Reply to the response to Entry 337

"’Why do we need to go beyond phenomenon to make a more reasonable choice?’

You yourself tell us why: Phenomena can only produce representations made out of other phenomena. True knowledge would have to incorporate dynamics and can only do so if it continuously changes. When I know who I truly am, the instant after I will be different. I know that, but for my knowledge to keep up with this change, it could never be solely phenomenal. Again, if the proposition is boiled down to: ‘We cannot know what every neuron is doing in every single point in time, therefore we can't know’, then this proposition has nothing other to tell than any other ‘already open door being kicked in’.

If we truly cannot truly know, a quest for a standard of reason becomes entirely arbitrary. If there is no circumference to the universe, then there is no such thing as a ‘most circumferish location’. The decision will be arbitrary and unable to escape the cycle of rulership and downfall that every elephant bull, empire, religion, sportsman/woman, political organization, etc. undergoes. If you really want to lay foundations for an improved existential framework for humanity, more free of bullshit than the frameworks we are using today, then say so. Then let's discuss that. In the present format, this discussion lacks a context. All we do is discuss abstractions such as knowledge, being. One can argue they exist and one can say that they don't. For ever.

Also, again, for the proposition to be most reasonable, it should be: ‘WE CAN'T TRULY KNOW WHO WE ARE’. All the rest of the proposition may do, is imply that ‘we can't truly know.’ is only reasonable under the condition defined by the second part.. If you are right the first time (we can't truly know), than why on earth is the rest of proposition reasonable? It is not.

‘Why can't we simply reason the phenomenon we know based on reasons themselves, and come to a more reasonable decision?’

Provide us with a context, is the first thing that comes to mind. Further, the field of reasons, the field of ‘because’, is as limitless as the universe itself. A decision is only possible within the context of preset standards, which in this case only can be those that you choose to adopt. I don't need this decision and what's more, I don't believe in it. Not much seems to be lost in this way, since the earth will still be revolving around the sun and the salmon will still be swimming upstream when their season comes. However, anybody that supports your point of view, which of course includes you as well, may very well be able to come to a decision. Just remember that I am one of those who deem it unreasonable. The concepts on which this issue hinges, have no substance, which means that conclusive proof for either point of view is forever unattainable. But I think that time will be on my side.

‘How do we get outside of phenomenon when apparently all we can know is what we know?’

Well, apparently, the non-phenomenal can possibly be a part of the realm accessible to knowledge. I know that there are things I can't know. My point is that these things, per definition, can't ever be called ‘true knowledge’, since knowledge is related to knowers, which is us (and we can never know).
Whatever is called true knowledge must be knowable, otherwise it may never be called knowledge. Impossible knowledge does not exist, and therefore it can never be a fact. Therefore, the proposition can never be a fact as well. There is no such thing as the ‘most factish’. Our world of existence has no circumference, and every point in it is at the center. Denying this, which the proposition does in a more or less covert fashion, is nothing more or less than creating a dogma, that tries to crown itself king.

‘You argue that deduction is a means to get outside of phenomenon, but we respond that deduction is only a limited means at best because we are using phenomenon to do the deducing;’

We don't USE phenomenon to deduce. WE aren't even there, from the perspective of being. There is no USER. THAT which deduces only manifests itself through phenomena (reflection). That is a different matter. It only is represented as a phenomenon in our conversation. In itself, it is not.

‘and for this reason, we are no further outside of phenomenon using deduction than if we did not use it. Although we agree for a different reasons (i.e. the representational nature of knowledge, and the necessity of reason for the existence of being (Kant)) that there appears to be a non-phenomenal existence. However, it does not more reasonably follow from the premises of establishing non-phenomenal existence and being itself (as conception) as non-phenomenal that all phenomena is caused by being. You assume that being as the single cause is an end-in-itself, and yet this assumption is inconsistent with your causal perspective in which things (and non-things) come from other things (and non-things) ad infinitum.’

(?) I think this is your own opinion, that you say mine is inconsistent with..

‘Also, if we consider the interactive nature of things, and the lack of any evidence or example of non-interactive things and non-things, it does not make sense how you can more reasonably maintain that the existence of an end-in-itself whether phenomenal or non-phenomenal.’

Well that is my point, isn't it? Evidence per se is phenomenal. Non phenomenal knowledge per definition needs to be deductive in nature. Also, this being that causes phenomena may not be interactive, but is evidently very much active. The reason it is not interactive, can only be that there is nothing it can interact with! Being encompasses all in itself. In this sense, the phenomenal world is portrayed as what the Hindu call Maya. I stress that your denouncement of my point of view as being less reasonable is based on the very grounds I contest. If existence only consisted of evidence, everything would be evident. That, again, is deduction.

’You could turn to the non-phenomenal nature of being and deduction, thereby claim our causal perspective does not apply, but then your argument comes down to ex nihilo versus something from something else ad infinitum, which would necessarily take us back to our causal perspective and the interactional nature of things, thus the more reasonableness of something from something else ad infinitum over ex nihilo.’

