Reply to the response to Entry 362

"Committee: ‘Just because consciousness may encompass three ‘unique properties’, it does not necessarily follow that the three unique properties equate with a ‘complete (whole)’ substance. Viz., the notion of uniqueness does not necessarily equate with completeness. If we consider the apparent interconnectedness of things, then it follows that consciousness is not a whole onto itself.’

Surely the committee will acknowledge consciousness constitutes a complete whole; otherwise, there is no consciousness. I only identified the three requisites that allow awareness to identify self through free will.

Committee: ‘For your ‘complete whole’ argument to make sense you would have to refute that human consciousness is dependent on, among other things, human sensory and human respiratory. In other words, you would have to establish that human consciousness comprised of awareness, self- identity, and free will, is a thing-in-itself.

If the committee was asking for a total biological makeup - that should be stated in the challenge, as a sub proposition.

Committee: ‘If you are unsatisfied with our reasoning, then explain to us how human consciousness can have awareness of external things, while at the same time be a whole onto itself?’

Human consciousness functions as an electromagnetic waveform; therefore, it is a pure continuum when we are awake. It is the nature of electromagnetic waves to oscillate in amplitude (frequency) within a range above and below the straight centerline, which is the carrier of information in and out. Everything in the universe oscillates at a specific frequency based on composition of substances involved, so you can consider your own consciousness as a private transceiver (i.e., radio transceiver), which sends and receives data as an autonomic function; moreover, you cannot stop it from functioning. Can a radio transceiver function if we remove a part? Neither will consciousness; therefore, consciousness is a complete whole.

Committee: ‘Another issue you need to address is that the combination of consciousness and free will does not necessarily result in self-identity with absolute truth- value. What is it about consciousness and free will that true self-identity results? You refer to ‘innate’ knowledge, but where does the innate knowledge come from, and how do you deal with the less reasonableness of a thing- in-itself (innateness) compared to something from something else ad infinitum? Further, how can you maintain the notion of ‘free will’ in consideration of the interconnectedness of things, whereby life unfolds through interaction rather than non-interaction?’

What function does Basic ROM perform in your computer? Exactly the same function as innate knowledge does for consciousness. Free will allows you to reject interaction- it is purely optional. Can I make you eat an ear of corn? Of course not- your free will denies me the privilege. Innate knowledge comes from the same source as your DNA/RNA, but innate knowledge is embedded in your memory cells. I suppose that DNA/RNA are not embedded (innate) data? I believe Francis Crick and James Watson proved otherwise-

Committee: ‘In your criticism of the proposition, you incorrectly maintain that the proposition spatially separates the properties of consciousness. For example, you say that the first clause of the proposition, ‘we cannot truly know who we are’, means that identity must reside outside of consciousness. No that is not the case. You are assuming that there is such a thing as self-knowledge with absolute truth-value. Whereas, we maintain that from a position of more reasonableness there is only self- knowledge with limited truth-value. Actually, by you arguing that self-identity results from consciousness and free will, it you yourself that has spatially separated your perceived properties of consciousness.’

Perhaps the Committee should review the argument as presented, which is specific. Can any member of the Committee reject consciousness? If not, that verifies free will is fact, and is congruent consciousness; therefore, free will and consciousness are simultaneous, and cannot be spatially separated."

Jim White July 17 2002

Response:

Why should we acknowledge consciousness as a "complete whole" when we more reasonably know it is not? Viz., consciousness is contingent directly and indirectly on external data, our biological make-up including nervous system, lungs, brain etc, and the external environment including oxygen, water, food source etc. Your argument is that if we do not accept consciousness as a complete whole, then there is no consciousness. Yet you are only partly right because there would still be consciousness as part of the infinity of things. Also, the basis for evaluation is not ensuring that something like consciousness exists as a complete whole, but determining what is more reasonable.

Moreover, just because our consciousness will not function if we remove part of it like our brains, does not necessarily mean that consciousness is a complete whole. If we examine consciousness for its wholeness, we face its infinity of interconnected parts, whereby no complete whole from our perspective is ever reached. The same reasoning applies to a radio transceiver, or any thing else, because of its infinite, interconnected parts. Though we acknowledge it is possible to perceive our consciousness or a radio transceiver as a complete whole from our limited perspective, or within a system of thought, but that does not more reasonably establish our consciousness or a radio transceiver as a complete whole.

