Critique of the main arguments supporting the claim that "we cannot truly know who we are in part or in whole":

1. Representational knowledge
Conscious knowledge is apparently based on interaction at sensorial, biochemical, and neurological levels, or any other levels, and therefore we can only know via representation.
(i.e. we do not know directly from the external world in a Aristotelian fashion, whereby external knowledge somehow enters directly into our minds. We know through representation based on interaction, whether it be the interaction of neuron cells or the interaction of sensory receptors with external stimulus. One way around this position is to assert that some conscious knowledge is created ex nihilo ("out of nothing"). However, the concept of ex nihilo is less reasonable than something coming from something else (causality), because we can only know by imputing causality onto things.

---I don't see any reasonable grounds to conclude that something coming from something else (stacking the turtles) is in any way more reasonable then coming to the point right away: The first turtle had to come from nowhere, as we understand it.
You matter of factly state that something created ex nihilo is less reasonable than something coming from something else without any justification. Also, a different kind of critique could be that "ex nihilo" can be perceived as to spring from something, namely "No-Thing". To me this is more than a word game, because no human alive knows what "nothing" really is. Therefore it can be deemed a cause just as reasonably as any other conceivable cause.---

The representative nature of conscious knowledge is important, in the context of the competition, because it refutes the notion of true knowledge viz., representative knowledge cannot truly be what it represents, because then it would not be representational.

---The experience of being hit on the head with a hammer can never truly be the hammer itself. Knowledge in its corporeal form (neurons, proteins, electrical fields, quantum fluxes, whatever, probably none or all of these, including the ones we never heard of) is never identical to the phenomena that made it into what it is. However, this has not removed the notion of "true knowledge" from the insides of this knowledge corpus.---

2. Epistemology of knowledge (human invention)
Conscious knowledge is apparently derived from human invention. (i.e. we invent conscious knowledge from interactional based information.)
Since we are the ones behind the invention of conscious knowledge, we cannot invent true knowledge of ourselves and be ourselves.
In other words, we cannot be the basis for invention and at the same time the product of invention.

---This implies:

If we are the basis for invention, then conscious knowledge is apparently derived from us("Conscious knowledge is apparently derived from human invention"). However, we are not the product of invention. Many may say this.

If, on the other hand, we are considered to be the product of invention, but not the basis of invention then conscious knowledge is created(invented?)within us by THAT which is being. Many may say that.

If we argue that we can be basis and product of invention at the same time, the above two options can be true at the same time. I think that the two options are differently shaped in the representational sense, but that the truth of being, to which both attempt to refer, does not care which one is adopted, for the resulting world of phenomena can remain exactly the same.---

3. Internalism and externalism
Since we are the knowers trying to be the known at the same time, we need to get outside of ourselves, otherwise we would have no space to know who we are. Yet by getting outside of ourselves, without considering its probability, we cease to be ourselves; and by ceasing to be ourselves we have no grounds to know who we are because there is no who we are to know. Hence, whether as ourselves (internalism) or outside of ourselves (externalism), we cannot truly know who we are.

---I am the knower. This is what I know this second: I know that true knowledge can never be representational. It's very similar, if not identical to experience. Tiger Woods can not tell you his knowledge of the game of golf. He can talk to you till kingdom come, you will not posses his true knowledge of the game. Which is not in the conceptual representations he picks to teach you, but in his flesh and bones. True knowledge exists, but I call your version of it unreasonable. I do not have to show why, since you do that yourself exhaustively (We can't truly know.). Furthermore, if we can't know ourselves truly, I think it is safe to say that there is nothing out there we can truly know. Our makeup does not essentially differ from that of anything else. Not even the English language concepts that constitute the proposition itself. These concepts are ever corporeal themselves, whether made up from ink molecules on paper, sound waves in the air or photons emanating from a tv-screen. In essence they have little to do with knowledge itself, which is a separate manifestation ,although influenced by these manifestations continuously. We can't deny to experience knowledge every now and then, and I see no way of prohibiting the word "true" when it comes to speaking of such an experience.---

4. Temporal lag
Conscious knowledge is apparently defined by temporality, and therefore as soon as we think we know who we are, we cease to know who we are because what we know is past knowledge of who we are. (If we deny the notion of time, we also deny the notion of thought, which then self-defeats the denial of time.)

