"This argument over 'knowing ourselves' is similar to another useless but much-debated topic-that of belief by faith. Christians will often tell you that belief by faith is the foundation of their system of thought, the truth or falsity of which can't be argued against, because it is a matter of faith. What they are really arguing about is the philosophy of believing hoax. Is it merited or is not merited to swallow an out-and out hoax, perpetrated by religious maniacs 2000 years ago? And so the useless debate goes on.

If 'being' is constructed, something always becoming, whether or not we know it, then this debate is useless. You can never know 'yourself', if you yourself are a construction of the brain, an illusion existing only in the brain's construction of it. Or alternatively, you can know yourself, because by recognizing that you are a construction means you now know that you are an illusion, and the matter is settled. (In other words you can know by construction that you are a construction, which is just as useful and useless as not knowing you are a construction). To go beyond this is like arguing over the merits of delusion."

eif January 21 2002

Response:

The proposition is not defined by "if"; rather, the proposition is stating a position on self-knowledge viz., there is no true self-knowledge we can more reasonably know. For you to state that if such and such were the case, then the competition is "useless", has minimal significance because your statement only establishes a possibility.

If you wish to challenge the proposition on grounds that "being is a construction of the human brain", we would like to know what is behind the human brain if there is no being except as illusion? Also, how can the human brain be a construction of itself? Further, if being and all conception of who we are is an illusion, and our perception is contingent on individual identity, it would follow that everything we know including your statement on the human brain, is illusion. We would be left with something unknown behind illusion, because surely illusion is not self-existent, which would establish the main more reasonable position of the proposition that we exist, but we cannot truly know who we are.

317. Entry:

With reference to your response to Entry 313

"Whosoever wishes to understand Schopenhauer needs to read every line of what he has written and make repeated study of the texts and meditate on them. These are the conditions he demands of his readers. I believe a better translation in English is available than the one you mention viz. The World as Will and Representation (in 2 Volumes) by EFJ Payne, Dover Press. The best thing about Schopenhauer is that he is his own best interpreter. A beacon of clarity which is so rare among philosophers.
I do not wish to play with words. However certain things needs to be put in perspective.

The word ‘idea’ in a Schopenhauerian context should refer to the Platonic concept of the same and the word representation (of the data to the senses) mean the content of the phenomena and the subjects continual perception of it.

The ideality of space and time as demonstrated by Kant in his critiques is the central position held by Schopenhauer and he acknowledges this debt over and over again.

From your very first sentence I understand that you agree that a complete denial of the will is (an absolutely) necessary (and sufficient If I may add) condition to attain the state in question however your apprehension is
a)Causality-( remember that it is a principle that is operational only in the phenomena)
b)Not clear how to attain that state
I refer here to the work ‘On the Fourfold root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason’ by Schopenhauer (His doctoral dissertation to the University of Jena) an understanding of which is required to grasp his main masterpiece.

The form of the phenomena is time, space and causality. You quoted the passage in which Schopenhauer states that the growth of Knowledge (of the principle of sufficient reason) is not a solution nor can experience of the phenomenal world teach us anything but the phenomena.

You mention it is not clear how to attain that ‘complete denial of the will’.
Schopenhauer provides us the answer

The will itself cannot be abolished by anything except knowledge i.e. the will’s knowledge of itself (as opposed to the knowledge of the principle of sufficient reason) what I had earlier put as ‘self realization’.

If you are looking for an answer to our question whilst maintaining the subject/object duality then it is unachievable for we are searching for our answer in our dream world where there can be nothing but dream states and knowledge of those.

In his epiphilosophy he states Why the will wills are beyond our grasp for our knowledge itself evolved to serve the will.

Your last paragraph states thus

‘In short, for Schopenhauer's position of ‘world as mirror of will’ to stand up, you need to more reasonably explain Idea as the only direct objectivity of the will. Schopenhauer's explanation that the Idea is ‘the form of being object for a subject, [and therefore,] it alone is the most adequate objectivity possible of the will’, is simply not adequate because due to our causal perspective, Idea is not exclusively an object viz., we could postulate something behind it like our physical bodies, or even will itself from Idea being a product of our creation or invention. He has no ground to say that Idea is created ex nihilo except by blindly asserting it and at the same time contradicting his causal perspective.’

AND one of your earlier paragraphs

Further, the notion of ‘direct objectivity’ does not make sense because we can only know from a representational or indirect standpoint due to our causal perspective which is defined by subject and object. To deny the individual through the oneness of will, would also deny ‘direct objectivity’ because it is also contingent on the subject/object duality.

