"In few words the proposition states in the simplest form that our existence is in the process of growth of realization of who we are or we become static and absorbed in material conditions which reduces us to nothing yet existing. The essence and the beauty of life lies from this process/journey of self realization which conform purpose of our existence and connectivity with other entities. Reason is part of the tools to take oneself to better understanding of oneself BUT reasons alone are not complete tools for one's journey, that is where faith comes in to guide one through."

Malcolm Nxele November 26 2001

Response:

What is it about reason as a tool, among other tools, which allows an individual to attain a "better understanding" of him or herself? If we more reasonably cannot truly know who we are, how can it be said that there is a progressive attainment of self-knowledge except from our limited perspective? What can progressive self-knowledge be worth, since it is not truly who we are? It appears that the notion of progressive self-knowledge, or attainment of better understanding of oneself, is an illusion or simply part of a language-game.

How can faith be separated from reason, when faith as a conscious phenomenon, requires some level of reasoning? Perhaps by asserting that faith is our fundamental guide, you are distinguishing faith asserted through unformalized reasons (guide) from faith asserted through formalized or scientific reasons (non-guide). (i.e. since formalized reasons apparently do not have absolute truth-value, they cannot replace unformalized reasons as our fundamental guide.)

304. Entry:

‘we cannot truly know who we are and be who we are at the same time’

"--the opposite (not contrapositive) 'we CAN truly know who we are and be who we are at the same time' is what we want to find valid.

(In my view, I sense that the author of this 'conundrum' might indeed have a ‘point to prove’ and may be considering this problem 'solved' already, without having necessarily considered *all* possible solutions.

as the former (and now deceased) head coach of the varsity men's basketball team at NC State University once said ‘Never give up!... Don't EVER give up.’)

anyway, here goes--
-----------------------------------------
NECESSARY PREDEFINED TERMS:

1) ‘We cannot know’: our ability to refute or prove a proposition, within the limits of what we know, by more reasonably contradicting our use of reason than not doing so. For further explanation, and explanation of ‘know’, see ‘we cannot know’ and ‘know’.

2) ‘Who we are’: the fundamental level of our being from our limited perspective. For further explanation see who we are.

3) ‘Be’: the state of living or existing with who we are as the basis.

4) ‘Existence’: things and life-forms occupying space.

5) ‘Truly know’: more reasonably showing how we can know something in entirety.

6) ‘We’: the individuals who make up humankind.

7) ‘Overcome’: our ability as individuals to more reasonably refute the proposition, ‘we cannot truly know who we are and be who we are at the same time’, than reasonably supporting it. ‘More reasonably refute’ entails using reason in the most objective manner possible, and includes the arguments stated in the entries and disputes submitted to the ‘Challenge the Philosophy’ competition, and the arguments stated in the responses to them. Also, one idea is deemed more reasonable than another idea if it is more consistent and sound. (Overcoming the proposition can entail more reasonably refuting its terms and the concepts behind them.)

--
(I first must suggest that there is an ‘overlap’ of PREDEFINED TERMS w/ regard to 1) & 5) which happen to comprise possibly *the* most vital portion of the claim (‘we cannot truly know-’). since ‘truly know’ seems to take predicating precedence over either ‘we cannot know’, or even ‘know’--terms of which one is referred to for ‘further explanation’--I will utilize the term (without contest default I would hope) ‘truly know’ which is listed #5 on the list including ‘Definitions of principal terms used in the competition’ (e.g.--IF ‘truly know’ keys with '*essential* knowledge/’essentially know’' THEN I would make note of the term ‘essence’...

(essence as defined by Merriam-Webster's (on-line) Collegiate Dictionary:

--------------------- es·sence
Pronunciation: 'e-s&n(t)s
Function: noun
Etymology: Middle English, from Middle French & Latin; Middle French, from Latin essentia, from esse to be -- more at IS
Date: 14th century
1 a : the permanent as contrasted with the accidental element of being b : the individual, real, or ultimate nature of a thing especially as opposed to its existence
c : the properties or attributes by means of which something can be placed in its proper class or identified as being what it is
2 : something that exists : ENTITY
3 a (1) : a volatile substance or constituent (as of perfume) (2) : a constituent or derivative possessing the special qualities (as of a plant or drug) in concentrated form; also : a preparation of such an essence or a synthetic substitute b : ODOR, PERFUME
4 : one that possesses or exhibits a quality in abundance as if in concentrated form
- in essence : in or by its very nature : ESSENTIALLY, BASICALLY - of the essence : of the utmost importance

