"More problems/thoughts with the main arguments of the proposition.

Critique of the summary of the main arguments supporting the claim that ‘we cannot truly know who we are in part or in whole’:

1. Representational knowledge

‘All conscious knowledge whether innate (encoded) or intuitive, must ultimately originate from sensory information, otherwise there would be no grounds to explain the origin of conscious knowledge except that it originated ex nihilo (out of nothing.)’

I think you still have a problem here. As discussed, knowledge can emanate from the brain by default, or accident, or disfunction, and be taken as ‘real’ by the individual, and therefore extend into the domain of ‘conscious knowledge’, whether in the individual or collectively. This is probably how most religions originate and develop (i.e. by ‘revelation’). ‘Revelation’ can also be correct by default-i.e. it can be a pre-coded response to a certain environment, by individuals who are more in 'sync' with their unconscious brain functions. This is also why people sometimes experience dreams before an event-the brain can, in some situations, pick up signals from the environment, without the person's awareness, and interpret them unconsciously, and release pre-coded signals to the conscious self, so to speak, which can in some cases be interpreted as a warning. (The brain can only do this in certain situations and it needs signals from the surrounding environment-something psychics, for example, take out of context-it can't 'perceive' things about a person whom it has never been in contact, for example). Actually the 'warning' itself is probably a 'warning' by default-the brain is simply responding to what it interprets from the surrounding environment. But the important point is, in reference to the proposition, these dreams, visions etc., can also occur *randomly*, without any external stimuli, or by disfunction (e.g. schizophrenia) and then be taken by the individual as real, or relevant, when it isn't. Thus conscious knowledge can originate from no sensory input at all, and it can pass into the general population as dogma, something which empirical scientists and philosophers have been struggling to get people to understand for thousands of years.

And what about 'knowledge'/'response'/'learning', before the senses evolved? Mold, for example, can apparently learn, which may be a component or process element in the evolved property we call ‘knowledge’. Therefore you could possibly have 'partial knowledge', without any senses.

‘Also, conscious knowledge is apparently based on interaction at sensorial, biochemical, and neurological levels, or any other levels, and therefore we can only know via representation.’

Again, I think you may have several problems-e.g. emergence. Some ‘knowledge’ can be similar to what occurs with the phenomenon of colour, produced in the brain, derived from an arbitrary chemical structure of colour filters in the evolved eye. But this emergent property of colour, in the brain, does have a 'life', or properties, if you like, of its own. It is no less real than the wavelengths of the EM radiation which produces it, being an emergent 'effect' produced through the chemical structure of filters in the eye. An important point here is the colour divisions which result from this process aren't 'representation', because the colour divisions are based on chemical properties of the dyes and the brains manipulation of these, and not the EM properties. The colours thus attain a 'life' of their own, which can then initiate other properties and effects. It may be that the phenomenon of colour in the brain is not based on 'representation' at all, but derived from emergent properties within the brain. It is certainly true to say that within EM radiation no colour division exists, therefore the colour divisions we experience are not strictly representational. Properties have emerged from processes and properties independent of the properties of EM radiation. Things can become separated from their origin.

With regards to knowledge, the structure and processing of the brain may also produce similarly separated processes and effects, resulting in beliefs and behaviour, e.g. through chemical properties, and *not* through sensory input.

I have doubt as to whether *all* knowledge is ultimately derived from sensory.

2. Epistemology of knowledge (human invention)

‘Since we are the ones behind the invention of conscious knowledge, we cannot invent true knowledge of ourselves and be ourselves. In other words, we cannot be the basis for invention and at the same time the product of invention.’

I think we can, if we are not the product or the basis, but what emerges from the two.
Just who is ‘we’. The brain, the conscious self, or a changing and learning mix of the two, or three, if you include the sensory environment (or more?). 'We' are not necessarily the ones behind the invention of conscious knowledge, if we are multi-dimensional, or if we ourselves are the self constructed by the brain operating in sync with a random environment.

