| Challenge the Philosophy - Summary of Entries (135-238) |
Definitions of the principal terms used in the competition:
"We cannot know": our ability to refute or prove a proposition, within the limits of what we know,
by more reasonably contradicting our use of reason than not doing so. For further explanation, and explanation of "know", see "we cannot know" and "know".
Alexander Fiske Harrison argues by method of reductio ad absurdum that the truth of the proposition’s negation, we can know who we are, leads to infinite regress, and that we may be able to know "essential" truths about who we are rather than the complete truth.
With reference to Hinduism and Buddhism, Richard Henderson argues that to know oneself, an individual must be separate from what he knows and at the same time not separate from it.
Travis Hedglin contends that all a human beings is a "combination of energy and mass with consciousness", and therefore the proposition is invalid because "who we are" does not exist.
Eif argues that the proposition is invalid because the human brain constructs the illusion of knowledge, so that there is neither ‘we can know who we are’ nor ‘we cannot know who we are’ except as illusion.
Richard argues that because of the epistemological uncertainty of language, the proposition has a "null" result, and thereby is invalid.
In reply to the response to Entry 138, Eif contends that the notion of "fundamental level of being" is an illusion constructed by the human brain, and since illusion equates to invalidness, the proposition is invalid.
Arvan Harvat suggests different ways to approach the proposition like materialist epiphenomenalism (consciousness studies and cognitive theory), spiritual traditions like Advaita Vedanta and Theravada Buddhism, and spiritual doctrines like Tantricism, Aurobindo, and Gerda Walther.
Raoul Starren requests a reread of Entry 117, arguing that the position that who we are is beyond our comprehension, so whatever we know about who we are is unreasonable, is more reasonable than asserting that we cannot know who we are.
David K Duke argues that we can "coincidentally" know exactly who we are.
With reference to Descartes, Gerald J. Gambale argues that we make choices from our being, and that in order to make choices, we need to know who we are.
Jim Dix argues that being at a particular position in the world cannot be separated from knowledge at the same particular position in the world.
With reference to Minsky, Chaitin, Perlovsky, Prigogine, and others, Yuri Kuzyk examines the nature of Western thought, by focusing on the "constrictive" framework of Aristotelian middle-excluded logic, and he concludes that humanity needs a new framework if detached destruction of the biosphere is to be avoided.
Mrs. Bharathi Shanker argues that "I" is soul because thoughts can carry oneself away from the physical world; thoughts are subtle entities; and similar to the necessity of an electrical current to pass through equipment for the equipment to work, life-force is a necessary part of a human being for the human being to live, and that through a life-time of inquiry, an individual can know who he or she is.
Wayne Holland argues that the proposition can be overcome by simply redefining the word "who".
In reply to the response to Entry 147, Mrs. Bharathi Shanker contends that there are four paths available to know who we are: path of karma, path of yoga, path of knowledge, and path of devotion.
In reply to Entry 146 and its response, Ken Bell contends that since knowledge of ourselves is more aptly described as a process, self-knowledge is inherently irrational.
Wayne Holland contends through examples that by redefining the word "who", the proposition can be overcome.
Mitch Hodge argues that the proposition can be overcome on grounds of vagueness and ambiguity like the unclear distinction between "we" and "I", and on ground of a more reasonable position like direct realism which states that consciousness "becomes" the knowledge of the external world, and therefore has "immediate" access to external knowledge.
Wayne Holland contends that human beings and other life-forms like "trees" are not words, and that we cannot know thinking through thinking, and therefore we cannot know who we are without ceasing to be who we are.
Travis Hedglin contends that though we cannot fully conceive or understand who we are, we experience who we are every moment of our lives.
Ken Bell contends that though being and mind appear to be inseparable, our thoughts due to the self-referential nature of knowledge are not who we are.
In reply to the response to Entry 149 and with reference to Paul Bronton, Mrs. Bharathi Shanker argues that because thoughts and being are subtle entities, they travel together, and therefore, our thoughts contain who we are, and that through withdraw from the external world, an individual can know who he or she is ("inner self").