I still don't see why Something From Something Else (something, because..) is more reasonable than Something From Nothing (something in itself). Also, when we return to your assumption that SFSE is more reasonable than SFN, doesn't mean, merely because you assume this, that the issue is finished. It's easy to see why something from nothing is impossible, but it's equally easy to see why the thought that this world is supported by an infinite stack of turtles (I assume you know the ancient myth I'm talking about) is immaculately absurd. So we get to take a pick between something impossible and something absurd. One could also argue that SFSE is the impossible one and SFN the absurd. We cannot decide, most reasonably or otherwise.

‘Hence, your claim of true knowledge from the statement, ‘knowledge has to be non-phenomenal in order to be true’ becomes nothing more than a less reasonable claim supported by assumption. Though we give you credit because if you could more reasonably establish being itself as ex nihilo viz., the cause of all phenomenon, you would have more reasonable grounds for asserting that knowledge has to be non-phenomenon in order to be true. (Though this position is no different from Schopenhauer's theory of will and representation, in which he uses the thing-in-itself as a basis for knowledge with absolute truth-value. Entries 313, 317, 320) Yet in terms of the competition, your position even if it were accepted would actually support the proposition by showing that we cannot more reasonably truly know who we are, because we can only know from phenomenon.’

Additional comment
To argue that non-phenomenon or being itself is the only ‘reasonable candidate’ for knowledge with absolute truth-value, ‘

The above I did deduce. But I do not claim the following, that because I am assuming, it must necessarily be true. That would be very silly.

‘... and therefore it must more reasonably be the source of true knowledge, does not necessarily follow because you are assuming that a candidate for true knowledge exists to begin with, which may not necessarily be the case viz., for your argument to work you need to first establish the necessity for a candidate of true knowledge,’

I do not need to establish this, since you yourself establish nothing. To establish would be to create true knowledge, which in your own words is not possible. My aim is a stalemate, not a win. Of course you can argue that this is ‘less reasonable’, but you continuously fail to ‘establish’ the constitution of this elusive reasonableness yourself. Then, of course, you can tell me again that the onus is on me.

To illustrate a related issue to the above mentioned (The onus issue), I quote my entry in the Challenges to the ‘unconscious assertion’ theory:

3. Entry:
An assertion requires a consciousness present to assert. This fact, projected on the claim, results in the consequences that the origin of knowledge must lie in an unconscious consciousness. This is conceivable, but then it also goes, that there must also be 'prior forms of knowledge and assumption'.
Raoul Starren May 28 2002
Response:
‘We agree that an assertion requires a consciousness present in order to make the assertion. However, does the same requirement apply to an unconscious assertion? We do not think so, because an unconscious assertion according to our use of the term stems from an exertion and unconscious consciousness (i.e. unconscious information from responses to interactions). So through an exertion and unconscious consciousness, a human being can unconsciously assert that there is conscious meaning which takes the form of conscious knowledge.‘

Observe what happens in the above:
-First I interpret ‘assumption’ in a way with which you agree in the first sentence of your reply.
-Then you contradict this agreement in asking whether an ‘unconscious assertment, which you implicitly deemed an impossibility in the first sentence, is subject to the same requirement.
-Then you tell the world: ‘We don't think so,.... according to our use of the term...’ You may of course use terms in any way you see fit, but don't you see the serious issue here? You continuously deny me the use of terms according to my personal insights and continuously force your use of terms, your interpretation of every concept that comes unto the stage upon every one that opposes you. You take the liberty of using the concept of assertion in relationship to unconscious processes that are ‘asserting’. This is nice poetry, and if I try I can see what you may mean, but the liberties you allow yourselves, are being denied to everyone who writes to you, applying their own ‘use of terms’. I don't mention this to blame you, since all of us are unable to escape this ,what I would call, law. I stress the point, because it is one of the most important reasons that I don't believe we will reasonably be able to resolve the issue.

‘which takes you to the problem that from our causal perspective something from something else ad infinitum (infinity) is more reasonable than something from nothing (end-in-itself).’

Equally reasonable is all I need to establish. This is essential: If I where to attempt to ‘win’ this in terms of reasonableness, I would be agreeing with you. The only reason I argue for opposite views, is to counterbalance yours. I don't believe that my point is more reasonable, but yours isn't more reasonable than mine either.

Both are based on assumptions, of which one can argue: ‘does not necessarily follow because you are assuming.’
Perpetuum mobile.

Finally:
I think that within the framework of the human mind, life and people, there indeed is such a thing as ‘more reasonable’. If I break my foot, it is more reasonable not to compete in a 110m hurdles race. If a beautiful girl seduces me, the most reasonable thing to do, if I'm single anyway, will be to kiss her."

