"This is not my idea but that of Arthur Schopenhauer. And it is the solution to the question raised here.

Knowledge of the following texts by Schopenhauer is assumed and further discussion follows

The World as Will and Representation Vols. I & II
with emphasis on Book IV which is relevant to our discussion
On the Will in Nature
On the Freedom of the Will

To attain the state i.e. to truly know who we are and be who we are at the same time a complete denial of the will is the absolute condition. However such a state would no longer can be called knowledge - a better term would be self realization - the will turning against and abolishing itself in the phenomenon."

Suvas Lakshmikutty January 11 2002

Response:

We agree that to attain the state of truly knowing who we are and being who we are at the same time a complete denial of the will is a necessary condition, whereby ourselves as knower becomes one with what is known. However, it is unclear how such a state or denial of will could be attained, and we know that it has, because we can only know from a position of causality, and by denying the will we deny ourselves as individuals. Buster Price in Entries 306, 308, 310 tries to get around the problem of causality by claiming that a state of non-separation of knower and known can be more reasonably shown by establishing experience registered in memory of the non-separation. Yet the same problem of causality arises from the evaluation of experience whether it is registered in memory or not viz., it does not follow how we can know we had an experience of non-separation of knower and known, because it is beyond our comprehension, so our grounds for thinking so, whether from the moment of experience or following it, is based on an assumption about something we cannot comprehend.

Your approach to the problem of showing the non-separation of knower and known, is "self-realization" in which the will turns against itself by abolishing itself in the phenomenon. What we think you mean is that the will becomes everything, or in the words of Schopenhauer, "the thing-in-itself, [or will] is the content of all phenomenon," which means that everything would fractal the thing-in-itself, and thereby the knower and known would be in union or oneness. Yet if everything is in oneness, it does not follow how we could know anything because we ourselves would not exist. Also, it does not follow how we could know "oneness", and that everything is in oneness. Further, even if the thing-in-itself is innate in everything, it still does not show how we can truly know as in conscious knowledge who we are. Schopenhauer alludes to the self-knowledge problem when he says,

The following thoughts, if they are not too subtle, may help to make clear that the individual is only the phenomenon, not the thing-in-itself. Every individual is, on the one hand, the subject of knowing, i.e., the complemental condition of the possibility of the whole objective world, and, on the other hand, a particular phenomenon of will, the same will which objectifies itself in everything. But this ambiguity of our being does not rest upon a self-existing unity, otherwise we could be conscious of ourselves in ourselves, and independent of the objects of knowledge and will. Now this is simply impossible, for as soon as we turn to ourselves to make the attempt, and seek for once to know ourselves fully by means of introspective reflection, we are lost in a bottomless void; we find ourselves like the crystal ball out of which a voice speaks whose cause is not to be found in it, and wanting to understand ourselves, we grasp, with a shudder, only an insubstantial spectre. (The World as Will and Idea, Abridged in One Volume, (1995, Everyman) Footnote 1 on page 180.)

In this excerpt, Schopenhauer states clearly that ourselves as individuals cannot truly know ourselves, in which he refers to the unavoidable "bottomless void" when any attempt at self-knowledge at an individual level is undertaken.

In another section of ‘The World as Will and Idea’, Schopenhauer points out that our conscious knowledge is epistemically limited by its representational nature, or what he calls "indirect objectivity", and that the only true objectivity comes from the "form" of knowledge. But the form is beyond our comprehension viz., "no form peculiar to knowledge", or as he says in full,

The particular thing that manifests itself in accordance with the principle of sufficient reason is thus only an indirect objectification of the thing-in-itself (which is the will), for between it and the thing-in-itself stands the Idea as the only direct objectivity of the will, in that it has assumed no form peculiar to knowledge as such but that of the idea in general, i.e., the form of being object for a subject. Thus it alone is the most adequate objectivity possible of the will or thing-in-itself; indeed it is the whole thing-in-itself, only under the form of the idea. (Ibid., p. 99.)