3. Internalism and externalism

‘Since we are the knowers trying to be the known at the same time, we need to get outside of ourselves, otherwise we would have no space to know who we are. Yet by getting outside of ourselves, without considering its probability, we cease to be ourselves; and by ceasing to be ourselves we have no grounds to know who we are because there is no who we are to know. Hence, whether as ourselves (internalism) or outside of ourselves (externalism), we cannot truly know who we are.’

W do not cease to be ourselves if ‘we ourselves’ are an amalgam of the internal and the external, or even other 'spheres' of influence. What you have to consider here is that 'we' are the by-product of a mutli-dimensional biological machine, operating within a multi-dimensional universe.

How do you know if we are not multi-dimensional, in the sense that we are never one or the other, but in state of flux, and emerging from this flux as a separate entity. Either way, we are not static. Neither here, nor there, only existing in the brains construction and manipulation of the internal and external.

4. Temporal lag

‘Conscious knowledge is apparently defined by temporality, and therefore as soon as we think we know who we are, we cease to know who we are because what we know is past knowledge of who we are.’

Temporal lag also suggests that we are not the inventors of conscious knowledge.

5. Comparative nature of reason (reliance on past knowledge)

‘Reason is apparently defined by comparison of conscious meaning, and therefore what we reason and thereby know is based on what previously we know, which means that we can only know in the context of past knowledge.’

We can learn new things, and new reason. I do not agree with the above assertion. Also, we can reason based on an encoded methodology of the brain, without any previous knowledge at all (as in instinct).

6. Incomplete empirical knowledge

‘Empirical knowledge of who we are whether of our biological or conscious make-up, cannot completely capture ourselves in entirety due to the complexity of our make- up.’

No, but it can partially create us. Who we are is partly dependent on received knowledge. If you don't think so, you are now a new ‘who we are’ after you have read this sentence. For example: try not to think of pink elephants. You can't, as you are now: you + the thought of pink elephants.

7. Recursive reflexivity (infinite regress)

‘Infinite regress supports the contention that who we are is not static. But this doesn't mean we don't have intrinsic value, actually it adds to it, and makes us god-like in essence. An ethereal changing entity, able to change shape and form, according to our needs and desires.’

Whether or not we can ‘know ourselves’, really depends on what one means by ‘know’ and ‘ourselves’. Your arguments appear to assume that ‘we’ is static, and also they appear to assume that there is no encoded knowledge in 'who we are'-i.e. a blank slate-tabular rasa. It also appears that you dismiss the notion of prepared learning and/or 'instinct'. You also appear to dismiss the possibility that we are the result of a biological process, and not any single entity.

‘We’ are always incomplete. I would also say that ‘knowledge’ is not as you say. It is a combination of many things, which are always changing. So instead, I would argue that we need to build on our incompleteness, and our incomplete knowledge, to create ourselves afresh, according to our needs and desires, and to challenge and change those biological predispositions we no longer consider relevant, beneficial or even functional.

But the proposition is ultimately deficient, in that it ultimately relies on arbitrary and static definitions. The proposition contradicts the very axioms it proposes to encapsulate, and then produces a circular argument, ignoring possibilities to the contrary, such as process theory, to support it. I think the idea of consciousness as a net effect, and/or the self as a process, support the contentions of postmodernism, and the self-referential nature of knowledge etc. etc. better than the proposition. To counter this by asserting that any arguments against the proposition are arbitrary, is to deny the possibility that these arguments in fact better align themselves and support the arbitrary nature of knowledge than the proposition. What is ‘knowledge’? From the perspective of consciousness as an emergent property, knowledge can only ever be defined arbitrarily, as can ‘who we are’. If one wants to defeat the proposition, one has to first change or challenge the *definitions*, which seem purposely built-in to fulfill the arguments of the inexpressible committee."

