‘We can't know who we are and be who we are at the same time.’

"I think I will draw here first from Heidegger's preposition that "man is identical with his existence". We are always who we are, it could not be any other way. If we "are" Being, then we are, and since Being is us, then we are who we are, it could not be different.

Perhaps however, this little dilemma should be looked at with the eyes of the Buddha, or optionally David Hume. What you really are implying is that the self is not unalterable, changing in every present, and since man can never contemplate the present (only the past, and ponder the future), by the time he has understood himself, his self has altered so that he is different.

The problem is that you have gone about establishing this in a very wrong way. The sentence "we can't know who we are and be who we are at the same time" is flawed, because we always are who we are, and so if we ever gained knowledge of "who we are", we would still have to be who we are, because frankly we could not be different.

I don't really feel I've expressed myself clearly on these points, the words seem to me to have come out rather jumbled, so I will try and some up my expression concerning the refutation of this statement in a simple little paragraph:

We are always who we are, we cannot be different from who we are, because then we would not be who we are, and be something else, and not the "we". The statement "we are" is static, because we are always "who we are" whatever that may be. If we ever were to attain precise knowledge of "who we are", then it would be knowledge of "who we are", and since we always are "who we are", the knowledge of who we are would correspond to exactly "who we are". "WE can't know who we are and be who we are at the same time" is an illogical sentence, because if we know "who we are" then that is "who we are", but if we are not the "who we are" that we know of, how could we know "who we are"? We are always "who we are", we cannot be anything different, the statement "we can't be who we are at the same time as knowing who we are" is crazy because we are who we are: therefore the sentence is also useless.

It’s a simple confusion of language, nothing a little Wittgenstein won't fix."

Andreas Mogensen March 23 2000

Response:

We agree that we can’t help from being who we are, as long as we exist as human beings, and that if we ever gained knowledge of who we are, we would still be who we are. However, it is questionable whether we could ever gain knowledge of who we are, because it appears that we need intrinsic separation to know. Hence, the statement, "if we ever gained knowledge of who we are, we would still have to be who we are," does not prove anything, because it is referring to a hypothetical scenario, rather than one that is really occurring or will occur. For the statement to refute the challenge proposition, you must reasonably show how we could gain knowledge of who we are.

If we can’t know who we are, what we know of who we are appears to be fabrication with limited connection to who we are.

We disagree that the challenge proposition is a "simple confusion of language". Rather, it illuminates an inherent difference between what we think itself and who we are.

31. Entry:

"You conclude your response to Entry 30 with: 'If we can’t know who we are, what we know of who we are appears to be fabrication with limited connection to who we are. We disagree that the challenge proposition is a "simple confusion of language". Rather, it illuminates an inherent difference between what we think itself and who we are.'

It is a platitude that what we think that we know is, from some more or less likely vantage point, vulnerable to more or less corrosive skepticism. Skepticism, applying as it does to anything that we might entertain about how things may in fact be, also, of course, applied to anything that we might entertain about ourselves. Thus, by a natural extension of the skepticism that is available (and essentially so) to any creature capable of thought, any such creature has the potential for arriving at the mental point of doubting the objectivity of their knowledge of self. Consideration of the capacity for skepticism -- which is an inherent potential feature of the capacity for thought -- is quite sufficient, I think, to reveal that the Proposition to which this website is devoted is not especially illuminating of anything important that isn't already available to unphilosophical thought."

Rob Sica March 27 2000

Response:

We disagree that it is a platitude to think that what we know is vulnerable to more or less corrosive skepticism. Rather, from our perspective, it is platitude to think that what we know is beyond objective criticism in the form of skepticism.

Just because thinking beings have the "potential" to doubt the objectivity of their knowledge of self, it does not follow that any doubt we have about knowledge of self is unreasonable or unphilosophical.

Also, just because skepticism doubts the objectivity of knowledge, it does not follow that skepticism is unphilosophical. For instance, a skeptic could prove philosophically, within the limits of reason, that there is no such thing as objective knowledge of self, except as an illusion in our minds.

32. Entry:

"It's not a valid proposition, it assumes its own negation in order to be true; like the proposition `this statement is false', such propositions are true when false and false when true. You cannot start a series or construct a self-inferential system on the basis of a self-negating proposition. There is no answer, there is no solution ... and that is the solution."