Schopenhauer goes on to claim that "the world as mirror of will", and "the world is the will’s self-knowledge", and further, "thus in man the will can attain the full self-consciousness, to distinct and exhaustive knowledge of its own nature as it mirrors itself in the whole world." (Ibid., p. 188.) His reason for claiming the epistemic connection between will and world is that through interaction they are dependent on each other, and that whatever happens in the world is a reflection of the will since it is fundamentally innate in everything. Though it does not necessarily follow that our view of the world is true, accurate. He tries to make this epistemic connection between world and will by claiming that the "Idea" i.e., form of ideas is the "only direct objectivity of the will", so our thoughts that conform most to the Idea and thereby to reason, would accurately capture the world, thus the will as well viz., by knowing the world and how it unfolds, we can know the nature of the will, thereby attain true self-knowledge of ourselves, the will. In other words, through the anchor of form of ideas which is a direct extension of will itself, we would truly know who we are (most sufficient idea (world) --> form of ideas (reason) --> will (thing-in-itself)) and be who we are (will, thing-in-itself) at the same time, and the proposition would be overcome. ("knowledge of [the will’s] own true nature" (Ibid., p. 181.))

For Schopenhauer’s position to more reasonably stand, we need to establish whether Idea is direct objectivity of the will viz., what is the form of ideas? Where does it come from? To answer these questions, we need to look at epistemology and ontology, which takes us to the position and problem that apparently we are the creators of knowledge, and that we cannot create who we are through who we are. (Also, if we maintain that we are the inventors of knowledge, then what we know including the form of ideas would be mere human inventions, thereby separate from the will, while paradoxically the will if we accept Schopenhauer’s position that the will is innate in everything. So either through creation or invention, the form of ideas would not be the direct objectivity of the will.)

Also, it does not follow how Schopenhauer can say that the form of ideas is the only direct objectivity of the will, because he cannot comprehend the will itself, thereby his assertion is based on an assumption about something he cannot comprehend similar to the assertion by Buster Price about his knowledge of the experience of non-separation of knower and known.

Further, the notion of "direct objectivity" does not make sense because we can only know from a representational or indirect standpoint due to our causal perspective which is defined by subject and object. To deny the individual through the oneness of will, would also deny "direct objectivity" because it is also contingent on the subject/object duality.

Further still, since knowledge is apparently in constant flux as new ideas replace old ideas, it does not follow how our imperfect knowledge could mirror as in truth, the will. It appears that the most objective knowledge of the world would have to maintain a true form to correspond to the will itself as absolute truth-value. Though from our perspective a true form of knowledge does not occur. Added to this point, none of our knowledge maintains true form itself due to infinite regress, and therefore it does not make sense how we can say our most objective knowledge truly mirrors the will itself.

In short, for Schopenhauer’s position of "world as mirror of will" to stand up, you need to more reasonably explain Idea as the only direct objectivity of the will. Schopenhauer's explanation that the Idea is "the form of being object for a subject, [and therefore,] it alone is the most adequate objectivity possible of the will", is simply not adequate because due to our causal perspective, Idea is not exclusively an object viz., we could postulate something behind it like our physical bodies, or even will itself from Idea being a product of our creation or invention. He has no ground to say that Idea is created ex nihilo except by blindly asserting it and at the same time contradicting his causal perspective.

314. Entry:

"From the collection of my aphorisms, Fragments: Thoughts of an Anti-Philosopher:

35. The dictum, ‘Know thyself,’ in its original sense could have only had an entirely different meaning than we might assign to it today, for it was not the personal self, the ego, which was called into question here, but the heraldic self.

36. The heraldic denotes the prime necessity and highest value of self. Self-knowledge in this original form is a choosing, a selection, and determination of that which has heraldic significance as against that which possesses a merely ‘personal’ value. Pindar's exhortation, ‘Become what you are!,’ pointing toward the what and not the who, is indicative of a heraldic goal placed over and above life.

37. Self-concealment is never deeper, never more profound, than when we presume to self-knowledge. The old Delphian dictum, ‘Know thyself,’ was even then a trap for the unwary. How many have lost themselves in thinking they had found themselves!’

