In reply to the response to Entry 238, Joel Wendt argues that experience is separate from conscious awareness of experience, and the "freedom of inward expression" allows us to control the drawing together of thought and experience (i.e. there is no comparison of thought at the conscious level.), thereby we can know who we are through the experience of who we are.

Entry 240:

Ray Nepveux argues that because our knowledge is based on data procured from who we are, knowledge of who we are is based on the being of who we are, and therefore we can know who we are.

Entry 241:

Roberto Macías Barrientos argues that because we cannot place ourselves outside of the limits of what we know, we cannot know what the limits of what we know are, and therefore we cannot say that we cannot know who we are.

Entry 242:

In reply to the response to Entry 241, Roberto Macías Barrientos argues for various reasons that knowing who we are is inherent in being who we are, and that because life is a constant change of transition, it does not follow that we can ever be who we are.

Entry 243:

Richard L. Stover argues that through being as a "determination by brain" and conscious awareness of "detached feelings", we can know who we are.

Entry 244:

Robert Vahovick argues that because it is possible we could eventually know who we are, the proposition by using "cannot" is false.

Entry 245:

Alistair Burrowes argues that because existence is made up only of "matter" with three attributes, "inputs, outputs, and makeup", there is no knowledge or "who we are" except for illusions, and therefore there is no "who we are" to not know.

Entries 239-245

Entry 246:

In reply to the response to Entry 245, Alistair Burrowes argues that we are machines with programs, made up of "inputs, outputs, and makeup" and which respond to the laws of physics, and ultimately matter is all there is including machines, and therefore, there is no who we are to not know as the proposition contends.

Entry 247:

In reply to the response to Entry 246, Alistair Burrowes contends that if matter is all there is, and that matter cannot be categorized, then the proposition is invalid because there is nothing that can be overcome.

Entry 248:

Donald Changeau argues that the proposition is false because we can state that we currently exist, and through that statement, we can assess the manner(s) of our existence, which then allow us to know who we are and be who we are, regardless of the manner(s) we assign to our existence.

Entry 249:

Michael De argues that the proposition is an internalist account of epistemology, and by being so, it is subject to infinite regress from claiming to know that we cannot know who we are, thereby is epistemically unjustifiable, and the proposition is contradictory from claiming to know that we cannot know anything.

Entries 246-249

Entry 250:

In reply to the response to Entry 249, Michael De argues that the problem of infinite regress still applies to the proposition, unless the distinction between absolutism and non-absolutism can be demonstrated, and shown to be relevant to epistmic justification, viz., justification in the knowledge (or non-knowledge) of one’s belief.

Entry 251:

In reply to the response to Entry 250, Michael De argues that beliefs are certain at the time of their possession in order to justify the claim that an externalist account does not know the grounds for belief, (i.e. certain knowledge of belief’s possession is sufficient itself), thereby uphold the distinction between externalism and internalism, and the problem of infinite regress associated with both the latter and the proposition, and to show the non-applicability of absolutism and non-absolutism to epistemic justification. (i.e. the distinction is not applicable to beliefs.)

Entry 252:

In reply to the response to Entry 251, Michael De argues that the proposition being an internalist epistemic account, requires that all the grounds for belief be known, and therefore the proposition is subject to infinite regress, and that if the internalist account is not accepted, the proposition is overcome on grounds of having adequate and coherent evidence that we ourselves are "animate, corporeal/material biotic entities comprised of such and such matter (quarks, leptons, gluons, atoms, molecules, and so on)."

Entries 250-252

Entry 253:

In reply to the response to Entry 248 and using linguistic analysis, Donald Changeau maintains that he knows with certainty that he currently exists, and that his model mapping the existence and manners of a human being has not been disproven.

Entry 254:

Entry 255:

In reply to the response to Entry 252 and with reference to Russell and Edwards, Michael De argues that the proposition is invalid on grounds of "‘fallacy’ ignoratio elenchi by redefinition" of the term "know", whereby the term has been redefined to make it impossible to know who we are by the definition, and therefore the proposition has been overcome "a long time ago" using a "proper", non-fallacious definition of know.

Entries 253-255

Entry 256:

In reply to the response to Entry 255, Michael De argues that by establishing that we can only consciously know in representational sense is not enough to show that our knowledge of ourselves is false, and that if self is inherent in consciousness prior to perception then our ability to express knowledge of ourselves linguistically is what is limited, not the actual knowledge.