In reply to the response to Entry 156, Mrs. Bharathi Shanker contends that human thought is mixed with who we are (soul), and that by focusing inwardly and with practice, it is possible to experience the inner self.
Goran Arsov argues that individual cannot help from being who he or she is, and that self-awareness does not imply that an individual cannot be who he or she is.
Trey argues that there is nothing to know about who we are, because we ourselves are in flux, so that all we can know about ourselves is from a phenomenal standpoint in relation to our fairly stable bodies and memory.
With reference to Bell's Theorem, Big Bang theory, entropy, quantum mechanics, synergy, DNA, and human genome, Stephen P. Smith argues that the universe is made up an intrinsic whole, whereby the whole is greater than the parts, and that through evolution and the birth of consciousness (i.e. ability to create new metaphors or parts of the whole), human beings have created a "spiritual universe".
Arik Issan argues that because knowledge is an extension of being, and thereby arises from being’s time, knowledge is not separated from being. (i.e. "a way of being")
Bob Balonek argues that in order to be who we are, we need to know who we are, and that ‘who we are’ are curious living beings which need answers in order to keep existing.
Trey suggests that in order for the proposition to be valid, we need to show that there is a "who we are" to know, and we then need to explain how we can know something, "who we are", which is apparently beyond our comprehension.
In reply to the response to Entry 157, Mrs. Bharathi Shanker contends that who we are (soul) travels with thoughts, and that in the process of focused, internal concentration, the self may merge with the universal soul, producing self-awareness, and then produce knowledge of self when back in the state of body awareness.
In reply to the response to Entry 160, Stephen P. Smith contends that because local and non-local interactions make up human thought (Bell’s Theorem), knowledge of ourselves through local interactions cannot provide a complete picture of ourselves.
Kevin Wagner argues that the proposition cannot be truthfully negated because human sensa is separate from the sensing organism (i.e. sensation implies relation), and to assume the contradictory of the proposition, "we can know who we are", leads to infinite regress.
Arik Issan argues that if being is static, then it is possible to eventually know who we are through scientific or religious progress, whereby being is consciously totalized with either knowledge coinciding with being ("static by addition") or being coinciding with knowledge ("static by a geometrical progression").
In reply to the response to Entry 166, Kevin Wagner argues that because sensation implies a relation between sensa and sensing organism, and that the contradictory of the proposition leads to infinite regress, the proposition is impossible to overcome, and therefore the competition is invalid.
Trey suggests that if being is in constant change, then there is no being while we are alive, and therefore there is no being to know, and if we are not strictly a being until we die ("unchanging"), then we face the problem of how we can know it.
In reply to the response to Entry 165, Stephen P. Smith contends that non-local interactions imply that there is a larger range of possibilities for an observer based reality, and that conscious knowledge is equated with "restricted" free will or our ability to determine our reality.
Jackie St. Hilaire argues that by "letting go" or "detaching from the ego", an individual can know who he or she is.
In reply to the response to Entry 170, Stephen P. Smith concedes that quantum reality may be a false reality, and suggests that whole reality revolves around movement by life-forms towards harmony with it.
Martin Bebow argues that the proposition can be overcome by viewing knowledge as a state of being, whereby knowing comes from who we are (inexpressible), so that in a moment of direct perception of reality or "flash of intuition", an individual can know who he or she is.
Ivan D. Alexander argues that because identity is made up an infinite number of minute connections, it is impossible to know who we are.
Eugene Goheen argues that because ‘be who we are’ is contained in the total construction plan which results in the projection of knowledge of ‘be who we are’, ‘be’ equals ‘know’, and therefore since ‘cannot know who we are’ does not equal ‘be who we are’, the proposition is invalid.
D. Zalkind argues that only by stripping ourselves of our egos and attaining knowledge of all existence, we can know who we are.