(with attention being given to definitions 1 & 4)
------------------------------

--further, since what can be referred to simply as ‘isness’, I propose that ONLY the characteristic nature of any 'thing' is the entailment of essence (I do not want get all into Plato and stuff, so I digress, hopefully with there being at least some understanding, on my part, of all terms being used, and on the part of IP with regard to my understanding and position as a contestant overall)

(As well, it would seem that certain ‘limitations’--based on personal understanding??--have been placed on certain definitions (like #2 and #6 on the IP list of principle term definitions). some can be ‘expanded’ in ways. as I consider myself an ‘absolutist’, I might be inclined to utilize (much) different definitions, even considering that our sentient scope is apparently limited to a certain degree... but I’ll work with what you give me.)

with that said--
----------------------------- THAT ‘we cannot truly know who we are and be who we are at the same time’ has some primary implications:

1) we are EITHER a 'definitive' (vis-à-vis, absolutely (finitely) definable) entity ((P); ‘... *we* cannot... be who *we are*...’) OR NOT (P v ~P). IF ~P, THEN we should be considered ‘absolutely (infinitely) undefinable’ (or better yet, ‘truly NOT know(able)’) and we really shouldn't worry about it because there's nothing we can do about it anyway.

2) ’to know’ IS NOT EQUAL TO ‘to be’; this idea, with the help of the definitions list, seems to undergird the proposition.

3) 'IT IS NOT POSSIBLE that (we can) ‘'(truly) know' (who we are)’ (Q1) AND ‘'be' (who we are)’(Q2) ( ~(Q1 & Q2)) (condition: *simultaneity* of incidence). ONLY IF Q1-TRUE AND Q2-TRUE THEN is it that ‘WE CAN truly know who we are and be who we are (at the same time)’.

All other values for Q1 AND Q2 draw out the contrary positions that ‘WE CANNOT truly know who we are AND be who we are at same time’--*especially* if both premises run False. apparently, IF we CAN ‘truly know’ but CANNOT ‘be’, or IF we CANNOT truly know but CAN be, we cannot truly know who we are and be who we are).
------------------------------------------------

with ‘be(ing)’ defined as ‘the state of living or existing with who we are as the basis’, as we swap out the ‘who we are’ portion with its predefine, we get as a definition for be(ing):

‘the state of living or existing with [the fundamental level of our being from our limited perspective] as the basis’

--there develops a nasty bit of 'recursion' do to the fact that A PREDEFINED TERM IS BEING USED INSIDE OF A DEFINITION OF ITSELF (!--theories of infinitude/consciousness anyone?)

such that we get as a new definition for 'be(ing)':

a. ’the state of living or existing with [the fundamental level of our {being} from our limited perspective] as the basis’

b. ’the state of living or existing with [the fundamental level of our {‘the state of living or existing with [the fundamental level of our {‘the state of living or existing with [the fundamental level of our {‘the state of living or existing with [the fundamental level of our {...} from our limited perspective] as the basis’} from our limited perspective] as the basis’} from our limited perspective] as the basis’} from our limited perspective] as the basis’

right down that deep, dark hole of the 'self'... yet, as if by *magik* to emerge at the signifying predicate of ‘as the basis’.

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

CONCLUSION:

At this point, I am going to just cut to the chase and suggest that such a ‘phenomenon’--as that of ‘knowing who I am WHILE being who I am’--would appear to be achievable ONLY if we come to accept the inherent PARADOX of such a circumstance as

*MEETING WITH YOURSELF AND BEING FULLY UNDER-STANDING OF YOUR ENTIRE SELF*

To overcome such a proposition that ‘we cannot truly know who we are and be who we are at the same time’ is possible IFF there is what I would call a ‘continuum of being’, whereby *us* in the smallest can join with *us* the Grandest/Most Absolute. quite frankly, this is a visualization exercise which can make one want to cry and throw their hands up in mind-tweaked awe and frustration.