Entry 257:

In reply to the response to Entry 253 and with graphic illustration, Donald Changeau argues that we can know we currently exist with complete certainty, and within that complete certainty we can know the manners of our existence, thereby who we are.

Entry 258:

In reply to the response to Entry 256, Michael De argues that the epistemology of the proposition, which according to Michael De says that ‘we cannot be said to exist with any certainty’, is in contradiction with the premises behind the proposition, and that not all conscious knowledge is representational, and that the reflexivity of knowledge does not necessarily equal epistemic limitation of knowledge.

Entries 256-258

Entry 259:

Jeffrey Wayne Scott argues that the word "cannot" in the proposition implies an "absolute necessity", which is a "highly questionable" and confusing concept, thus making the question of overcoming the proposition a "category error".

Entry 260:

Neil Burgess argues that we need to go beyond reason in order to attain a more accurate, holistic understanding of ourselves, and that we can partially overcome the proposition by viewing ourselves as "self-aware components" of the universe, or viewing knowledge as a progression to more complete knowledge of the universe.

Entry 261:

Marc Lane argues that the competition is about the probability of the proposition, and that because the proposition is not probable in all circumstances, the proposition can be overcome.

Entry 262:

DanKY contends that the only thing we can know, without unrealizing it, is that we do not know anything.

Entry 263:

In reply to the response to Entry 261, Marc Lane argues that the proposition can be overcome through our reasoning capabilities, and nullified by showing that what we evolve into as adults is who we are.

Entry 264:

Marc Lance argues that by defining possibility as what may occur according to our nature, custom, or manners, the proposition can be overcome.

Entry 265:

In reply to the response to Entry 258 and with reference to Chomsky and Descartes, Michael De argues that the existence of innate knowledge contradicts the notion of all knowledge being representational, and that since it is more reasonable that we are thought than anything else, and thereby our knowledge of self is ourselves, the proposition is overcome.

Entry 266:

A. M. Trotter argues that the first half of the proposition is a "hollow assertion" because no reasons have been provided showing the proposition’s truth, and that the second half of the proposition is an illusion, because we cannot be other than that which we are in any given moment, and therefore knowing who we are would not negate being who we are.

Entry 267:

Marianne Bartley argues that the proposition can be overcome by taking the position that we begin our physical experience with knowledge of who we are, thereby there is no conflict between existence and knowledge.

Entries 259-267

Entry 268:

With reference to Whitehead and Sartre, Sam Nico proposes a direction for resolution of the proposition, by suggesting that the unification of the in-itself and for-itself at death, occurs in every living moment in the form of a "rhythm as a pattern which announces both closure (completeness) and expectation (incompleteness)."

Entry 269:

Donald Changeau argues that the proposition is false, because the global frame of reference, which shows that we can more reasonably know and be who we are, cannot be disputed, and that the claim that "we cannot truly know who we are" is contradictory, because we must know something about ourselves in order to know that we do not.

Entry 270:

In reply to the response to Entry 268 and with reference to Sheldrake and Sartre, Sam Nico provides a direction for a solution to the proposition by arguing that at death, the organic form of memory is passed on, so that what is known in the moment is a totality (i.e. "particular level of knowing representing the whole"), and he points out that the solution to the proposition will entail a "constant criticism" rather than an absolute answer.

Entries 268-270

Entry 271:

Rick Rush argues that the individual human mind is a closed book to all other individuals, and therefore all that can be known is logically unfalsifiable "personal opinion", thus the proposition is "not worthy of further argument".

Entry 272:

In reply to the response to Entry 270, Sam Nico proposes a direction for solution of the proposition by suggesting that current scientific, middle-excluded thought needs to be overcome by expanding the boundaries of human thought or "reducing the scope of the empty center" through incorporating more of the metaphysical whole into our perspective.

Entry 273:

In reply to the response to Entry 269, Donald Changeau argues that a global frame of reference in relation to local frames of reference is a means to overcome the proposition.

Entries 271-273

Entry 274:

In reply to the response to Entry 273, Donald Changeau argues that the global frame of reference is not only the fundamental means of overcoming the proposition, but that the global frame of reference overcomes the proposition, assuming there are local references which assert that we can truly know and be who we are, by being a necessary average value for local frames of reference.

