Mark Evanshen identitifies the solution of uniting being with knowing.

Entry 2:

Mark Evanshen suggests a connection between knowing and being.

Entry 3:

Scott Hudson applies the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle to the proposition.

Entry 4:

An anonymous entry uses a time-line argument to suggest that we cannot know who we are, but then argues that the we could use, with much difficulty, "basic attributes" of who we are.

Entry 5:

James E. Petts argues the uncertainty of knowledge and our identity.

Entry 6:

An anonymous entry equates the proposition with nature. (i.e. an expression of nature.)

Entry 7:

Elric Kline argues that we are self-observing entities, thereby can observe and know who we are.

Entry 8:

John Hubbard alludes to fabricated identities as a way around the proposition.

Entry 9:

Jeffrey Brown argues knowledge of individual actions allow us to know who we are.

Entry 10:

Jeffrey Brown argues that an individual who practices meditation could know who they are by being aware of their change as it unfolds.

Entry 11:

Kent Van Cleave suggests that we can know our essential nature.

Entry 12:

Corr argues that since who we are is unknown, the proposition cannot be overcome, because there is nothing to overcome.

Entry 13:

Jason Spratley argues that outside of reason, an indivdual can know who he or she is.

Entry 14:

Jason Spratley implies that Buddhism is a way to know who we are.

Entry 15:

Well1 argues that there is an inner knowing which allows us to know who we are.

Entry 16:

Christoffer suggests that the we know who we are without knowing that we do through the primary state of knowledge.

Entry 17:

Mark Evanshen argues that "true" being lies in realizing the limitation of knowledge.

Entry 18:

Mark Evanshen argues that we can know who we are without knowing we do through meditation.

Entry 19:

Dustin Daugherty argues that tradition and culture are an expression of who we are.

Entry 20:

Dustin Daugherty suggests that knowledge as form may be intrinsically the same as who we are.

Entry 21:

Edwin C. Turner contends that an individual can know he or she is by realizing the unlimitedness of what they know.

Entry 22:

Edwin Carroll Turner argues that the phrase "we cannot know" contradicts the proposition because in order to know we cannot know who we are, we need to know who we are.

Entries 1-22

Entry 23:

Paul M. Lantos argues that the proposition is invalid because of his perceived difference between who we are and what we are.

Entry 24:

Curtis Wilbur argues that the application of scientific method is a means to overcome the proposition, and that there may be mirror neural sites which allow individuals see copies of themselves.

Entry 25:

Robert Burnier argues using a time-line and movement sequence that being is inherent in knowing.

Entry 26:

Paul Trejo argues using Hegel that being and knowing are united in a continuous organic flow.

Entry 27:

Rob Sica contends that we cannot know with absolute certainty, and therefore we cannot attain an "ultimate account of who we are", and that we cannot help from being who we are.

Entry 28:

Rob Sica argues that there is an essential connection between being and knowing, and that there are sufficient Kantian grounds to doubt that we can know who we are.

Entry 29:

Gerry May suggests that the proposition’s division of being and knowing parallels Nietzsche’s critique of reason, and that perhaps Nietzsche’s "free spirit", instinctual knowing, is a way to overcome the proposition.

Entries 23-29

Entry 30:

Andreas Mogensen attempts to refute the proposition by establishing that we cannot help from being who we are, and that if we know who we are, we can know and be who we are simultaneously, but then he reverts to the position that the proposition is a "confusion of language".

Entry 31:

Rob Sica contends that all thought faces skepticism ("doubting objectivity"), and therefore the proposition is not profound.

Entry 32:

CG Von Kram argues that the proposition is invalid because the proposition is contingent on its own negation for it to be true.

Entry 33:

Rob Sica contends that it is "inconceivable" how to fully know who we are.

Entry 34:

Edwin C. Turner suggests that an individual can know who he or she is through observation of his or her existence.

Entry 35:

Zack Condry argues that being who we are and knowing who we are are mutually dependent, and therefore they are "one and the same".

