"The proposition cannot be overcome. We are who we are by definition of state of nature--time and space. We cannot truly know who we are as we do not know which states, at any times, and which space definitions we truly are. If we knew that much, we would be defining a God-like scenario which needless to say is unattainable."

DragonFly January 27 2003

Response:

As the response to Entry 168 establishes, possibility precedes impossibility. I.e. from our perspective, impossibility is contingent on the possibility of it; whereas, possibility is not contingent on the impossibility of it. So we could truly know and be who we are and more reasonably show that we do. For you to deny this possibility by maintaining that the proposition cannot be overcome, is to contradict your position that we are not God-like.

422. Entry:

Reply to the response to Entry 378

"You suggest that since human beings are no more than ‘uber- apes’, human beings are unqualified to identify the ‘ways of reason’. 1 However, your suggestion is contradictory because if we are not qualified to identify the ways of reasons from being ‘uber-apes’, then it follows we should not be qualified to identify ourselves as ‘uber-apes’ as well.

You are quite a piece of work. Holy Jesus and what not. You came up with uber-apes, not me (I just tried to create common ground: silly mistake). Lo and behold: your own quote:

‘This recent functional neurological finding shows why our history is the way it is. Although we can attain to more peaceable and advanced thought and culture sometimes, it's normally too difficult for us because the more primitive, violent area of the brain really still controls almost everything we do. This neurological finding explains what history has always told us, that we're really just violent uber-apes with a thin veneer of civilization grafted on top, and not a very sturdy or secure one at that, since it gets peeled off all too often in the violent annals of history.’

This doesn't follow, because we're also not qualified to disqualify ourselves in identifying the ways of reason. I may choose which opinion I prefer without being in danger of making ‘the wrong choice’. Stalemate. Now follows the possibility precedes impossibility concept in some form or other I suppose, but I feel that this statement is not reasonable.

The statement:
‘The impossibility of impossibility caused possibility’, is perfectly matched with the statement:
‘Possibility made the impossible possible’. There never was, is, or will be a ‘first one’ in this.

Stalemate. If you cannot admit to this, I accuse you of not seeing language for what it is: Something like everything else we know, without a circumference, and without a center. The only way to win is to abandon the abstract realm on which this proposition is constituted. You will simply have to start talking tons, meters, dollars, hotdogs and gods."

Raoul Starren March 4 2003

Response:

Your overall contention is that no definitive conclusion to argumentation/discussion can be attained within the apparent limit of what we know. Viz., there is no apparent true (or complete) right or wrong choice. However, we contend that your position can be taken further by acknowledging the need on our part to make choices, and our inability to identify complete right or wrong choices, so that we end up determining the more reasonable right or wrong choice. You have already conceded the existence of more reasonable choices in Entry 359, in which you conclude, "I think that within the framework of the human mind, life and people, there indeed is such a thing as ‘more reasonable’. If I break my foot, it is more reasonable not to compete in a 110m hurdles race. If a beautiful girl seduces me, the most reasonable thing to do, if I'm single anyway, will be to kiss her."

To support your position of "stalemate" choices, you contend that the "impossibility of impossibility caused possibility" and "possibility made the impossible possible", and therefore, neither impossibility or possibility precedes the other. What you overlook is that the impossibility of impossibility is not entirely established by you, and therefore, all human thought from our perspective is defined primarily by possibility. Viz., impossibility of impossibility is contingent on its possibility, which means that impossibility is as well, and since possibility cannot more reasonably be contingent on its impossibility, it follows that possibility more reasonably precedes impossibility, impossibility of impossibility ad infinitium.

In conclusion, we agree with you that there is apparently no complete "center" to what we know, but as mentioned, we disagree that this lack of complete center necessarily leads to stalemate. We contend that within the apparent limits of what we know, the more reasonable choice trumps the stalemate choice. Perhaps, you may liken more reasonable to "tons, meters, dollars, hotdogs, and gods", but that classification does not refute that more reasonableness is a necessity of reason. Note, the critical point in our contention is that from out of the relativity of what we know, more reasonableness establishes itself, whereas your stalemate position is anchored firmly in relativity; so we do not see how you can defend your position.

Other issue:

The original reference to "uber-apes" was authored by Steve Burwen in the response to Entry 375, and in our view, you are correct in contending that we (i.e. humanity) are not qualified to disqualify ourselves in the way of reason. Though in fairness to Steve Burwen, we are confident that he is only identifying ourselves in the way of reason (i.e. "uber-apes") from a neurological standpoint within its limits.

