Reply to the response to Entry 514

“I would like to hear the committee’s defense of how it is more reasonable to apply a methodology of more reasonableness to a proposition that considers truth (i.e. ‘truly know’). Since our knowledge is apparently of a comparative nature, what comparisons validate reasonableness as more reasonable in this situation?

I have been antagonistic to the proposition throughout this debate. The only defense I see that you have against my antagonistic position is more reasonableness. A methodology of reasonableness seems to make sense when considering an election of an official, but to apply it to the consideration of the very nature of human existence (i.e. ‘who we are’) does not makes sense. In order to show that imposed time limits is more reasonable, you must more reasonably show time limits on existence, thought, knowledge, self, et al. Furthermore, you must more reasonably show time having to do with those things at all.

The concept of the proposition is what it is, just as the concept of ‘high’ is what it is and so is the concept of me morphing into a tree. It does not mean the concept of the proposition is more reasonable than what the proposition actually is. What is more reasonable is that if something is conceived as high, it is just as reasonable to conceive it as low, because the actual space is more reasonable than the concepts. If two people were on opposite sides of the center of the Earth, a person’s high (which is being conceived here through its opposite, the level of that person’s height, or not high) would be the other person’s low (or not high). This is apparently not more reasonably debatable, as you contend. One side is just your side of the perspective (of which you seem to be claiming mere concept), though that one-sided perspective more reasonably always has the other side, whether it is stated or not. The two perspectives are just as reasonable.

I have more reasonably completely demonstrated I am of an existing phenomenon. I am aware of my thoughts therefore I am aware of my existence. Existence is a phenomenon, otherwise existence wouldn’t be, and by writing this I more reasonably completely demonstrate I am of an ‘existing phenomenon’. I do not see why I need to provide a more reasonably complete demonstration of the existing phenomenon I am of to completely demonstrate I am of an existing phenomenon. Furthermore, not once in my argument do I contend that we can truly know we exist, rather I contend that there is no ‘truly knowing’. Either we know, or we don’t (bearing in my mind that not knowing does not mean cannot know). I do contend that it is not more reasonable that we cannot truly know we exist. Also, I do not contend that the proposition claims that you truly know we exist, rather I contend that knowing we exist is technically truly knowing ‘who we are’ in part, while being that existence.

Please demonstrate ‘completely more reasonable’ as it is opposed to ‘more reasonable’. I contend that either something is more reasonable or not more reasonable just the same as knowledge. Please demonstrate how we can ‘truly know’ as it is opposed to ‘know’. It would appear to me that if we know something but want to truly know it, what we would attempt to truly know is different from what we are just knowing.

If the proposition claims that we exist within the limits of what we know, then that ‘existence’ is defined by what we know. An existence that incorporates aspects other than what we know is a different ‘existence’, not a different ‘level of knowledge’ of the same existence. It only follows that the ‘who we are’ we are trying to know, as stated in the proposition, is within the limits of what we know and any ‘who we are’ that incorporates aspects other than what we know is a separate ‘who we are’, not a different ‘level of knowledge’ of the same ‘who we are’. Since what I know is that we exist as physical entities that survive, this is ‘truly knowing’ ‘who we are’. I have more reasonably completely demonstrated this. If this is not more reasonably truly who we are, then you must more reasonably completely show that ‘who we are’ is more than that.

I do not contend that there is sufficient evidence within this argument that we can truly know who we are while being who we are. I do contend that there is not sufficient evidence within this argument that we cannot truly know who we are while being who we are. Without methodology of reasonableness, the proposition is inconclusive. Reasonability seems inapplicable to determination of truth. You must provide more reasonable evidence that levels of reasonability is applicable to determination of truth, or complete demonstration we cannot know who we are while being who we are, the proposition is overcome.

Antagonistic position to the competition proposition as applied to the 10 main arguments for the competition proposition:

1) The competition proposition is inventing a phenomenon. Knowledge is knowledge. True knowledge, as I have explained, is an imagined illusion. Either we know something or we don’t. ‘Who we are’, as with all things, is of the same existing phenomenon (hence the ‘knowledge’ the competition claims is of that same existing phenomenon). All things are based on interaction unless you can more reasonably demonstrate otherwise. This does not have to be more reasonably ‘complete’ as you contend, just more reasonable than the proposition can refute. Since all that the proposition is asking is knowledge (true or not) means that the answer is within knowledge, not whatever definition of knowledge seems fit to prove the proposition. It would follow that ‘truly know’ is to know ‘who we are’ as representation (‘who we are’ being representation since ‘who we are’ is derived of our representational knowledge). Otherwise, whatever it is you expect to ‘know’ is not conscious knowledge, but some other phenomenon you apparently believe exists without any proof of it.

2) Knowledge is human invention? I get burned from the sun. I know this. I did not invent it. Of course it is of interaction. What proof do you have that ‘who we are’ is more reasonably anything other than interaction?

3) How is ‘getting outside’ at all related to knowing ourselves? We are within ourselves and connected to all aspects of ourselves. Getting outside of ourselves is irrelevant since ‘not who we are’ is not part of ‘who we are’ unless it follows that something is what it is through what it is not (its direct opposite).

4) What is temporal lag? Explain how thought is dependent on the illusion of time. Explain the existence of time in the sense of ‘past’ and ‘future’ vs. change of space (coordinates).