THE COUNTER-PROPOSITION: we CAN truly know who we are and be who we are at the same time.

Principally speaking, we should be able to take things in space-time and cram them into themselves. though I don't know if we can cram ALL of some thing into itself. this would be a very ideal compression ratio however--it can either be 100% or infinite (for instance, last I checked, some suppose that particles can escape/eject from black holes).

So say I am a 100% (absolute-finite) being: I have a certain ‘number’ of components that I would have to account for. assuming that all my parts are *real* (‘mind’ and all) and can be accounted for, it is possible that I could get to know/be myself.

But if I am absolute-infinite, I may not even begin to be able to comprehend myself.

Using something like the ‘Ideal Gas Law’ which says that an ideal gas is one in which all *molecules* are an 'infinite' distance away from each other particle (this would, of course, cause for there to be 'no interactive force' between any of the molecules: inertia), I suppose that having the self undergo this sort of ‘dissolution- resolution’, whereby you don't really dissolve totally-- your being just spreads out with an unimaginable breadth...and then, at once, compactify... (... oh, and then there's the idea that the point of ‘all knowing/knowledge’ might well involve simply that of all ‘perspectives’. Imagine knowing *everything*. ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

As well, who we *truly* (in essence) are has yet to be decided."

Kenny Snyder November 28 2001

Response:

You have raised several challenges to the proposition which we will address:

1. You claim that recursion occurs in the proposition because one of the predefined terms, "be" is being used inside the definition of itself viz., "be" refers to the state of living or existing with [the fundamental level of {being} from our limited perspective] as the basis. What you are overlooking is that "be" refers to a state of existence (existing), whereas "being" refers to an actual entity which has been defined as "essence, life-force".

2. Even if there is a "continuum of being", whereby who we are in entirety is fractal in every aspect of ourselves, it does not follow how we can truly know who we are because the composition of who we are as in "continuum of being" does not necessarily equate with us having true knowledge of who we are. Also, what grounds are there for the fractal of who we are in entirety? How is it feasible for the change in one aspect of ourselves, like a new thought passing through our minds, corresponding exactly with the change in another aspect of ourselves, like our toenail, so that we are not made up of parts, but an indivisible whole? If we are an indivisible whole, how can we truly know who we are through who we are?
Further, to claim that what we know itself is in fractal oneness with whoever we are, does not explain how we can truly know who we are.

3. We agree that if we are 100% (absolute-finite) beings, it is possible we could account for every aspect of ourselves. Though we contend that it is improbable due to the large number of components that comprise our physical selves, not to mention the change in them through interaction, or as Laon Shelley in Entry 296 says,

"Truly know who we are’ must at least involve complete physical knowledge, for example of all our bodily systems, endocrine, muscular, central nervous, digestive, and many other systems, plus their complex interactions; and yet that relatively observable knowledge is beyond the capacity of any doctor, or indeed of the whole of medical science. Then add the necessity, to attain the standard implied by ‘truly’, to also know every aspect of our own personalities, all our memories, all our intellectual capacities, all of our hopes and fears and shames and secrets and drives and so on, including - which is surely a contradiction and therefore impossible - knowing the mental events and capacities we are not conscious of. If that is not impossible enough for you (and its impossibility is quite clear to me), then remember that ‘truly knowing’ ourselves must also involve knowing those extraordinary and crucially important things that the particles we are made of at the sub-atomic level."

If Shelley’s point is not enough, it does not follow how we could know the exact nature/composition of each neuron in our brains, while account exactly for the interactive changes in them. (Steve Burwen in Entry 209 notes that "a single human brain contains [approximately] 12 trillion neurons, which are connected to anywhere from 3,000 to 100,000 other neurons.")

4. We agree that the point of all knowing/knowledge may involve that of all "perspectives". However, involvement of all perspectives in knowing does not necessarily equate with truly knowing every aspect of ourselves. What it appears to mean is that what we know at a particular moment is a reflection of everything else we know.

5. The proposed compactification of self or being through the process of "dissolution--resolution" does not explain how we can truly know the self or being.

Other issues:

We agree that there is an overlap in the predefined terms. To eliminate this repetition, we have deleted the definition of "truly know", and redefined "we cannot truly know" to "our inability to more reasonably show how we can know something in entirety."