Entry 36:

Rob Sica contends with reference to Lichtenberg that knowledge is leading to the most objective or "best", so that eventually the proposition will be dissolved rather than refuted.

Entry 37:

Santiago Zorzopulos argues that by showing conscious experience of oneself, and equating inner experience with who we are, the proposition can be overcome.

Entries 30-37

Entry 38:

Rich Tysinger argues that though we can be aware of who we are, we cannot know who we are, because what we know are labels with definitions.

Entry 39:

Edwin C. Turner contends that sensory input is separate from knowledge and contains who we are, so that at the subconscious level, we can know who we are.

Entry 40:

Aashish Payal argues that we cannot know who we are and be who we are represent a fraction, in which as the numerator grows, humanity as a civilization grows.

Entry 41:

Louis José Mercier argues that our sensory experience coupled with our reason allows us to know who we are.

Entry 42:

Stein Leikanger suggests that non-being, including thoughts, is an essential component of our existence.

Entry 43:

Héctor Tedín argues that thought is a vehicle to get outside of ourselves, while at the same time to know ourselves.

Entry 44:

Gary Parrish suggests that the proposition, through the use of "we", is insufficient in explaining an aspect of us ourselves.

Entry 45:

Héctor Tedín argues that we can know who we are, because the basis of thought is made up of "thinking substance" or who we are.

Entry 46:

Roger McEvilly argues that through evolution and our ability to control our existence from our minds, we can know who we are.

Entries 38-46

Entry 47:

Bjørn H.B. Clasen argues that through thinking about ourselves, we can know who we are.

Entry 48:

In reply to the response to Entry 46, Roger McEvilly suggests that knowledge of who we are may be part of an irreducible infinite loop centered around who we are, so that the form of knowledge, rather than the meaning of knowledge, is who we are.

Entry 49:

Alexander Wuijts argues that being is inherent in knowing.

Entry 50:

Roger McEvilly argues that if consciousness is an expression of quantum reality, then the proposition can be overcome.

Entries 47-50

Entry 51:

John B. Larson argues that the proposition can be overcome by both an individual looking into a pool of water and seeing him or herself, and the necessity of an individual to know him or herself in order to survive in the physical world.

Entry 52:

Viktor Simkovic agrees that the proposition cannot be overcome within the bounds of reason, but suggests that it could possibly be overcome outside of reason in the realms, for example, of Taoism, Zen, Castaneda, Qabbala, and Yoga.

Entry 53:

In reply to the response to Entry 52, Viktor Simkovic argues that we can have conscious awareness of a perception without conceptualizing it, thereby know who we are without the use of reason.

Entry 54:

Julieta Petroni argues that we do not need to know who we are in order to be who we are.

Entry 55:

Roger Whitson suggests that we can only know part of ourselves through our analytical knowledge, and that we need to be who we are in order to fully know who we are.

Entry 56:

With reference to Godel's Theorem and Peano's axioms, Yuri Kuzyk contends that reason cannot contain a closed, absolute set, and therefore the proposition cannot be overcome.

Entries 51-56

Entry 57:

Roger Whitson suggests that there are other forms of knowing, other than reason, which may allow us to know who we are, and that it is necessary for us to have limited knowlege of ourselves to exist in the world.

Entry 58:

With reference to Santa Teresa de Jesus, Camus, Goedel´s theorem, and Paulo Coello, Jose Maria Hernandez Roca argues that human thoughts are "NOTHINGNESS", so that there is no way we can know who we are.

Entry 59:

Jefferson Bronfeld argues that the proposition "executes" itself because if the proposition is true, it is then false because there should be no way of knowing it is true, and that since the proposition is unverifiable, it is meaningless.

Entry 60:

In reply to the response to Entry 59, Jefferson Bronfeld contends that if knowledge is relational and limited, then it is not absolute, and therefore it is possible that [some] knowledge is absolute.

Entry 61:

In reply to the response to Entry 57, Roger Whitson argues that we do not create knowledge, rather we exist in relation to it and the world, and that through the process of "becoming" who we are, we can have limited or incomplete knowledge "OF" ourselves.