In reply to the response to Entry 172, Stephen P. Smith argues that everything is based on a process of creation and graduation to a higher level.
Stephanie Kirmer argues that because of the uncertainty of knowledge and the inability of individuals to get outside of their minds, an individual is the best judge of whether or not he or she can know who he or she is, and therefore based on an individual having a perception of him or herself, and not the content of it, the proposition is disproven.
Steven Conifer argues that there is nothing to overcome, because the notion of "fundamental level of being" is "metaphysical nonsense", and there is no incompatibility between "know who we are" and "be who we are", and therefore the proposition is "flat-out false".
Trey challenges the notion of fundamental level of being by suggesting that we may have no fundamental basis than change itself, and he questions how we could know we even have an essence if it is beyond our comprehension.
Sergiy Grynko argues that because knowing originates in being, and that we must "continue being in order to continue knowing", being and knowing are "simultaneous", and therefore we can know who we are.
In reply to the response to Entry 173, Martin Bebow argues that all new knowledge stems from a "flash of intuition" and that we receive knowledge from the external world, and then cloth it with words, and further that knowledge is both scientific and religious in nature.
In reply to the response to Entry 179, Steven Conifer from an empiricist position argues that knowledge is made up of factual information obtained from observation, experience, and reason, and he attacks the proposition by for instance questioning the notions of "intrinsic separation" and "fundamental level of being", in which he concludes that the proposition is "linguistic and philosophical mess".
In reply to the response to Entry 177, Stephen P. Smith argues that through human consciousness and its means for creation, evolution leads to a higher order.
In reply to the response to Entry 174, Ivan D. Alexander argues that through an act of will, he can know who he is because he has chosen to know who he is.
Mel argues that because consciousness will never "outrun" existence, just as existence will never "outrun" time, self-identity is an inherent part of consciousness, and knowledge lags behind the present, all we can know is who we are.
With reference to the response to Entry 166, Roger McEvilly argues that if there is a whole, unchanging, completely uniform force of the universe, which permeates through all of space and time, and our minds taps into the force so that there is continuum between the force and our minds, then thoughts as form are the same as who we are.
Nicholas Covelli argues that being and knowing exist in a "co-existent relationship", whereby we cannot be who we are without knowing who we are, and we cannot know who we are without being who we are, and that in order to achieve a "fundamental level of being", human beings must follow their "innate human instinct", thought.
In reply to the response to Entry 187, Roger McEvilly contends that our minds tap into the force of the universe, so that there is nothing received through our senses from the external world; rather there is a continuum between our sensory and minds, and the external world.
Steve Vaughn argues that because we cannot physically know everything about ourselves due to the limits of our brain size (e.g. we cannot completely know a "10,000 pound tree" in the "four or five pounds" of our brain’s grey matter), all we can know of ourselves is an "abbreviation" of ourselves.
Raymond argues that by knowing we are always changing and realizing that knowing who we are does not entail knowing everything, we can know who we are ("beings that are consistently changing") and be who we are.
Charles Kindall argues that the only way to know who we are is to change our state of being, and in the process we would cease to be who we are while "initiating a whole new cycle of existence".
Matthew Groves argues that there is no disembodied mind or soul and that the human being is a physical system made up constituent particles and their interactions, and that due to relativity, constant change, and the Heisenburg Uncertainty Principle, we cannot know who we are.
Elena Suhir contends that we can only know who we are by being who we are and observing ourselves, and that we learn about ourselves by analyzing our feelings and thoughts.
David Duke contends that knowing who we are is contingent on who we are and what names we give ourselves.
In reply to the response to Entry 195, David Duke contends that it is possible to know who we are, if an individual is "omniscient" or has the same being but is in a "different vessel for the mind".
Steve Burwen suggests that the challenge may come down to the "temporal exclusivity" of the two main statements, "can know who we are" and "be who we are", and whether this exclusivity can be overcome.
