"The general premise, "we cannot know who we are and be who we are at the same time," hinges on the particular premise, "we can only know knowledge itself in relation to who we are." The argument that follows is that since "who we are" involves non-relational knowledge, i.e. knowledge qua knowledge, being who we are necessarily precludes such knowledge.

However, the particular premise defines knowledge as being wholly relational. To further posit the existence of non-relational knowledge is by this definition illogical and insupportable. The "who we are" that is being conceived of here is simply the parallel negation of that which we know (i.e. "who we are" is defined as that which we do not know, in fact cannot know, with relation to who we are).

In refutation: lacking any demonstration of the validity of knowledge qua knowledge, I propose that to know who we are in relation to ourselves and our capacities (subjectively) is to "know who we are." To attempt to insert a pure objectivity into the investigation is to thus subtract knowledge out of it.

In essence, the initial claim suggests that it is impossible to know a knowledge that definitively precludes any sort of "knowing." This is a valid claim. The difficulty is that the claim redefines its primary substantive term, resulting in an empty set - knowledge that is not knowledge as we know it. I am given no adequate reasoning to acknowledge the existence of such a thing. As such, I would argue that non-relational knowledge is the empty concept."

Tom Anderson August 16 2000

Response:

The premise, "we can only know knowledge itself in relation to who we are" (Premise 1), stems from two other premises, "we cannot get outside of our minds" and "we cannot know knowledge solely through itself". Hence, the only way to know knowledge is through a transcendent idea, or in relation to it, which we have labeled "who we are". Fortunately, for Kant’s premise, "being is a necessity of reason" that the relationship between knowledge and transcendent ideas, from our limited perspective, makes sense. However, your statement that "being who we are necessarily precludes such [relational] knowledge, confuses the concepts of "who we are" and "being who we are": who we are, not the label, precludes relational knowledge, though it does not follow that being who we are does as well. In fact, we argue that to make sense of the relation between knowledge and who we are, and also the origin of knowledge, being who we are must include knowledge, without knowledge itself existing as "who we are". (ie. though knowledge is part of who we are, it does not follow that knowledge itself is intrinsically the same as who we are.)

Premise 1. above, does not define knowledge as being "wholly relational"; rather, it defines knowledge as being relational within the limits of what we can know [Premise 11 from the Proof, "we imagine conscious meaning, thereby knowledge, from a position of complete ignorance".] (ie. the thoughts behind the relation are not whole or absolute, thereby the relation is not whole or absolute.) So, even though your claim that the "existence of non-relational knowledge is by definition illogical and insupportable" is correct, Garvey does not posit the existence of non-relational knowledge. The concept of who we are, and the label, is a product of relational knowledge.

Further, your proposition that "to know who we are in relation to ourselves and our capacity (subjectively) is to ‘know who we are’", is unreasonable on two grounds:

1. we do know in relation to our capacities; rather, we know through our capacities.

Your proposition is thereby reduced to: "to know who we are in relation to ourselves is to ‘know who we are’".

2.1. we cannot know who we are in relation to ourselves, unless there is separation between them (ie. who we are is not ourselves).

2.2. it does not follow how we can know who we are through the "separated" ourselves, since who we are appears to behind ourselves, thus it does not make sense how we can know who we are through who we are.

What is knowledge as we know it? Where does knowledge come from?

In terms of no adequate reasoning to acknowledge the non-existence of knowledge itself, we refer you to Garvey’s new work, Why I Am Right, being published this fall, which deals directly with knowledge itself.

Finally, by you asserting that non-relational knowledge (ie. the notion of being) is an empty concept, it appears that you are asserting that our essence comes from our thoughts themselves or reason (ie. "thinking substance"). What is the basis for thoughts themselves? How can we know anything without the relation to something outside of what we know? It appears that your argument does not stand, because as Kant asserted, "being [or non-relational knowledge, at least the limited idea of it] is a necessity of reason". (ie. in order to have reasonable conception of ourselves, we need the idea of being.)