Being, itself, is never anything more than a question mark. Being is simply that which we always are in the process of becoming, and yet never really are in any finally determinable manner. ‘Being is that which must be, yet never is.’ All else is presumption. Being is an indetermination. Being is freedom. ‘Eternity is the infinitude of the possible.’"

Steve Callihan January 14 2002

Response:

If being itself is never anything more than a question mark, how can you know that being is "simply that which we are always in the process of becoming", or "that which must be, yet never is"?

If eternity is the infinitude of the possible, how can you know that eternity is the infinitude of the possible?

Your position on being itself and eternity is similar to the contradictory skeptical claim that "we know that we cannot know anything" viz., we cannot claim there is nothing we can know from a position of knowing without contradicting ourselves, just as we cannot claim that being itself is a question mark from a position of knowing what being itself is, without contradicting ourselves. The important contention is that if being itself is a question mark, we may know it without knowing that we do, or we may not know it without knowing that we do not, which means that we are left in an empty state of knowing with nothing of absolute truth-value to attach ourselves to and know that we have attached to it.

Also, what value does Pindar’s exhortation "Become what you are!" have, if we more reasonably cannot know what we are?

315. Entry:

In reply to the response to Entry 295

"‘The limit on what we can truly know establishes that we are not claiming knowledge with absolute truth-value,...

I honestly understand that point.

...thereby we avoid the contradiction of claiming we do not truly know anything from a position of truly knowing, while the notion of more reasonableness establishes a relatively objective basis to evaluate entries, whereby entries are evaluated based on their reasons, and not the individual perspectives from which they are asserted.’

Let me sum this up:
-No absolute truth value
-A magical trick called ‘more reasonableness’, which is supposed to be ‘relatively objective’. -Entries evaluated on their reasons (Reasons? What are reasons? Not mine, I'm sure! Who's? Who's? Who's? I'd love to know!!!) and not the individual perspectives from which they are asserted.

You have got to be kidding me! This is no more than a personal perspective, your very own judgment of what is reasonable and what not, disguised in some semi-serious concept called ‘more reasonableness’! Why won't you accept that what you are trying to do is impossible? Trying to create a criterion beyond the individual perspective on the one hand, while claiming at the same time it has no absolute truth value? Then what does it have?

What's more important, the proposition, which was the thing that was to be overcome in the first place, states nothing about ‘more reasonableness’.

But well, if we have to speak about more reasonableness, which in my opinion is just another superfluous complication of matters, since it's just a pretty synonym for the jury's taste. I don't mind that if it were conceded. What's a good reason? I suppose some definition will have to follow here. I don't believe it exists, so what am I to do? This merely to prove to you that your rules already exclude me in their structure! I'm entirely powerless against this. Do remember that I must be a less reasonable person than you. How does your philosophy deal with such people as I? What are we? Not part of your world? Should we be institutionalized, brainwashed, converted? You believe in a ghost that died a long time ago and you don't even know it. Underneath the veils you put up still lurks the absolute you so cleverly hide in ‘more reasonableness’. Give it up!

‘Also, how does the context of ‘different spaces’ add to the proposition, when we have established that anytime we are being who we are we cannot truly know who we are?..’

I was being ironic here

‘You contend that ‘not truly knowing who we are’ poses no practical problem because on an individual level, our identities grow whether we truly know who we are or not. However, if we cannot truly know who we are, in part or in whole, so that what we know of ourselves is not really who we are, it does not follow we can rationally invent an existence out of our identities when we know that they are not really our identities.'

Existence needs no inventing; it takes care of itself.

'Other issues:
It does not follow how the symbolic content of the equation, (1+1=2) is ‘forever static’, because our perspectives are apparently constantly changing at some level.
You quote Harry Mulish, ‘there is only surface’. But does that mean his assertion is only surface as well?!'

YES, YES, THAT IS MY POINT!

‘Also, how does the context of ‘different spaces’ add to the proposition, when we have established that anytime we are being who we are we cannot truly know who we are?’

I was being ironic here..

‘Also, without actual identities, the grounds for law, ethics, morality, society, and science appear to collapse or simply become ‘language-games’ (Wittgenstein).’

