Reply to the response to Entry 501

“Though your proposition apparently looks insurmountable, many great artists have demonstrated time and again that it is NOT so. For example take different forms of art. Be it music, painting, sculpture or flower arrangement, interior decoration, cocktail, etc. Let us examine as to what happens. Every form of art including mundane cooking which turns into art in the hands of a creative cook, things like musical notes, tones, colors, shapes, textures, ingredients, shades etc. get arranged (seemingly known only intuitively) in such a way that some cosmic factor gets captured, whether one knows the exact mechanism or not. When this happens in the hands of only a few, nonetheless, the resulting aesthetic beauty of such arrangement unfailingly triggers a response of thrill and tranquility in the minds of the audience! In so doing the artist has managed to just get out of the physical limitations at least for a moment and just ‘be’ in what ‘is’ and capture and express some facets of the ever-changing and dynamic cosmic factor, yet retaining his/her personal character at the same time! Thus, what is captured in art-forms is neither ‘more reasonable’ nor ‘less reasonable’ but just what 'is' in an inexhaustible reality and though only a few of us could do it, yet the vast majority ends up acknowledging the truth of it all.”

R. Rangan August 10 2004

Response:

What does “response of thrill and tranquility” have to do with more reasonably demonstrating complete knowledge (i.e. your so-called “cosmic function” or “what is”), especially since the notion of response implies interaction, thereby indirect relation between, for instance, an audience and a particular artwork?

Also, what is the more reasonable mechanism that allows an artist to impart his “cosmic factor” or “what is” into an art form? (We concede that an art form is an extension, in some sense, of the artist who produced it, but how does the art form itself or its relation to an audience allow the audience to more reasonably completely know the artist of the art form?)

In essence, how do you more reasonably overcome the apparent interaction between things?

Other issues:

If “what is” is an “inexhaustible reality” as you contend, then it follows that “what is” is incomplete, and therefore, your position is consistent with Proposition 1.

Whether a majority or super-majority acknowledges the so-called truth of an artwork, it does not necessarily follow that the majority or super-majority’s acknowledgement is correct. (Viz., a majority and super-majority are not absolute. Rather, they are collective opinions.)

505. Entry:

Reply to the response to Entry 484

“‘The first problem with your position is that you incorrectly claim that Proposition 1 amounts to “we cannot know who we are” or simply “who” (i.e. “to know who”). Your oversimplification of the proposition ignores that it refers to specifically to complete knowledge, whether in part or in whole, and is proposed within the bounds of more reasonableness.’ (Excerpt from response to Entry 484)

No, I don’t ignore this, I have been asking you for the past four years to tell me what this more reasonableness is exactly. I have argued that you need a concrete context to even consider discussing reasonableness. I have argued that the proposition does not supply such a context. Talking about ‘being’ and ‘knowing’ and whether we can do this simultaneously is nothing but empty philosofobabble. I love that like the next person, but really, you don’t win any arguments on that turf by going on about an ever elusive ‘more reasonableness’. So I’ll say it again: I ignored nothing; I merely don’t agree with you. I will never use your terms, because it’s these very terms I contest. More sound and consistent reasons you ask? Let’s again look at the monster: ‘we cannot [more reasonably] truly know who we are, in part or in whole, and be who we are at the same time.’ The only way in which this proposition makes sense (I’ll try to refrain from raging over the way it’s formulated for a moment), is in a trivial way: An olfactory organ cannot [most reasonably] truly smell the receptors that it consists of, in part or in whole, and be an olfactory organ at the same time. And yes, the more reasonable will agree with that. But in the case of the proposition there is a catch. In order for someone to have a shot at truly knowing who he is, in part or in whole, he will first and foremost need to be. If he is not, he cannot know. No matter in what way or at what time. That’s reasonable enough. So now let’s put the following two propositions next to each other: ‘we cannot [more reasonably] truly know who we are, in part or in whole, and be who we are at the same time.’ ‘We cannot [more reasonably] truly know who we are, in part or in whole, and not be who we are at the same time.’ I ask you: Which one of the two is most reasonable? Which one can we accept with the least amount of doubt? Clearly the latter, there can be no doubt about that. The point is that if we cannot [more reasonably] truly know who we are, in part or in whole, whether we are being who we are at the same time or are not being who we are at the same time. The last part of the proposition can just as well be discarded. That is what is most reasonable here. Therefore your claim that I most reasonably oversimplify the proposition is most reasonably incorrect, where my claim that you most reasonably have added needlessly obscuring factors to the proposition, is most reasonably correct. All you say is: We cannot [most reasonably] know who we are. And what’s ‘WHO’ anyway? Don’t tell me it means: ‘what we are’. It does, doesn’t it? So the proposition we’re addressing becomes: We cannot [most reasonably] truly know what we are. All that needs to be removed now, is the -[most reasonably] truly- bit. In my opinion it can only possibly refer to the fact that we cannot know what the most differentiated knowledge of existence which is available to us consists of. For if we knew, there would be a yet more differentiated part of which we wouldn’t know what is was made of.... ad infinitum. Anybody denying this, could safely be called unreasonable. But leaving our turtle stacking brothers out of the equation for a moment, all we talk about is: We cannot know what we are. Maybe that is because knowing and being are two different things. Something like we cannot drink what we eat.”