The answer to this as I have mentioned above is that causality is a principle which applies only to the phenomenon. Our physical body is nothing but the objectified ‘will-to-live’. The subject/object duality exists only for the phenomenon (the world that we are in and that is in us). We have neither created nor invented the will but we ourselves are will objectified.

‘The will determines itself and therewith its action and its world also for besides it there is nothing and these are the will itself. Only thus is the will truly autonomous.’

Schopenhauer has given detailed explanation in his main work why the world dies when we die.

I hope your questions are satisfactorily addressed."

Suvas Lakshmikutty January 25 2002

Response:

The main premises for Schopenhauer’s philosophy of will and representation are similar to the main premises supporting the proposition viz., from Schopenhauer’s standpoint all conscious knowledge is representational, and that there is a will or thing-in-itself behind all existing things, and similarly, from the committee’s standpoint, all conscious knowledge is representational, and there is a basis, essence, or life-force behind all existing things. (Note, the difference between will and basis appears insignificant since they both refer to the essence or kernel of life.) However, the important difference between the positions is that Schopenhauer views the thing-in-itself as the "whole" of all life, or as he says, "[The thing-in-itself] is the innermost essence, the kernel, of every particular thing and also of the whole." (The World as Will and Representation, Volume 1, Translator E.F.J. Payne (1969, Dover Publications) p. 110) Whereas, the committee’s position is that based on the necessity of reason, there is a basis behind all existing things, and that it is inexpressible whether the basis refers to the whole of all life or not viz., no necessity exists that the basis has to be the whole of life. This subtle difference in position is important because it acts as the fork between the positions in which Schopenhauer’s theory leads down a path to self-knowledge and knowledge with absolute truth-value, and the committee’s position leads to epistemically limited knowledge including self-knowledge.

What we intend on doing in this response is more reasonably evaluating whether the path to self-knowledge and knowledge with absolute truth-value holds, in comparison to the path of epistemically limited knowledge maintained by the committee and other participants in the competition.

Right off in evaluation of Schopenhauer’s position, it is questionable that the will or thing-in-itself is not only fundamental to all existing things, but a whole of all existing things. We do not deny that will as whole is possible; what we deny is the necessity for the equation of will to the whole of life viz., it is possible that there is a will behind all existing things, but each and every will is fundamentally unique to the existing thing it is part of. This point is significant because since we cannot truly know the will as thing-in-itself, because to do so would contradict the thing-in-itself, (which Schopenhauer acknowledges), we can only reason its existence based on what we know viz., we can only reason that it exists whatever it may be. Schopenhauer mistakenly takes this position further, by contending as mentioned that not only is there will behind all existing things, but it is the whole of all life. He has no grounds to make this assertion, except from an assumption about something he does not truly know. The more reasonable position is that will or thing-in-itself exists in all existing things viz., as an essence or basis behind all existing things. We have no grounds to assert what its inherent make-up is, except by making an ignorant assumption.

In defense of his position of will as "whole", Schopenhauer claims that the will is known "immediately" in any event, or in other words, it is known a priori viz., we do not experience the will in events, rather we know it a priori (devoid of experience) in events. Or as Schopenhauer says,

"... our willing is the only opportunity we have of understanding simultaneously from within any event that outwardly manifests itself; consequently, it is the one thing known to us immediately, and not given to us merely in the representation, as all else is. Here, therefore, lies the datum alone capable of becoming the key to everything else, or, as I have said, the only narrow gateway to truth." (The World as Will and Representation, Volume 2 (1958, The Falcon’s Wing Press) p. 196)

To illustrate a priori knowledge, Schopenhauer says with reference to the law of causality which defines representational knowledge that,

"The only genuine and convincing proof that we are conscious of the law of causality prior to all experience is actually found in the very necessity of making a transition from the sensation of the senses, given only empirically, to its causes, in order that perception of the external world may come about." (Ibid., p.37)

With reference to an actual event, Schopenhauer says,

"For no one will assert that the flying out of the bullet is actually simultaneous with the pressing of the trigger. Therefore not merely the law of causality, but also its relation to time, and the necessity of the succession of cause and effect, are known to us a priori." (Ibid., p. 39)

Schopenhauer is partly correct in both examples, whereby knowledge of the relationship between external stimulus and sensation of sensory receptors or the pulling of the trigger and flying out of the bullet is a priori knowledge (non-experience) rather than a posteriori (experience). What Schopenhauer fails to realize is that his a priori knowledge of the relationship between stimulus and sensation of sensory receptors or the pressing of the trigger and flying of the bullet is based on experience because the fundamental basis for all conscious knowledge is experience or representation, otherwise there is no basis to know something a priori viz., a priori knowledge is contingent on already having representational knowledge. In other words, an individual cannot have non-experienced knowledge simply come to him or her, because there would be no basis for the a priori knowledge. Hence, there is no pure, absolute a priori knowledge as Schopenhauer appears to be implying, which thereby closes his "narrow gate to truth", because whatever knowledge is attained through the gateway of a priori or "immediacy" will be fundamentally defined by representational knowledge.