5) I have already explained in detail that what we reason is based on what we currently know. Please give ample explanation how this is not more reasonable? (This involves proving there is a ‘past’ in the sense of time.)

6) The very complexity of our make-up is what enables our knowledge, so it stands to be more reasonable that something so complex is needed to understand that complexity. Fortunately, our complex make-up would enable such a complex understanding. Unfortunately, we do not realize this complex understanding enough at this point to reasonably argue this in either direction. This does not mean that more reasonably we cannot. Again, I do not need to demonstrate complete knowledge of self to disprove the proposition, just prove the proposition is not more reasonable than the opposite (viz. ‘we can’).

7) Explain how infinite regress is not an absolute endpoint to reason. A loop is not a continuance of a chain of particular reasoning; it is an end of that chain of reasoning. Explain how addition of knowledge changes who we are? What we think is not part of who we are. That we think is. To disprove this, you must show how you become what you think or what you know.

The competition exerts that the proposition would be overcome if we can prove the hand is truly a part of ‘who we are’. The competition then exerts that who we are comprises of our entire physical make-up, including separate systems. It would then follow that the competition would have to prove all these separate parts are truly part of ‘who we are’ in order to exert that they are contingent parts of proving entire knowledge of who we are. This disrupts the definition of ‘who we are’, thereby, there is no ‘who we are’.

8) Prove how something is possible. Either something is, or it isn’t. Possibility, as I have sufficiently described, is a concoction of human perception and does not exist in actuality. Only actual events exist in actuality. If this is untrue, show how something is truly possible. Everything is in a state of ‘change’. The only ‘possible’ things are events that happen within that state of ‘change’. Possibility more reasonably means predicting a future that doesn’t exist.

9) Limited perspective cancels itself out of the proposition (just the same as methodology of reasonableness). We are dealing with what we perceive. I do not use limited perspective for or against. I do not assume it. It goes without saying that anything we use in defense is of whatever phenomenon. Claiming it as a ‘defense’ is inventing parameters to something you do not fully grasp (viz. human perspective). The proposition creates ‘extensions’ of existing phenomenon and claims them as separate phenomena, when it really is just an invention of the proposal (i.e. ‘truly know’, ‘more reasonably complete’). What you are saying is you can more reasonably reason truth (without even knowing what truth is). This sounds like ‘playing God’. Save reason for matters of reason such as what is more reasonable within the argument between us, and not reasonability as part of the proposition considering true nature.

10) Again, you are inventing (i.e. ‘what we know’ vs. ‘the nature of what we know’). These are the same phenomenon. What more reasonable proof do you have that they are not? The very fact that we conceive a ‘nature of what we know’ is saying ‘the nature of what we know’ is what we know. We cannot conceive anything outside of that because there is nothing outside of that. It is what it is: ‘what we know’. You are arguing ‘the nature of what we know’ not the nature of a phenomenon that lets us know. If there were something outside of knowing what we know that becomes who we are, we would know it i.e. ‘I get burned from the sun’. It’s the same phenomenon that let’s me know I get burned from the sun, and the same that actually ‘burns’ me, the interaction of energy. This is the continuum of knowledge from ‘external’ to ‘internal’ (if you can prove such a thing as ‘internal vs. external’ exists). This does not have to be ‘more reasonably complete’, just more reasonable than the competition can refute (because, we are bound by the same ‘limited perspective’).”

Dennis Stawicki October 27 2004

Response:

In your entry, you have made a number of arguments and asked several questions, which we will address and answer.

The methodology of more reasonableness, which is based on the evaluation of reasons according to their soundness and consistency, can be applied consistently to the concept of truth, or any other concept, because the concept is within the limited realm of comparison. You appear to be arguing that truth is outside that realm (which makes it inexplicable how you could express/think truth), and yet like any other concept, the concept of truth is defined by reason within the limits of what we know. So in our view, the methodology of more reasonableness can be consistently applied to the competition proposition even though the proposition contains reference to the concept of truth (i.e. “truly know”). If you disagree, more reasonably tell us how the concept of truth, which you think and express, is outside the realm of human reason. Note, neither obscurity nor incompleteness are grounds for existence outside of human reason.

Since we apparently cannot get outside of our minds and know that we are, everything we know including the concepts of “existence, thought, knowledge, self et al.” are defined from inside of our minds. Moreover, since our minds are defined by comparison of thought, and thereby at a theoretical level a time aspect, it follows that everything we know is characterized by some form of comparison and time aspect. (Time, as mentioned, is a theoretical extension of comparison.) Hence, it not only makes sense to apply a time constraint on the determination of human existence (i.e. who we are), but also a time constraint in some form is unavoidable. Another important consideration is that any final determination in Competition 1 is only final within the bounds of the Competition including its limited time frame.