Raoul Starren July 8 2002

Response:

You argue that there is no true knowledge we know that we know, so any assertion of more reasonableness will be arbitrary or founded by assumption. Therefore according to you, your antagonistic position, the existence of a thing-in-itself, or any other position for that matter is equally reasonable as the proposition, which means that the competition is invalid in the sense that it can only determine that all positions are equally reasonable. ("stalemate")

The subtle problem with your position, is that you have taken a (more reasonable) position even though all positions according to your position are equally reasonable. Viz., if your position is correct, there would be no way to distinguish any position in terms of more reasonableness, and therefore your position itself (i.e. the equality of reasonableness) is self-contradictory.

For you to retort that everything we know is arbitrary, and therefore all there can be is equal reasonableness without succumbing to "dogma", is for you to establish your own dogma. In our view, the way forward, is to concede within the limits of what we know that we cannot get outside of our minds and know that we are, so all we can know is what we know, and as you mentioned, we cannot truly know and know that we do. So what we have is a universal plane of reasonable thought. Though as thinking beings that does not help us because we cannot distinguish one thought, in terms of reasonableness, from another. It is here we contend that as thinking beings there is a necessity of reason to determine what thought is more reasonable within the limits of what we know. Since the determination of more reasonableness is centered around thought or conscious meaning, we contend that the basis for the determination is reasons themselves, and their evaluation in terms of consistency and soundness. The important consideration is that we have avoided the nullifying effect of arbitrariness except for a slight opening from positions contradicted by our fundamental premises--all we can know is what we know, and the limited truth-value of what we know. Though even this opening is offset by the inherent arbitrariness of any other position. Also, to challenge the necessity for the determination of more reasonableness, you need to challenge the fundamental premises by either establishing knowledge with absolute truth-value or the non-existence of who we are as thinking beings, otherwise within the limits of what we know and to avoid contradiction, you are forced to accept the necessity for the determination of more reasonableness. You may call this acceptance a dogma, but we call it a necessity of reason, which all thinking beings are forced to accept without succumbing to contradiction. (Note, these ideas on more reasonableness are discussed in detail in "The Critique of Reasonableness" by Garvey which will be published in September 2002.)

Turning to your antagonistic view of the proposition, you contend that the thing-in-itself is equally reasonable as something from something else ad infinitum, because the former is "impossible" and the latter is "absurd". We disagree with your determination. The notion of "impossible" as shown in the response to Entry 168 is preceded by possibility, and therefore the thing-in-itself is not necessarily impossible. Also, the notion of infinity (or "infinite stack of turtles") is not necessarily absurd, because we cannot even comprehend the notion of infinity. Though what we can see is that from our causal perspectives and the apparent interactive (interconnected) nature of things, it follows that something from something else is more reasonable than something from nothing. Viz., from our limited perspectives, it is more reasonable that there is an infinity of interactive things than a thing-in-itself, which does not rule out the possibility of a thing-in-itself. Why is the infinity of things so hard for you to accept? All it means is that there is no origin to things. Unless you can establish a necessity for origin or thing-in-itself, we must conclude that the thing-in-itself is less reasonable. Of course, you could revert to the apparent arbitrariness of what we know, and the equal reasonableness of what we know, but then you face the necessity to determine what is more reasonable, and the contradiction of taking a more reasonable position even though all positions according to your position are equally reasonable.

Other issue:

In our view, there is no difference between the propositions, "we cannot truly know who we are" and "we cannot truly know who we are, in part or in whole, and be who we are at the same time", except the former is more concise and the latter is more clear. We choose the latter proposition because we think it is more important to establish clarity over conciseness in this context.

Also, as you appear to be aware, the competition is not just about establishing the more reasonable truth-value within the limits of what we know of our self-knowledge, but establishing a more reasonable framework for our decision-making. Does this satisfy you as a context for the competition/discussion? Since our identity is the center of our consciousness, and decision-making is fundamental to the content of our consciousness, we think we are focused on some very important issues. We are hoping to establish a viable, alternative political framework partly out of the competition.

360. Entry:

"I truly know that I am part of the whole Universe, being Itself in me.

This is representational from 'our limited perception' with 'more reasonableness', and therefore overcomes the proposition."

protomutant July 12 2002

Supplementary information as requested by the Inexpressible Committee in the form of questions:

What is the more reasonable ground(s) for your knowledge with absolute truth-value?

"The basic nature of my body is Atomic as it is made entirely of atoms and therefore identical to the nature of the Universe."

What is the more reasonable ground(s) for your knowledge of absolute truth-value that the basic nature of your body and the Universe are identical in that they are both Atomic?

"Atoms never die... they are only subject to change. Therefore the basic nature of my body is Infinite and Eternal. The 'Time Space Continuum' reveals the Universe as being Infinite and Eternal.

Therefore I am an Infinite and Eternal Part of the Whole Infinite and Eternal Universe."

What is the ground(s) for your knowledge with absolute truth-value that atoms never die, and that atoms are the basic nature of your body and the Universe?

"Due to the 'Time Space Continuum' we are able to deduce the Universe is Infinite and Eternal. ‘This’ is the basic nature of the Universe... i.e. - the fact that it is Infinite and Eternal.