How can there be "free will" when you cannot establish our existence as a complete whole? For instance, your existence is contingent partly on the make-up of your parents, just as their existence is contingent partly on the make-up their parents. Where is the free will when an individual has no control over the origin of his or her existence?

We concede that innate knowledge may be embedded in our memory cells, but where does the innate knowledge come from? Does it simply appear in our memory cells from no where, or could it be passed from one generation to another, with its source in the knowledge acquired by ancestors? If innate knowledge is from ancestors, it means there is no such thing as pure innate knowledge. The challenge you face is to establish pure innate knowledge.

In conclusion, we are not rejecting human consciousness. We are rejecting that human consciousness is more reasonably a complete whole, while we are maintaining that human consciousness is more reasonably part of the infinity of things. To salvage your challenge, you need to find some other way than consciouseness would not exist, to more reasonably explain why consciousness is a complete whole.

364. Entry:

Reply to the response to Entry 363

"Committee: ‘Yet you are only partly right because there would still be consciousness as part of the infinity of things.’

Is it reasonable to accept the above statement at face value, ‘that consciousness as part of the infinity of things?’ I do not think it is reasonable or more reasonable; moreover, I do not believe it is a rational statement. Does the Committee have access to a demonstrable proof there exists an ‘infinity of things?’"

Jimmy L. White July 18 2002

Response:

We can more reasonably demonstrate using reason within limits that there exists an infinity of things. From our causal perspective and the apparent interconnected nature of things, it follows that something from something else ad infinitum (infinity) is more reasonable than something from nothing (complete whole). For you to overcome this position, you need to overcome the law of causality, which defines our thoughts, by establishing a thing-in-itself. In essence you must overcome our thoughts.

To summarize, so far your argument has been that consciousness as a "complete whole" must exist, otherwise there is no consciousness. We respond that consciousness as a non-complete whole would exist as part of the infinity of things. You retort by questioning the notion of infinity of things, and we respond that the infinity of things, though incomprehensible just as a complete whole is, is more reasonable from our causal perspective and in consideration of the interconnectedness of things than a complete whole (thing-in-itself). Moreover, your argument that the notion of infinity of things is neither reasonable nor rational overlooks that due to our inability to know with absolute truth-value and know that we do, all thoughts from our perspective are reasonable themselves, and since we are conscious of them, they must be rational viz., they must make sense at some level.

What we want to know is how you can deny that consciousness is dependent on external things, like stimuli and the biological functioning of the human body, which negates it from being viewed as a complete whole?

365. Entry:

Reply to the response to Entry 364

"Committee: ‘Moreover, your argument that the notion of infinity of things is neither reasonable nor rational overlooks that due to our inability to know with absolute truth-value and know that we do, all thoughts from our perspective are reasonable themselves, and since we are conscious of them, they must be rational viz., they must make sense at some level.’

Does each of the Committee possess a Driver’s License, and a Social Security Number?

My question is: Who is the person listed by name on each of them?

Then I must (I have no alternative) presume the Committee does not know who they are.

If that is the case, I have responded to a Committee the members, of which, do not know who they are; therefore, I have no alternative but to think, the Committee does not exist.

I rest my case."

Jimmy L. White July 19 2002

Response:

Even if you could establish that the Committee does not know who they are, and thereby it does not exist, you still would not overcome the proposition. Rather, you would throw into question the competition. However, this point is irrelevant because the Committee knows who they are, and therefore they exist. The critical point is that they know who they are with limited truth-value, which does not negate that they could know who they are with absolute truth-value without knowing that they do. Does self-knowledge with limited truth-value equate with non-existence? We do not think so. Viz., we are not aware of a necessity that we have to truly know who we are in order to exist.

The challenge you face as mentioned in the response to Entry 364, is to more reasonably explain how our consciousness, which is dependent on external things like stimuli and the biological functioning of our body, could be viewed as a complete whole.

366. Entry:

Reply to the response to Entry 359

"First I'd like to say that your response has most possibly been the best response so far. We seem to be favoring points of possible conflict over a chance to agree. Technology has been known to thrive in times of war, and I believe that what we are trying to create is more or less technology based. Of course, in the end, many of us would prefer words like language, art, spirit or reason. Whatever we may prefer, practice makes perfect in any case.