Roger McEvilly February 18 2002

Response:

Since you can only think from a causal perspective, any theory you come up with regarding the nature of human knowledge will be defined by your causal perspective. So in terms of isolating human knowledge to the human brain, you would have to take the inconsistent and less reasonable position of ex nihilo viz., view the human brain, or at least an aspect of it, as created "out of nothing" rather than something from something else ad infinitum. Therefore, to avoid this inconsistency, all your examples like knowledge from the brain by default (pre-coded), accident (randomness, emergence), and disfunction must be interconnected to the human brain’s origin, thereby to the human being’s interaction with the external world viz., there is no human brain or human being for that matter without interaction at some level with the external world.

Even emergence and chemical properties have underlying causes which define what they are. So your claim, for instance, that the chemical properties of dyes in human eyes are not representative of EM properties, because EM properties do not contain colour divisions, overlooks that there is no colour divisions without EM radiation.

The confusion with our view of representational knowledge may lie in that we do not limit representational knowledge to sensory information, but extend it to all forms of interaction, whether biochemical, sensorial, and neurological, or any other forms. The important point is our claim that interaction is the basis for all conscious knowledge. In order for you to refute this claim, you need to show how knowledge can be attained without any form of interaction. It leads to the ex nihilo position, which as we have already stated is inconsistent with your causal perspective.

Though you "doubt" that all knowledge is ultimately derived from sensory, how do you propose to explain from your causal perspective, the origin of any human knowledge from a position of separation from the external world? How can a human being be separated from the external world without resorting to the inconsistent notion of ex nihilo? In our view, the interaction between ourselves and the external world is the ultimate basis for what we know viz., there is no who we are without interaction at some level with the external world. Though we concede that as an ultimate basis, the interaction may not necessarily be sensorial. However, our concession does not effect our major claim that all conscious knowledge is ultimately representational viz., a product of information derived from interaction.

You try to deny the existence of who we are by suggesting that we may be a "by-product of a multi-dimensional biological machine operating within a multi-dimensional universe"; or in other words, we may exist in a multi-dimensional oneness with everything else in which there is an underlying basis or thing-in-itself, or everything is simply created ex nihilo. If there is only a thing-in-itself, then it does not follow how it can exist in-itself from your causal perspective, and if your perspective is an illusion, then your notion of thing-in-itself is as well. If you claim that the multi-dimensional universe is created ex nihilo, then your claim is inconsistent with your causal perspective. Moreover, if you turn to the notion that the self is a construction of the human brain, then you face the question of what is behind the brain which allows it to exist? (The self as construction does not refute the existence of who we are.)

We feel your only way out is to acknowledge that we ourselves exist at some fundamental level. However, by making this acknowledgment, we are not asserting that who we are is static or dynamic; we are merely claiming that from what we reason, we ourselves exist at some fundamental level viz.., "being is a necessity of reason".

We do not understand what grounds you have to assert that we are always incomplete? Incomplete implies that there is something complete. What is complete about ourselves, and how can you truly know it? To claim that we are multi-dimensional, an ethereal changing entity, or a construction of the human brain is not the same thing as more reasonably showing you truly know what we are viz., how do you truly know that we are multi-dimensional, an ethereal entity, or a construction of the human brain?

Our position of not truly knowing who we are in part or whole, does not rule out that we may in part be a "net effect". However, as mentioned we do not see how you can more reasonably show the "self as a process" viz., construction of the human brain, thereby deny the existence of who we are, because the position begs the question of what is behind the human brain?

We do not view the proposition as defined with absolute truth-value; we view it as more reasonable than antagonistic propositions.

Yes, the proposition is "circular", but this deficiency is canceled out by the circularity of any other proposition.

In your final attack, you claim that the proposition is arbitrary, and that overcoming it is just a matter of changing or challenging its definitions. Yet as in Entry 315, we acknowledge that from a position of absolute truth-value the proposition is arbitrary, just as any other proposition is, but from a position of more reasonableness with reason viz., conscious meaning as the commonality of all human thought, we do not view the proposition as arbitrary. Further, because of our inability to get outside of our minds, in our view you have no way around the non-arbitrariness from within the realm of reason, than to ignore the very reason which defines your own thought.