Entry 62:

Gary Parrish argues that humanity should place value on the human energy, that goes forward regardless of our intentions, exerted towards "conquoring our mental limitations".

Entries 57-62

Entry 63:

Roger McEvilly argues that though the proposition cannot be overcome because it is "fundamentally assumed", we can know ourselves in part.

Entry 64:

Edward G. Nilges critiques thirteen of the premises and conclusions from the Challenge Proof .

Entry 65:

Roger Whitson argues that the division between being and knowing is not as sharp and simple as the ‘intrinsic separation’ argument suggests, and he goes on to question whether such a line of separation between being and knowing exists.

Entries 63-65

Entry 66:

Edward G. Nilges contends that within the limits of what we know, there are "phenomenological truths" in relation to the external world.

Entry 67:

Roger McEvilly argues that because human 'being' and human knowledge are both in a state of flux, and human 'being' and human knowledge define each other through a "feedback mechanism", it follows that being and knowledge are partly intrinsically connected.

Entry 68:

Roger McEvilly argues that there is no fundamental level of being, and that instead, there is a "collection of interacting chemicals", so that human beings exist only as biological entities.

Entry 69:

G.E. Nordell distinguishes between false mind and working mind, and contends that we can know we are "Being" through "hyper-awareness".

Entry 70:

With reference to Spinoza, Emmanuel T. Rakitzis argues that we are what we are, whether we know what we are or not.

Entries 66-70

Entry 71:

With reference to Popper, Kant, Decartes, Schrodinger, and Euler, Epsilon Pi proposes a "superconscious domain", which is not limited by Descartes-Kant reductionistic drawback, through a synergy of different factors.

Entry 72:

In reply to the response to Entry 71, Epsilon Pi argues that through the principle of synergy, or the integration of the parts of the reality into an integral whole, the inexpressible can be made expressible.

Entry 73:

In reply to the response to Entry 72, Epsilon Pi argues that it is possible to know the whole integral reality from one qualitative point of view, rather than a quantitative view or a combination of perspectives.

Entry 74:

Ade Artis argues that because knowledge is relational, knowing who we are is just a matter of understanding all the relations which comprise who we are.

Entries 71-74

Entry 75:

Ron St. John argues that if we cannot know who we are, then we cannot know our conscious perceptions are accurate, and that experience of oneself, whether the experience of pain or happiness, is as plausible as not being able to experience oneself.

Entry 76:

In reply to the response to Entry 75, Ron St. John argues that the proposition is irrefutable because of its "specialized" definitions of know and who we are, and that with ordinary definitions of know and who we are, the proposition may be refutable.

Entry 77:

Dr. T.H. Wilson argues that according to the definition of "limited know", the proposition if valid leads to the paradox that since we cannot know who we are, it does not follow how we can know that we cannot know who we are.

Entry 78:

In reply to the response to Entry 77, Dr. T.H. Wilson argues that because the proposition purports that knowledge is limited, it does not follow how the proposition can refute all other perspectives.

Entry 79:

Wayne Leggette contends that we can know who we are, because knowing creates our psychological existence.

Entry 80:

R. E. Puhek argues that we can know who we are through a "transcendent perspective" which focuses on our own "living process".

Entry 81:

With reference to Vedic text, Buckminster Fuller, T.S. Eliot, Descartes, and Moses, G-man argues that because knowledge is derived from past knowledge, we cannot completely know who we are.

Entries 75-81

Entry 82:

Tom Anderson argues that the proposition can be refuted on grounds that who we are as ‘non-relational knowledge’ is an "empty concept", and that we can know who we are as relational knowledge.

Entry 83:

Aaron Z. Zimmerman argues that by an individual knowing all his or her "psychological properties", which is "not conceptually impossible", the individual can know who he or she is.

Entry 84:

Kevin Ward argues that we can know who we are in a moment of total selflessness or wholeness when the creator enters our being.

Entry 85:

In reply to the response Entry 83, Thomas R. Anderson critiques the response, and concludes that to be who we are is to know who we are, ("the nature of our being is the relationship between thought and mind"), because there are no necessary grounds to think otherwise.