Exactly. Merely stating this as if that would make the language game problem vanish is not enough. It is the main problem you face in making this ‘limited reason-thing’ more concrete. How are you going to keep this from being a mere language game? I'm curious. I demand an answer.

‘Further, if our identities are more reasonably shown to be false, it follows with our identities as the center of what we know, that everything else we know will be false as well’.

My identity does not depend on a verbal representation. My identity is THAT which I am. Observe that I implicitly don't know what THAT is and that the question: ‘What is it?’ doesn't enter my version of limited reasonableness.

‘You contend that the option that we could know who we are is excluded by the proposition itself, because we could never stop being and do some knowing at the same time. Yet you overlook that the proposition itself is asserted not as a truth, but as a limited assertion of more reasonableness, and therefore the proposition itself through its epistemic limitedness does include the possibility of knowing who we are’.

And you overlook that my criticism itself is asserted not as a truth, but as a limited assertion of more reasonableness.

‘Hence, your position is self-defeating because the reasons behind your attack from the rear on the proposition (saying something about being who we are even though we do not truly know it) are the same reasons supporting your position of attack (saying something about who you are even though you do not truly know it).)’

Yes, I see the nonsensicalness in my own position, as an integral part, like every electron has spin; do you see the nonsensicalness in yours?
My position isn't yours and your position isn't mine. Show me how you can overcome this in stating more than to declare me ‘Unreasonable within limits’. You claim I couldn't possibly state to not know something, because that would require me to know what I don't know.
You, on your hand, escape this problem by means of ‘limited reasonableness’. I can claim on the exact same grounds that to not know something, because of this limit, is very reasonable indeed. I can criticize your view on the exact same ground; you use the word ‘limit’ as if you could fathom what that means from a limited perspective. I can use your arguments to defend my own just as easily as I can use them to criticize yours! And THAT is where my actual point comes in sight. This IS a language game. The question for me has been more how to overcome that, than to overcome the proposition. This has to be acknowledged I think, to move from there.

Furthermore I'd like to remark that you seem more intent on picking on inconsistencies in my writing, like that joke I made about adding a special component to the proposition than answering the questions I ask you. Therefore I will re-enter parts of my previous letter again:

‘ First you take the option away for searching for an absolute refutation by stating that there is nothing but a ‘limit within more reasonableness’ and then you also take the individual's reason away by stating that this individual can never prove his point, solely by the fact that your individual reason does not concur. This way, all that can ever come out of this, is the establishment of your reason as the limit within more reasonableness that's supposed to stand for everyone. Once again, I have no illusions concerning my version of this limited reason, but you haven't convinced me so far of the fact that you don't either. This limited reason cannot exist beyond the borders of the individual in my point of view and you seem to be claiming that it does. These rules can never be yours and they can never be mine either. So where would we find them? We will never advance beyond a more or less sizable group of kindred spirits. We will never advance beyond a majority in a philosophical parliament.’

And I vote against your idea of reason. That's all I can do, because according to my own reason, even if I convinced you of my point, that would not prove my view to be correct. Your proposition is an absolute itself in the way it is formulated. Don't ask people to refute an absolute by non- absolute means. From your point of view the proposition must be considered unreasonable, precisely for this absolute message. Please listen to this:
We can't truly know who we are and be who we are at the same time.
This is an absolute if I ever saw one. Therefore, it is not reasonable according to your own views.

One final note to clarify my position in all this: No one is winning this, because it would be simply impossible to determine what was won in the end. Claiming to have overcome the proposition is unfathomably equivalent to the claim that it wasn't.
Maybe my approach is slightly negative, but without any negativity nothing ever happens. When you maintain that this competition has genuine essence, I will, for symmetry's sake, claim that it doesn't. Then, together perhaps, we speak a reasonable truth.
This is my truth, and all I'm disputing is your apparent notion that there could be more to this, some sort of a limited, yet very reasonable ‘AT LEAST SOMEWHAT MORE TRUTHYNESS’. I feel that the truth is that this can be done in life as a whole, but not in paper and ink. But that's just and only silly old me. I know. Do you know it's just silly old you?
I think I sometimes sense some form of philosophy behind your words, a belief about what humanity should be focusing on, and what not. I wouldn't be surprised that if this vision were the topic, I would agree a whole lot more with you.
But we're merely discussing an abstract proposition here, prone to subjective interpretation of each and every word in it. And, ladies and gents, this was yet an other interpretation of mine..."