Entry 275:

Raoul Starren argues that the proposition implies we can either not know at all or know by ceasing to be who we are and then recontinuing to be who we are, and therefore, to apply a more reasonable status to the proposition is "dubitable at its very best".

Entry 276:

In reply to the response to Entry 275 and from a base position, Raoul Starren argues that because being is necessary for knowing, and that being and knowing must occur simultaneously for there to be knowing, he can claim to have overcome the proposition, and that because more reasonableness is arbitrary, it is not useful, except in a democratic sense, in determining whether or not we can truly know who we are.

Entry 277:

In reply to the response to Entry 276, Raoul Starren argues that the statement "we cannot truly know who we are" is irrefutable, but the original proposition, "we cannot truly know who we are and be who we are at the same time", is nonsensical and thereby overcome because the proposition leads to either ceasing our existence in order to know or knowing and being who we are at the same time.

Entries 274-277

Entry 278:

In reply to the response to Entry 272 and with reference to a comment by Ken Bell, Sam Nico argues that the boundaries of more reasonableness need to be expanded to include the metaphysical, otherwise the division between the "subject" and "structure" or being and knowing will remain, and on a broader level, philosophy being confined by the reason of thought will be nothing more than a science.

Entry 279:

An anonymous entry argues that though we cannot know who we are on our own, we can know who we are through the All-knowing or an individual enlightened by the All-knowing.

Entry 280:

Dave Adams argues that because we cannot help from being who we are, we can know who we are in any moment from a position of "limited true knowledge" (i.e. our limited true knowledge of ourselves is who we are), but he contends that it is much more difficult to show that we can truly know who we are while TRULY being who we are.

Entry 281:

In reply to the response to Entry 277, Raoul Starren critiques the proposition from various angles arguing that the proposition should be reduced to "we cannot know who we are and be at the same time."

Entry 282:

Peter van Diest argues that the proposition can be overcome by acknowledging it, because acknowledgment leads to the contradiction that we cannot truly know who we are without truly knowing who we are.

Entries 278-282

Entry 283:

Dan Walsh argues that an individual needs to know who he or she is and have self-awareness of it, in order to be who he or she is, and that a conception of who one is must be applied in order for it to really be who one is.

Entry 284:

Through a detailed critique of the basic proof for not knowing who we are, a review committee for arbitrary assumptions argues that the proof is based on "arbitrary assumptions", and therefore there is "no proof at all".

Entry 285:

Berrada Mohammed Ali contends that knowing is a form of being, which allows us to be inside and outside of ourselves at the same time, and therefore truly know who we are.

Entry 286:

In reply to the response to Entry 281 and with reference to Kurt Gödel, Raoul Starren argues that the proposition is limited because it is a static definition describing a dynamic entity, and that the irrefutability of the proposition is inconsistent with Gödel's theorem, and further, Starren questions the effectiveness of more reasonableness as a decision-making method.

Entry 287:

Michael De argues that the proposition is overcome on grounds that it asserts a "logical necessity" but it does not entail a logical necessity, and that in revised format the proposition is still overcome, because epistemic limitedness is not a ground for logical necessity.

Entries 283-287

Entry 288:

Louis Barson suggests that the proposition is problematic because it has an "infinite loop".

Entry 289:

In reply to the response to Entry 287 and with reference Sartre’s theory of consciousness, Michael De contends that the proposition can be overcome by the most reasonableness of the belief, "I exist at least as utterances", and Sartre's existentialist conception of consciousness, whereby who we are is an impersonal spontaneity created ex nihilo.

Entry 290:

In reply to the response to Entry 288, Louis Barson contends that the proposition is subject to infinite loop, and he asks for clarification of the proposition.

Entry 291:

In reply to the response to Entry 286, Raoul Starren argues that the proposition is overcome because the second half of the proposition "be who we are" based on its static property is "identical" to "know who we are", and our conscious knowledge is "an integral part of THAT which is being".

Entry 292:

Dale Clifford argues that things have no more meaning than they are meant to be, and therefore just as our kidneys’ produce urine, our brains produce knowledge of who we are.

Entries 288-292

Entry 293:

Berek Qinah Smith argues that with knowledge being a "fuzzy matter of degrees", we can know who we are, and that all knowledge being derived from "without", knowledge of who we are has been injected or implanted by the Creator, and that we have sufficient knowledge of ourselves in order to exist.

