Reply to the response to Entry 305

"I am well aware of ‘inherent inconsistency and contradiction’ which renders an argument invalid. Such can be used for example to show, in contrast to some other entries, that many of the doctrines in the 'scriptures', and the scriptures themselves, for example, and not given by God, because an all-knowing God cannot for example, ‘change his Mind’ as claimed in the Bible, and the scriptures, if written by God, cannot contradict themselves on matters of importance, as also occurs many times in the Bible. Such is also the history of Christianity's demise in western thought. Examples of contradiction include the claim that Christians will never ‘be let out of his hand’, (Gospel of St. John) yet they can lose their salvation, (Hebrews 6), with the ‘dog returning to his vomit’ (one of the Peter epistles-my religious days were a long time ago). The authors of the holy scriptures themselves disagreed with each other at times, which means they can't be the 'inerrant word of God'. There are many contradictions in the scriptures, which render many ‘doctrines’ a human contrivance. The word 'trinity' for example, isn't even in the Bible-this was an invention of later Roman versions of Christianity. There is no 'mystery' about the trinity, the only mystery is why 'Christians' still swallow it. 'God the Father' is mammalian need for paternal guidance, 'God the Son' is a mammalian need for a leader of the tribe (the same occurs in social animals like horses and dogs), and 'God the Holy Spirit' is probably an evolved mind-set of religion which they misconstrue to be associated with 'God'. The 'Holy Mother of God' is mammalian need for maternal guidance, which they couldn't quite fit into the 'trinity', especially in a male-dominated religion. Christianity's 3-headed god and associated religion isn't all that different from the multi-headed gods of other cultures, it just uses more sophisticated language.

The scriptures themselves have also been heavily doctored, but the Romans didn't quite get rid of all the contradictions in the scriptures, and so many remain. The only 'mystery' is how some 'thinking Christians' can't see them. Why does all of it have to come from God? What about in the Old Testament where God gives instructions on how to rape women, and how to kill and murder members of other tribes, and/or those who don't follow restrictive laws (e.g. through terrorism)? Isn't it possible that people made these doctrines/views up (including the resurrection of the great mammalian leader) and then claimed it came from God to justify their tribal/political agendas?

Anyway I digress after reading some other, non-critical assumptions about 'Christianity', here and elsewhere. True, contradiction would render my argument invalid. But I think there is something else to consider. What is inherent inconsistency and contradiction? I suspect that the problem may lie with our minds construction of contradiction, not contradiction itself.

Put it this way: it is clear that our senses can deceive us. We have 'blind spots', for example in our eyes, and there are many graphical-visual tests which make one see things that aren't there, and not see things that are. It is the way our senses have been engineered. I suspect, unlike the inexpressible committee, that it is little different to our minds. We are pre-programmed to understand things from one perspective, and not another. Various modules exist in our minds which, when used, can only understand part of any argument. To understand further, one needs to dissociate oneself from one 'module' of thought, and activate another, to be able to look more clearly at the big picture. It is this continual review and doubt and reflection which enables us to gain a better view on things. But at the end of the day, I'm not sure whether our minds can ever come to a view of the real world as it wholly is, perhaps partly due to a pre-programmed need to construct and categorize. A pre-programmed division and apparent contradiction, which may not exist. I think it is possible for example, that there is no contradiction in the view of indivisible continuum, and 'divisible being' (me), in the same way as there is no contradiction between the wave and particle nature of light, and the space-time continuum. It is perhaps our minds which simply can't break this barrier, not 'apparent contradiction' which is the problem. If this is so, the proposition can only be overcome, perhaps, by rejecting part of what our 'reason' is telling us. One needs to assume a fault in our reasoning, or perhaps a fundamental limit in the ability of our evolved reason to determine reality. The alternative, that human reasoning is not faulty, and that our brains are rather good at determining reality through reason, is not all that well supported by several lines of evidence including the history of science and philosophy, and studies on the brain, for example.

I assume that our reasoning abilities are insufficient when it comes to 'indivisible continuum', and that there is no distinction between knowledge-being, at some 'point' (a bad word, but our language itself appears limited to constructed division/category). I also assume that at some point we can 'know' and 'be' on the apparently contradictory, indivisible-divisible continuum. I exist, but not as an island. I am inextricably part of a greater whole. The 'greater whole' could be the gene pool/genome, knowledge as form, or even an eternal deity, or all of them, inextricably indivisible, and yet divisible in our minds.