83. Entry:

"We know what something is by forming true, justified beliefs about its properties. (Leaving aside Gettier cases for the moment.) I know what my chair is, because my belief that it is a chair is true and is justified by perception of the chair and my conceptual knowledge of what makes for a chair and what does not. The question, then, "How do I know who/what I am?" Is just the question, "How do I know of my properties?" Since the properties of a self are psychological in nature, an account of self-knowledge will tell us how we know of our feelings and sensations, our beliefs, desires, hopes, emotions, and - perhaps - our character traits. Given this commonsense framework, the falsity of the proposition that we cannot know who we are and be who we are at the same time is ensured. If I am to know that I currently believe that Gore will win, then my second-order belief that I believe that Gore will win must be true. So I must be someone who believes that Gore will win, to know that I believe that Gore will win. (Knowledge requires truth.) But then if I am to know what I believe at all, I must have the very beliefs I believe myself to have. The fact that I believe that Gore will win and know that I believe that Gore will win at this very moment shows that I can know something of myself at the very time at which that thing is true of me. I submit that when someone knows of all his/her psychological properties - knows of all her beliefs, desires, emotions, feelings, character traits, etc. - she knows "who she is." (Indeed, much less than complete knowledge is ordinary required for successful self- knowledge.) Though this task is quite difficult, and something that confronts all rational, reflective persons, it is not conceptually impossible as the proposition under consideration suggests."

Aaron Z. Zimmerman August 17 2000

Response:

How is belief a source of truth, rather than a personal bias within a limited system of thought?

How is conceptual knowledge a source of truth, rather than a conscious fabrication?

How is perception a source of knowledge, rather than a fabricated system of conscious awareness through belief and conceptual knowledge?

What is self? (ie. is self an invented conscious identity or who we are?) How do we know self-knowledge is our fundamental level of being?

Yes, your second-order belief that Gore will win must be true, but only within your system of thought. Surely you do not know that your knowledge of your belief about Gore, or any other knowledge, is absolutely true?! Also, just because you know what you believe, it does not follow that what you know about what you believe is really who you are. What you know may be an invented appearance devoid of who you are, though with limited connection to who you are.

How can someone know all his or her psychological properties, including emotions, desires, and feelings, if someone cannot know how he or she will react in all situations and change from all situations?

We counter your challenge by asserting that the self and its psychological properties are fabrications with only limited connection to who we are, from fact that we exist through them. To support our counter claim, we know through the axioms:

1. we cannot get outside of our minds

2. we cannot know knowledge solely through itself

that knowledge, including the self and its properties, is an empty form devoid of who we are. Also, empirically, we know that knowledge itself shows no sign of life except that it reappears in our minds.

84. Entry:

"Only one way, to become the "I am who I am." In the moment of total selflessness/wholeness when our creator enters our being all things are possible."

Kevin Ward August 18 2000

Response:

How can you conceptualize "total wholeness" and know that you do?

How can you know what the so-called creator is capable of, if it is beyond your mind, and the basis for your existence?

How is it possible, since you claim that "anything is possible", for you to become the creator of the creator, or the creator?

Finally, "how" can you know who you are through the creator?

85. Entry:

Reply to the Response to Entry 83.

Excerpt from Response: "The premise, 'we can only know knowledge itself in relation to who we are' (Premise1), stems from two other premises, 'we cannot get outside of our minds' and 'we cannot know knowledge solely through itself'. Hence, the only way to know knowledge is through a transcendent idea, or in relation to it, which we have labeled 'who we are'."