It is a well known scientific fact, that 'atoms' are subject only to change. They never die, they only change place in 'time space'. The nature of the atoms which comprise my body, is therefore Infinite and Eternal."

Response:

The ground for your proposed true self-knowledge is the scientific fact that atoms are subject only to change. However, it does not necessarily follow that the scientific fact that atoms are only subject to change is a statement of absolute truth-value. If we consider the relation between observer and observed, and the apparent flux of things or what you call the "Time Space Continuum", so that we can only know representationally, it follows that the scientific fact is representational, and therefore it can at most be said according to your position that you can know in a limited sense that you are part of the whole Universe, being Itself in you or it is possible that you can truly know that you are part of the whole Universe, being Itself in you.

(Note, we could add to our argument the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle which says basically that we cannot measure things exactly because in the act of measuring something, we change what we are measuring, or we "bump into it". Therefore, we cannot know exactly the true composition of atoms or that they are only subject to change. Viz.. we cannot say with 100% certainty that atoms are only subject to change, when we cannot measure, or know, with 100% certainty and know that we do, the composition of atoms.)

361. Entry:

Dispute of the response to Entry 360

"You are welcome to Prove the invalidity of the scientific fact of the 'Time Space Continuum', however, I fail to see how you can do it. No 'Observer' is able to conceive of time without a place or vice versa, neither is any 'Observer' able to conceive of a 'place' where the Universe ends. It is representational across the board, Science merely corroborates the fact.
Similarly the nature the sub-atomic composition of atoms, in so far as it has been achieved by measurement, merely corroborates the law of atomic change, it does not deny it. Why/how would the sub-atomic composition of an atom somehow magically alter the fact that it is subject only to change?

Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle is neither here nor there, it has already been invalidated and scientists know it. Only they cannot admit to it because it would collapse the edifice of Quantum/New Physics and force them to back-track 75-100 years.

Soon it will be shown that Einstein was the 'true' father of quantum physics. He never did agree with Heisenberg and Bohr on the introduction of probability and uncertainty into quantum theory. New sub-atomic understandings have subsequently proved that he was right - 'God doesn't play dice'. Even 'Stephen Hawking' admits in - 'A Brief History of Time':... 'The main difficulty in finding a theory that unifies gravity with the other forces is that general relativity is a classical theory; that is it does not incorporate the uncertainty principle of quantum mechanics.' The obvious reason for this is because general relativity is correct and the 'Uncertainty Principle' is wrong.

Your persistent referral to ‘Absolute Truth-Value’ begs the question:
Do you know of some philosophy or science that has a 'Patent' on 'Absolute Truth-Value'? The Truth is simply that which is so, and is representational for all of us, even from 'our limited perception'."

protomutant July 14 2002

Response:

Just because we cannot disprove the validity of the "Time Space Continuum", does not necessarily mean that the Continuum has absolute truth-value. If you contend that the Continuum has absolute truth-value, because no observer as you say is able to conceive without dimensions of time and space, then we want to know how you more reasonably truly know that no observer is able conceive without time and space dimensions. What is the ground(s) for your knowledge of absolute truth-value? Where does the knowledge come from?

Similarly, just because the measurement of sub-atomic composition of atoms corroborates the law of atomic change, does not necessarily mean that the atoms are only subject to change. What is the ground(s) for your knowledge of absolute truth-value that atoms are only subject to change? You refer to Einstein and Hawking’s rejection of the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, but you do not say why they disagree with it. How can our measurement of something not change the thing we are measuring? Isn’t the Uncertainty Principle consistent with general relativity? If you view general relativity with absolute truth-value, how can you know it has absolute truth-value from a position of general relativity?

Our persistent reference to absolute truth-value is because the competition is centered around the issue of the absolute truth-value of self-knowledge versus non-absolute truth-value of self-knowledge that we can more reasonably know. We define knowledge with absolute truth-value as something we can more reasonably know in entirety. (i.e. complete, whole, doubtless knowledge) Your definition that knowledge with absolute truth-value refers to "that which is so and is representational for all us, even from our limited perception", begs the questions: how do we know that which is so, and why does that which is so from our perspective necessarily pertains to knowledge with absolute truth-value? Also, universal agreement on that which is so does not necessarily equate with knowledge with absolute truth-value, not to mention the inconceivability of everyone agreeing. If you turn to the majority of all of us agreeing on that which is so, then you face the problem that the view of the majority also does not necessarily equate with absolute truth-value.

362. Entry:

"© Copyright 2002 by Jimmy L. White - All rights reserved

Consciousness encompasses three unique properties; thus, consciousness is a complete (whole) unique substance in its own right, and of its own volition. Consciousness is the substance of life; moreover, the three properties of consciousness are constituted as one substance, which comprises our being.