These sorts of statements are no less strange, for example, than saying that light is both a particle and a wave, and although one philosopher I know thinks there is some kind of virtual 'wave packet' operating, while another thinks there is something wrong with the experiments, I remain skeptical. Maybe our minds simply haven't evolved to understand the wholeness of certain things, which may appear to our 'reason' as contradictory."

eif December 10 2001

Response:

Just because human reasoning apparently cannot determine so-called reality and we know that it has, does not necessarily mean that human reasoning is "faulty", because fault implies a mistake or defection, which could not have occurred. Is it more reasonable to say human reasoning could have evolved to truly determine reality and we know that it has, than human reasoning could not have evolved to truly determine reality? We have no way of truly answering this question because all we can know is from our limited perspective. (i.e. we have no evidence or example of truly determining reality, so we have no way of saying the true determination of reality is probable.) Hence, based on this point, we say it is less reasonable that our evolved human reasoning is faulty (or more reasonable that human reasoning is not faulty). Though we face a number of other issues like is human reasoning something that evolves, or is it only our knowledge which evolves through accumulation, and is there a true reality that could ever be known and we know that it has whether through human reasoning or any other way?

We agree that it is possible that there is no contradiction with the view of indivisible continuum and divisible being, but as long as we can only know from our epistemically limited perspective, there is no way of showing that the non-contradiction of indivisible continuum and divisible being is probable. To simply accept that there is no contradiction based on blind faith in the assumed faultiness of human reasoning, thereby our assumed inability to fully understand the reality we already know, would leave anything open to being accepted as reality. Therefore, we think that "rejecting part of our reason" in order to make way for blind faith is a less reasonable solution to the proposition.

You claim that you are part of a "greater whole" which is "inextricably indivisible". Yet it is unclear to us why you claim the greater whole has to be indivisible? This question leads back to a question in our response to Entry 305, namely how can an indivisible whole, thereby state of static oneness, be a basis for existence?
Moreover, why does there have to be an indivisible, greater whole for there to be existence? If we follow your reasoning through, anything we know through our "faulty" reasoning must be faulty as well, including your view of indivisible continuum viz., greater whole.

In summary, we agree that the epistemic limitation of human reasoning appears to be a "barrier" preventing us from truly knowing who we are, without considering if truly knowing who we are is even probable with no barrier. However, to side-step the epistemic limitation of reasoning and assert contradictory things as truth/reality would leave impulse or instinct as the sole basis for human understanding, so that anything we claim depending on how we feel could be justifiable as truth/reality. It appears to us that the more reasonable approach is to accept the epistemic limitation of human reasoning instead of side-stepping it, and to more reasonably prove things; and in this sense, we think that your view of the non-contradiction of indivisible continuum and divisible being due to the faultiness of human reasoning, falls short--there is no way of knowing human reasoning is faulty since human reasoning is all we can know, and if human reasoning is faulty, it follows that your view of the non-contradiction of indivisible continuum and divisible being is as well.

310. Entry:

Reply to the response to Entry 308

"Since we agree on one thing, namely, the first sentence in your response to my entry 306, ‘We agree that one way to overcome the proposition is to establish that there is no separation between the knower and known,’ the dispute between us boils down to whether or not it can be established. What I offer derives from experience. Your response has boiled down to attempts to show that what I offer is impossible. Your position is that such an occurrence can not be registered in memory for reflection upon, and ‘even if it could, it does not necessarily follow that what the experience refers to really occurred.’ You must deny the possibility of my experience for if the possibility is admitted, the proposition is, in your own words, overcome. My thesis here is that my offering is outside your system and that you are limited to responses from within your system because such an offer is still hypothetical to you. Let me make that clear by responding to the particulars you offer.

You stated: In other words, how can we know we actually experience the non-separation of knower and known, when the non-separation of knower and known is apparently beyond our comprehension because it refers to a state of conscious oneness?!

As I have stated in my entry and my reply to your first response, the experience is registered in memory and is capable of being reflected upon. That is the fact as I know it.

You stated: You appear to side-step this problem, without realizing that experience being a conscious phenomenon, is tied to what we know. (i.e. we can only experience what we are capable of knowing, otherwise we have no way of knowing we had the experience.)