Entries 82-85

Entry 86:

Raoul Starren argues that because who we are as defined lies outside of our comprehension, we have no way of saying anything about it, not even that we can never know it, and therefore, the proposition is invalid.

Entry 87:

In reply to the response to Entry 84, Kevin Ward argues that through a relationship with the creator, or an experience of "being made whole", an individual can know who he or she is.

Entry 88:

Rick C argues that in relation to ordinary understanding, he knows who he is (i.e. "I am not a cat, a fish or the square root of 5"), and that because he cannot help from "always" being who he is, and knowing who he is inherent to being who he is, he can know who he is.

Entry 89:

Marc Reside contends that who we are is the accumulation of our knowledge, and therefore the proposition as defined is invalid.

Entry 90:

In reply to the response to Entry 90, Marc Reside argues that our fundamental level of being is "energy", and that we are defined by our knowledge, so that all we can know completely is who we are.

Entry 91:

In reply to the response to Entry 88, ‘Signed-----not a cat, not a fish, not the square root of 5’ argues that because he cannot help from being who he is, and he knows at a basic level of understanding that he is not a cat, a fish, or the square root of 5 that he must have knowledge of who he is.

Entries 86-91

Entry 92:

In reply to the response to Entry 91, Rick C contends that from an ordinary level of understanding he knows that he is not a fish, and by doing so, he has knowledge of who he is.

Entry 93:

Marc Reside challenges the proposition, through a series of premises, with the view that who we are is an accumulation of knowledge.

Entry 94:

In reply to the response to Entry 92, Rick C defends his ordinary use of "knowledge", and he claims that he knows he is not a fish or cat without referring to what he is.

Entry 95:

Signed-An entity in flux argues that everything is in a state of flux, and that when the being and knowledge interact, in a state of chaos and thereby oneness, the proposition is overcome.

Entry 96:

In reply to the response to Entry 87, Kevin Ward defends the notion of "experiencing wholeness", or oneness with the creator, by claiming that an individual believes the experience, or has faith in it, through the rewards that manifest from applying the experience to his or her life.

Entry 97:

Scott Sanders argues that because our thoughts are in flux, who we are is in flux as well, and therefore we cannot know who we are.

Entries 92-97

Entry 98:

In reply to the response to Entry 86, Raoul Starren argues that knowledge faces the same inexpressibility as being, so that knowledge of the irrefutability of the proposition translates into the refutability of the proposition because we cannot know the proposition is irrefutable and the proposition be irrefutable at the same time.

Entry 99:

In reply to the response to Entry 90, Marc Reside questions the notion of ‘basis’ and human beings as creators of knowledge.

Entry 100:

In reply to the response to Entry 96, Kevin Ward defends the experience of wholeness, or relationship with the creator, by referring to the oneness of wholeness and the unfathomable ability of an individual experiencing wholeness.

Entry 101:

In reply to the response to Entry 99, Marc Reside argues that knowledge is inextricable from existence.

Entry 102:

In reply to the response to Entry 101, Marc Reside distinguishes between human created knowledge and knowledge that is from the external world (i.e. existence).

Entry 103:

Sami Saab argues that the proposition cannot be overcome because we cannot know every aspect of life, and that what distinguishes human beings from other life-forms is self-consciousness (i.e. we know that we know).

Entry 104:

In reply to the response to Entry 100, Kevin Ward contends that selflessness is the key to experiencing wholeness.

Entries 98-104

Entry 105:

With reference to Hegel, Chris Krajewski contends that expression in the moment makes the absolute inexpressible in the whole.

Entry 106:

With reference to J. Krishnamuti, Kevin Ward contends that "effortlessness" is the sign of a whole experience.

Entry 107:

In reply to the response to Entry 106, Kevin Ward contends that it is through experience that we know we are in wholeness.

Entry 108:

Marc Reside argues that human strife is from lack of knowledge rather than knowledge itself.

Entry 109:

Richard L. Stover contends that it is possible to know who we are by stripping away "indoctrination".