Three Essential Properties of Consciousness

Awareness
Self-Identity
Free Will

Consciousness arises of its own volition, meaning a conscious entity is the possessor of free will, which gives rise to volition; therefore, it is by the combination of consciousness and free will that self-identity occurs.

‘We cannot truly know who we are .’

Self-identity occurs through the volition of free will and conscious awareness

‘In part or in whole .’

The properties of consciousness are inseparable; therefore, consciousness is whole

‘And be who we are at the same time .’

It is inconceivable to think we are not who we are, for there is no spatial separation of the three properties of consciousness, the substance of life.

The first clause, would demand that our identity resides outside of our consciousness-

The second clause, demands the three properties of consciousness are spatially separated-

The third clause, demands spatial separation and a time lapse between the three properties of consciousness-

Conclusion: The proposition as framed is problematic in that, the demanding of the three properties of consciousness to be treated as separate entities i.e., each part separated from each of the other parts; however, to fathom such a process as potentially giving rise to the knowledge as stated is incomprehensible, and illogical. If we properly understand what it means to be conscious, the associative problems disappear for the conclusion as rendered here is based on objective participation, not subjective thought. Thereof, the knowledge of self-identity is a complete whole, and it is undeniably true in every respect regardless of time, for the complete function of consciousness occurs simultaneously, which cannot be spatially or dimensionally separated from the experience of consciousness itself.

Addressing only the first three premises as stated-

1. Representational knowledge

Your supporting arguments do not logically follow; i.e., ‘we do not know directly from the external world in a Aristotelian fashion, whereby external knowledge somehow enters directly into our minds.’

Direct information is absorbed by our consciousness for our consciousness permeates the space surrounding us, which therefore, encompasses every object within proximity of our being. If that were not true, we would not be able to make decisions of judgment such as the involuntary reactions required to avoid accidents. A speeding car that pulls in front of your car when traveling at fifty miles per hour requires such reaction to avoid a collision; therefore, the ‘knowledge’ of that car pulling out in front of you is not - representational, it is direct knowledge as absorbed by our consciousness.

2. Epistemology of knowledge (human invention)

‘Conscious knowledge is apparently derived from human invention. (i.e. we invent conscious knowledge from interactional based information.)’
‘Since we are the ones behind the invention of conscious knowledge, we cannot invent true knowledge of ourselves and be ourselves. In other words, we cannot be the basis for invention and at the same time the product of invention.’

I reject the first statement for the use of word, ‘apparently.’ It is not readily apparent that humans invent direct information as absorbed; moreover, humans ‘discover’ knowledge.

Do humans invent - conscious knowledge? I would greatly appreciate a proof of such an invention. Knowledge of self is a priori, as demonstrated next.

I am- demands that free will make a choice; thereby, two options are available to what is our ‘awareness.’ Free will can choose I, or not I. In the absence of I, no choice can be; therefore, free will only has one choice to make - I am, which is the guarantor of truth.

Here, I believe it imperative to clarify some conceptual errors in your hypothesis, for it is most certainly evident to me your platform of argumentation is rather weak and unsound. Because the vast majority of human beings have no memory prior to two years of age, an identity is firmly established, before cognizant memory functions occur; therefore, it can be assuredly stated that for whatever reasons such historicity is fact, the establishment of an identity is the primary function of consciousness during the first two years of life, and it can be categorically proven the human brain does not mature until around the age of 18 - 19 years. By that, through modern diagnostic methodologies, we can prove humans do in fact Build an Identity; therefore, we have no need to discover - or - invent an identity.

3. Internalism and externalism

I addressed the issue of internal and external in my response to the First Premise.

Conclusion: After reviewing the remaining supporting premises, there is no further point to continue since the remaining premises are logically insurmountable. What has been so cleverly woven into the challenge is - what we are - not who we are. By using the word ‘apparently’ there are very few hard factual statements, the type of statement that can be validated. For me to understand who I am does not require knowledge of what I consist of, in the same sense I do not require knowledge of what an apple consists of to identify an apple; therefore, your challenge shall remain forever unanswered for it is meaningless, and an endeavor in futility.

Appended - to Formally Complete the Philosophy Challenge - July 13, 2002
After thinking about the arguments that at first I did not think could be overcome using normal methodology I read through arguments 4 through 9 and of them, only the eighth argument seemed to be a sound argument that could not be dealt with or overcome. The difficult triple negative caused difficulty because I could not eliminate any of them using every methodology I could think of. What follows should reveal the problem of dealing with argument 8.

4. Temporal lag

‘Conscious knowledge is apparently defined by temporality, and therefore as soon as we think we know who we are, we cease to know who we are because what we know is past knowledge of who we are. (If we deny the notion of time, we also deny the notion of thought, which then self-defeats the denial of time.)’

Time - the age old problem rears its ugly head; however, for a thing to exist, it obviously must consist of something. Here, I invoke the PNC, for it proves Time is not logically plausible.