In other words, we can only experience what we are capable of knowing that we experienced. However, there is the question of what one can know. Because I can know only what I know does not preclude the possibility that there are things I do not know that I can come to know. To deny such a possibility is again unreasonable.

You stated: We cannot remember the unity of knower and known because it is something we cannot comprehend. All we can remember is the experience of ourselves thinking that we had an experience of union of knower and known, without really knowing that we did. Therefore, even if experience is registered in memory, it does not necessarily follow that what the experience refers to really occurred.

You begin by saying, in effect, that to remember is to comprehend. Such a definition does not leave room for insight, as your above definition did not leave room for the possibility of learning more through experience. You have made the same argument using different terms. But that aside, I can only say that the next statement, to wit, ‘All we can remember is the experience of ourselves thinking that we had an experience of union of knower and known, without really knowing that we did,’ says to me that all we can do is remember that we remembered, piling up layers of remembering instead of remembering the occurrence each time. Let's look more closely at that claim.

It effectively places a block that prevents a direct reflection upon the register of memory, allowing you to say that ‘even if experience is registered in memory, it does not necessarily follow that what the experience refers to really occurred.’ The difficulty with your block is that a memory that includes the thought present with the reflection upon an experience must be related to the experience being reflected upon. Why, then, in the second reflection upon the thought present in the first reflection has the thought been annulled? In effect, you are saying, when applying the block, ‘That could not have been what I thought it was.’ That does not deny the occurrence. All it says is that the occurrence is beyond knowing, which belies your statement to the effect that ‘we can only experience what we are capable of knowing.’

You stated: What you overlook is that even though the experience appears to have occurred at some level and in some form because it is registered in memory, it does not follow as mentioned that what the experience refers to actually occurred, and that the notions of ‘registered in memory’ and ‘unity of knower and known’ or an experience retrieved from our memory, as examples, are subject to infinite regress no different from any other thought.

Again, you take your fall back position, to wit, even if it were to have been registered in memory, it is not what I claim it to be. However, I want to address the notion of infinite regress here, since one of your arguments in the response to 306 was as follows:

You stated: So based on your initial observation alone from a position of more reasonableness, it appears that the proposition is valid, because we would always be a step behind consciously experiencing the union of the knower and known. This point is similar to Laon Shelley's comment in Entry 296 that we cannot truly know who we are, because as soon as we think we do, we cease to. (i.e. the new knowledge of who we are becomes part of what we are, so that we always end up a step behind or in a state of ‘recursive reflexivity’. For instance, John says, ‘I am’ and if Johns knows that he knows he is, he would become ‘I am that knows I am’ which adds additional knowledge to who John is, so that he never ends up truly knowing who he is in the moment--I am that knows I am, that knows I am, that knows I am ad infinitum.

Even though the experience of not-knowing can not be known during the experience, and can only be known after the fact, the experience of not-knowing effectively stops the infinite regress in its tracks. With the experience of not knowing who I am registered in memory, each reflection contains, as the bottom line, that same experience. No regress is possible, and, in fact, the act of reflection upon the self is revealed as it is being done, and since it goes nowhere, comes to an end. This is my experience with it. It is a process that can only be known in knowing it. And this segues rather neatly to your final statement.

You stated: In short, you merely claim that an experience of non-separation of knower and known shows that we can truly know who we are, without showing why the experience should be believed other than that it is registered in our memory.

Since you do not know what I am talking about, you have no way of knowing what I am talking about. Your use of the term 'merely' shows that you can only dismiss my offer as hypothetical, for you can not adequately argue against that which you do not know. In short, I see you as having run out of arguments against my position in that you have ended in your fallback position, where you summarize your argument to the effect that even if it did happen, it should not be believed as happening because it can't happen. It does strike me as somewhat ironic in that the only way that you can deny the possibility of what I offer is to believe that what you know is gospel."