423. Entry:

Reply to the response to Entry 422

"Issue 1.

‘However, we contend that your position can be taken further by acknowledging the need on our part to make choices, and our inability to identify complete right or wrong choices, so that we end up determining the more reasonable right or wrong choice. You have already conceded the existence of more reasonable choices in Entry 359...’

Yes, I have said that there are more and less reasonable things in the world of human experience. That is, the world of ‘tons, meters, dollars, hotdogs, and gods’.

‘Note, the critical point in our contention is that from out of the relativity of what we know, more reasonableness establishes itself, whereas your stalemate position is anchored firmly in relativity; so we do not see how you can defend your position.’

What you use as an argument against my point of view is exactly the same point that I use against yours. I say that the content of the proposition is entirely abstract, lacking a meaningful connection to the world of more or less reasonable choices made within the world of human experience. Therefore it doesn't qualify to be justified by the principle of more reasonability within limits that you have formulated. This principle may in itself possess merit (I am inclined to call it a truism), but the proposition: ‘we cannot [more reasonably] truly know who we are, in part or in whole, and be who we are at the same time.’
Has unreasonably little bearing on the world where I don not run in races with a broken foot and decide to kiss pretty girls that are in love with me. It is your proposition itself that is ‘anchored firmly in relativity’. Far away from the world that is reasonable within limits, the one that we humans experience, the world of ‘tons, meters, dollars, hotdogs, and gods’.

Issue 2.

Possibility more reasonably preceding impossibility may be reasonable in the world of human experience: It's reasonably possible I marry Jane, but then I tell her no and she marries someone else. Now it has become reasonably impossible to marry Jane.
The opposite may be equally reasonable: It's reasonably impossible for me to marry Jane for she is married. Now her husband dies and it becomes reasonably possible to marry Jane.

Possibility more reasonably preceding impossibility, devoid of any context, can only be viewed from a metaphysical perspective. In the metaphysical it can easily be maintained that one does not precede two. It all starts with zero (none), which is also one, for one-thing has nothing to relate to and can in itself not be distinguished from no-thing. However, no-thing and one-thing together are two- thing, their relationship is three, four, five,.. All the numbers come into being in the same moment, in big-bang fashion, not preceding or following each other. To maintain on a metaphysical level that possibility precedes impossibility therefore seems to make little sense and in the world of human reason within limits, either can occur:
Possibility preceding impossibility and vice versa.

Issue 3.

To revisit the basics, what you claim in my view is this:

We cannot [more reasonably](not that we know what that means)truly know (not that we know what that means), in part (not that we know what that means) or in whole (not that we know what that means), and be who we are (not that we know what that means) at the same time (not that we know what time has got to do with it at all)."

Raoul Starren March 9 2003

Response:

Your argument is now anchored by relativity and the world of human experience as distinguished from the world of abstract experience, and contradictorily notions from the so-called world of human experience, like "marry", "Jane", and "big-bang", used as complete knowledge. What you overlook is that apparently we can only know from what we know, so that all human experience consciously known is defined by our consciousness. There is no separation between our world of human experience and abstract experience as you imply. Viz., all our conscious experience, whether you want to call it human experience, abstract experience, super-abstract experience or whatever, is from in our minds, and limited by our apparent inability to completely know and know that we do. So your distinction between the world of human experience and the world of human abstract experience based on connection to external world and non-connection to external world is more reasonably incorrect. In fact, one could more reasonably argue that all human thought is abstract due to our apparent inability to completely know.

Moreover, your argument that the proposition is "far away" and "abstract", and therefore it cannot be subject to more or less reasonableness, ignores that the proposition revolves around our identity (i.e. who we are) which is central to our perception, and therefore, the proposition is likely closer to our world of conscious experience than anything else. Even your examples of more reasonableness from Entry 359 are centered on our human identity: the identity of yourself in deciding whether to compete in the 100 meter hurdles or not, and the identity of yourself deciding to kiss pretty girls who love you (other identities) or not. Clearly, your abstract and far away argument is contradicted by your own examples, and refuted by your arbitrary distinction between the world human of human experience and world of abstract experience.