We agree with your argument, which is apparently based on the concept of interconnectedness, that antagonistic positions to one another are equally reasonable because they are part of each other. So the proposition, “we cannot truly know who we are” has the same reasonableness as the proposition, “we can truly know who we are”. However, what you overlook in terms of Competition 1 is that establishing an antagonistic proposition with equal reasonableness as the competition proposition does not overcome the competition proposition. Overcome is defined by more reasonably demonstrating that an antagonistic proposition is more reasonable than the competition proposition. Your position is not more reasonably antagonistic; it is neither antagonistic nor supportive. Yet, upon further evaluation, your position based on the concept of interconnectedness, is self-defeating, because it means that everything is part everything else, so that we would have no valid way of distinguishing anything, and therefore, your distinction of the competition proposition from an amalgamation of the competition proposition and its opposite is inconsistent. So we conclude that the competition proposition is more reasonable than the amalgamation of the competition proposition and its opposite. Viz., based on the self-defeat of your position, the competition proposition and its opposite are not necessarily equally reasonable.

The notion of “more reasonable completely” refers to demonstrating through more sound and consistent reasons that something is complete (i.e. known in entirety). Your argument that you are aware of your thoughts, and therefore you are an “existing phenomenon” falls short of a more reasonable complete demonstration, because it does not more reasonably completely follow that just because you are aware of your thoughts, you are of an “existing phenomenon”. For instance, it is possible you may not even exist, or an existing phenomenon is an illusion. (What does more reasonably incompletely follow is that by being aware of your thoughts, something must exist at some level, otherwise you could not be aware of your thoughts.) Note, we do not use the notion of complete more reasonableness. We use the notion as mentioned more reasonable completely.

The onus is not on us to demonstrate how we can truly know, because our position is antagonistic to it within limits. Viz., we only acknowledge that it is possible to truly know. Though it is up to participants to more reasonably demonstrate how to truly know is more possible than mere possible. (I.e. more reasonably demonstrate how we can truly know.)

Your argument that what we know is a different existence from what we truly know, is premised on the assumption that true knowledge is separate from who we are--at least who we are as beings who only know. Hence, it is possible that true knowledge and knowledge are of the same existence, and if true knowledge is foreign to who we are, which you appear to be contending, then it follows we cannot truly know. Yet, within the realm of knowledge (as distinguished from true knowledge), you claim that you truly know we are “physical entities that survive”. What you are saying is that within the limits of knowledge, we are more reasonably physical entities that survive. This claim is clearly not the same as more reasonably establishing complete knowledge (of who we are) (or knowledge of who we are known in entirety), and therefore, it falls short of overcoming the challenge proposition.

Response to your comments and questions on the 10 main arguments for the competition proposition:

Your contention that true knowledge is an “imagined illusion” ignores/overlooks the possibility that true knowledge may not be an imagined illusion. Viz., it is possible that true knowledge exists. (You cannot completely refute this position without contradicting your own position.)

What proof do you have that who we are is more reasonably completely “interaction”? (Note, we agree that who we are is more reasonably incompletely interaction (or what we call “causal infinity”).

We agree that what we reason is based on what we currently know in the sense that reasoning occurs in the present moment. Though we find it odd that you would ignore/overlook the apparent relationship between present knowledge, and past and future knowledge.

Since you concede that thinking is part of who we are (i.e. “that we think is”), it follows that thoughts the product of thinking are part of who we are as well. (How could thinking be part of who we are and the thoughts that are necessarily produced from thinking and part of thinking are not? If thoughts are not part of who we are, then how can they come from something and be part of something (i.e. thinking) which is part of who we are? Since the conception of “thinking” is a thought, how is your thought that thinking is part of who we are, not part of who you are? (Note, our contention that thoughts are part of who we are does not necessarily mean that all thoughts are equally part of who we are. It means that at a fundamental level all thoughts are part of who we are… From another angle, since we apparently cannot get outside of our minds, and we exist from thoughts, it follows that thoughts are part of who we are. (I.e. thoughts help, no matter how miniscule, to determine our existence, and therefore they are part of who we are.)))

Since you contend that true (or complete) knowledge is an “illusion”, it does not follow how you can validly deny the possibility of anything. (Possibility stems from incompleteness.)

Your criticism that we reason truth without even knowing [completely] what truth is, applies to everything we know, unless you or anyone else can more reasonably establish complete knowledge. (Note, we do not need complete knowledge of truth to reason truth, just as we do not need complete knowledge of who we are, to reason who we are.)

We agree that the nature of what we know is the same as what we know, but your assertion which is based on the circularity of human thought applies to any contention. The key question in our view is whether or not you can more reasonably refute our contention that human thought is defined, within limits, by comparison and incompleteness.

517. Entry:

Reply to the response to Entry 515

“In your entry you make several arguments in support of your contention that we can more reasonably completely know who we are. It is our contention, which we will more reasonably demonstrate, that all these arguments more reasonably fall short of establishing more reasonable complete knowledge of who we are.

First, you argue that based on your definition of sanity (i.e. ‘a condition of normalcy with respect to behavior’), there are complete principles like mutual agreement. However, what you appear to overlook is that the notion of normalcy does not necessarily equate to completeness. What the notion equates to is some form of status quo, which may or may not be complete. (Excerpt from the response to Entry 515)

The definition of sanity you credited me with was actually drawn from the ‘Dictionary of Psychology’ by J C Chaplin. My apologies for not making that reference clear. Its simplicity was used, as it seemed appropriate in the circumstances.

My definition of sanity using language principles which helps establish constancy:

Sanity: ‘That measure of reality we recognize as a true standard we use to establish that which is reasonable, and evident. (No infinite regress).
Associated activity: When we establish simple measures to identify reality then no matter how insane an individual presents we are able to address that which is real, supportable, and that we can deal with, simply because it is the only available conformity standard.