Time if it exists, exists as three distinct disconnected parts

1. Future 3. Past

It is impossible for a thing not to be accessible to itself; thereof, demands time does not exist, for the Present cannot access the Future, neither can the Present access the Past. Thereof the PNC denies Time is a necessity, which negates the premise, time exists. There can be no such thing as an arbitrary necessity; hence, for time to exist, the claimant suffers burden of proof, which demands that time must be proven as a logical necessity. Logical necessities always serve specific purposes; therefore, defining a logical purpose for the Future, and the Past is the only method that will prove that time exists. It is impossible to define a purpose for either Future or Past. The present definition of Time was arbitrarily established by using the decay rate of the Cesium Atom; therefore, there is no potential for time to exist for it is an abstract constructed entity without properties, and nothing can/will exist without properties. The past is spatially separated from both Present and Future; the Future is spatially separated from both Past and Present; the Present is spatially separated from both Past and Future. No thing can/will exist if separated from any of its parts. Exists means to have real being, and time does not possess real being, for a real being consists of a substance; therefore, the Past does not consist of a substance, neither does the Future consist of substance.

Lag means - to follow or trail behind; however, time cannot lag behind itself, for the three parts are spatially separated by Dimension. Obviously, the Future cannot lag the Present; the Future cannot lag the Past; the Present cannot lag the Past, which denies every potential for ‘time lag’ to exist.

The problem of Time is, it is not a universal attribute that can be ascribed to the universe; therefore, it is on this occasion that I remove time and the associated time lag from the argument as presented, which proves to be a logically fallacy that can be absolutely proven as such by a simple experiment.

Experiment: Place three volunteer human beings inside an enclosure without access to the outside world of reality. To insure no suffering occurs, the enclosure must be fitted accordingly, and then provide every creature comfort necessary to sustain life for 14 days. No source of any external to internal communications is allowed, but communications to the external world is paramount for a consideration of safety. Ideally the enclosure should be adequately large, fully equipped with good lighting and all accommodations requisite for normal living, excepting television, radio, and every type of device that is capable of measuring duration. All food must be passed upon demand to any volunteer whenever requested, and an adequate amount of beverages, refreshments and snacks shall be in storage inside the enclosure. None of the volunteers will know the total of elapsed duration to ensue before they will be tested for their ability to know what time it is prior to their reentry into the world of Reality. The period of duration for confinement shall be no less than eight days, and no more than 13 days.

The results are predictable - No volunteer will have a concept of what time it is, after the conditions for length of stay in confinement are met.

5. Comparative nature of reason (reliance on past knowledge)

‘Reason is apparently defined by comparison of conscious meaning, and therefore what we reason and thereby knowledge is based on what previously know, which means that we can only know in the context of past knowledge.’

Reason is not apparently defined by anything; therefore, to categorically prove facts, the clauses of the statement must be iterated as three separate clauses enabling logic to function, as logic should.

1. ‘Reason is defined by comparison of conscious meaning."

2. "and therefore what we reason and thereby knowledge is based on what previously know,

3. ‘which means that we can only know in the context of past knowledge.’

Knowledge of pain is my choice for refuting the argument, for the knowledge of pain is an inherent (innate) or embedded necessity for all mammals. You must understand pain is a necessity, and that a necessity always serves a specific purpose. The purpose of pain is to warn the sufferers of it as it is experienced to notify them something associated with their being is abnormal. It does not matter when, if, how, or why, pain occurs, for the sufferer of it will react accordingly. That proves the first clause of the argument is false, and that at least some knowledge is innate; thereby, adjudicates and nullifies the claim that, ‘and therefore what we reason and thereby knowledge is based on what we previously know,’ which effectively renders, ‘we can only know in the context of past knowledge,’ as a false notion not established by facts.

6. Incomplete empirical knowledge

‘Empirical knowledge of who we are whether of our biological or conscious make-up, cannot completely capture ourselves in entirety due to the complexity of our make-up."

Empirical knowledge of biological composition is an odd form of question begging; therefore, it is not relevant for proof of anything, specifically the knowledge of my self- identity. The reason being for that is, I exist; therefore, I do consist of a substance; that substance is my being, and my being is my essence. Previously the issues of being, and its associated consciousness were fully addressed; therefore, there is no complexity to my conscious make-up. This is where you crossed the bounds of logic using an assumption, and sublime crossover (and a direct contradiction I might add) of the meanings of - who we are - and - what we are. Who = that person, a person, or the interrogative of another person - what = interrogative of an object, or matter. Who, and what, are both pronouns; therefore, extreme caution is necessary for challenges such as this, which insures that there is no misunderstanding of a specific word possible. That proves use of vague, and abstruse language, which is totally unacceptable and is not honest for debate, or discussion. Yes I know what I am, but what I am, is not what the proposition specifies.

7. Recursive reflexivity (infinite regress)

‘Apparently all conscious knowledge if it is asserted with absolute truth-value succumbs to infinite regress, whereby we reach an end link in our chain of reasoning which infinitely repeats because we never come to an absolute endpoint. Or, we face ‘recursive reflexivity’ whereby each addition of knowledge of who we are changes who we are so that we never attain true knowledge of who we are.’