CG Von Kram March 28 2000

Response:

It is unclear how the challenge proposition could be true when false, and false when true, when it is possible that we could know who we are, thereby it is possible the proposition could be false when false. Hence, the proposition itself does not assume its own negation in order to be true.

We disagree that "no answer and no solution" is the solution to the challenge proposition. You appear to be assuming that it is impossible to know who we are, and ignoring that all knowledge appears to bottom out into unknown. Therefore, because of the apparent uncertainty of knowledge, and its progressiveness, it is possible that we could know who we are.

33. Entry:

"In your Response to my Entry 31, you fail to recognize the far-reaching implications of skepticism -- or, more precisely, of our inability not only to rationally shake it off once and for all, but of our inability to even make sense of such a possibility.

Your retort to me in your Reply that "it is platitude to think that what we know is beyond objective criticism in the form of skepticism" misses the point because it is precisely such a platitude that I have invoked in support of my claim that the first prong of the Proposition -- knowing who we are -- is itself not only unrealizable, but inconceivable. If, by "knowing," you mean a knowledge of oneself that is fully complete and lacking in nothing, and if we also cannot conceive of a state of knowledge which is absolutely immune to skepticism, then such "knowledge" of self is a chimera.

One final point. The fact that every state of knowledge is always vulnerable to the skeptical thought that it might be another appearance -- even, in relation to previous states of knowledge, one of a higher-order -- does not itself constitute a proposition that shares in common with all others such vulnerability. This fact is, rather, the phenomenology of the mental which renders our thoughts of possessing complete knowledge chimerical."

Rob Sica March 29 2000

Response:

We agree that we as a species have been unable to "rationally shake off the implications of skepticism", but that does not mean we will never be able to shake them off, nor does it mean that we will never realize profound meaning, in terms of us existing through thoughts, in our inability to shake off skepticism.

We disagree that we are unable to make sense of the implications of skepticism. We can do so from the limit of what we can know. To argue that skepticism shows itself and other belief systems to be illusions, and thereby cannot be contemplated, is to ignore that all knowledge appears to bottoms out into unknown. If you are to be consistent in your position, you would have to argue that we cannot make sense of any belief, because they all appear uncertain. In other words, we have to work from within the limits of what we can know, including skepticism, or not at all. To exclude skepticism from rational thought is to reason with unreasonable bias.

How do you really know "knowing who we are" is "unrealizable and inconceivable"? It appears that you are stating a truth. Are you sure you want to make this claim? If so, please prove to us that we can never know who we are. (See Entry 32 for one attempt at this argument, and for explanation of knowing, in terms of the competition, please see know).

Regarding the last statement of paragraph 2 in your entry, you appear to be assuming that "we cannot ever conceive of a state of knowledge which is absolutely immune to skepticism". Again, please prove to us that we cannot ever conceive such a state of knowledge.

We agree that not all states of knowledge may be vulnerable to skepticism, and yet at the same time, all states of knowledge may be vulnerable to it. Because of the apparent uncertainty of knowledge, we can’t say with certainty one way or the other. However, from our limited perspective and our apparent inability to refute the challenge proposition, all states of knowledge appear vulnerable, and even illusory. In our view, there may be something significant behind a proposition which can refute all other different systems of beliefs, and itself remain reasonably immune to refutation. This scrutiny and immunity appears to be closest thing to a truth. One purpose of the competition is find out whether the challenge proposition is immune to reasonable refutation or not.

34. Entry:

"A sentient being observes its existence and accumulates knowledge thereof. It is, whilst accumulating knowledge."

Edwin C. Turner March 30 2000

Response:

It is questionable whether a "sentient being observes its existence" because due to the apparent interconnectedness of life-forms and things, it is questionable whether a sentient being even exists, except as an illusion. However, assuming there are sentient beings, it is unclear whether a sentient being really observes its existence, or through unconscious sensory, it observes fabrications in its mind.

Also, it is unclear how a sentient being could observe, and thereby accumulate knowledge, without first having knowledge to observe through. It appears that observation cannot be disconnected from knowledge, and thereby from the apparent dilemma that we can’t know who we are. Though even if we observe unconsciously and then transfer our observations into conscious knowledge, it is still unclear whether conscious knowledge itself is what really is or fabrication of whatever is outside of our minds including ourselves. For further explanation see Entry 7.