Buster Price December 16 2001

Response:

You claim that if the possibility of your experience of non-separation of knower and known is conceded, then the proposition is overcome. Yet how is the mere possibility of something enough to overcome the proposition?! If that is the case, the proposition has been overcome long ago by, for example, Curtis Wilbur in Entry 24 who argues that there are mirror neural sites which allow individuals to know who they are, or Robert Burnier in Entry 25 who says that being is inherent in knowing viz., there is no separation between them. Or someone could simply assert that they truly know who they are because that is what they feel, and therefore on grounds that the feeling may be true, the proposition is overcome. However, the competition is not asking to show the mere possibility of truly knowing who we are, but to show the more probability (or reasonability) of truly knowing who we are over not doing so. Therefore, your claim that you have an experience registered in memory of truly knowing who you are, and even though you cannot confirm with certainty that the experience as you interpreted it actually took place, you know it is possible viz., you may truly know something without truly knowing that you do, or you may come to truly know something that you truly do not know, is not enough to overcome the proposition. You must take your position further by showing how it is more reasonable than antagonistic positions. So far you have made several arguments in this regard:

You claim that because your experience is directly exclusive to yourself, it is outside of our system of analysis, and therefore by establishing the occurrence of the experience and your interpretation of it as an instance of truly know who you are, the proposition is overcome. The problem with this position is that even though your experience is directly exclusive to you, what you say about it is not viz., the reasons you give for claiming that your experience is an instance of truly knowing who you are. In other words, saying that you had an experience of truly knowing who you are is not enough; you must explain how you know that you had the experience. The mere existence of an experience registered in your memory, and thereby proof of its occurrence, is not enough to show that your experience is actually an instance of truly knowing who you are.

To take your argument further, you argue that the initial thought about the experience when it occurred, "must be related to the experience". We do not deny this relationship. However, a mere relation between the thought about the experience and the experience itself does not necessarily show that the thought truly captures the experience. To get around this problem, you argue that the initial thought is somehow inherently part of the experience, whereby "[the experience of truly knowing who you are] is a process that can only be known in knowing it". In other words, you appear to be saying that your experience of truly knowing who you are occurs simultaneously with your thought that you truly know who you are through the experience. Though it does not follow how you can know something simultaneously with its occurrence viz., there must be a gap or separation no matter how small (i.e. a millisecond) to allow you to process what you think you know, otherwise you have no basis to know something. This necessary gap or separation between the object of knowledge and the processing of knowledge about it, takes us back to the "block" or the question of what grounds you have to believe that your experience is an instance of truly knowing who you are, especially considering that you cannot comprehend a state of non-separation of knower and known?! We are left with your assumption that you had an experience of truly knowing who you are based solely on an experience you had, and despite that you cannot comprehend what you think you had. Though we concede the possibility that your assumption may be correct, it does not follow what grounds you have to make the assumption when you cannot comprehend what you are assuming. Your assumption becomes an instinctual assertion or baseless hunch.

To help solidify your position, you contend that it is not subject to infinite regress because experience registered in memory is a "bottom line" viz., any reflection upon an experience contains the experience itself as a bottom line. In other words, you appear to be claiming that an experience registered in memory is a concrete thing that can only be reflected upon without actually changing the registered experience. However, what you overlook is that we apparently cannot get outside of our minds, so all we can know is what we know, which means that we can only know an experience registered in memory through reflection. Therefore, what we know the registered experience as, is based on our interpretation which takes us back to the occurrence of the experience and our initial interpretation. It is this interpretation, or any other, which defines the experience registered in memory, and since our interpretation does not have absolute truth-value, it will cause the registered experience to be subject to infinite regress. There is no registered experience we can know without having an interpretation of it, and therefore it follows that experience registered in memory is subject to infinite regress. Though as in our response to Entry 308, to make our point we could only focus on the concept of "experience registered in memory". (You appear to be assuming that experience registered in memory is something with absolute truth-value, without explaining how?)

In short, without more reasonably showing the simultaneousness of experience and initial thought, and the non-application of infinite regress to experience registered in memory, or maintaining the exclusiveness of your experience from an evaluative standpoint, and while only establishing the possibility of your experience, all you have shown is that you assume that you had an experience of truly knowing who you are, without truly knowing that you had, and to make matters worse, your assumption is based on assuming something you cannot comprehend, and for these reasons, your position as it stands does not overcome the proposition.

311. Entry:

"The only way to know who we are is to be who we are. In being we know. So the beginning of knowing is in being. The totality of who we are may or may not be known, and unless we are the creators of our beingness we can not know who we are. If we are the creators of our beingness than we do know."