Entry 294:

Prasad Mapatuna argues that there is no "ultimate truth" we can know because our knowledge is defined by the processing of information through our senses, and that because of the uncertainty of what is real, anything is possible including a computer system or super human being controlling the human species through control of the species’ sensory input.

Entry 295:

In reply to the response to Entry 291, Raoul Starren agrees that we cannot truly know who we are, but he argues that the second half of the proposition, "be who we are", holds no reason, because it needlessly repeats the first half of the proposition, and that the irrefutability of the proposition is "unreasonable" because the proposition is based on uncertainties.

Entries 293-295

Entry 296:

With reference to Gödel, Laon Shelley argues that in a strict philosophical sense viz., the incompleteness of self-knowledge and its "recursive" nature, we cannot truly know who we are, but in a practical sense we can truly know who we are viz., disciplines like morality, ethics, and law depend on self-knowledge, and individuals sufficiently function with the self-knowledge they have.

Entry 297:

Jay Nakonechny argues that we can truly know who we are through indirect (or external) observation of ourselves, whereby we use three points of observation, or a mirror to look at ourselves in another mirror.

Entry 298:

In reply to the response to Entry 289 and with reference to Descartes and Sartre, Michael De argues that "I exist, and I know myself in every conceivable way since I am at most an utterance", thus the proposition is overcome, because it is most reasonable that an utterance exists over anything else, and that "I" as non-reflexive pronoun, is used to express the utterance, which means that "I" is the same thing as the utterance. (Sartre’s "impersonal spontaneity" created ex nihilo)

Entries 296-298

Entry 299:

Lee Stocks argues that the proposition is impossible to overcome because we are a single lifetime away from death, rather than a step away from God or utopia, (or the answer to the proposition).

Entry 300:

In reply to the response to Entry 294 and with reference to Stephen Hawking, Prasad Mapatuna argues that the proposition cannot be overcome, because what we know is based on representation through our senses, and therefore there is no such thing as absolute truth or reality from our perspective.

Entry 301:

In reply to the response to Entry 298, Michael De argues that the proposition is overcome because it is most reasonable that he is an utterance over anything else, and that causality is a necessary part of human perspective even though it does not rule out the possibility of "creation ex nihilo" (non-causality), and that the problem with changes in the truth-value of indexicals (e.g. pronouns) can be solved by the removal of them from statements.

Entry 302:

In reply to the response to Entry 295, Raoul Starren argues that the concept of more reasonableness, thereby the competition, is subjective because the concept of more reasonableness is not defined by reasons themselves, but the individual opinions of reasons, and that the proposition is "nonsensical" because it does not follow how we can say something we cannot truly do (i.e. truly know who we are) cannot be said to perform in synchronicity with something we cannot truly know (i.e. being who we are).

Entries 299-302

Entry 303:

Malcolm Nxele contends that the proposition states that human existence is in a "process of growth of realization of who we are", and that because reason alone as tool cannot completely capture who we are, faith comes in to guide individuals through existence.

Entry 304:

Kenny Snyder critiques the predefined terms of the proposition, and proposes possible directions for solution to the proposition like the "continuum of being" whereby who we are in entirety is fractal in every aspect of ourselves, the dissolution-resolution of self (compactification of self), or the point of all knowing/knowledge involves all perspectives.

Entry 305:

With reference to Pythagorean, eif argues that the proposition can be overcome by accepting that reality is fundamentally defined by an "indivisible continuum", so that knowledge and being "merge" into one with the rest of the continuum.

Entry 306:

Buster Price argues that the proposition is "flawed" because the non-separation of knower and known, or truly knowing who we are, can be established based on experience of it.

Entries 303-306

Entry 307:

In reply to the response to Entry 293 and with reference to orthodox Christianity and Protestantism, Berek Qinah Smith believes that the proposition is overcome because a "noetic structure" or "what forms the patterns in our minds", which contains certain knowledge including knowledge of who we are, has been implanted by the Creator.

Entry 308:

In dispute of the response to Entry 306, Buster Price argues that the proposition is overcome because by experience of non-separation of knower and known being "registered in memory", we have a time in which we truly know who we are.

Entries 307-308

Entry 309:

In reply to the response to Entry 305 and in defense of the concept of ‘indivisible continuum" whereby everything makes up an indivisible "greater whole", eif argues that indivisible continuum may not really be contradictory, but our "faulty" reasoning is unable to comprehend its soundness viz., we have not evolved to understand indivisible continuum, and perhaps we may have to reject part of our reasoning in order to accept the indivisible wholeness of all things, and thereby overcome the proposition.