Raoul Starren August 12 2004

Response:

We certainly do not expect you or anyone else to agree with our formation of Proposition 1, nor do we expect you or anyone else to agree with our interpretation of the meaning of Proposition 1. Though one thing you should keep in mind is that Proposition 1 has developed originally from the statement, “we cannot know who we are and be who we are” to the current statement, “we cannot more reasonably truly know who we are, in part or in whole, and be who we are at the same time” in order to establish greater initial clarity (to participants with a diverse array of viewpoints) of Proposition 1 both as a whole and in parts. Unfortunately, you are a particular participant who finds Proposition 1 obscure, but based on the fact that no other participant has raised this obscurity issue (except for Mitch Hodge from Entry 152), it is likely that Proposition 1 is obscure only to a minority of participants. As we are sure you would concede, there is no absolute formation or meaning of Proposition 1. So an obvious goal would be to strive for the most clear formation and meaning of Proposition 1 to the most participants.

Regarding your criticism of Proposition 1, we acknowledge that there is no apparent absolute “concrete context” behind the conception of more reasonableness, but the same criticism can be applied to any other conception, and therefore, your criticism is cancelled out. Moreover, in a limited sense, the concrete context of more reasonableness, in terms of Competition 1, is Proposition 1 and its defined terms and most significant the basis for evaluation, the more or less reasonableness (i.e. more or less soundness and consistency) of Proposition 1 to antagonistic propositions. In terms of the concrete context of more reasonableness itself, the context stems from the apparent fact that we cannot get outside of our minds, so that all we can know is what we know, and the apparent facts that human thought is defined reason (i.e. comparative dynamic), and soundness and consistency in terms contradiction/non-contradiction are fundamental aspects of human reason. Added to these points, the apparent incompleteness of all human thought establishes the possibility of all human thought, which in turn establishes the necessity of reason for thinking beings to determine, in relevant situations, the more reasonable or possible thought.

Also, your contention that the condensed notion that ‘we cannot (truly) know who we are and not be who we are’ is more reasonable than ‘we cannot (truly) know who we are and be who we are’ is incorrect (in a limited sense) because the former notion leads to the latter notion (i.e. the statement, ‘we need to be in order to (truly) know’ leads to the question ‘can we (truly) know and be who we are?’). In addition, through the notion that we need to be in order to (truly) know, you blindly assume that being is necessary for truly knowing, and yet you have not established truly knowing itself. (If you define knowing exclusively in a limited sense, then your comparison of the two statements is invalid, because we cannot know who we are and be who we are refers specifically to truly or completely knowing, and actually the statement is nonsensical if it does not.)

Further, your condensed version of Proposition 1, “we cannot know who we are” begs the significant question, in what sense can we not know who we are, and your condensed version assumes that being is necessary for (truly or not truly?) knowing which is not necessarily the case.