Unless, and until we develop the capacity to experience the microcosmic true standard as the affirmative whole (e.g., DNA), all else appears fragmented, separate. The innate implicit structure of the microcosm contains the completeness of the macrocosm; it has all the information necessary for us to understand ‘who we are’. The factors that are necessary for us to understand are universally available. Infinite regress is attempted removal from that which is constant. The point of any true realization is to disentangle the myriad of mental constructs used mistakenly as properties of completion. Completeness is not a smorgasbord of infinite regress particles that are misused to form mental constructs. When there is clarity of concepts that are real then we can extend on that reality, because they equally contain the properties of the macrocosm.
Continuous improvement expressed in evolutionary progress, must always use the basic principles of Natural Law to facilitate human development.

Second, you argue that the concept of infinite regress (and concept of causal infinity) is a denial of ‘what is’, or ‘an attempt to undermine [so-called] Reality itself’, or ‘a denial of life’s activity as the only Reality’. Yet, what you appear to also overlook is that your argument is based on the assumption of what is ‘Reality’, and a denial of the possibility that Reality is unknowable (as illustrated by the concept of infinite regress). In essence, you are denying that Reality could be unknowable, while the infinite regress position (by definition) leaves open the possibility that Reality may be knowable. So in fact it is you who may be denying ‘what is’, by declaring to know ‘what is’. (Excerpt from the response to Entry 515)

Certainly using infinite regress thought processes as a standard to operate under, would make reality unknowable, as its very obvious activity is to constantly remove itself from ‘what is’. For arguments sake how could anyone approach, or understand Reality when the philosophy is to remove oneself from it? My basic knowledge Reality is that if I do not eat, drink, or breathe, I will die! Also that if I put my hand over a flame, I will feel pain! There is much within my Reality scope that I do not assume, but understand, and which I am sure would be the norm for members of the Committee. Consistent with that, my approach to addressing ‘who we are’ is to deal with the certainties in immediate reality that provides me information, sustenance, and support.

Question: What could possibly be that is unknowable?

Have already said that we do not have the ability to deny anything. We can only affirm!
Any attempted denial is a measure of affirmation of anything one attempts to deny.
To say that we are ‘independent’ is attempted denial of the reality of our dependence, which by any measure is easy to identify.

Third, related to your second argument, you contend that so-called negative dichotomies exclude the possibility of insight into Reality. This contention is incorrect, because so-called negative dichotomies like infinite regress contend as mentioned above that insight into Reality is possible. Infinite regress by definition is limited, and thereby leaves open the possibility for anything. (Excerpt from the response to Entry 515)

‘Infinite regress by definition is limited’??????
Would appreciate an explanation as to how that which is infinite can be limited. It appears to me that the statement is a simple contradiction in terms!!! But given that as I read this in relation to what is said in conjunction with it above, there is a certain support for Reality, and the possibility that we may come to understand its properties. Have expressed above the fallibility of using ‘infinite regress’, or ‘negative dichotomies’ as tools to provide understanding simply because they lead inevitably to nothingness. To repeat, all that we can ever experience is each moment of Reality. Establish what is Real.

Fourth, you argue that human experience contains the equation ‘Truth + Understanding = Knowledge (Viz., Archimedes)’, or ‘direct experience of Reality is not attained through thought processes’. In other words, human experience itself is a source of truth. Yet, according to the responses to Entries 308 and 310, there is no such thing as experience itself from our perspective without thought processes. Viz., if we do not know an experience, it does not exist from our perspective. Also, due to the apparent separation between experience itself and our thought processes, experience can only be known through our conscious interpretation of it, thereby refuting within limits the notion that experience itself contains truth. (Of course, we concede that experience itself may contain truth, but the arguments above more reasonably demonstrate otherwise.)

Moreover, for you to deny the separation between experience and thought processes, then based on the apparent necessity of thought processes for the existence of experience, you cannot avoid the (apparent) comparative, incomplete nature of our thought processes defining our experience as well. (Excerpt from the response to Entry 515)

It is precisely because thought processes (mental constructs processed through historical information) dictate their own evaluation of ‘what is’ that realization is constricted, and contaminated by habitual dichotomy. It is the presumption that only ‘thought’ processes can reveal Reality which is the very barrier to an understanding of real experience. Truth is not a temporary property that may be contained in presumptions of Reality; it is the constant essence of real experience, and the catalyst for establishing all human values.

Direct experience of ‘what is’ (immediate reality) is not conditioned, or determined by ‘thought processes’. It is a pure equation of innate knowledge complementing that ‘which is’. In that experience there is no separation, no division, no fragmentation, and no artificial thought processes that require evaluation because of their divisive nature.