Also, to further clarify some of the terms, as you hinted at, we have redefined the following terms:

"Who we are" to "the entire make-up of ourselves as human beings, including the fundamental level of our being (viz., essence, life-force) from our limited perspective."

"Be" to "the state of living or existing with who we are, as in fundamental level of being (viz., essence, life-force), as the basis."

"We" to "all Homo sapiens who are existing, regardless of level of functionality."

Note, to attain greater clarity, we have added a phrase to the proposition: we cannot truly know who we are, in part or in whole, and be who we are at the same time.

305. Entry:

"The proposition can be 'overcome' by the simple and frank recognition of gross Pythagorean error. The Pythagoreans claimed that one of the sides of a right-angled triangle is not 'real'. Two sides of a right-angled triangle are ‘rational’ (that is they can be expressed as the ratio of two apparently whole or divisible numbers), and one is ‘irrational’ (cannot be expressed as the ratio of supposedly rational, 'divisible numbers'). From the mistaken assumption of 'divisible whole number', their misconstructed world collapsed. But rather than redefine their world, they redefined reality. 'Things' that existed outside of their (mis)constructed 'rationality', were 'irrational' and were to be excluded in fear from the dreamworld in which they lived.

All 'sides' of any 'shape' are part of an indivisible continuum. 'Whole Numbers' as defined by the Pythagoreans, do not exist, it is our minds that divides the continuum into apparent divisible wholes. Our minds categorise where no such categories exist, it constructs where no such constructions exist, and it excludes where no such exclusions exist. Outside of constructed category is 'irrationality', which has passed into a byword for 'madness'. Is one of the sides of a right-angled triangle mad? Is it to be viewed and treated with disdain and fear? Or is all part of a numberless, indivisible continuum?

This 'continuum' includes 'knowledge' and 'being'-there is no 'whole divisibility' between them. Just as the 'triangle' merges into the 'point', the 'circle', the 'square' and the 'line', all aspects of 'being', 'knowledge' and 'existence' eventually merge together. No divisibility or granularity exists - such is Pythagorean error - all the way down to the supposed 'atomic unit'. The 'triangle shape' exists, but as part of the space-time continuum, all three sides are *rational*, irrespective of our mental misconstruction of them.

To repeat: all aspects of space, time, knowledge and being are in the same continuum. At some 'point' (for want of a better, non-defined human word) on this continuum, as the triangle also merges into a point or another shape, knowledge and being MUST merge, and in that flow of indivisibility, which is reality, the proposition is overcome. We 'know' and 'we are', on the continuum of reality, as also often defined as 'space-time', but it could also be defined as 'knowledge-being'."

eif November 30 2001

Response:

If your position that ‘everything is defined by an "indivisible continuum"’ is more reasonable than antagonistic positions, it would overcome the proposition, because there would be no "who we are" to overcome. However, your position faces inherent inconsistency and contradiction which in our view makes it less reasonable than the position of divisible continuum as maintained by the proposition.

First, your position of indivisible continuum is self-defeating because in order to express your position, you yourself must exist, and yet ultimately you say there is no you yourself, which means there can be no "indivisible continuum" which you can express either. In other words, you cannot use something to support your position, which you claim to be non-existent, without facing inconsistency and contradiction.

Second, if there is only indivisibility, it does not follow what reality is? A state of static oneness? If the oneness is dynamic, how can it change since that is all there is? If the change is from within the oneness, then how can it change since it is indivisible? It appears on probabilistic grounds that you must concede divisibility because there is no other probable way for "reality" to exist.

Third, your claim that reality is an "indivisible continuum" is not a claim of absolute truth-value, and therefore, it is possible so-called reality is not an indivisible continuum, and since you cannot make the claim without establishing your own existence, thereby the existence of divisibility, it follows that so-called reality is at least a divisible continuum.

Your position is similar to Michael De’s position in Entries 289, 298, 301, in which he claims that the conscious self is "created ex nihilo" (out of nothing), and instead you are claiming the indivisibility of reality. Yet since we can only know by imputing causality onto things, we must conclude that both your positions are less reasonable than causality viz., something out of something else, and divisible oneness.