---What if thinking we know who we are incorporates this fact of temporality, drawing the proper consequences and concluding that knowing who we are is necessarily based on non-temporally dependent experiences (ideas, dreams if you like)? If I truly know who I am, I will know not to believe that I can know myself through temporality: Thus something like a soul is born. You may argue that when I start trying to verbalize my true knowledge, I necessarily have to revert to words that are or have been en vogue at one point or an other, or I have to invent my own temporally dependent ones, but I will claim my words to be mere representations of that which is truly mine own: The knowledge that I truly am.
"I" is not 12 trillion neurons, or any other collection of objects, but "Me".
"I" is "Me". I know this truly and exactly. It can be nothing else, but "Me".
Of course, if someone would prescribe me the kind of rules and regulations I had to abide by in answering the question of who I truly am, I would be in trouble. I would be talking and thinking for the rest of my life and never find the answer.
Especially if I had to define this truth in terms of an entirely representational tongue, which on top of all else would not be representing me!---

5. Comparative nature of reason (reliance on past knowledge)
Reason is apparently defined by comparison of conscious meaning, and therefore what we reason and thereby knowledge is based on what previously know, which means that we can only know in the context of past knowledge.
--Aren't you forced to concede that there is no truth, unless the limit to that truth coincides with your skin? For if you don't, you have succeeded in getting outside of your mind. And if you do concede it, I can oppose you for ever, refuting the proposition in part, by proving its counterpart to be exactly equal in truth-value.

---The human being can only grow in the context of past events. How is this a problem?
The universe only exists in the context of previous states.
Therefore, anything pretending to be truly true within this universe, must be grown in context of previous states as well. It is exactly the notion that true knowledge, for it to be true, should not be based on previous states that is unreasonable. I would turn things around in stating that true knowledge of who we are necessarily incorporates this dynamic component, which brings me back to a point I have made in one of my previous entries: Dynamics is the very thing that concepts (definitions) are unable to deal with properly. They can, combined in good writing, mimick it, but careful study of the words in question will always reveal a bottom turtle, supported ex nihilo. The true knowledge however, your life's experience and mine, is for ever supported by all those phenomena we can never truly know.---

6. Incomplete empirical knowledge
Empirical knowledge of who we are whether of our biological or conscious make-up, cannot completely capture ourselves in entirety due to the complexity of our make-up. Laon explains this position in Entry 296, in which he says,
".... truly know who we are' must at least involve complete physical knowledge, for example of all our bodily systems, endocrine, muscular, central nervous, digestive, and many other systems, plus their complex interactions; and yet that relatively observable knowledge is beyond the capacity of any doctor, or indeed of the whole of medical science. Then add the necessity, to attain the standard implied by 'truly', to also know every aspect of our own personalities, all our memories, all our intellectual capacities, all of our hopes and fears and shames and secrets and drives and so on, including - which is surely a contradiction and therefore impossible - knowing the mental events and capacities we are not conscious of. If that is not impossible enough for you (and its impossibility is quite clear to me), then remember that 'truly knowing' ourselves must also involve knowing those extraordinary and crucially important things that the particles we are made of at the sub-atomic level."

---All the things mentioned here are representational in nature. Since you yourself show abundantly that representation doesn't breed true knowledge, it also should not be used in supporting your own point. For if you do, your view becomes as untrue (or truish) as its opposite. Every problem faced by the one side (the opposers of the proposition), will inevitably find its way into the camp of the supporters.---

To put what Laon Shelley says in context, Steve Burwen in Entry 209 states that "a single human brain [alone] contains [approximately] 12 trillion neurons, which are connected to anywhere from 3,000 to 100,000 other neurons.") Hence, due to the sheer complexity of the human brain, it is inconceivable within the bounds of probability how all the neurons themselves of a single human brain could be known.