Entry 310:

In reply to the response to Entry 308, Buster Price argues that experience is not subject to infinite regress because it occurs prior to reflection upon it, and the fact that experience is registered in memory shows that experience has occurred, and therefore, on the grounds that it is possible to experience the non-separation of knower and known, and that Price believes he has experienced it, and no one can deny the possibility that he may have, the proposition is overcome.

Entry 311:

June Plaice contends that the beginning of knowing is in being, and that if we are the creators of our beingness then we can know who we are.

Entry 312:

Eif contends that if it is accepted that human consciousness and all other structural aspects of our being are emergent in nature, stemming exclusively from an indivisible whole, then reason and our senses are preceded by the indivisible whole and who we are and knowledge are in oneness, and the proposition is overcome.

Entries 309-312

Entry 313:

With reference to Schopenhauer, Suvas Lakshmikutty maintains that the proposition can be overcome if the [individual] "will" is completely denied.

Entry 314:

With reference to his collection of aphorisms, Steve Callihan contends that being itself is indeterminable because it is in an infinite process of becoming.

Entry 315:

In reply to the response to Entry 295, Raoul Starren contends that the competition amounts to no more than a "language game", so that no true winner can be determined.

Entries 313-315

Entry 316:

Eif equates the proposition to a "religious hoax" in which something based on faith can never be fully determined, and he contends that if being is a construction of the human brain, and thereby is an illusion, the question of who we are is settled.

Entry 317:

In reply to the response to Entry 313 and with reference to Schopenhauer, Suvas Lakshmikutty contends that the will is the basis for existence, and that everything else including ourselves and conscious phenomenon is the will objectified, so that through the oneness of existence we can truly know who we are, the will.

Entry 318:

In continuation of Entry 188, Nicholas Covelli contends that being who we are and knowing who we are is the fundamental level of a human’s being.

Entry 319:

In reply to the response to Entry 318, Nicholas Covelli argues that if it is true that we can only know who we are with limited truth-value, then it means that we can truly know who we are in part.

Entries 316-319

Entry 320:

In reply to the response to Entry 317 and with reference to Schopenhauer ("The World as Will and Representation") and Kant, SL states that the will itself is the kernel or core of life rather than the whole of life, and the will itself ontologically precedes the intellect, and the state of complete self-knowledge (viz., complete denial of the individual will) can only be experienced individually.

Entry 321:

With reference to Ken Bell’s Entries (Dispute 9 (1-37), Ivan Alexander contends that the problem with self-knowledge with absolute truth-value is communicating it between individuals, whereby the best we can hope for is a self-referential probabilistic value like "1", and even then it is fuzzy to anyone else and possibly of "0" value.

Entries 320-321

Entry 322:

With reference to process theory, Roger McEvilly critiques the nine arguments defending the proposition ("Defense of Proposition"), claiming that the proposition is deficient due to its "arbitrary and static definitions", and in comparison to who we are (including consciousness) as an emergent, biological process.

Entry 323:

In reply to the response to Entry 321, Ivan Alexander states that only the individual can decide whether he or she knows him or herself due to the self-referential aspect of communication, and that intellectually proving true self-knowledge to oneself, or others, through the concept of "interrelated infinite Totality" (and the necessity of who we are within this Totality) is presently beyond the human mind.

Entry 324:

In response to Entry 321, Ken Bell contends that partly because "completeness is momentary and fleeting", there is no absolute "I" in a unitary sense, and critical analysis is a form of "technology", and we can only understand ourselves and others through "love and compassion".

Entries 322-324

Entry 325:

In reply to the response to Entry 322, Roger McEvilly identifies possibilities for non-existence of who we are and non-interaction of things (i.e. things-in-themselves), thereby possible means to overcome the proposition, but concedes that it is not possible to more reasonably show the proposition to be "wrong".

Entry 326:

With reference to Entry 322 by Roger McEvilly, Ivan Alexander contends that knowing who we are comes down to a "choice" of either a rationalistic approach to the definition of knowledge itself, or a rationalistic and non-rationalistic approach to the definition of knowledge itself which includes our feelings and sub-rational mental processes.