We are not saying that the statement you make concerning humanity, ‘that we all must eat; we all must drink; we all must die’ are not scientific Realities applicable to the human race. We are contending that the statement you make concerning humanity, ‘that we all must eat; we all must drink; we all must die’ are not more reasonably complete scientific Realities applicable to the human race. (Note our implied distinction between complete Reality and incomplete Reality, with the former referring to knowledge known in entirety.) (Excerpt from the response to Entry 515)

To repeat, each moment in Time is a microcosm of the macrocosm. Each moment is eternal, and complete. When we experience the reality of ‘who we are’ we know it is a complementary shared complete state. We also know that all knowledge is contained in that experience of Reality, and that we are all subject to its laws.
But that being said, it is hardly reasonable to put forward as you do the proposition that in time it may not be a natural condition that we all must eat, we all must drink, and we all must die! Given common knowledge of the laws of Nature it would be ‘more reasonable’ to expect complete continual compliance.

You presume that thought processes are the criteria for knowing that which is complete.
The sad, ironic circumstance of truly comprehending completely ’what is’ has no mental construct value!

We are not arguing that there are no observable grounds we will accept as reality. We are arguing that there are no apparent more reasonable grounds for complete reality. (Of course, if a participant provides more reasonable grounds for complete reality, we will accept them, but so far in our view, a participant has not provided more reasonable grounds.) (Excerpt from the response to Entry 515)

See below my reference to significant conclusion, the three bears in relation to the baker, the purchaser et al.

Our position on the apparent comparative nature of human consciousness does not ‘conclude that no other perspective exists’. Rather, the position due its limitation concludes that anything is possible including a non-comparative nature of reality. (Excerpt from the response to Entry 515)

Giving credence to the possibility of division directly impinges negatively on any potential experience of Reality as a whole experience.
All principles that are recognized as implicit standards in making Reality transparent (Archimedes--principle of leverage et al) are acceptable testaments to the direct relationship between the knower, and the known. In this regard complementary evident proof of realization (the principle of leverage et al) can stand as markers to our innate ability to eventually recognize constant standards.

In response to your request that we supply ‘a significant conclusion that is circular’, the conclusion that ‘the centrifugal force goes from the center outwards’ is circular because, for instance, the concepts of centrifugal force and center are incomplete when broken down in terms of their meanings, just as the transaction itself between a purchaser and baker is circular, because the bases for the transaction itself (i.e. the baker, purchaser, bread, money etc.) are all incomplete in terms of their meanings. To contend as you appear to do that the transaction itself (in the instance) is separate from the bases for the transaction, leaves the transaction itself devoid of meaning. I.e. there is no transaction itself without the baker, purchaser etc. (Excerpt from the response to Entry 515)

My request was not meant to be taken seriously as any significant conclusion cannot be circular. It is a contradiction in terms to say that a ‘significant conclusion’ is circular. You constantly look for unreasonable grounds (infinite regress etc,) to break down meanings. Although you accept ‘centrifugal force’ as a significant conclusion, you then attempt to deny that conclusion, and its significance by attempting to impose circularity to the reality. We now understand the main purpose of centrifugal force in many applications without the need for us to break it down in an infinite regress fashion toward meaninglessness.
The fairy tale of the three pigs, their building techniques, the wolf who would destroy their homes, and their constituent meanings, we can completely understand without the laborious futility of breaking down obvious meanings. This applies to the transaction between the baker, and the purchaser, and all other examples provided.

Your contention that ‘everything is, and everything that is, is connected’, is in contradiction with your contention that there exists ‘microcosmic complete acts’. Viz., microscopic acts more reasonably cannot be complete without complete knowledge of everything (and according to you ‘everything is connected’). So to isolate observable (complete) microscopic acts from non-observable (complete) microscopic acts, as you do, is contradictory. (Excerpt from the response to Entry 515)

I experience, you experience, we all experience.
To experience microscopic complete acts cannot be done in isolation. Nothing can be observed in isolation, there must be connectedness. The reality of the microscopic complete act is that it has connectedness with the macrocosm in that it has all the implicit information necessary to provide us guidance (principle of leverage et al). You may liken the experience to realizing the properties of a grain of sand. In that instance you then experience the properties of every grain of sand.
So to extend the analogy, if we experience the innate complete properties of a human being, we experience the essential properties of every human being. It is our fundamental connectedness, and it bestows on us the potential ability to identify wholly, and completely ‘who we are’. If it were not within our innate capacity to know ‘who we are’, life as we live it in contact with other homo sapiens would be an impossible nightmare!

To facilitate the activity of seeing ‘whole’. Hypothesize the baker, the bread, the purchaser, the money, the transaction, and the location, as existing only for that moment in time. In that circumstance there is complete agreement. Utilize that facility, and relate it to the drivers at traffic lights – the traverse of the ball from A to B et al. Having done that – come to the realization that you have dealt with Reality in the moment, and there is no need to analyze the experience out of existence, and then with thought processes deny the experience. Each activity is connected through the ‘completeness’ of each act, and our innate ability to recognize the relationship.

It is the quality of our inevitable experiences that dictates our ability to relate to ‘what is’. Conventionally we have presumed that our only means of defining ‘what is’ is generated by thought processes, and we have invested a great deal of human capital into securing that modus operandi as the only way of experiencing Reality, which imposes, negation, fragmentation, separation. Causal infinity, infinite regress; have no room in their doctrinaire for the recognition of that which is complete, constant, despite evidential Reality. Implicit within pure experience, everything is. It is precisely because there are constants that we can keep at least a tenuous grip on Reality.”