Entry 110:

Eric Husher argues that the proposition is refuted on a daily basis, like for instance a shipwright knowing he is a shipwright and being a shipwright by building a ship.

Entry 111:

Richard L. Stover argues that practically we cannot know who we are because of the interchange between being and knowing, and that philosophically we can know who we are because the interchange is in milliseconds.

Entry 112:

Richard L. Stover lists eleven defensive rationalizations which he contends need to be stripped away in order to know who or what we are.

Entry 113:

In reply to the response to Entry 98 and through an example of an ‘unreasonable perspective’, Raoul Starren contends that since the proposition cannot express the inexpressible, the proposition is invalid.

Entries 105-113

Entry 114:

Richard L. Stover presents a list of propositions by Dr. Sheldon Kopp which supposedly allow individuals to cut through the layers of "hypocrisy, deceit, and self-importance" to who they are.

Entry 115:

Raoul Starren defends the notion of ‘being’ as the supreme reason and questions whether we can determine more or less reasonableness about something inexpressible.

Entry 116:

Richard Stover argues that in order to know who we are, we need both a clean slate of knowledge and an understanding of the causal nature of our existence.

Entry 117:

With reference to Godel’s theorem, Raoul Starren argues that the supreme reason of being, containing its own refutation, makes everything we know unreasonable, and therefore this position is more reasonable than the proposition which defies its own refutation.

Entry 118:

In reply to the response to Dispute 9 Response 33, Ken Bell examines the relationship between the external world ("matter") and what we know.

Entry 119

Richard Stover argues that being and knowing are the same thing when an individual is consciously aware or "stimulated".

Entries 114-119

Entry 120:

Richard Stover draws on an experience of a snail to distinguish instinctual reactions from conscious reactions, and asserts that our knowledge of who we are from a limited perspective appears to be defined by prejudices.

Entry 121:

Daniel Sadlon argues that he can know who he is, because everything he knows about himself is who he is. (i.e. "there is nothing to compare [myself] to.")

Entry 122:

Sean Walker argues that we can know who we are because from a foundational and fundamental perspective, our "concrete reality of intuition and our senses" are who we are.

Entry 123:

With reference to Aristotle's Ethics and Politics, Nathaniel Hannan argues that the proposition can be overcome by adopting an Aristotelian perspective, whereby the body and mind are one; mind thinks its own ideas; ideas are the form of mind; and functional concepts define who we are.

Entry 124:

Richard Stover suggests that animals in their reaction to different situations appear to know themselves.

Entry 125:

In reply to the response to Entry 123, Nathaniel Hannan argues that the concept of "knowledge itself as non-existent" is contradictory, without realizing that the concept does not rule out the existence of knowledge as both form and an extension of who we are.

Entries 120-125

Entry 126:

Marc Reside questions how the claim that knowledge is an illusion can be made from knowledge, and why knowing who we are is important when human beings appear "inconsequential".

Entry 127:

Duane Salmon argues that from his perspective he knows that he knows who he is, and no one else can refute that he knows who he is.

Entry 128:

Marc Reside contends that by necessity human beings must exist through things empty of who they are.

Entry 129:

Greg Nyquist argues that the proposition is refuted on grounds of knowing personal attributes about oneself like "taste and interests", and that we cannot know that we cannot know who we are, without knowing something about who we are.

Entry 130:

Ian Dengler contends that not knowing who we are or "prosopagnosia" can be overcome when a similar condition after REM sleep occurs.

Entry 131:

Travis Hedglin argues that perception is dictated by the individual, and that being and knowing are "inextricably" connected.

Entry 132:

Paul Dawkins argues that every individual perception is different and that there is no "true" definition of who we are, and therefore we cannot know who we are.

Entry 133:

Jesse Crawford that human beings need to know who they are in order to be who they are.

Entry 134:

Bruce Newman argues that the proposition cannot be overcome because it is obscure and fixed in an epistemological corner.

Entries 126-134

Summary of Entries (135-245) Summary of Entries (239-358) Summary of Entries (359-366)