Entry 327:

With reference to Genesis, Ray Kaliss contends that we can truly know who we are only with "experiential-knowledge", because analytical-knowledge is representational ("less aware and attentive to experiences"), and that we truly know who we are through experiential-knowledge because we cannot long for something that does not exist (i.e. truly knowing who we are), and we are born with bare (non-analytical) awareness (i.e. "a complete union with nature and nature's God").

Entries 325-327

Entry 328:

With reference to the response to Entry 326, Ivan Alexander contends that by acknowledging that the infinity of interconnections define the "point" of existence, we can truly know who we are (i.e. it is our "choice").

Entry 329:

In reply to the response to Entry 327, Ray Kaliss contend because the "I" can experience itself, without having to go outside of itself, (i.e. the "one experience"), we can truly know who we are through experiential knowledge.

Entry 330:

In reply to the response to Entry 328 and with reference to "Habeas Mentem", Ivan Alexander contends that the human mind, a product of universe’s infinite interconnections, is an autonomous entity or closed system, so that our every thought is a true reflection of who we are.

Entries 328-330

Entry 331:

In reply to the response to Entry 329, Ray Kaliss contends that we can truly know who we are at all times through "self-contained" experiential knowledge which is in the conscious form of "I".

Entry 332:

In further reply to the response to Entry 326, Ivan Alexander proposes that the existence is defined by an infinity of interrelations, and which he identifies as a "totality", and that truly knowing who we are is apparently limited by reason itself, which begs the question of whether poetry would be a more reasonable way of knowing who we are than logic.

Entry 333:

In reply to the response to Entry 315 and with reference to Schopenhauer and Entry 313, Raoul Starren argues that knowledge viewed as phenomenon leads to problem of relativity, and one way to overcome this problem in the context of the proposition, is to view knowledge as "Being itself", thereby propose the union of knowing and being.

Entry 334:

In continuation of Entry 292 and with reference to Feynman, Hakin, Jung, Popper, Feyer-Abend, Mach, Goethe, Pauling, and Kossyln, Dale Clifford contends that there are "many absolutes" differentiated by "different paths", and that the subconscious is "more directional" than scientific and philosophic methodologies, and that the only way to answer the proposition is to grant "full set status" to one’s assumptions.

Entry 335:

In reply to the response to Entry 330, Ivan Alexander proposes that the human being is defined by "A" which equals "(infinity - A)", so that we can infer that we truly know who we are based on what we know being interconnected to the infinite totality of things, and being as we are meant to be which includes self-consciousness of what we are meant to be.

Entries 331-335

Entry 336:

In a critique of the nine supporting arguments of Challenge Proposition 1, Raoul Starren argues that what we ultimately know comes down relatively to our individual “skin/mind”, and therefore, no (universal) more reasonable position on the epistemological nature of human knowledge or anything else can be known.

Entry 337:

In reply to the response to Entry 336, Raoul Starren argues that the only basis for choosing between alternatives without succumbing to subjectivity is to concede a non-phenomenal existence with being itself (i.e. oneness) as its (ex nihlo) basis. Starren concludes paradoxically that non-phenomenal existence is the only basis for true (or complete) knowledge, and therefore in defense of Entry 336, he further (implicitly) concludes that there are no purely objective grounds for distinguishing between choices (or determining the more reasonable position).

Entries 336-337

Entry 338:

In reply to the response to Entry 331, Ray Kaliss argues that experiential knowledge, as opposed to analytical knowledge, is completely objective because it occurs directly through our senses, and that the self or "I" is necessarily part of experiential knowledge because the knowledge is an expression of our existence. Therefore, he concludes that through experiential knowledge we can truly know who we are.

Entry 339:

Paul Dawkins argues that Challenge Proposition 1 can be overcome by having "faith" in "logic" and our ability to truly know who we are.

Entry 340:

Satisfaction proposes that the process of knowing may truly be who we are, so that knowing and being (truly who we are) are the same.

Entry 341:

James proposes that we could truly know who we are through a "supremely knowledgeable, non-human being" who explains to us who we truly are.

Entry 342:

Ulysses Alvarez argues that the "[human] will" can overcome the "ruses of logic" by the ability (or "approval") of logic to allow us the "freedom" to truly know who we are.

Entry 343:

Padraig Sinkec contends that if the functionality of human beings in the definition "we" includes a "self-assembled root cognitive neural mapping ability", Challenge Proposition 1 can be overcome.

Entry 344:

Jennifer argues that because we cannot know without being, and the way of knowing is absolute, our being is absolute as well, and therefore we cannot avoid knowing absolutely and being (absolutely) who we are.