Furthermore, through your claim that the most differentiated part of who we are is unknown, you mistakenly assume that less differentiated parts of who we are are known, which takes us back to the question stemming from your condensed Proposition 1, in what sense do we know who we are? Completely know less differentiated parts as you appear to imply? Incompletely know less differentiated parts, which raises the question of why you distinguish most differentiated from less differentiated? (Note, we consciously know the most differentiated part of ourselves through this mere identification now, and therefore, in a limited sense the most differentiated part of ourselves is known.) What clarifies your usage of knowledge is the “in part or in whole” phrase from Proposition 1, assuming that you agree with the position that there is no part of ourselves that is (more reasonably) completely known.

506. Entry:

Reply to the response to Entry 504

“A deeper look at all forms of fine art- be it abstract or visual - reveal the following: - No one can deny the existence of the finest artists and the greatness of their creations. This process has been has been going on and on, though only a few of us have such artistic capabilities. And, great works of any form of art, express much more than spoken/written words. Apparently, only at moments when the perceiver and the perceived merge into one, both disappearing simultaneously, such great creations come into being. Such is the mechanism and any relationship with the appreciative audience has nothing to do with such creation. In fact only when the artist ceases to exist as a separate entity such creations of art get revealed. In so doing, the artist, manages to arrange the chosen parameters, in a perfect way, like in a jigsaw puzzle, to such a degree that everything else gets thrown into oblivion. Even ignorant onlookers have to unanimously agree this undeniable character of such great creations. Yet, the artist has managed to retain his individual stamp and character also, throughout. This proves that individual perceptions and creations by various great artists, when they willingly lose their individual identity to merge with what is being observed or perceived, reveals to them the most perfect arrangement of the chosen parameters to be expressed in the chosen medium. If additional parameters be included or deleted more such perfect creations remain possible and hence such a state remains inexhaustible. However, this does NOT mean that such a state is ‘incomplete’ as you conclude. Rather it only indicates that it is limitless, boundless or ‘more than complete’ considering their inherent limitations of the so-called mind. In summary, unique creations of art do express facets of the unknown in the domain of the known, yet, bearing the individual character. Though such creations take place through only a few (less reasonable), yet, the majority cannot deny the power and beauty and tranquility emanating from such creations (more reasonable). Hence can we not conclude that something ‘unique’ is neither more reasonable nor less reasonable, but is just what 'is'? Similarly something infinite holding multiple perfect arrangements of a number of parameters in different groupings, cannot be categorized as being incomplete. Though can only be termed as being infinite with no boundaries or limitations. Such states of perfection can be discovered by the mechanism of one loosing the individual identity, thus the perceiver and the perceived disappearing simultaneously, great creations do get revealed. Artists, though transcending the barriers due to mass-body-mind, yet retain the individuality at the same time.”

R. Rangan August 17 2004

Response:

The main issues regarding your entry is how we more reasonably know that an artist merges into one with his or her artwork, and the audience through viewing the artwork completely knows the artist.

In response to these issues, you say that “no one can deny the existence of the finest artists and the greatness of their creations”, and onlookers “unanimously agree” about the undeniable character of great creations. However, unanimity regarding artwork or anything else is not necessarily correct. Viz., the opinion of everyone though in agreement could be wrong. Moreover, though no one can deny the greatness of an artist, it does not follow that no one can deny the more reasonable complete greatness of an artist. Even if no one can, we come back to the possible incorrectness of unanimity. (Note, according to the concept of more reasonableness, what matters in terms of unanimity or any other quantification of opinion is the reason(s) for the opinion. Though in a situation in which there are no reasons, then unanimity would be more reasonable than non-unanimity, but that is not saying much.)

Also, you contend that the state of perfection in a great artwork, for example, is “inexhaustible”, and that the perfected state is “limitless, boundless, and “more than complete”. Yet, we ask how can something in an infinite state be considered more than complete when by definition infinity implies incompletion? In addition, the state of perfection (i.e. infinite creation) despite your contention of its limitless, has the limits of having no end or no finiteness.