Also, as pertaining to the notion of whole, it does not follow from the immediate knowledge of will, which we have established as limited a priori knowledge, that the will is the whole of all existing things. All we know is that as a necessity of reason like the bullet flying out of the gun after pulling the trigger, a will is behind all existing things. There is no necessity that the will as thing-in-itself has to be the whole of all existing things.

Now that Schopenhauer has established the will as whole of nature and a priori knowledge, despite their shortcomings, he proceeds down his perceived "narrow gateway to truth", by as you mention the will itself abolishing itself (the phenomenal will), thereby overcoming the duality of subject/object or knower/known, and everything existing becomes an immediate manifestation, "mirror" of the will or thing-in-itself. Or as Schopenhauer says,

"... a way from within stands open to us to that real inner nature of things to which we cannot penetrate from without. It is, so to speak, a subterranean passage, a secret alliance, which, as if by treachery, places us all at once in the fortress, that could not be taken by attack from without. Precisely as such, the thing-in-itself can come into consciousness only quite directly, namely by it itself being conscious of itself." (The World as Will and Representation, Volume 2 (1958, The Falcon’s Wing Press) p. 195)

"phenomenon, determinations, qualities, and modes of existence remain as the inner nature of... the thing-in-itself when it has freely abolished itself as will" (Ibid., p. 198)

subject and object are not quite clearly distinguished... knowledge of the innermost being of the whole of nature, since [the individual] now transfers it to all those phenomena that are given to him..." (The World as Will and Representation, Volume 1, Translator E.F.J. Payne (1969, Dover Publications) p. 109)

To further extrapolate his position, Schopenhauer overcomes the divisions of time, space, and matter by contending with reference to Kant that they are different dimensions, but all in one. So we are left with a "gateway" to truly know who we are, not as the thing-in-itself, but as the "phenomenon, determinations, qualities, or modes of existence" which reflect the inner nature of the will, the thing-in-itself. In other words, every occurrence of existence or event we are conscious of is a reflection of the will itself, because it is the fundamental basis for these events viz., these events would not occur if it were not for the will itself, just as the will itself would not exist if there were no events which reflected it, so the will itself and events are inseparable as in the "vibrating strings to the sound-board" (Ibid., p. 202) But how do we know for certainty what we are conscious of is actually a quality or mode of existence of the will itself? Surely, not everything we think or imagine is equated equally as in form to the will itself? To get around this problem, Schopenhauer using the Platonic notion of idea (gradation of objectivity) which goes from least sufficient reason to the pure objective reason based on the sufficiency of reasons and gradated detachment from individual will. So an individual who is not conscious of him or herself, while being absorbed completely into an object can attain the pure, objective knowledge of the will, and an individual relying on non-scientific reasons can attain the least sufficient knowledge of the will. However, the problem with Schopenhauer’s position of gradation is that there is no pure objective knowledge, because although an individual may not be conscious of himself in the moment of observing an object, he cannot entirely detach himself from his identity, because identity acts as a necessary basis for everything he knows viz., whatever knowledge the individual attains in the moment will be from his individual perspective, and therefore not be purely objective in terms of the will itself. To lose all sense of individual identity is to no longer have consciousness.

Also, it is unclear how objectivity can be the light which allows the "way from within [to] stand open to us to that real inner nature of things to which we cannot penetrate from without". (Ibid., p. 195) Schopenhauer addresses this apparent ambiguity by asserting that the thing-in-itself freely abolishing itself as phenomenal will. But we would be left with a oneness of will in different dimensions of form and yet in all in one viz., all forms emanating from the will itself. Though how does objectivity based on the law of causality correlate to something non-causal? What are the grounds for the connection between reason and will itself? Why is a more sufficient idea of greater objectivity of will than a less sufficient idea? Granted the more sufficient idea is more objective, but it does not follow that objectivity itself necessarily correlates with will itself. If we consider that will itself, or thing-in-itself cannot be known because "being-known of itself contradicts thing-in-itself" (Ibid., p. 198), we have no way of knowing whether what we know actually correlates to the will itself or even that the will itself exists except as an illusion viz., there is no ground to make the connection between objectivity and will itself other than ignorant/blind assumption.