June Plaice December 21 2001

Response:

We agree that we must be who we are, whatever that may be, in order to know who we are viz., if we are not being who we are, then apparently there is no who we are to know, nor is there a basis to know. (i.e. to know is not something in and of itself, but through the process of being.) However, by establishing the origin of knowing in being, does not tell us in what sense we know.

If you are correct that we can only know who we are in entirety by being the creators of our beingness, then we cannot completely know who we are, because the notion of being the creators of our existence or beingness, implies that we must exist prior to the creation of our existence, and yet we only exist after our creation. To overcome this contradiction, you need to tell us how we can be the creators of our beingness while at the same time be dependent on our beingness for existence? (Are you implying that we may exist in a form devoid of beingness? If so, how can we recreate ourselves?) Though we even question the notion of "creator" because the concept implies something produced out of nothing which is beyond our causal perspective.

312. Entry:

"The proposition can be overcome if one assumes a certain emergent property occurs in the human mind, perhaps but not necessarily, recently evolved. This 'emergent property' transcends our evolved reason, and the brains sense of self-awareness, as the brain becomes transfixed and overcome by a newly created reality. 'Who we are', is transcended entirely, because the relationship between the brain's or soul's 'being' and its 'knowledge', and/or the constructed 'self', becomes distorted to the point of non-existence. That is, the brain ceases to function as a modem of self-awareness, and becomes a transcended wholeness by an 'emergent' property of consciousness.

Chemical molecules for example, display a similar 'transcendence' of structure, whereby the joining together of two entirely different 'atoms' transcend the original properties and structure of the original, as in the molecule water, for example. The properties of water cannot be predicted by the properties of hydrogen and oxygen which make it up, because the emergent properties of H2O do not relate to the former properties of H2 and O, on their own. And once the two are joined, 'who they are' becomes changed, the former O2 and H no longer exists structurally, or otherwise, they are only H2O.

Now the important point here is that 'knowledge' becomes contemporaneous with 'who we are' under emergence/transcendence, because 'who we are', whatever this may be, in original form ceases to be (?the self as constructed by the brain). The emergence of the indivisible whole, thus creates a null distinction between knowledge and who we are. To know (now an emergent property) has become 'who we are', and does not relate structurally to the former 'being' and 'knowledge'. The two are one, and therefore the proposition is overcome.

Both reason and the senses in this emergence are also null and void. The brain no longer resides in this capacity of self-awareness. Awareness only, has become existence, but not through the senses or reason. It is an independent property of the emergent consciousness. It is this independence which allows the proposition to be overcome, because the former structural relations in our 'being' have become void, through emergence."

eif December 29 2001

Response:

We do not deny the emergent nature of things viz., some things are emerging beyond our comprehension. However, it is unclear to us how you can isolate human consciousness, and then based on its emergent property say that the distinction between who we are and knowledge is nullified or the proposition is overcome. Also, it is unclear to us how you can more reasonably equate emergent property with "indivisible whole".

You argue that there is an indivisible whole which is the emergent property, and from there you argue that human consciousness is defined by emergence, and since the fundamental basis for consciousness is outside of ourselves viz., an indivisible whole, who we are and knowledge are dissolved into the whole. Yet what grounds do you have to say that indivisible whole is the basis for the emergence of human consciousness? Why not divisible whole instead of indivisible whole?

How can the individual be separated and even eliminated from the indivisible whole, and there still be an emerging consciousness? (We assume that you view all aspects of human existence as defined by emergence at some level.)

We come back to the problem from Entry 305, in which it does not follow how an indivisible whole or state of oneness can be dynamic or emergent, unless there is something separate from the whole. Even then we are still left with the problem of how an emergent consciousness could even exist in an indivisible whole. It appears what you are really saying is that there is a divisible whole which is the fundamental basis for emergence. Though the notion of divisible whole does not nullify the distinction between who we are and knowledge, because who we are would be part of the fundamental basis for emergence.

In summary, for your challenge to be successful you need to establish a logical necessity for indivisible whole, and deal with the resulting contradiction from you knowing that there is an indivisible whole while at the same time knowing that you do not exist. If we look at the origin of things, it does not follow that there has to be a starting point, and if anything based on the causal nature of our perspectives, something must come from something else, which would contradict the notions of indivisible whole and divisible whole. We would be left with a divisible infinity.

Entries 307-308,  Entries 313-315