Your argument against the precedence of possibility over impossibility is anchored on implicitly using "marry", "Jane", and "big-bang" as complete knowledge, which as mentioned contradicts your relative position. Sure, if you can establish complete knowledge, then you will overcome the precedence of possibility, but so far whether unknowingly or knowingly you have only assumed complete knowledge. To illustrate, if John plans to marry Kelly, but then Kelly is tragically killed, can it be said it is impossible for John to marry Kelly? Yes in the sense that Kelly has died, but not completely, because it is possible for instance that she may come back to life or they marry in another life-time. The point being that it cannot be said with complete certainty that it is impossible for John to marry Kelly, even though Kelly has died. You may respond that these counter examples are unreasonable, but that response ignores that we are only dealing with possibilities. What you appear to ignore is that relativity is grounded by possibility, and therefore as long as relativity stands so does possibility. To merely take antagonistic positions and then claim stalemate overlooks that relativity and possibility underlie the positions both for and against, and that out of this uncertainty there is a necessity as thinking beings to determine what is more reasonable.

Other issue:

You can attack the proposition on grounds that it is based on "not knowing what that means" (i.e. pleading ignorance), but you ignore the defined terms of the proposition, and our apparent inability to completely know and know that we do.

424. Entry:

"If who you are is defined by what you do and you KNOW before you do wouldn't you be knowing who you are while being who you are?"

anonymous April 24 2003

Response:

The proposition is not more reasonably denying that we can know who we are while being who we are. Rather, the proposition is more reasonably denying we can completely know who we are while being who we are, and since there is more reasonably no knowing without being at some level, the proposition in essence is more reasonably denying we can completely know who we are.

In reference to your entry, it does not necessarily follow that the definition of who we are by what we do and our knowledge of what we do prior to doing entail complete knowledge of who we are. (Nor does it necessarily follow that the definition of who we are is exclusive to what we do.)

425. Entry:

"The proposition is invalid because it contains a number of invalid underlying assumptions which are not representative of external nature, and it draws conclusions from these assumptions without due reference to their representativeness.

The following model may be used to better understand the implications and issues relating to the proposition, which also more closely parallels current findings of experimental science and reason.

The dynamic 'Nature-who we are-knowledge' exists on a spectrum. In this spectrum 'Nature' may be defined as external reality, 'who we are' may be defined as either individuals within the DNA/gene pool, or indeed the entire gene pool/DNA of all life, and 'knowledge' may be defined as interacting with (in the form-sense termed 'understanding') the environment around us.

None of these three dynamics exists as a static, separate form. Any change in one produces a corresponding change in the other two. Therefore, there can be no intrinsic separation of any of the three.

Furthermore, there is no such thing as 'form-knowledge' (implied in the proposition), no such thing as 'form-who we are' (stated in the proposition). The question of 'form- nature' is not addressed in this competition. 'Knowledge' and 'who we are', are not 'forms' in the absolute sense, as they are not static, but exist as an association only. It is doubtful also whether 'nature' can exist as form since it seems to be intrinsically tied to the other two (c/f-observer-observed relationship of quantum theory), and may well exist only as an association with the other two.

You therefore cannot separate 'who we are' from 'knowledge' as in the proposition. In another context- you cannot separate environment from genes/DNA, or 'who we are' from what we eat, or 'who we are' from what we learn, or 'who we are' from the environment. These are all mutually dependent, existing on a spectrum. Genes/DNA without 'nature' might be defined as dead, knowledge without genes/DNA might be defined as nature. Experimental evidence suggests that none of these three exist without the other.

Therefore, there is no static ‘who we are’ or static 'form- knowledge' as implied by the proposition, and no separation between them, as also implied by the proposition. Each part of the dynamic is defined by its interaction and association with the other two.

To use the terms 'knowledge' and 'who we are' therefore, as in the proposition, in the sense that one is separate from the other, is not justified.

Moreover, language appears to be a form-representation of the dynamic-and therefore conclusions regarding the dynamic cannot be reached through the use of propositions which are language (form)-based. This will be mixing representative (form) with dynamic.

It is also possible that language is only an unjustified representation of a non-real single end-point of the dynamic, and therefore language would be a form- representation of a form-representation (regarding 'who we are' and 'nature'). Form-language which derives from a non- real end-point of knowledge, therefore (such as the proposition), is a representation of a representation, which is not justified. If this is the case, hodge-podge natural selection has produced a species (all species?) with a mind which is not validly representative of the dynamic, or external reality.