An infinite regress is possible only when dealing with abstract entities or concepts; therefore, your argument as presented is invalid and unsound. An infinite regress will never occur in reality of the worlds of which, are the private and mutually exclusive domains of our existence. Prediction: My body will die, and will convert to other forms of matter, or energy; by that, my body will disappear from experiential reality. That is an absolute prediction, with an absolute truth-value. I defy logic to disprove the truth in that prediction. There is no other condition, nor further point to find or prove, for that is the essence of absolutism - guaranteed truth value, and guaranteed result in reality as we, human beings experience it. By that, prove to me the truth of the prediction is not self- evident, as specifically phrased.

8. Precedence of possibility

‘Since possibility is necessary for the existence of impossibility, and impossibility is not necessary for the existence of possibility, it follows that possibility precedes impossibility. This axiom defends the competition from the standpoint that it cannot be claimed with validity that it is impossible to truly know who we are, and therefore, the proposition is impossible to overcome.

Also, since the proposition is asserted from a limited perspective, it is consistent with the precedence of possibility, and in particular the possibility of truly knowing who we are.’

All things, concepts, entities, or abstract constructed whatever's the human mind can conceive of are impossible to make manifest in reality; thereof, we can say, it is impossible for all possibilities to occur. Possible can be both causal and contingent; impossible is not contingent, and cannot be caused.

The argument as presented is based on devious wording as phrased, of which, by using what is a triple negative obfuscates every potential result. That statement follows with the explanatory and superfluous clauses omitted, and then divided into the three relevant clauses required to prove the truth-value of each particular clause.

‘it cannot be claimed with validity that’

‘it is impossible to truly know who we are,’

‘the proposition is impossible to overcome.’

There is no possible rebuttal to argument 8, until after argument 9 is refuted. In other words, every potential to refute argument 8 does not exist, until after argument 9 is refuted, which will determine the truth-value of each of the cited clauses.

Final argument-

‘it cannot be claimed with validity that’ - This clause is true.

‘it is impossible to truly know who we are,’ - This clause is false, PNC wins!

‘the proposition is impossible to overcome.’ - This clause is false, I win!

9. Limited perspective

By asserting the proposition with limited truth-value, we avoid the skeptical contradiction of claiming to not know anything from a position of knowing, or in the context of the proposition, claiming to not truly know who we are from a position of truly knowing who we are. Also, we do not diminish the significance of the proposition by limiting its truth-value, because apparently all propositions from our perspective are subject to limited truth-value, and as mentioned, if we did not limit the proposition's truth- value, it would result in contradiction.

Here again, it is not apparent that all propositions are subject to limited truth-value. That is an assertion without supporting argument; however, I will accept the assertion.

Argument 9 is clearly obfuscating and ambiguous.

Argument 9 includes a direct contradiction that is clearly elucidated. It follows as was written.

‘we do not diminish the significance of the proposition by limiting its truth-value.’

The contradicting statement immediately follows the above statement.

‘because apparently all propositions from our perspective are subject to limited truth-value,’

The following statement compounds the contradiction with a hilariously funny extra warning about - what contradiction?

‘and as mentioned, if we did not limit the proposition's truth-value, it would result in contradiction.’

In view of the ‘noted’ and properly ‘identified’ direct contradiction, I claim victory with argument 9, for it conclusively proves the results for argument 8! End © Copyright information-"

Jimmy L. White July 16 2002

Response:

We will evaluate the main points of your entry.

Just because consciousness may encompass three "unique properties", it does not necessarily follow that the three unique properties equate with a "complete (whole)" substance. Viz., the notion of uniqueness does not necessarily equate with completeness. If we consider the apparent interconnectedness of things, then it follows that consciousness is not a whole onto itself.

For your "complete whole" argument to make sense you would have to refute that human consciousness is dependent on, among other things, human sensory and human respiratory. In other words, you would have to establish that human consciousness comprised of awareness, self-identity, and free will, is a thing-in-itself.

Moreover, you face the problem that from our causal perspective and the apparent interactive nature of things, something from something else ad infinitum is more reasonable than something from nothing (thing-in-itself), and therefore human consciousness as a thing (or substance)-in-itself is less reasonable than human consciousness as a non-thing-in-itself.

If you are unsatisfied with our reasoning, then explain to us how human consciousness can have awareness of external things, while at the same time be a whole onto itself?

Another issue you need to address is that the combination of consciousness and free will does not necessarily result in self-identity with absolute truth-value. What is it about consciousness and free will that true self-identity results? You refer to "innate" knowledge, but where does the innate knowledge come from, and how do you deal with the less reasonableness of a thing-in-itself (innateness) compared to something from something else ad infinitum? Further, how can you maintain the notion of "free will" in consideration of the interconnectedness of things, whereby life unfolds through interaction rather than non-interaction?