Raoul Starren January 17 2002

Response:

You question the competition on grounds that since there is no absolute truth-value we can know that we know, the determiner of what is more reasonable comes down to "personal opinion", so that the competition is determined on personal grounds rather than objective grounds, which means that the evaluation of entries is nothing more than personal opinion. If you are correct, the exclusiveness of personal opinion would pose a serious problem, and could only be partly resolved through what you call, "a sizable group of kindred spirits" or "a majority in a philosophical parliament", and even then any decision would come down to personal opinion and its quantification.

The solution to the dilemma of personal opinion is to establish a basis upon which all opinions could be judged equally. In our view, that basis is reason viz., conscious meaning, whereby all consciously expressed opinions are necessarily defined by conscious meaning, otherwise there would be no opinion expressed. Even your claim that there is only personal opinion has been reasoned by you at some level.

Now in terms of the concept of more reasonableness, we do not deny that personal opinion at some level defines all human thought, but we also claim that reason viz., conscious meaning, as mentioned, is a commonality of all human thought, and thereby all human thought can be evaluated based on the comparative consistency and soundness of their conscious meanings. However, due to the apparent uncertainty on what we can truly know, reason viz., conscious meaning is something without absolute truth-value, but at the same time, in our view, reason viz., conscious meaning cannot be denied in whatever form or level we wish to define it. This point is the same as trying to deny existence at some level or form while at the same time acknowledging conscious awareness of thoughts; instead in this case, we are aware of thoughts, and in order for us to be aware of them, there must be some form and level of conscious meaning in the thoughts. To deny existence is to deny our conscious awareness; to deny conscious meaning however we define it is to deny our conscious awareness. Both denials lead to contradiction viz., we cannot deny existence and know that we deny existence, just as we cannot deny conscious meaning and still have conscious awareness.

So in terms of the competition, we are left with relative objectivity based on the comparison of conscious meanings in order to evaluate personal opinions on the issue of whether or not we can more reasonably truly know who we are.

For you to argue that this relative objective evaluation is no more than a "language-game" is correct in one sense, and yet in another, it is incorrect because of the commonality of conscious meaning in all human thought viz., even your language-game argument is defined by reason, conscious meaning at some level.

Is there a more objective way to evaluate the entries than judging them based on their comparative consistency and soundness? The quantification of opinion as in majority decide does not necessarily result in the best reasons for a decision. Perhaps, you think no evaluation is necessary, and yet your position is contradicted because you rely on your own reasons for your opinion. (Note, an in-depth analysis of more reasonableness with many examples, will be coming out in a book entitled, "The Critique of More Reasonableness, A Method to End Partiality" by S.Garvey, in the autumn of 2002.)

Turning to another issue, we disagree that the proposition as defined is an "absolute itself", because "we cannot truly know" is not a statement implying absolute truth-value, but a statement implying more reasonable reasons for not truly knowing, or in other terms, the more consistent and sound reasons for not truly knowing. Maybe you view the core of the proposition, "we cannot truly know who we are" with absolute truth-value, but since possibility precedes impossibility, we do not think your view, in terms of more reasonableness, stands viz., it is more reasonable that it is possible that we can truly know who we are than it is impossible that we can truly know who we are.

Also, we agree that there will be no absolute winner of the competition, whether for or against the proposition, but there will be a winner in terms of the most reasonable position within the time-frame of the competition. What value will this winning position have? We think a lot of value considering that reason at some level and form defines all human thought. If you doubt that the proposition can be overcome on more reasonable grounds, we suggest you take a close look at Entry 313, in which Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) has come very close to overcoming the proposition.

Entries 309-312 Entries 316-319