One line in your reply caught my eye before anything else:
"Why is the infinity of things so hard for you to accept?"

Well, it is not, not at all. However, I don't have a problem with the "thing in itself" either. You don't seem to have a problem there either, since you don't exclude the possibility. So what is the basis for these two possible preferences? What is going to decide?

Reason.

Would it be reasonable to say that these two options are mutually exclusive? Can we think of ways in which they are not mutually exclusive? Could these two views be like incarnations of the "Man" and "Woman" of the mental universe, and do they need to mate instead of attempt to wipe each other out?
Who of the two is the most essential factor in procreation?

Referring to: "if your position is correct, there would be no way to distinguish any position in terms of more reasonableness":
It still matters what the two do in bed. If they play a game of backgammon, no child will emerge. However, in essence there is nothing unreasonable about a game of backgammon, lest you mistake it for a pro-creational activity.
So then "Most reasonable" would become: "Most reasonable, considering the topic at hand". What is the topic at hand?

"The subtle problem with your position, is that you have taken a (more reasonable) position even though all positions according to your position are equally reasonable. Viz., if your position is correct, there would be no way to distinguish any position in terms of more reasonableness, and therefore your position itself (i.e. the equality of reasonableness) is self-contradictory."

I think it is inherent to the fabric of reason that these inherent contradictions will be found. In fact, it is likely that anything seeming to lack such a contradiction, should be approached with great distrust. In this case, the mere fact of you bringing the notion of "more reasonable" into being, has made it impossible to circumvent. From now on, , we will find it everywhere.
Like you say about your own position, there is always a small window through which even the most challenging propositions will be vulnerable. We will always, fairly easily, be able to negate and create points of view. In turn it will be easy to negate those negations, which are creations in themselves. All it takes in the end, it seems, is a "No". Of course, in real life, there are laws (both physical and historical), guns, and mortgages.

However, a more important point has to be made: You instigate the notion of more reasonableness. After this, Anybody stating anything else but your own point of view, can be confronted with the fact that they claim the same: To be more reasonable. You cannot, and will not prevail. And yes, merely because I say so. My power is equal to yours. Now we may be playing a game to see who is the most crafty. I think this game to be reasonable, however it is not ABOUT reason, as you seem to claim. It is reason at work, reason itself. Nothing can be said ABOUT it, we can only BE it (SPEAK it).

**************

I don't mean to say that there is no reasonable discrimination possible between points of view regarding what we are and what not. I think that to say that we are merely pogo-sticks should be losing out to the statement that we are more than that.

In real life there is a very straightforward way to distinguish any position in terms of more reasonableness, namely the individual way. The problem arises, when such is attempted at group level (One of the most gruesome of examples being the Jerry Springer logic; easy to learn and unfathomably rigid/pathogenic).
Here, it must be a hundred steps back and a 101 forward. Or, if such turns out to be more reasonable, to relinquish any form of attempt at this. This last option is a contender to be reckoned with. Buddha for one was tempted by it, and they had to lock up Lao-Tzu (the creator of Taoism) in order to coerce him into writing his wisdom down on pieces of paper. He deemed this to be ludicrous but complied, since he fancied leaving Tibet for India more than spending time in the brig. Man writes a book on a new philosophy of humanity and through it he is set free to depart for India. Maybe that's the way it is, but we may attempt to achieve more than that.
People who displayed a more willing attitude towards sharing their wisdom, like Jesus Christ, Gandhi, Martin Luther King, lost their lives.
Madmen like Hitler, Mao Zedong and Stalin, also proponents of all encompassing belief systems, proved to have their drawbacks as well, to say the least. Mao had millions of birds killed, because they ate the fruit that was meant for the people of China. The year after an estimated 35 million people died, because the vermin, unimpeded by birds preying on them, ate next to all the fruit.

So probably a reasonable person speaks up, omits the dying bit, and does not kill any birds (redesigning the world on a symptomatic level).
In speaking up he may be foolish, in refusing to die for the cause at hand he may fail and in not killing birds his influence may be restricted to the world of the mind.
This changing mind in turn changes the environment in ways he may not attempt to control.