In reply to the response to Entry 197, Steve Burwen points out that if being is a constant, then the competition centers around whether or not knowing precludes us from knowing who we are.
Seth McMillan contends that we can know who we are, but we cannot know who we were.
Paul Fucich contends that for human beings there is no "cannot", because human beings have "unlimited imagination and unlimited will", so that by willing something with full intent, it becomes what is.
Chris Bennett argues that since neither statement, "we can know who we are" and "be who we are" can be negated, they cannot be negated when they are used together.
Troy Wilber argues that we cannot know who we are because we are changing everyday.
With reference to Buddhism and Mitja Perus,
David Tyrrell argues that the human mind stems from "co-dependent arising", whereby the not-self "trawls" all inputs, thereby allows us to know who we are, and the mind’s "quantum spin" allows us to know who we are and be who we are.
Thierry Georges argues that who we are is something very basic and common to all human beings, namely that we think and exist.
In reply to the response to Entry 204, Thierry Georges contends that the proposition cannot be refuted unless someone discovers the source of human origin, and proves it without a doubt.
Eif contends that the only truth is that there is no truth, and therefore, any proposition which purports to be the truth is false.
With reference to the results of certain degenerative brain diseases and syndromes, Steve Burwen contends that the physiology and anatomy of the brain are behind the mind and consciousness.
In reply to the response to Entry 203 and with reference to quantum spin, dependent co-arising, gestalt higher order construct, and the Global Workspace Theory, David Tyrrell argues that knowing who we are and being who we are are equivalent, and therefore we can know and be who we are at the same time.
In reply to the response to Entry 207, Steve Burwen contends that even though consciousness is comprised of different components, consciousness is underlain by neural mechanisms in the brain.
In reply to the response to Entry 209, Steve Burwen contends that the cerebral cortex is the sole cause and only source of human consciousness.
With reference to the Philosophy of Objectivism by Ayn Rand as described by Dr. Leonard Peikoff, Ivan D. Alexander contends that in act of grasping a statement, an individual shows that what he grasps exists, and he himself exists in order to grasp it, and therefore by stating "I am in existence" "I am", an individuals shows that he exists in his consciousness and is conscious of it.
In reply to the response to Entry 210, Steve Burwen argues that if the human brain is a biological machine, then the cause for consciousness will be found completely in biological principles.
Vladimir Parkhomenko argues that the proposition is only valid up to a certain step in the development of human life, and that because the neurological and emotional development of humanity appears impossible, it is possible to believe anything we like or dislike.
Eif challenges the notion of who we are by arguing that it is an "unconscious, non- detectable, unknown, empirically non-verifiable entity", and therefore nothing reasonable can be said about it, and that more reasonableness is not necessarily the best and only way to determine what is true.
Kevin Brewer claims that our material inventions are the very things that make human beings human, and that by knowing our limitation we can know who we are, and by accepting our limitations we can be who we are.
Louis Casinelli argues that because we act in accordance with our views of ourselves, we are always what we know who we are.
Ivan Alexander from the Humancafe argues that according to Aristotelian logic the proposition is irrefutable due to the phrase, "at the same time" because it creates two separate entities, and that the only way to overcome the proposition is to move beyond Aristotelian logic to a mechanism which will allow two separate entities to be one.
Kenneth Udut argues that by being aware of our roles in structured environments, we can within limits know who we are.
With reference to the Self or Atman of the Hindu's and the Dharmakaya of the Vajrayana Buddhist, Dana Gaynor from the PsychoSpiritual Research Institute contends that by realizing that the self is a "field of potential" rather than something from a relational structure, the proposition can be overcome.
Alireza argues that by showing the non-applicability of the Heisensburg Uncertainty Principle to the proposition, the proposition can be overcome.
In dispute to the response to Entry 219, Kenneth Udut questions the notion that roles do not exactly correlate to who we are, by arguing that through "introspection and maturity", we can follow the "threads that appear in common through all roles", thereby know who we are.