So we ask you again, how can we more reasonably know a great artwork is complete? How does an artist more reasonably completely merge him or herself into an artwork? How does an audience itself more reasonably completely know an artist through his or her artwork? How can an artist him or herself be considered complete in consideration of his or her apparent interconnection to other things?

507. Entry:

“The exact nature of anything outside of man is necessarily intangible to man. For example one can never know the ‘stoniness’ of stone or the ‘iciness’ of ice. Man can only ‘know’ these things by their apparent properties. (Hardness, coldness, etc.) On the other hand, theoretically, man should be able to know himself since he IS man. Since the only nature man can know is man’s, there is an innate problem to his self knowledge. There is nothing to compare this knowledge to; there is no contrasting nature which man knows. It is like a person who, for his whole existence, can only see one tone of the color blue. He will be unable to appreciate it as blue because there is nothing to compare it with. Man therefore can never appreciate self-knowledge regarding his nature. He can never have knowledge of the experience of his own nature. Unable to know by experience his nature, man asks the second question; ‘what is my purpose?’ One looks at a particular tool used for driving nails into wood and says that it ‘IS’ a hammer, or another which drives screws and says that it ‘IS’ a screwdriver. Man identifies things according to their usefulness or purpose. Man speaks as if the nature of a thing is somewhat connected to its purpose. Naturally he does the same to himself and so to discover his nature he seeks purpose. Here again there is an innate problem in discovering man’s purpose. As a matter of fact there are two: If the lock on my front door were to malfunction and had to be replaced, then the respective key would have lost its purpose. In other words, if the thing which man serves has no purpose, or is useless, then man has no purpose. What is more, if the thing which man serves, itself serves another, but that other has no purpose then both man and the thing he serves are useless. For man to have purpose, either he or the ultimate thing he serves must have its purpose innate in him/it. Taking the proposition that man does not have purpose innate in himself, it is incumbent on man to find that which needs no reason or purpose to exist, and in which man finds his ultimate usefulness. It was reported that Napoleon Bonaparte once had one of his officers court marshaled and sentenced to death for some matter. The mother of the convicted man pleaded with Napoleon to have mercy on her son. The General replied ‘Madam, your son does not deserve mercy.’ To which the mother replied ‘Sir, if he deserved it, it would not be mercy.’ Mercy is a strange thing. It can only be given to those who do not deserve it. It can only exist if there is no reason for it. It serves no purpose other than itself. Mercy does not need to be justified. It exists in a class different from all creation. Because mercy can have no reason it cannot be unreasonable, rather it is ‘non-reasonable’. Reason is not applicable to it. It is beyond and above reason. Mercy therefore is one thing which can take us out of our dilemma. It is possibly the ultimate purpose of everything. The same can be said of love. If it is subject to anything it ceases to be love. The question whether mercy and love share the same nature or is the same thing will not be addressed here. It is sufficient to show that there can be a reason for man’s existence and man can discover something of his nature by knowing it. The second problem in man knowing his purpose is this: If the ultimate reason for man’s existence necessarily has no other reason but itself. If the ultimate reason must necessarily be above and beyond reason itself, then in it, philosophy has reached the end of its usefulness. The greatest power of the greatest mind is still only the power to reason. Man cannot therefore mentally know his purpose except to know something of it. But what is ‘knowledge’? Is it only a tenant of the mind? Should one limit ‘knowledge’ to mental knowledge? Is it certain that there is no other type? Can one be certain of a negative? Perhaps still there is a faculty in man which could comprehend a non reasonable thing. Perhaps the heart knows things which the mind is powerless to understand. Perhaps people like Mother Theresa of Calcutta who serve the precepts of love and mercy hold within their hearts, a wisdom and understanding beyond human mental comprehension. Perhaps there are those who, through serving their usefulness, serve their purposes while knowing themselves through knowing their purposes in their hearts. They ARE servants of love and mercy and they KNOWINGLY SERVE love and mercy.”