In summary, due to the law of causality which defines human thought, you are unable to isolate conscious knowledge to the human brain without contradicting your causal perspective. Also, merely stating that "if" we ourselves are in a multi-dimensional universe or the self is a construction of the human brain, is not enough to overcome the proposition. You must more reasonably show how we can truly know who we are viz., first show the multi-dimensional nature of our existence or the self as a construction of the human brain, and then show how we can truly know who we are. We do not see what options you have because by denying who we are, you support the proposition viz., if there is no who we are, then there is no who we are we can truly know, and by accepting who we are, you face the interactional nature of our existence, which leads to representational knowledge.

323. Entry:

In reply to the response to Entry 321

"I would agree with your assessment, that we cannot know in its entirety all the 'interconnections' that simultaneously define our being, or as you say: "Yet it does not make sense how we can know something with 'complete understanding' without knowing it as a complete interconnected whole, because the interconnections determine the thing we want to completely understand."

I agree with this in principle, except that the issue, as I see it, is the "reasonable" knowledge that we have of ourselves, as it applies to knowing 'who we are', our inner consciousness. It is my view that none can have this inner consciousness for us, except ourselves, so that it then becomes a matter of definition: either we accept that only ourselves have the ability to know ourselves, or we do not. And that, I suspect, comes down to making a choice, a conscious choice, that no one is able to know 'who we are' other than ourselves, within the interconnected reality within which this 'who' exists. This is why I worded by response as I did, that only for ourselves can the formal statement of:

[E(x) (b(x) = c(x))] = 1; or as close to '1' as anyone can get, given our 'imperfect' minds.

From an ontological point of view, however, this 'who' can be known through the 'interconnections' if taken as an infinite Totality, but then this would necessitate that this Totality is 'conscious' of who we are, which for us, we who have imperfect knowledge, is of necessity an unknown. On the other hand, there is a way to think of our 'being' as a definition from that interrelated Totality, that our being is embodied in our body and mind, and that this 'consciousness' we experience is an expression of that being. If this is so, then we in our self awareness, however faulty it may be, is the best expression of our being's identity, of who we are. This is especially defined if one considers that the subatomic activity in our brain, that which renders us conscious, is somehow interrelated to all of physical existence 'out there' as the interrelated forces of the universe, through interacting subatomic activity in both the micro and macro format, which Paul Davies in "The Mind of God" calls the universe as its own 'simulator'; then our physical existence as expressed through our being is also connected to the activities in our brain. If so, then this is how we arrive at the 'who we are', that the activity in our brain is also connected to the activity of a self simulating universe, as it specifically applies to us in our body, in our personal state of being. That we are conscious of this then is, even if incompletely so, the definition of 'who we are' in our 'being'. Or, is this not another way of saying that we are who we are while knowing who we are, at the same time? Well, it would appear to be so, if this is a definition we choose, one that is acceptable to us as an extension of our being conscious in a universe that is 'conscious' of itself, at the point of our being. Of course, I can also appreciate Schopenhauer's dilemma, "being-known of itself contradicts being-in- itself", except that this is negated by the universe being totally true to the 'principle of non-contradiction', even if we are not; and thus it is our universal definition, our identity in terms of an interrelated infinite Totality as it defines us in our body, that we are of necessity who we are. The trick then is to raise our consciousness, our understanding, high enough to make this a reality in us. Can we achieve this? Maybe not yet, not at the present level of our mind's evolution. But if this is correct, then we either wait until our brains evolve highly enough to capture this Totality consciousness, or accept it as a 'definition' by choice, that 'who we experience' in ourselves, in our being, is 'who we are'.

Is this reasonable?"