With reference to Descartes, Robby May argues that from his perspective, all he can know is that he exists, and therefore there is nothing to overcome--he is himself and that is all.
In dispute to the response to Entry 221, Kenneth Udut argues that because who we are has been defined as unconscious, the proposition cannot be overcome, because as soon as someone claims to have overcome it, who we are would no longer be unconscious.
In reply to the response to Entry 217, Ivan D. Alexander from the Humancafe argues that through the notion of "infinite being" and the mechanism of interrelationship, whereby infinite being as consciousness continuously redefines itself, we can know who we are and be who we are.
Burt Harding contends that intellectual knowing is of little value in knowing who we are, but "feeling-knowing" can allow individuals to feel who they are, without actually knowing it.
Dov P. Ancona suggests that by determining "levels of awareness" of who we are, and then define who we are according to those levels of awareness, we can know who we are while being who we are.
In reply to the response to Entry 224, Ivan Alexander from the Humancafe argues that "infinite being" precedes the creation of knowledge by human beings, and that the totality or "Consciousness itself" through the mechanism of interrelation defines human beings, so that what human beings are conscious of is the totality.
Graham Scott argues that because knowledge is a "thing of the past", the proposition holds true.
In reply to the response to Entry 227, Ivan Alexander from the Humancafe contends that the parts of the interrelated whole of existence are made up the same substance as the interrelated whole itself.
Roger McEvilly argues that by instinctually knowing knowledge which is derived from inherent modules or programmes in the human brain, we can know who we are.
In reply to the response to Entry 229, Ivan Alexander from the Humancafe argues that by being aware of both the infinite totality of interrelation, as a self-defining system, and our own being, we can know who we are because the two awarenesses tend to merge into one.
In reply to the response to Entry 230, Roger McEvilly contends that the problem of indirect sensory information can be overcome by knowledge being already encoded or pre-programmed in human beings as they come into the world, and the problem of defining who we are through who we are can be overcome if who we are is defined before we are born as the genome.
In reply to the response to Entry 231, Ivan Alexander from the Humancafe questions whether it is reasonable or not, to reject the notion of infinity, as pertaining to his theory of interrelation, on grounds that we cannot comprehend infinity, because all notions or perspectives face epistemological limitation.
David Tyrrell argues that the proposition is false because the use of "we" in the proposition cannot be universally justified nor does it resemble any fact in the world.
In reply to the response to Entry 233, Ivan Alexander from the Humancafe argues that the mechanism of interrelationship, which as a "totality that reverts back on itself and redefines itself", can reconcile being who we are and knowing who we are.
In reply to the response to Entry 234 and with reference to excerpts by Ken Bell, David Tyrrell argues that "human moral agents and thus moral actions in all their forms must assume an a priori superposition of intuitive knowledge as to 'who they are'", and that ethics overrides epistemological judgments.
Ivan Alexander from the Humancafe argues that consciousness is the center of human Being, so that through self-consciousness and saying, "I am I", an individual can know who he or she is.
Joel A. Wendt argues that the proposition can be overcome through experience, and not words, in the form of examination of inner life through introspection and then practice of concentrated thinking without an object.
"Who we are": the fundamental level of our being from our limited perspective.
For further explanation see who we are.
"Be": the state of living or existing with who we are as the basis.
"Existence": things and life-forms occupying space.
"Truly know": more reasonably showing how we can know something in entirety.
"We": the individuals who make up humankind.
"Overcome": our ability as individuals to more reasonably refute the proposition, "we cannot truly know who we are and be who we are at the same time", than reasonably supporting it. "More reasonably refute" entails using reason in the most objective manner possible, and includes the arguments stated in the entries and
disputes submitted to the "Challenge the Philosophy" competition, and the arguments stated in the responses to them. Also, one idea is deemed more reasonable than another idea if it is more consistent and sound.
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Summary of Entries (1-134) Summary of Entries (239-358) Summary of Entries (359-366)