Lawrence Fortune August 18 2004

Response:

How can the conceptions of mercy and love more reasonably be “beyond and above” our minds and reason, when being conscious phenomenon they are from our minds?

Just because mercy is apparently given to those individuals who do not deserve it, does not mean mercy is “non-reasonable”. It means that mercy is given to those who do not deserve it. That is the reason of mercy, regardless of how “strange” it may appear. (Though we contend that in most situations, there are likely more reasons for giving mercy than simply to those individuals who do not deserve it such as the passionate plea of a mercy seeker, doubt regarding the guilt of a mercy seeker, or compassion of a mercy giver.)

Similarly, the conception of love as defined by you, is at least conditioned by it not being subject to anything, which is (incidently) self-contradictory and apparently unattainable from our comparative perspective.

We concede that it is possible that there are individuals who “serve their purposes while knowing themselves through knowing their purposes in their hearts”. Though the key question in terms of Competition 1, is how these individuals or anyone else more reasonably completely know themselves through knowing their purposes in their hearts?

How can anyone whether Mother Theresa or Mahatma Ghandi more reasonably completely know their purposes in their hearts?

508. Entry:

Reply to the response to Entry 506

“If one can't let go of his/her favorite theory or notion, however imperfect it may be, to the extent that undeniable facts also would be objectionable, what can be done? You acknowledge the greatness of art but insist that the artist or the onlooker must know it all. Great art-forms and artists are undeniable facts whether one understands the mechanism or not. How does the analysis matter more than becoming sensitive to the uniqueness of such perfect creations? The magical arrangement of the ingredients, be it musical notes, tones or shades, colors or strokes or the curves, contours etc., capturing the unmistakable thrill, exuberance - in one master stroke is always perfect and aesthetically most appealing and cannot be anything else - what does this all mean to you? How do you reckon the creative work as executed by great artists of various kinds? Do you reject just because it wouldn't fit in your theory? Then, in your opinion what do you suppose is the meaning of art? Here I clearly see that a few of us who have talent, though they may not be perfect individuals by any standard, demonstrate time and again that they could capture something out of the ordinary and yet, carry their individuality or character without having to sign verbally and express a great deal more than words to strike a ringing bell in the minds of the onlookers, whether anyone knows the mechanism or not. Such feats are very many and oft-repeated over time immemorial and sensitivity is needed more than any theory. Rather, set notions and theories may prove to be stumbling blocks preventing an innocent approach. Not knowing what to expect next, the artist gets into such a state of mind losing his individuality and lo behold - another new wonderful perfect arrangement emerges!”

R. Rangan August 21 2004

Response:

You are entitled to your belief in the undeniable perfection (or completion) of great artworks. However, your reasons supporting your belief (i.e. “sensitivity” to great artworks, and “strike a ringing bell in the minds of onlookers”) are less reasonable than antagonistic reasons like the representative nature of conscious sensitivity and the apparent incompleteness of the artist himself, thereby his artwork as well, due to his interconnection to and interaction with other things. So unless you more reasonably demonstrate otherwise by, for instance, demonstrating that so-called great artworks are undeniable perfect creations, your view of great artists and their artworks falls short of more reasonably demonstrating complete knowledge of who we are.

Note, if so-called great artworks are undeniably perfect, then it follow the perfection of great artworks cannot be objectionable, and yet since we object, the perfection of great artworks is not undeniable as you contend.

Our view of art as a heightened state of expression is irrelevant to you more reasonably demonstrating the undeniable perfection of great artwork. Viz., the success of your demonstration or anyone else’s comes down to the soundness and consistency of the demonstration compared to antagonistic reasons.

As mentioned, you are entitled to hold onto your belief in the undeniable perfection of great artwork by not testing the validity of your belief through the theory of more reasonableness. Yet as thinking beings we contend that it is contradictory to knowingly hold onto a less reasonable belief and/or avoid testing the validity of one’s belief.

So you can walk away with your belief intact, but mistake not, it is only supported, unless demonstrated otherwise, by the threads of possibility (in the form of your faith) and contradiction.

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