Ivan Alexander February 20 2002

Response:

We agree that it appears that us ourselves, in terms of our inner consciousness, are the only ones who have the ability to know ourselves. However, just because we apparently are the only ones with the ability to know ourselves, does not mean that we have the ability to truly know ourselves. To confront this issue and get around Schopenhauer’s dilemma of "being-known itself contradicts being-in-itself", you argue that our being defines the infinite totality of existence, and that our consciousness is an expression of our being. Yet how can our being be defined by the infinite totality of existence, including the thing-in-itself behind the totality, when our being is a dimensional form of the thing-in-itself? In other words, for our being as defined by the infinite totality to hold up, our being must be the thing-in-itself, and yet that takes us back to Schopenhauer’s dilemma. If our being is not the thing-in-itself, as you appear to contend, then our being cannot be defined by the thing-in-itself, and that what we know through our consciousness cannot truly be who we are viz., self-knowledge with absolute truth-value, in an infinite totality, can only come from the thing-in-itself. Also, in an infinite totality defined by a thing-in-itself, there is no who we are, because everything is a dimensional unfolding of the thing-in-itself, which again takes us back to Schopenhauer’s dilemma.

324. Entry:

In response to Entry 321

"Completeness is momentary and fleeting. Certainly it's better to enjoy a moment than to seek it. I agree that the individual can't be considered a whole unto itself, just as any set of values within a parameter space can't be considered to represent the entire space. In fact the question of ‘who I am’ is somewhat aphophetic in that it relies upon a specific member of the general class ‘who’. So, one implies interconnection through definition. The deeper I contemplate individuality, the more I realize that the elements of my life are all part of larger sets, whose members are shared by many. At any point I am a unique intersection of these sets, but only by definition and comparison. There is no absolute ‘I’ in a unitary sense. There are only the elements that are meaningful to me, here and now. Self knowledge, doesn't fall into the category of truth claims and therefore, the categorization of ‘thing in itself’, through the vehicle of language, constitutes a belief statement.

Here, I am reminded of the Turing test, which, in a broad sense, we take every time we speak. If we ask ourselves to prove consciousness using a set of parameters, there will always be those which could be only defined by another mind, but are applicable when realized.

Ivan Alexander has pointed out the limitation of language and perception when gauging the degree of self-reference. We can only understand one another, and ourselves through love and compassion. Critical analysis can only take us so far, and when it's transitory nature becomes apparent, it reveals itself to be, only technology."

Ken Bell February 21 2002

Response:

We agree that the question of "who I am?" implies interconnection through definition because the question relies on a specific member of the general class "who" to understand the question and answer it viz., interconnection exists between the question and the member of the class "who", in order to understand and answer the question. Apparently there is no way around this implication because due to the law of causality, we can only know through questions at some level and point, and thereby through reliance on a specific member of the general class "who". This point is important because due to interconnectedness, it eliminates from our perspective, as you mentioned, an absolute "I" in a unitary sense.

Connected to this point, we agree with you that self-knowledge or "I" does not fall into a category of truth claim, with truth defined as complete knowledge. Though we contend further that no claim falls into a category of truth claim because any question implies interconnectedness by definition, thereby epistemic limitedness as well. From another angle, since the thing-in-itself or complete whole does not fall into a category of truth claim due the interconnectedness between question and member of class "who", and the concept of whole is apparently the only ground to establish truth, as Schopenhauer is aware viz., the concept is crucial to his theory of world as will and representation, it then follows that nothing else can fall into the category of truth claim.

How does our understanding through love and compassion avoid the transitory nature of critical analysis? Is not our understanding through the phenomenal concepts of love and compassion a form of analysis? It appears that due to the lack of knowledge with absolute truth-value, all human thought is transitory viz., nothing concrete, complete, or absolute is ever consciously attained and we know that it is. Though this contention does not rule out that some thoughts are less transitory than other thoughts.

Entries 320-321 Entries 325-327