Bridie November 24 2004

Response:

Competition 1 centers on the requirement for participants to more reasonably establish complete knowledge (i.e. knowledge known in entirety). This requirement is distinguished from the requirement for participants to more reasonably establish more reasonable knowledge (e.g. Competition 2 and 3). The important distinction is more reasonably establishing completion versus more reasonably establishing more reasonableness. So when we evaluate your entries or anyone else’s to Competition 1, we are looking to see if more reasonable grounds have been established for complete knowledge (i.e. knowledge known in entirety or in all possible senses). As a side note, we think this is an extremely high standard, as illustrated by the fact that after almost 600 entries including disputes to Competition 1, challenge proposition 1 has yet to be overcome.

Regarding your entry, you make several arguments which more reasonably demonstrate the possibility for complete knowledge, but we think your arguments do not meet the requirement of more reasonable demonstration of complete knowledge. (Viz., the more reasonable establishment of possible complete knowledge falls short of the requirement of Competition 1.)

Your first argument is that there is an “innate implicit structure of the microcosm” within us like DNA which “contains the completeness of the macrocosm”…. “When there is clarity of concepts that are real then we can extend on that reality [through our innate knowledge], because they equally contain the properties of the macrocosm”. So in essence, you are saying there is innate complete knowledge within who we are and in the external world, and that all we have to do to utilize the knowledge is link the knowledge between the two worlds. However, it is unclear to us what more reasonable grounds you have to claim that there is innate complete knowledge within us or even in the external world. Where does this innate knowledge come from? How can you claim your argument meets the standard of knowledge known in entirety or all possible senses when our perspectives are apparently defined by comparison and incompletion (via. infinite regress), so that the possibility exists that there is no innate complete knowledge?

In response, you argue that it is “hardly reasonable” for instance to assert that it is possible we do not need to eat or drink, and we do not die, and yet Competition 1 is not centered on establishing what is more reasonable, but what is more reasonably complete in all possible senses.

Also, you argue that thought processes are not the only way we can know. We can know as well, you contend, through “direct experience of what ‘is’ (immediate reality)” or what you call “pure experience” through linking our apparent innate complete knowledge with the same knowledge in the external world. However, without considering the problem of more reasonably establishing innate complete knowledge, as discussed above, your position faces the problem that the Eureka experience of matching one thing within us with the same thing outside of us is still based on a relationship between the experience and what we know or interpret the experience as. You appear to claim that somehow we know the experience without our thought processes, and yet how can experience be known without the use of our thought processes? How do you go from experience directly into conscious thought of the experience? Even if you can more reasonably demonstrate a continuum from experience to conscious thought, how do you overcome the limitations of conscious thought itself? It appears to us that any involvement of conscious thought, no matter how insignificant, in your so-called “pure experience”, opens a gateway for infinite regress, and therefore, your position falls short of meeting the standard of more reasonable demonstration of complete knowledge in all possible senses. In our view, your only hope to salvage your position is to more reasonably establish knowledge without any involvement of conscious thought, and even then your position succumbs to the problem that you apparently cannot express your position without using conscious thought!

Other issues:

The concept of infinity is limited because infinity itself faces its own infinite regress. Moreover, the concept implies no beginning or end, which then by definition mean there is no whole or completion including the notion of no beginning or end.

Your notion of sanity with reference to what is “reasonable and evident” does not correspond to the standard of Competition 1 (i.e. more reasonable demonstration of complete knowledge in all possible senses).

By us contending that the concept of “centrifugal force” as a significant conclusion is circular, we are not denying as you argue the conclusion. No. We are merely placing a more reasonable limitation on the conclusion in terms of completeness.

Infinite regress and causal infinity by definition do not rule out, as you contend, that which is complete and constant. Rather, infinite regress and causal infinity project limitation on what we know including the concepts themselves. Therefore, there is a possibility through the concepts of infinite regress and causal infinity that some things are complete and constant.

518. Entry:

Reply to the response to Entry 505

“‘…we acknowledge that there is no apparent absolute ‘concrete context’ behind the conception of more reasonableness, but the same criticism can be applied to any other conception, and therefore, your criticism is cancelled out.’ (Excerpt from the response to Entry 505)

Should we take a proposition like: ‘The universe [most reasonably] started with a thing called [Big Bang]’, the term ‘Most reasonably’ becomes more problematic. The reason is that we are looking at a statement to which we simply do not know the answer, so who would I be to claim to be most reasonable in stating it, denying my opposition any claim to this same reasonableness? Why? Just because I say so? Because I have a 1000 brothers and sisters who agree with me and only 59 who are opposed? Because present theories point in that direction? Humanity has never in history created a theory of physics that has not been shown to be flawed in the end.
I would not be able to provide a concrete context for my opposition to base an attempt at refutation on. As long as the actual occurrence of [Big Bang] is neither proven nor refuted, they will have to stand by powerlessly and endure this philosophical bully that has taken their reasonableness away for no particular reason. The best claim I could make would be nothing other than a democratic one. The only people who would deem my claim ‘Most reasonable’, would be the ones that already deem it most reasonable to begin with. That is, the ones that would also [Most reasonably] agree with the proposition: ‘The universe started with a thing called [Big Bang]’. I would not be able to convert a single antagonist by adding [Most reasonably] to my proposition.