Also, our position on divisibility has nothing to do with "fear of things that exist outside [our] (mis)constructed rationality"; rather, our position has everything to do with more reasonableness, and ultimately with the consistency and soundness of reasons themselves.

In short, we are not denying the possibility of creation ex nihilo or indivisible continuum. We are asserting that they are less reasonable from our causal/comparative perspective. Hence, in our view the Pythagoreans’ mistake lies with the absolute division, in terms of truth-value, of real/true (numbers) and unreal/untrue (numbers), and not as you contend, the division of the indivisible.

(Note, Alistair Burrowes in Entries 245, 246, 247, also takes a similar position to your own, in which he contends that existence is made up only of "matter", and since matter is all there is, matter cannot be categorized, and therefore the proposition is invalid because there is nothing that can be overcome. However, like your own position, Burrowes’ position succumbs to inconsistency and contradiction as we explain in our response to Entry 247,

".... you are also claiming that what we know, which is based on relational constructs, does not exist, and therefore there is no way to overcome the proposition because in terms of consciousness, there is nothing to overcome, and nothing to overcome with. The contradiction in your position is that you are claiming that consciousness does not exist, and yet you are using consciousness as though it does exist to refute the existence of consciousness.... (i.e. you cannot use consciousness to refute the existence of consciousness without contradicting yourself, because then your refutation does not exist as well, and something that does not exist cannot logically be used to show the non-existence of something else without contradiction; and if your refutation does exist, as you appear to be implying, then you also have contradicted yourself.)")

306. Entry:

"If we take the statement as implying a knower as separate from that known, and being who we are as being the knower, there is no way to deny the statement, for the distance between the knower and the known is already assumed. To overcome the proposition it would be necessary to define the knower as the known. As such, there cannot only be no distance between the knower and the known, but that known must also be the self. The decisive qualification, however, must be that such a defined self derive from the experience. The upshot of such an experience would be that it could only be reflected upon after the fact, which is to say, again bringing the separation of the knower from the known into being. In this sense, the two ways of knowing, to truly know, where the knower and the known was not differentiated, and to know, where the knower is differentiated from the known, would have to be categorized as different, and, in doing so, the proposition itself, in the light of that difference itself being capable of being reflected upon, would then be seen to be flawed and thus not necessary of being overcome."

Buster Price December 2 2001

Response:

We agree that one way to overcome the proposition is to establish that there is no separation between the knower and known. (Michael De made this observation in Entry 265, and went further saying that we ourselves must be thought, or in his words, ".... it seems as if you're implying that our knowledge of self must be ourselves, and not knowledge, in order to truly be knowledge of self (since it must be us, not a representation of us). This doesn't make any sense unless we are thought (and only thought).")

However, you then argue that in order to know whether there is separation between the knower and known, we must experience it. But experience implies that we can only know from a position of separation between the knower and known, or you say "[we could only experience the separation between the knower and known] after the fact, [which is to bring the] separation of the knower and known into being." This point leads you to conclude that the proposition is "flawed" because we can never truly know that there is no separation between the knower and known.

We disagree with your conclusion because the proposition is not asserted from a position of truly knowing or experiencing that the knower and known are separated, but from what we more reasonably know about the knower and known. Also, the competition is not asking for a true proof or experience that we can truly know who we are, but a more reasonable proof that we can truly know who we are.

You may respond that the competition is flawed because it can never come to a true solution, so that there will always be doubt regarding any limited or more reasonable solution that is derived at. But we would respond that your argument is self-defeating because apparently no true solution can be derived at for anything, including your assertion (viz., solution) that the competition is flawed.

So based on your initial observation alone from a position of more reasonableness, it appears that the proposition is valid, because we would always be a step behind consciously experiencing the union of the knower and known. This point is similar to Laon Shelley’s comment in Entry 296 that we cannot truly know who we are, because as soon as we think we do, we cease to. (i.e. the new knowledge of who we are becomes part of what we are, so that we always end up a step behind or in a state of "recursive reflexivity". For instance, John says, "I am" and if John knows that he knows he is, he would become "I am that knows I am" which adds additional knowledge to who John is, so that he never ends up truly knowing who he is in the moment--I am that knows I am, that knows I am, that knows I am ad infinitum.

Entries 299-302,  Entries 307-308