To summarize, Schopenhauer’s theory of world as will and representation comes down to the conception of the thing-in-itself ("whole of nature") in which forms like ourselves exist in different dimensions within the thing-in-itself, but are inherently in oneness with it. So the forms are a reflection, mirror of the thing-in-itself, because they are an dimensional extension of the thing-in-itself, while at the same time an integral part of the thing-in-itself because without the reflection there is no thing-in-itself, just as without the sound-board there is no vibrating strings, or without the splash and turbulence of fallen water, there is no waterfall. It is because of this inherent connection that Schopenhauer thinks true self-knowledge is attainable, but only if the thing-in-itself abolishes the phenomenal will, thereby abolishing the dualism of subject/object and knower/known. Has Schopenhauer truly found a narrow gateway to truth? In general, it appears that Schopenhauer has, but if we examine deeper, we must ask how the thing-in-itself can truly know the forms of itself within itself? The answer is that the forms are on a different dimension than the thing-in-itself, but at the same time in oneness with it. But is this explanation sufficient? Schopenhauer says that there is no causality at the level of the thing-in-itself, and yet how can it truly know the forms of itself through our causal, representational perspective? Schopenhauer turns to the gradation of the sufficiency of reason, and the flawed concept of pure objective knowing, without establishing a connection between reason and objectivity to the thing-in-itself. Sure, according to Schopenhauer the thing-in-itself is the basis for everything existing, but that does not mean that reason or gradated levels of objectivity can be the means for attaining true self-knowledge. If anything since our conscious perspective is representational in nature, and subject to the law of causality, we must conclude that the only connection is that the thing-in-itself is the basis for reason and objectivity like anything else existing. Moreover, the thing-in-itself’s perspective is subject to representation from its relationship to dimensional forms, which can be established by the inexpressibility of the thing-in-itself, and expressibility of the dimensional forms. Further, it does not follow how the thing-in-itself can truly know itself from itself, which means that its knowledge of its dimensional forms cannot truly reflect itself viz., the innermost essence of the dimensional forms is the thing-in-itself, and therefore in order to truly know the forms the thing-in-itself must truly know itself, which would be in contradiction with itself. ("being-known of itself contradicts being-in-itself") Therefore, Schopenhauer has not more reasonably shown that by the thing-in-itself abolishing the phenomenal will, it can attain through reason and objectivity true self-knowledge.

Another fatal shortcoming of Schopenhauer’s theory is the notion of thing-in-itself as the whole of nature, because Schopenhauer can only know from his causal, representational perspective, and therefore for him to assume the existence of an inexpressible entity created ex nihilo is inconsistent with his causal perspective, and therefore, the notion of thing-in-itself ("whole of nature") is less reasonable than an infinite, divisible whole, and more important, Schopenhauer’s perceived "gateway to truth", which is contingent on the thing-in-itself as whole, is more reasonably refuted.

In addition, the notion of the thing-in-itself as a whole eliminates the individual perspective except as a reflective form, so that Schopenhauer’s individual perspective of his theory is in contradiction with his theory viz., the basis for the Schopenhauer’s theory is his individual perspective, but if his individual perspective does not truly exist according to the theory, then his theory does not either.

318. Entry:

Continuation of Entry 188

"You said ‘who we are’ refers to our fundamental level of being...

Well... Being who we are and knowing who we are is the fundamental level of a human's being..."

Nicholas Covelli February 2 2002

Response:

Being who we are and knowing who we are is a fundamental level of being in the sense that being who we are and knowing who we are are dependent on each other viz., barring particular situations like while asleep or as a fetus, we apparently cannot have one without the other, or you say in Entry 188, they are in a "co-existent relationship". However, it does not follow that we have to truly know who we are in order to be who we are. We can meet the dependency requirement by only knowing who we are with limited truth-value.

319. Entry:

Reply to the response to Entry 318

"The proposition states that we cannot truly know who we are, in part or in whole, and be who we are at the same time... If we can meet the dependency requirement by only knowing who we are with limited truth value, then that would mean we are knowing and being ‘in part.’"

Nicholas Covelli February 4 2002

Response:

Yes, we agree that if we can meet the dependency requirement by only knowing with limited truth-value who we are in part, we would [not truly] know and be who we are in part. But that is basically what the proposition is saying viz., all we can more reasonably know of who we are, in part or in whole, is knowledge with limited truth-value. So your challenge if anything reinforces the proposition. However, if you take your challenge to another level, and more reasonably show that we can truly know who we are in part, the proposition would overcome. For example, if you more reasonably show that "your hand made up of four fingers and a thumb" is true part knowledge of who you are, the proposition would be overcome.

Entries 313-315,  Entries 320-321