Entries 338-344

Entry 345:

In reply to the response to Entry 335, Ivan Alexander points out that no two things can occupy the same space and time, and therefore the individual who occupies his own space and time is in a better position to know who he is than anyone else. Also, Alexander argues that through a practical human need to know at some level and the "universal mechanism of interconnectedness", being and knowing are the same.

Entry 346:

In reply to the response to Entry 338 and with reference to Kant, Newton, Darwin, Hegel, the book of Genesis, Ray Kaliss argues we can truly know who we are through the "I" itself in what he calls an "existential and experiential knowledge of union". He defends his position with reference to the conception of "no thing" as the basis of existence, "unhindered existential experience of ‘I’" in the first experience of a child, and the argument that we cannot "long" for true knowledge of ourselves without previously knowing true knowledge of ourselves.

Entry 347:

John Charles Morzfeld argues that by observing we change what we are measuring, and therefore we are fundamentally and truly unmeasurable beings, and by observing (who we are) we are being simultaneously.

Entry 348:

Svetlana Ivina argues that Challenge Proposition 1 cannot be overcome because regretfulness (of past actions) in people indicates a lack of complete understanding of oneself.

Entry 349:

Dylon Paul Storey contends that we can truly know who we are because we are "exactly" part of the infinite pattern of the universe.

Entry 350:

With reference to the concept of "delta mapping" and by acknowledging that we are ones trying to know, Brian Anderson proposes that we are the state of analyzing to know who we are.

Entries 345-350

Entry 351:

With application of the "Law of Vacuum", protomutant acknowledges the limited nature of human perspective, but attempts to overcome it in the context of the Competition by assuming that "absolute being exists" (in the form of "will"), thereby indirectly demonstrating it is less possible (or less reasonable) to prove him wrong from our limited perspective, and therefore he contends that he has overcome (or refuted) Challenge Proposition 1.

Entry 352:

In dispute of the response to Entry 351, protomutant argues that he has more reasonably overcome the Challenge Proposition 1 "when" absolute being exists, and therefore, Proposition 1 is overcome. In defense of the more reasonableness of absolute being existing, he contends that in identifying our "real" identities, it is more reasonable to assume that the "absolute" does exist, than it does not.

Entry 353:

In dispute of the response to Entry 352, protomutant contends that "when" absolute being exists, Challenge Proposition 1 is overcome, and therefore by establishing this possibility, he is adamant that the Proposition is overcome. To support his position, he contends that he is only required to more reasonably show that it is "not impossible" to truly (or completely) know (who we are).

Entries 351-353

Entry 354:

In dispute of the response to Entry 353 and with reference to his first Entry 351, protomutant contends that Challenge Proposition 1 is overcome on grounds that it is possible “Absolute Being” exists (through the conception of “absolute truth factor”), and that there is no requirement in the Competition to prove either the non-existence or existence of Absolute Being.

Entry 355:

In dispute of the response to Entry 354, protomutant contends that because it is claimed Challenge Proposition 1 is “impossible” to overcome from our limited perspective, the Proposition is an assertion of absolute knowledge from our limited perspective. Therefore, Proposition 1 is overcome by demonstrating itself the possibility that we can know Absolute Being.

Entry 356:

Chris Chaten contends that self-knowledge is similar to “intuition, instinct, innate sense” (viz., something we are “born with”, something “essential to living”), and self-knowledge does not require the conception of time for its expression, and therefore, we can know who we are in the moment.

Entry 357:

In dispute of the response to Entry 355 and with reference to Entry 351, protomutant contends that Challenge Proposition 1 is contradictory because it asserts (in the first instance) through the phrases “cannot truly” and “impossible to overcome” absolute truth-value, and (in the second instance) through the concept “more reasonableness” and the phrase “not fully certain” non-absolute truth-value.

Entry 358:

In dispute of the response to Entry 357, protomutant contends that the conception of “truly” is a fundamental part of Challenge Proposition 1, making the Proposition an assertion of absolute truth-value, and that more reasonableness was only inserted into the Proposition to limit the absolute truth-value. Yet it does not make sense how a proposition with absolute truth-value can be limited. Hence, according to protomutant Challenge Proposition 1 is contradictory.

Entries 354-358

Summary of Entries (1-134) Summary of Entries (135-238) Summary of Entries (359-366)