On the grounds laid out above, I claim that the addition of [most reasonably] to the proposition is less reasonable than omitting it. The people who agree with my Big Bang proposition already deem the proposition to be most reasonable without the addition of [most reasonable] to its formulation. The people who disagree will definitely not change their minds because I add it. If anything, it will antagonize them even further and, in my opinion, quite reasonably so. Because that is how it should work, is it not? I present a proposition and it is up to my fellow thinkers to assess its reasonableness. Some may deem it most reasonable, others may not. I should not be claiming it to be most reasonable period, for I will only be speaking for myself, not for those whom I have put my proposition to for assessment.

I ask you to imagine what the addition of [most reasonably] to the proposition means to any possible antagonist. You deny them any claim to reason. Irrespective of the further content of the proposition, you have preempted all attempts at refutation. This, in my opinion, is clearly unreasonable.

I do understand that for those who are in favor of the proposition, the addition of [more reasonable] is convenient. What they say becomes: Okay, we concede that we are not god, we cannot be absolutely sure of our point, observe how aware of our limitations we are….., but we are right anyway, because your claim, o most highly esteemed antagonist, is simply less reasonable than our point of view, on the grounds of being less reasonable than our point of view.

In the end, we seem to agree that we don’t know what ‘knowing who we are’ is, except in a down to earth context (Being a secretary, a shaman, yonder woman’s husband, the decathlon world champion etc..). In other words, the same context in which we ‘know’ what nerve gas is.
If being who we are is removed from this mundane context and placed in an abstract setting, as is the case with the proposition, stating claims concerning ‘being who we are’ becomes like a poker game in which all cards are wild. You’ll be facing a royal flush in each and every game, unless you play people who don’t know that a royal flush is the highest combination in the game. But, as it so happens, I do know this. But of course, in case of an equal hand the bank may claim that the dealer wins..

‘Also, your contention that the condensed notion that ‘we cannot (truly) know who we are and not be who we are’ is more reasonable than ‘we cannot (truly) know who we are and be who we are’ is incorrect (in a limited sense) because the former notion leads to the latter notion’ (Excerpt from the response to Entry 505)

Being who we are is what I always have done, always do and always will do, because I cannot get outside myself. Even when I say the words ‘I am not being myself at the moment’ and I actually believe this to be true, I am still being myself. I have no means whatsoever to be anything but myself. In other words, I can only be myself, in the same way as you can only be your self, as far as I’m concerned. Now, if I can do nothing but be myself at any time, the following proposition sounds somewhat weird:

‘we cannot [more reasonably] truly know who we are, in part or in whole, and be who we are at the same time.’

I cannot do { -something- } and be who I am at the same time. But I am always who I am! So just say that I cannot do { -something- }!

By the same logic: I cannot do { -something- } and not be who I am at the same time. Of course! If I am not being, I cannot do anything! This is why I deem this particular proposition far more reasonable. I fear that I know what you will say. You will explain to me that this is not how you have decided to use these words. However, you yourself state that we cannot get outside ourselves, which, to me at least, implies that we are always being ourselves. My proposition would be this: We do never (-truly-, if you will) know ourselves, but are always being ourselves.

This way any proposition of the form: I cannot do { -something- } and be who I am at the same time

Is logically equivalent to: I cannot do { -something- }

Finally, let me repeat that I would fully agree with the proposition ‘We cannot truly know who (or what ) we are’, where true knowledge refers to a body of knowledge that is exhaustive, complete and not open to interpretation or containing every possible interpretation within itself. This body of knowledge being continuously at our disposal in its entirety, or even only in part, as you say. It is my firm belief that we possess nothing of this hypothetical form of knowledge.

‘…the apparent incompleteness of all human thought establishes the possibility of all human thought, which in turn establishes the necessity of reason for thinking beings to determine, in relevant situations, the more reasonable or possible thought.’ (Excerpt from the response to Entry 505)

Lots of thoughts indeed, just a few:

- A paraphrase: The apparent incompleteness of all life establishes the possibility of all desire, which in turn establishes the necessity of ability for living beings to acquire the more nourishing or accessible food source.
- Consider those killer whales, continuously being voted to shreds by trillions of herrings, who in turn find themselves at the mercy of the even far more numerous krill. Lucky for them (and all creation) they are not aware they should be listening. I can see how reason is important in resolving the Middle-East problems, in how to best build a dam or in fighting aids or in resolving the terrible Babylonian mess that the world’s various religions have brought about in their wake. However, the proposition has no bearing on these, nor on any other concrete issue that concerns the condition of humanity.

-The above statement states that certain thoughts are more reasonable than others and that we have a need and obligation to determine the most reasonable way to look at relevant situations. I assume that with these relevant situations you’re referring to situations like the ones I mentioned above and on which, by the abstract nature of its formulation, the proposition itself has no bearing whatsoever.

‘…Further, your condensed version of Proposition 1, ‘we cannot know who we are’ begs the significant question, in what sense can we not know who we are, and your condensed version assumes that being is necessary for (truly or not truly?) knowing which is not necessarily the case.’ (Excerpt from the response to Entry 505)

The sense in which we cannot know who we are, is in the sense of a body of knowledge that is exhaustive, complete and not open to interpretation or containing every possible interpretation within itself. This body of knowledge being continuously at our disposal in its entirety, or even only in part, as you say. It is my firm belief that we possess nothing of this form of knowledge.