Whatever alternative may prevail is irrelevant in relation to the goal, the topic at hand. We wish to make this world a better place for everyone. I'd love to proceed.

Let's get everything untrue dissected and spelled out. About truth itself, there is precious little to say. I don't think this conversation should be about that proposition anymore, although I understand that this most reasonably shall be left unconfirmed."

Raoul Starren July 21 2002

Response:

We concede that it is possible that the notions of "infinity of things" and "thing-in-itself" may be mutually inclusive, but based on what we more reasonably know, they are clearly mutually exclusive. Viz., the notions contradict each other: in order for there to be an infinity of [all] things, there cannot be a thing-in-itself, just as in order for there to be a thing-in-itself, there cannot be an infinity of [all] things. Of course, we could say there is an infinity of things except the thing-in-itself, thereby establish a basis for their mutual inclusion, but what grounds from our causal perspective do we have to assume the existence of a thing-in-itself? Is there a more reasonable necessity for a thing-in-itself in order for us to exist? We are not aware of a necessity, which takes us back, unless it can be shown otherwise, to the more reasonableness of the infinity of things over the thing-in-itself.

We disagree that inherent contradictions can more reasonably be found in any proposition. What we say is that inherent limitations can more reasonably be found in any proposition. To illustrate, what is the inherent contradictions with the proposition, "we cannot truly know who we are, in part or in whole, and be who we are at the same time"? Sure you could point to the circularity of the proposition, but that is offset by the limited truth-value of the proposition and cancelled out by the circularity of any other proposition. Though we acknowledge that outside the bounds of more reasonableness, individuals can establish inherent contradictions in any proposition, but it is another issue to more reasonably establish inherent contradictions.

Unfortunately, you still attach to the slight opening in the theory of more reasonableness, which allows any proposition to be asserted, without being refuted with absolute truth-value. You claim that this opening gives you equal power as us or anyone else. Though what you overlook is that the slight opening is hanging by a thread of contradiction, so that an individual can take any position he or she wants, and yet it may be more reasonably contradictory. Can so-called civilization function with individuals taking whatever positions they want? It is here we turn to the necessity of reason to determine what is more reasonable, without succumbing to contradiction or ultimately anarchist and less reasonable outlooks. We do not see any room for maneuver, than to accept the necessity for the determination of more reasonableness.

Added to this point, you contend that the determination of more reasonableness is not about reasons themselves, but about us existing through reason. We acknowledge that we must exist in order to reason, but the focus of the theory of more reasonableness is on reasons themselves. Viz., determinations of more reasonableness are based on the comparison of conscious meanings, or what is more sound and consistent, so that the existence of the individual, in terms of the theory, is a mere means to make determinations. For you to retort that we only "speak" or "be" reason, ignores that we can perceive reasons for positions and thereby evaluate them in terms of their comparative meanings. Also, to contend that we cannot say anything about reasons themselves, because we cannot get consciously outside of them, merely establishes the circularity of them which no theory from our limited perspective can avoid.

Other issues:

How the theory of more reasonableness is practically applied is a concern of ours, but in our view that is not sufficient grounds for the theory’s non-application, because the issues of misuse and misapplication apply to any theory. What this means is that the application of the theory needs to be monitored to ensure correct application. Also, the issue that the well-being of proponents of more reasonable may be threatened, and therefore the method ought not be applied, does not stand because by not supporting the theory, we would simply be giving in to the forces against it. Clearly, a self-defeating action.

We acknowledge that the competition is centered around the notions of absolute truth-value and non-absolute truth-value, and that you may be correct that no progress can be made on this issue, and therefore the competition/discussion has lost its significance compared to other questions/issues. Though as you concede, it is a more reasonable that the proposition or (non-absolute truth-value) could be overcome. Also, any other question/issue will revolve around the questions of truth-value and self-knowledge (viz., consciousness centers around human identity, and it is tied epistemically to the issue of truth-value), or as Steve Burwen says,

"... [the] competition does have implications beyond just the context of a philosophy debate or context... It shows that, despite the superficial, materialistic culture we've evolved, people are still passionately concerned and interested in the deeper meanings of things, including the ultimate nature, and even value, of human consciousness, and of our place in the world. And the question you posed for the debate goes right to the heart of these important issues..."

Entries 359-362,  Entries 367-371