In your criticism of the proposition, you incorrectly maintain that the proposition spatially separates the properties of consciousness. For example, you say that the first clause of the proposition, "we cannot truly know who we are", means that identity must reside outside of consciousness. No that is not the case. You are assuming that there is such a thing as self-knowledge with absolute truth-value. Whereas, we maintain that from a position of more reasonableness there is only self-knowledge with limited truth-value. Actually, by you arguing that self-identity results from consciousness and free will, it you yourself that has spatially separated your perceived properties of consciousness.

In short, your challenge falls short of overcoming the proposition because you have not more reasonably established that human consciousness is a thing-in-itself ("a complete whole"), nor have you more reasonably established the existence of self-knowledge with absolute truth-value. In criticism of the proposition, you overlook that we are saying that we can only know who we are with limited truth-value. We have not spatially separated the properties of consciousness. Viz., self-identity with limited truth-value and awareness apparently occur simultaneously. Though we reject your inclusion of "free will" because as mentioned you have failed to more reasonably establish human consciousness as a thing-in-itself.

Other issue:

Our responses to your critique of the main arguments supporting the proposition

1. Representational knowledge

In refutation of the representational nature of knowledge, you claim that human consciousness absorbs direct information by "permeating the space surrounding us". In defense of this claim, you argue that knowledge derived in the immediacy of the moment, like avoiding a car which has pulled dangerously in front of your car, has to be direct information. Yet it does not necessarily follow that direct information is necessary for judgments made in the immediacy of the moment (i.e. the driver of the car could rely on representational knowledge stemming from interaction between sensory receptors and external stimuli). Nor is it clear where the direct information comes from? Basically, you are claiming that knowledge exists in things and situations, and our consciousness can somehow magically absorb it. Do you have any evidence of knowledge residing in things, or of the existence of a continuum between external knowledge and its direct transfer into our minds?

Also, how can knowledge be direct information when the information must contain our perspective, in some form, in order for us to be conscious of it? Viz., you do not think that a car is pulling out dangerously without any reference to yourself; you think that a car is pulling out dangerously from your perspective and with reference to yourself. Hence, it does not make sense that even if knowledge resided in things and situations that it would contain our perspective. So we must conclude that the notion of direct information does not stand, unless you can more reasonable show evidence to the contrary.

2. Epistemology of knowledge (human invention)

If human beings "build" identities, as you contend, then what is the difference between inventing an identity and building an identity? Surely, the process of building begins with some form of invention?

3. Internalism and externalism and 6. Incomplete empirical knowledge

We disagree that the question of who we are does not require knowledge of what we are, because we are dealing with absolute truth-value. So in order to truly know who we are, we will by necessity need to truly know what we are. Viz., we cannot truly identify ourselves without truly knowing what ourselves consist of. (See the response to Entry 23).

4. Temporal lag

Why is it impossible for a thing not to be accessible to itself? In the context of our apparent inability to get outside of our minds, how can we truly know ourselves through ourselves?

By denying the existence of time, you are self-defeating your denial of time because it is contingent on the existence of time. Viz., if there is no time, then it follows there is no thoughts we can know, or if time is an illusion, then it follows that since our thoughts are dependent on time at some level, our thoughts are illusions as well. Also, your experiment using three volunteers in a confined space is inconclusive, because you overlook that the volunteers could know the time after confinement through observation of the decay of food, sleep patterns, growth of facial hair etc. So it appears that there is no way to eliminate time or causality. The critical question you face is how can we have thoughts without an element of time whether we are aware of it or not?

5. Comparative nature of reason (reliance on past knowledge)

How can our knowledge of pain be purely "innate", when we ourselves are interconnected to the things around us? Sure our nervous system establishes a mechanism for responses to pain, but how do you know that our knowledge of the responses to pain is pre-established or innate? Is our conscious response to pain always the same, or are they specific to the pain we think we are experiencing?! Also, how can we know we are in pain without some reference to what we already know?

7. Recursive reflexivity (infinite regress)

How do you know that infinite regress will "never occur in reality of the worlds of which, are the private and mutually exclusive domains of our existence"? How do you get outside of your mind and know that you are? How do you know with absolute certainty that your body when it dies will disappear from experiential reality? What is the ground(s) for your knowledge with absolute truth-value?

8. Precedence of possibility.

How do you know that abstract constructs of the human mind are impossible to make manifest in reality? What is this "reality" you are referring to, and how can you truly know it?

There appears to be confusion on your part regarding our statement,

"... it cannot be claimed with validity that it is impossible to truly know who we are, and therefore, the proposition is impossible to overcome."

9. Limited perspective

We take your point that we cannot limit the truth-value of the proposition, if all propositions from our perspective are subject to limited truth-value. However, our main point stands that the criticism that the proposition is subject to limited truth-value is cancelled out if all other propositions from our perspective are subject to limited truth-value as well. The challenge you face is to more reasonably show knowledge with absolute truth-value.

Entries 354-358 Entries 363-366