---What's being said here, is that a human mind can't juggle 12 trillion balls. One can't argue with that. The nature of consciousness may require complexity, but to understand it might be something different from counting neurons and connections. So it is uncertain whether this 12 trillion neuron-argument has any bearing on the present question. It is easy to see how invincible this argument is, if one accepts the implied premises (for knowing what knowing is; If it is required to juggle 12 trillion balls, then we simply can't know).---

7. Recursive reflexivity (infinite regress)
Apparently all conscious knowledge if it is asserted with absolute truth-value succumbs to infinite regress, whereby we reach an end link in our chain of reasoning which infinitely repeats because we never come to an absolute endpoint. Or, we face "recursive reflexivity" whereby each addition of knowledge of who we are changes who we are so that we never attain true knowledge of who we are, or as Laon Shelley in Entry 296 says,
".... additional self-knowledge adds to what the circle is: it means the circle is a sentient simple-minded circle that knows it is a sentient simple-minded circle that knows it is a sentient simple-minded circle. If it knows that, then to truly know itself it now has to know that it is a sentient single-minded circle that knows it is a sentient simple-minded circle that knows it is a sentient simple-minded circle. This cycle goes on forever, to infinity, in what Gödel calls 'recursive reflexivity'. The knowledge never includes the whole system, because the knowledge expands the nature of the system it tries to know."

---The deductive conclusion would be, that true knowledge apparently is not about recreating the entire universe in a thought, or a perception. A comparison would be that exposure of the true selves of all the atoms in a multi-galaxy ocean would not be a possible task, if it had to be performed with a mere 12 trillion pebbles. This implies that true knowledge must be something else, for otherwise we are not talking about true knowledge, but about true insanity. It doesn't prove true knowledge to be impossible, it merely proves that true knowledge can't be found if based on the concept of a system, trying to represent itself with use of its own parts. Anyone attempting to establish true knowledge of being would not even consider to try this. For obviously, Gödel his words are extremely reasonable.---

8. Precedence of possibility
Since possibility is necessary for the existence of impossibility, and impossibility is not necessary for the existence of possibility, it follows that possibility precedes impossibility. This axiom defends the competition from the standpoint that it cannot be claimed with validity that it is impossible to truly know who we are, and therefore, the proposition is impossible to overcome.

---If nothing is possible, everything is impossible. In my view this argument (nr.8) can never be used to support anything. Impossibility can just as easily be argued a prerequisite for possibility as vice versa. Without impossibility there is only certainty. The meaning of the concept of possibility would be entirely lost.---

Also, since the proposition is asserted from a limited perspective, it is consistent with the precedence of possibility, and in particular the possibility of truly knowing who we are.

---A second statement should be added to this, or they both should be removed:
Also, although the proposition is asserted from a limited perspective, it is consistent with the precedence of impossibility, and in particular the impossibility of truly knowing who we are.---

9. Limited perspective
By asserting the proposition with limited truth-value, we avoid the skeptical contradiction of claiming to not know anything from a position of knowing, or in the context of the proposition, claiming to not truly know who we are from a position of truly knowing who we are. Also, we do not diminish the significance of the proposition by limiting its truth-value, because apparently all propositions from our perspective are subject to limited truth-value, and as mentioned, if we did not limit the proposition's truth-value, it would result in contradiction.

---I agree that you avoid the contradiction, but the side effect of this seems to be that eventually you may be forced to acknowledge that every proposition is exactly equal in truth value.
You will have to make an attempt at formulating the law that governs the decision process, that determines which statement is more reasonable than others. The magic words "more reasonable" in themselves contain no meaning that can be shared inter-individually, except diffuse sensations very similar to those of "more beautiful", or "more to my liking and taste". "More reasonable" captures all things connected to an individual's sense of "how things are ( -most reasonably- )", but is totally unsuited and inadequate for use in a general discussion.---
My argument is, that the term "more reasonable" can never act as a criterion, as long as the foundations of this "reason" are not specified. Someone opposing like I am doing at the moment, will always be able to question it.---

Final remark:
More reasonable within limits: I feel that if the exact dimensions of these limits were to be found out somehow, they would be found to coincide with the shapes of our skins. Outside these limits, reasonableness would decline, not unlike gravity between bodies at increasing distance of each other. Of course, clusters of people would have a stronger pull than ones that were alone, and some would be heavier than others. But what exactly would this convey when it comes to reason?

In conjunction with this final remark: Aren't you forced to concede that there is no truth, unless the limit to that truth coincides with your skin/mind? For if you don't, you have succeeded in getting outside of your skin/mind. And if you do concede it, I can oppose you for ever, refuting the proposition in part, by proving its counterpart to be exactly equal in truth value.

Raoul Starren May 9 2002

Response:

We will comment on the issues you raise.