It seems to me that your premises basically lend themselves to the simplification: We can only know knowledge in the way that knowledge is known. The first premise, 'we cannot get outside of our minds,' is another way of saying that (at least in our case) knowledge requires mind, if I'm following your logic correctly. The second premise, 'we cannot know knowledge solely through itself,' posits a more general version of the first premise, i.e. that knowledge requires a relation of some sort. The relation which we are familiar with is that of "mind," as indicated by the first premise. Your conclusion, albeit logically sound, is also rather misleading by virtue of the juggling of synonymous terms: '...the only way to know knowledge is through a transcendent idea, or in relation to it, which we have labeled "who we are."' Your first premise implies that the transcendent idea through which we know knowledge is "our mind(s)," though now the term "who we are" has been inserted instead.

Excerpt from Response: "...However, your statement that "being who we are necessarily precludes such [relational] knowledge, confuses the concepts of "who we are" and "being who we are"'

Your insertion of "[relational]" is incorrect in this instance. The actual statement is as follows: 'The argument that follows is that since "who we are" involves non-relational knowledge, i.e. knowledge qua knowledge, being who we are necessarily precludes such knowledge.' 'such knowledge' referring to non-relational knowledge, or knowledge qua knowledge. As such, the statement remains consistent with the terms used, since you have pointed out that being who we are involves having only relational knowledge.

Excerpt from Response: "In fact, we argue that to make sense of the relation between knowledge and who we are, and also the origin of knowledge, being who we are must include knowledge, without knowledge itself existing as "who we are". (ie. though knowledge is part of who we are, it does not follow that knowledge itself is intrinsically the same as who we are.)"

If I'm following this correctly, you seem to be saying that: "being who we are" = "who we are" + "knowledge" which I would state as: The nature of our being is the relationship between thought and mind.

Excerpt from Response: "Premise 1. above, does not define knowledge as being "wholly relational"; rather, it defines knowledge as being relational within the limits of what we can know [Premise 11 from the Proof, "we imagine conscious meaning, thereby knowledge, from a position of complete ignorance".] (ie. the thoughts behind the relation are not whole or absolute, thereby the relation is not whole or absolute.) So, even though your claim that the "existence of non-relational knowledge is by definition illogical and insupportable" is correct, Garvey does not posit the existence of non-relational knowledge. The concept of who we are, and the label, is a product of relational knowledge."

So only knowledge 'as we know it' is defined as being relational, but not "wholly relational?" Again this sounds like the positing of non-relational knowledge, which obviously must be distinguished from the relational type. I realize what is being gotten at here, but I don't see any justification for it. The position is that knowledge is more than what we know, even what we can know, but what this 'more than' is remains a mystery. To my sensibilities, this is like appealing to 'the other universe' when one runs into ontological or metaphysical problems with this one. Perhaps this treatment is a little harsh, as the position is really just a throwback to Platonic Forms and the Realm of Forms where we would presumably find "Who We Are" and "Knowledge with a capital K"

Excerpt from Response: "The concept of who we are, and the label, is a product of relational knowledge."

Then the question to be answered before any further debate can take place on the subject is: Are we correct in asserting (by virtue of our relational knowledge) the existence of "who we are" or "knowledge" as non-relational forms? Certainly we can assert their existence, but that does not necessarily make it correct. In other words, is it a universal necessity that there be a distinction between "mind" and "thought" in order for there to be a knowledgeable "me"? Thus far the only support for these assertions has been Kant's stance on Being, but the general position does not necessarily support the particulars. I can still "be" without having to split "mind" and "thought", or "who we are" and "knowledge"

Excerpt from Response: "Your proposition is thereby reduced to: "to know who we are in relation to ourselves is to ‘know who we are’". 2.1. we cannot know who we are in relation to ourselves, unless there is separation between them (ie. who we are is not ourselves). ' I don't see why not, unless you are insisting on a knowledge that goes beyond what is possible to know, in which case I again contend that it is, by definition, not knowledge.

Excerpt from Response: "What is knowledge as we know it? Where does knowledge come from?"