What Mr. Garvey essentially is getting at, I think, is that we cannot determine by form-knowledge/thought our ultimate nature or purpose. Implied in this however, is that nature and ourselves exists as form, and also that knowledge is separate from both ourselves and form-nature. However the model of the dynamic, also of closer parallel with experimental science, suggests that these assumptions are invalid. Thought itself is contained in the dynamic 'knowledge (thought)-who are-nature' spectrum. Furthermore, 'purpose' itself may be an evolved concept relating to form-language, and not representative of the gene pool/DNA-nature dynamic, which transcends all life forms. 'Purpose', therefore may be another representation of a representation, and subject to the same conceptual and language/communication limitations which the proposition itself is subject to, and not justified.

The point is, is that the proposition is looking at the (imagined?) problem is seeks to elucidate from the wrong perspective, as a result of some misplaced philosophical directions and assumptions. It is not a question of whether or not we can form-determine ('conscious-meaning'?) the ultimate nature of our existence, but rather find how we can best live in this world and use DNA/gene-nature dynamic evolved interactions for this aim, discarding some evolved baggage if necessary, and enhancing others. However, because Mr. Garvey assumes a static and separate fundamental nature, any enhancement or discarding of this assumed 'nature' is anathema.

There is no ‘assertion of conscious meaning’, as implied by the proposition. There is only evolved learning-DNA abilities which have varying levels of current relevance to nature. There is no issue over ‘who we are’ and ‘knowledge’ either, because neither of these exist as separate relations, or to each other in themselves, and certainly not by language-concept-knowledge representation, or representation of representation.

The proposition contains constructed forms abstracted from external reality, contained within codified language which has been co-opted for a self-contained pre-evolved political purpose, and is not of (much) survival benefit as it relates to thought-DNA-nature interaction."

eif May 6 2003

Response:

Challenge Proposition 1 states from our limited, more reasonable perspective that we (i.e. humanity) cannot completely know who we are {and be who we are at the same time}. The terms to express the idea of not completely knowing who we are like "who we are", "know", and "be" are used from our limited perspective and more reasonable perspective in the context of the Proposition as a whole. This point is important because though terms like "who we are" and "knowledge" are used separately, this separation does not necessarily mean in the context of the Proposition that "who we are" and "knowledge" are completely separate. Human perspective defined by comparison apparently cannot avoid separation of terms, ideas, theories etc. at some level just as your separation of DNA, nature, and human thought cannot be avoided, even though you qualify that they comprise a single dynamic. But this point overall is off target, because all Challenge Proposition 1 is saying is that from our limited, more reasonable perspective,

(1) we (i.e. humanity) and human knowledge exist at some level, and

(2) we cannot completely know who we are.

Responses to additional arguments:

1. Challenge Proposition 1 does not view knowledge and who we are as "forms" in an absolute sense. The Proposition in part and in whole is from our limited perspective. (Though we acknowledge it is possible that aspects of the Proposition or all of it are complete in an absolute sense, but the same can be said for any other proposition.)

2. You are correct that Challenge Proposition 1 is "representation of a representation" (i.e. circular), but so is any other proposition from our perspective, including your "gene pool/DNA-nature dynamic", unless you or anyone else can more reasonably establish complete knowledge.

3. Though through Challenge Proposition 1 we may infer from our limited perspective that there is intrinsic separation between who we are as essence and knowledge as form (viz., apparently we create conscious meaning, and we cannot create who we are through who we are; so it follows that what we know as form is empty of who we are as essence), the Proposition does not directly pertain to the possible intrinsic separation between who we are as essence and knowledge as form.

4. The "assertion of conscious meaning", which both stems from an "exertion of conscious meaning" and is used to defend the Proposition by establishing that we are the origin of human knowledge (in relation of the external world), is consistent with your "evolved learning-DNA abilities", because both concepts imply a human origin to human knowledge.

5. Because "who we are" and "form-knowledge" are defined as incomplete from our limited perspective, the Proposition does not imply "who we are" and "form-knowledge" are "static". We equate "static" with completeness.

6. Even though your proposed "DNA/gene-nature dynamic" may have more survival benefit than Challenge Proposition 1, the Competition is focused on whether or not we can more reasonably completely know who we are. Also, there is no inconsistency between Challenge Proposition 1 and your DNA/gene-nature dynamic as long as you do not view the dynamic with completeness.

Entries 416-420 Entries 426-430