Representational knowledge
The reason we say that something from something else is more reasonable than something from nothing (as in first cause) is that we know from a causal perspective, so that our perspective, which defines our thoughts, inherently favours something from something else over something from nothing. By taking this position, we are not claiming that something from nothing is impossible; rather, we are simply claiming from our perspective that something from something else ad infinitum is more possible than something from nothing.

If the basis for conscious knowledge is representation, how can "true knowledge" exist within representational knowledge? Are you referring to true knowledge within a system of thought? What else could you be referring to? How can the so-called "insides" of representational knowledge (i.e. corporeal form) be more reasonably disconnected with the outside of it (i.e. external world)?

To establish true knowledge from the insides of representational knowledge, you apparently need to show knowledge as a thing-in-itself, but that would take us back to the more reasonableness of something from something else (interaction) over something from nothing (non-interaction).

Internalism and externalism
How is experience a gateway to "true knowledge"? (We are not referring to knowledge with absolute truth-value within systems of thought; we are referring to knowledge with absolute truth-value regardless of systems of thought.) As we show in Entries 308, 310, there is no such thing as direct experience. Rather, experience only exists through our conscious awareness of it, so that we are in an indirect relation to what we think we are experiencing, and when we add the representational nature of knowledge, the notion of true knowledge from experience becomes highly questionable. (Also, it is worth mentioning again, as in the response to Entry 249, that when we say that we cannot truly know, we are saying that statement from our limited perspective, or what we more reasonably know, thereby we avoid the contradiction from claiming no true knowledge from a position of true knowledge.)

Temporal lag
Yes, you or anyone else can claim that your knowledge of who you are is not defined by temporality, but the difficult thing for you to do, is to more reasonably defend your position.

Comparative nature of reason
By conceding that there is no truth that we can know that we know, everything we know has a possibility of being the so-called truth, and assuming the initial premise holds, you can question the proposition or anything we want. But how can you show, as you contend, that your counter position to the proposition is of equal truth-value to the proposition? How is your gradation of truth-value defined? (Our gradation of truth-value, which underlies the competition, has no absolute endpoints, and is defined by more or less reasonableness.) Also, it is unclear to us how you can go from no absolute truth-value that we can know that we know to the necessity of all thought having equal truth-value.

If true knowledge must incorporate "previous states", how can true knowledge be known in the moment or so-called present state? What is it about previous states that allow us to know true knowledge?

Incomplete empirical knowledge
Laon Shelley’s point about the limit of empirical knowledge is important because it shows that even if true knowledge were accepted, we could not come to a complete understanding of ourselves or anything else through empirical knowledge. (Though as mentioned in the response to Entry 296, Shelley assumes that true knowledge of ourselves exists in part, but that may not necessarily or more reasonably be the case. If we consider the representational nature of knowledge, and interactional nature of things, it is clearly not the case.)

Precedence of possibility
How can impossibility more reasonably precede possibility, when in order for there to be impossibility, there must be the possibility of it? It does not necessarily follow that the exclusion of impossibility means that there is only certainty. There may only be possibility, including the possibility of impossibility. (Note, the concept of impossible like the concept of nothing, cannot be asserted in an absolute sense without contradicting oneself, because of the reason already stated--from our perspective possibility (or existence) precedes impossibility or (non-existence).)

Limited perspective
We disagree that the concept of more reasonableness cannot be used "inter-individually", or in general discussions. As we state in Entry 302, more reasonableness refers to a decision-making method in which reasons themselves are evaluated based on their comparative consistency and soundness. For you to deny the relevance of more reasonableness, is to deny, contradict the very meaning behind your denial, because all thought is defined by conscious meaning (reason) and possibility. Though obviously a question pertaining directly to personal taste of an individual will likely be more reasonably answered by the individual in question than anyone else, but that may not necessarily be the case if the individual is incapacitated in anyway. Or in the context of the competition, there is no reason why more reasonableness cannot be used to determine whether we can truly know who we are or not. In fact, we contend that it is the fairest and most impartial method possible, if transparency and accessibility are maintained, because more reasonableness as method focuses on the evaluation of reason themselves, instead of personal opinion. For you to argue that personal opinion defines all human thought, is to overlook that reasons themselves do as well, so that by focusing on reasons themselves we eliminate personal opinion and act consistent the meaning of our thoughts. (Though we concede that personal opinion cannot be completely ruled out, because it acts as the basis for more reasonableness. Though no method or system can completely eliminate personal opinion. If you can offer a more accurate, impartial method of evaluation, we want to know.)