As to the second part of the excerpt, I really don’t see how I could know something if I didn’t exist in the first place. And I do most reasonably know that I exist. Call it unreasonable, but that’s what I know.

‘In addition, through the notion that we need to be in order to (truly) know, you blindly assume that being is necessary for truly knowing, and yet you have not established truly knowing itself.’ (Excerpt from the response to Entry 505)

The only conceivable way in which knowledge could possibly exist without being, is in the case of our beings being temporally infinite. Then it could be argued that knowledge is necessarily temporally infinite too and might even have preceded being at ‘ground genesis’. Knowledge (logos) having fathered being, so to speak.
Well, that’s a well known theme, anybody should do with it as they prefer. But whatever you believe here, it’s not going to add to our knowledge (Viz., either of these two notions has existed for eons, which should be a testament to both their reasonableness), nor solve any of humanity’s issues.)

‘Furthermore, through your claim that the most differentiated part of who we are is unknown, you mistakenly assume that less differentiated parts of who we are are known,’ (Excerpt from the response to Entry 505)

‘…[most reasonably] truly- bit. In my opinion it can only possibly refer to the fact that we cannot know what the most differentiated knowledge of existence which is available to us consists of. For if we knew, there would be a yet more differentiated part of which we wouldn’t know what it was made of.... ad infinitum.’

I guess I should have written: ‘….For as soon as we THOUGHT we MOST REASONABLY knew, there would be a yet more differentiated…..’ Or something to that effect.”

Raoul Starren December 3 2004

Response:

There are two main problems with your entry.

First, you refer to “most reasonably” when the competition proposition is worded with “more reasonably”. The word “most” implies an endpoint or fixed position; whereas, the word “more” implies a prominent position which is open to refutation. So your contention that competition proposition 1 “denies” opposition in the form of concrete context to the same reasonableness, does not stand. Viz., the use of more reasonableness does not rule out the use or consideration of other so-called concrete contexts.

Moreover, the basis to determine more reasonableness in Competition 1 is not primarily from the wording of the competition proposition, but from the reasons, in terms of their soundness and consistency, for and against the competition proposition. Therefore, you or anyone else are able to claim the same reasonableness as the competition proposition or even overcome it, but to be successful in terms of Competition 1, you most provide reasons with equivalent soundness and consistency as the reasons supporting the competition proposition or provide more sound and consistent reasons than the reasons supporting the competition proposition.

Second, you claim that the competition proposition is abstract or lacks a concrete context in which to evaluate its validity, while other propositions like “you can’t [most reasonably] inhale ten liters of nerve gas and expect to survive at the same time” have concrete contexts. Also, due to the lack of concrete context, you contend that it is less reasonable to add the claim of more reasonableness to the competition proposition than not to do so. The problem with your position is that you criticize the competition proposition for being incomplete (or what you call abstract), while you assert that other propositions are complete (or clear, non-abstract). Yet you have not demonstrated a proposition to be complete or without abstraction; rather, you have merely, whether intentionally or unintentionally, assumed it. So unless you can demonstrate a complete, non-abstract proposition, then your distinction between arbitrariness and concrete context is arbitrary, and therefore, your position self-defeats itself. (Viz., unless you can establish complete propositions, all propositions at some point are subject to incompletion or arbitrariness. If you cannot establish complete propositions, then for your position to avoid self-contradiction (for criticizing the competition proposition for arbitrariness despite its own), you would have to demonstrate that it is less reasonable to apply more reasonableness to any proposition. (This position would likely be difficult for you to establish, as you have already conceded that more reasonableness applies to the proposition of inhaling ten liters of nerve gas and not expecting to survive.)

Other issues:

By you arguing that we cannot truly know who we are when “true knowledge refers to a body of knowledge that is exhaustive, complete and not open to interpretation or containing every possible interpretation within itself”, it follows that you agree with the competition proposition. (Viz., true knowledge from the competition proposition refers to knowledge which is known entirely or in all possible senses.) Now we would like to know what is stopping you from applying more reasonableness to your argument? What reasons do you have not to apply more reasonableness? If you claim arbitrariness then we say as above that all propositions are apparently arbitrary, and you have already conceded that there are valid applications of more reasonableness. So why not to your own argument and the competition proposition as well?

Though we agree with you that we have to “be” in order to “know”, by you removing the phrase, “be who we are at the same time” from the challenge proposition, you are changing the meaning of the proposition by removing the emphasis on the simultaneity of problem of truly knowing and being. Also, your alteration of the competition proposition does not overcome the proposition, and even if your altered proposition is more reasonable.

Your proposed proposition, “we cannot (truly) know who we are and not be who we are” does not make any claim on whether or not we can truly know who we are, and therefore, the competition proposition and your proposition do not have the same meaning. (Viz., the competition proposition claims that we cannot truly know who we are; whereas, your proposition takes no stand on the issue.) Hence, it is unclear that your proposed proposition is more reasonable, and even if it is more reasonable, it does not follow that it overcomes the competition proposition, because as mentioned your proposition takes no stand on whether we can truly know who we are or not.

Your claim that a more reasonable position will become less reasonable through a more differentiated knowledge, may not necessarily be the case.

Entry 515 Entries 519-523