When you answer these questions, I think you'll be in a better position to make sweeping ontological and epistemological claims on the order that you have been making them. As it is, I don't feel that you have adequately built up your position to do so.

Excerpt from Response: "In terms of no adequate reasoning to acknowledge the non-existence of knowledge itself, we refer you to Garvey’s new work, Why I Am Right, being published this fall, which deals directly with knowledge itself."

I'm not looking for references. Rather, I'm looking for explanations and defenses.

Excerpt from Response: "Finally, by you asserting that non-relational knowledge (ie. the notion of being) is an empty concept, it appears that you are asserting that our essence comes from our thoughts themselves or reason (ie. "thinking substance"). What is the basis for thoughts themselves? How can we know anything without the relation to something outside of what we know? It appears that your argument does not stand, because as Kant asserted, "being [or non-relational knowledge, at least the limited idea of it] is a necessity of reason". (ie. in order to have reasonable conception of ourselves, we need the idea of being.)"

When was the notion of being ever equated to non-relational knowledge? Certainly "being is a necessity of reason", but your arguments seem to demand that 'being' conforms to particular characteristics that may not be necessary, much less accurate. To be who we are is to know who we are at the most fundamental level. I see no difference between the two, aside from semantics.

Thomas R. Anderson August 18 2000

Response:

The first premise, "we cannot get outside of our minds" means that all we can know is from in our minds. The second premise, "we cannot know knowledge solely through itself" builds off the first premise by stating that we cannot know knowledge itself, so what we know knowledge itself as is not it, which does not make sense because we know something. Hence, it appears that from our perspective, knowledge is an empty form. Further, the only way to know knowledge, since we cannot know it through itself and knowledge is all we can know, is through a transcendent idea, whereby through something outside of our minds (ie "being"), we have the means to know in a limited sense (ie. we have the necessary intrinsic separation to allow us to know). We come to Kant’s assertion that "being is necessity of reason" not only to explain our existence, but also to explain how we know.

Regarding the nature of knowledge, from our perspective, there is no such thing as non-relational knowledge. Even "who we are" is derived from relational knowledge, despite the term's reference to something beyond our minds. Please remember that the first premise, "we cannot get outside of our minds", and the relational or comparative nature of reason ensures that we cannot have non-relational knowledge. (Also, please note that the notion of being equates to non-relational knowledge in the sense that being refers to something beyond our minds. In other words, non-relational knowledge as we have used it, is simply another way of saying something is beyond our minds. However, in our view, non-relational knowledge is a sloppy term, because it can be misconstrued that knowledge is somehow a characteristic of being. Incidently, Kant takes this position by equating being with the "supreme reason", though, we feel that he has no grounds for doing so, except for extending his 'bias to reason'.)

How does the equation "being who we are = who we are + knowledge" equate to the relationship between thought and mind? What is behind mind itself?

No, the position is not that knowledge is more than what we know, or even what we can know, but that from our perspective, knowledge itself is an empty form, because as mentioned, we cannot know knowledge solely through itself, so what we know is not knowledge which does not make sense, because we know something. Hence, it follows that knowledge itself is non-existent (ie. there is nothing to know of knowledge itself.)

In our view, there needs to be not "universal necessity", but a logical necessity for there to be separation between who we are and knowledge, because without it, there would not be intrinsic separation to know (ie. everything would be one, thereby unreasonable.)

How can we know who we are in relation to who we are? What is the relationship, or comparison, that allows us to know?

Without getting into detail, knowledge as we know it as is a non-existent illusion, supported by who we are through an unconscious assertion that conscious meaning exists. In other words, we create knowledge through an imaginary attachment of meaning to meaning. (Though this explanation is limited, because unconscious assertion, a conscious phenomena, describes something unconscious, it is a close approximation to the origin of knowledge.)

Finally, it does not follow that being who we are translates into knowing who we are. Surely, it is possible to be who we are without absolutely knowing who we are?!

Entries 75-81 Entries 86-91