As a final comment, just because we concede that there is no knowledge with absolute truth-value we can know that we know, and thereby you have grounds to question whatever you want, does not necessarily mean that your counter-position is of equal truth-value as the position you are questioning. How does the apparent limited truth-value of human thought equate with all human thought having the same truth-value? Your premise does not necessarily follow from your conclusion. What you could say is that all human thought is of equal truth-value in not having absolute truth-value we can know that we know, but that is not the same as all human thought having equal truth-value.

The onus is on you to show that contradicting positions have equal truth-value or different truth-value to the positions they are contradicting. In the context of the competition, the onus is on you to more reasonably show that truly knowing who we are is of equal truth-value, and thereby equal possibility, as not truly know who we are. To merely establish the limited truth-value of human thought is not enough, and to merely take a counter-position to the proposition is not enough either. You must more reasonably defend the position you are taking. (As stated in the conditions for the competition, more reasonable refers to "using reason in the most objective manner possible, and includes the arguments stated in the entries and disputes submitted to the "Challenge the Philosophy" competition, and the arguments stated in the responses to them... one idea is deemed more reasonable than another idea if it is more consistent and sound.")

337. Entry:

Reply to the response to Entry 333

"I agree that every concrete thought and sensation of experience is a phenomenon, as far as knowledge is concerned. If I say that the only candidate for something other than phenomena would be being itself, I do not perceive anything distinct about this being. I come to being itself as the only candidate by means of deduction. It is not a phenomenon in the sense that it has qualities that we can observe or experience, since you reasonably state that everything perceived is necessarily a phenomenon. My reasoning in entry 333 implied two alternatives:

Either there is no reasonable way of choosing between "we can't truly know who we are and be who we are at the same time" and any other proposition claiming this to be unreasonable.

Or I am forced to not view knowledge as a phenomenon.

The only candidate for non-phenomenon I could conceive of (whether rightfully so or not) was the being itself, which could not be perceived or sensed at all, since there is nothing outside this being that could perceive it, or know it as a phenomenon. Nevertheless, a conscious being might deduce the reality of being. All that is required is to establish that there are truly things outside its consciousness. If this would be so, it could be argued that we did get outside our minds in a non-phenomenal way, because we would not be able to describe or experience any phenomenon concerning this outside, besides the certainty of its existence. The only way to describe it would be as a mental black hole of some sorts, with an event horizon, beyond which we cannot go. It would be established however, that there is some form of beyond, unless one were to consider a destructio ad nihilo, accepting creatio ex nihilo as being reasonable in the process.

From our perspective, there would be two sides to being. One is being (from which we may not perceive any phenomena) and the other is created as a kind of shadow to this being, namely the perceived phenomenon "being", which is necessarily instantiated by our habit to reflect.
I can not escape the instantiation of phenomena when I reflect on the actual being itself, even if it is in terms of mental event horizons, as in fact also happens if we reflect upon a black hole, or the question: How did things look before the big bang ever happened?

If it is unreasonable to assume that the big bang occurred ex nihilo, since you claim it is more reasonable to assume that something comes from something else (argument1 of your defense of the proposition), we would have to acknowledge the reality of a non-phenomenal existence as well, for there would be no phenomena indicative of the nature of this pre-big bang "something", besides it being "something". In a similar fashion, it can reasonably be argued that a non phenomenal "something" called "being" is the cause of all phenomena. I hereby enter the birth of the universe as exhibit A.

Since I deduced that knowledge has to be non-phenomenal in order to be true, this is how I came up with the notion that true knowledge necessarily has to coincide with "being" (the non-phenomenal kind). Of course, then the question (phenomenon): "What is true knowledge then?" would pop up, but in my opinion the attempt to define an answer would be unreasonable within limits, on the grounds I have described in this entry.

Additional issues:

Objection:
"Though it does not follow that being and knowing are "always" simultaneous, because knowing can be transferred in the form of a program to a non-living thing like a computer."

Are you saying that non-living things can know? In my opinion a computer knows not. Enter this program and it will generate a sequence of phenomena that represent not the computer's knowledge, but our own. Everything the computer will exhibit, is put there by us. The bugs in the program are our mistakes, the knowledge is our knowledge and the possible error messages are part of the program we created. The most a computer could do, is show us implications of our knowledge we hadn't thought through ourselves yet. We use its brute computing power for things that would take us lifetimes to compute. Yet I don't consider that to be knowledge. We don't consider a volume of the Encyclopedia Britannica to possess knowledge either. Even robots that open doors, play soccer or beat Kasparov in chess possess no knowledge, only algorithms designed by us to make it behave exactly in the way we want it to. Perhaps neural nets may become knowledgeable in other ways besides our own, but then maybe we could no longer speak of a non-living thing and more importantly, no programs would be entered into it, but experience, as in ourselves. In any case, we would not be able to tell a neural net exactly what to know, besides in ways similar to how elephants are trained in a circus, or Chinese under Mao Zedong. So in my opinion an actual one on one knowledge transfer would never be achieved.

My current view on the proposition:
The adding of "--in part or in whole, and be who we are at the same time--" only pollutes the proposition with a swarm of implicit preconceptions about what's relevant in determining whether we can truly know who we are and consequently what isn't important, beforehand.

Whether we can truly know:

-We would not be able to establish this in a general discussion, using phenomenal/representational language, if it would not be established that truth is necessarily non-phenomenal (being the cause of phenomena, but not an effect, making truth untraceable by means of phenomenal /representational tools, that will always be something posing as something else) and it were not accepted that our only feasible way of making a decision has to be by means of deduction, leaving us eventually with "something being" outside of our minds, of which we possess no representation or phenomenal impression whatsoever. This, I feel, would be the only thing that could be called true knowledge, for practical purposes very similar to the Buddhist "I know not". Essentially however, it means that we do know what there is to know, which is the only reasonable candidate for truth. To declare to be true what can't be known seems more unreasonable than this."

Raoul Starren May 12 2002

Response:

Why do we need to go beyond phenomenon to make a more reasonable choice? Why can’t we simply reason the phenomenon we know based on reasons themselves, and come to a more reasonable decision? How do we get outside of phenomenon when apparently all we can know is what we know?

You argue that deduction is a means to get outside of phenomenon, but we respond that deduction is only a limited means at best because we are using phenomenon to do the deducing; and for this reason, we are no further outside of phenomenon using deduction than if we did not use it.

Although we agree for a different reasons (i.e. the representational nature of knowledge, and the necessity of reason for the existence of being (Kant)) that there appears to be a non-phenomenal existence. However, it does not more reasonably follow from the premises of establishing non-phenomenal existence and being itself (as conception) as non-phenomenal that all phenomena is caused by being. You assume that being as the single cause is an end-in-itself, and yet this assumption is inconsistent with your causal perspective in which things (and non-things) come from other things (and non-things) ad infinitum. Also, if we consider the interactive nature of things, and the lack of any evidence or example of non-interactive things and non-things, it does not make sense how you can more reasonably maintain that the existence of an end-in-itself whether phenomenal or non-phenomenal. You could turn to the non-phenomenal nature of being and deduction, thereby claim our causal perspective does not apply, but then your argument comes down to ex nihilo versus something from something else ad infinitum, which would necessarily take us back to our causal perspective and the interactional nature of things, thus the more reasonableness of something from something else ad infinitum over ex nihilo. Hence, your claim of true knowledge from the statement, "knowledge has to be non-phenomenal in order to be true" becomes nothing more than a less reasonable claim supported by assumption. Though we give you credit because if you could more reasonably establish being itself as ex nihilo viz., the cause of all phenomenon, you would have more reasonable grounds for asserting that knowledge has to be non-phenomenon in order to be true. (Though this position is no different from Schopenhauer’s theory of will and representation, in which he uses the thing-in-itself as a basis for knowledge with absolute truth-value. Entries 313, 317, 320) Yet in terms of the competition, your position even if it were accepted would actually support the proposition by showing that we cannot more reasonably truly know who we are, because we can only know from phenomenon.

Additional comment

To argue that non-phenomenon or being itself is the only "reasonable candidate" for knowledge with absolute truth-value, and therefore it must more reasonably be the source of true knowledge, does not necessarily follow because you are assuming that a candidate for true knowledge exists to begin with, which may not necessarily be the case viz., for your argument to work you need to first establish the necessity for a candidate of true knowledge, which takes you to the problem that from our causal perspective something from something else ad infinitum (infinity) is more reasonable than something from nothing (end-in-itself).

Entries 331-335 Entries 338-344