35. Entry:

"The old saying, "mind over matter" applies here. I think of the proposition as a fraction. Since a whole lot less is known about the insides and outs of the human brain/mind than the human body, it is somewhat like a fraction. And from a mental standpoint; part of being who we are is not knowing who we are or at least in that never-ending journey unto which we try to find ourselves, so in a sense one can not be without the other. Basically the two parts of the proposition are one in the same."

Zack Condry March 31 2000

Response:

We agree with your "mind over matter" view. However a question arises: Could we ever know who we are and be who we are? In other words, could the "never-ending journey" come to an end with us finding, and thereby knowing, ourselves? Based on your view, and what we know about knowledge itself in relation to who we are, as explained in Dispute 9 (Responses 29 and 30), we answer no. Though by accepting that we can’t know who we are, we face the dilemma that by existing through thoughts, and their material extensions, as we do in the modern age, we appear to be absorbing ourselves, and all other life-forms, into their emptiness. So it appears that the state of "being and not knowing who we are as one in the same", is a temporary state of being (ie. not permanent).

36. Entry:

'Regarding the last statement of paragraph 2 in your entry, you appear to be assuming that "we cannot ever conceive of a state of knowledge which is absolutely immune to skepticism". Again, please prove to us that we cannot ever conceive such a state of knowledge.'

"In reply, I invoke a remark, circa 1765-1770, of Lichtenberg's: 'It is a question whether in the arts and sciences a BEST is possible beyond which our understanding cannot go. Perhaps this point is infinitely distant, notwithstanding that with every closer approximation we have less in front of us.'

I think that Lichtenberg's suggested formulation of our epistemic situation -- which I have quite imperfectly already tried to convey in my earlier entries -- defies any attempt to contradict it; for the matter is not one of having to PROVE ITS TRUTH, but rather one of having to make sense of the idea that we could ever arrive at a 'best' whose absolute authority renders the skeptical move impossible. As far as I know, the only things which approximate to this "best" are basic mathematics and logic and reason-vanquishing religious conversion. The point that I have been feebly trying to make, and which, with his typically lucid concision, Lichtenberg articulates, is that however unconstrained our advances in objectivity may be, those advances have no conceivable end point.

Perhaps it is the case that the very attributes of mind by which we have made advances towards ever less subjective knowledge do not make provisions for the conceivability of such an epistemological 'best.'

The 'overcoming' of the Proposition would thus amount to its dissolution -- not its refutation."

Rob Sica April 1 2000

Response:

We feel that Lichtenberg’s remark is contradictory, because in one sense, he is referring to an "infinite distance", and yet in another sense, he is presupposing that with every closer approximation, we are moving closer to the "BEST", which implies a finite distance. Moreover, the notion of "BEST" is an assumed end-point from faith in knowledge and truth. In our view, it is no more believable than belief in the illusory nature of conscious knowledge.

In response to your assertion that basic mathematics is approximate to the "BEST", we ask you to consider our claim that (1+1=2)=FALSE. Also, it is unclear how "logic and reason-vanquishing religious conversion" could be considered an approximate to the "BEST", when religious conversion contradicts the notion of "closer approximation" through its control of thought.

Since objectivity appears to have no conceivable end-point, it follows that the notion of objectivity may be an illusion, except within systems of thoughts.

We acknowledge your point that there may not be an epistemological "BEST". On our part, we concede that skepticism is limited, because if all knowledge is illusory, it means that we have no way of knowing it is illusory, except through illusion. Though this point does not make skepticism invalid, because all beliefs succumb to similar epistemic limitation. So the only way to make sense of what we know, is to reason within the limits of what we know. Therefore, assuming there is no "BEST", we disagree that overcoming the Proposition would amount to its dissolution. Rather, it would amount to reasonable refutation by another belief, which shows the Proposition’s inconsistency while the other belief maintains its reasonableness in relation to the Proposition and other beliefs.

37. Entry:

"There are several problems which need to be untangled before one understands the solution. First, the assumption that our "limited perspective" does not allow us understanding outside our minds is entirely false. First off, the claim rests on the fact that we don't know if we're seeing an illusion, or dreaming, or some other form of sensory-deceit. The problem, is that the way we can tell if we are seeing an illusion is with further sense data. Thus, if I see an oasis, (which, suppose, is illusional) the way I find out that's a mirage is by running to the play I see and finding out its just sand. So the whole concept of illusion and dreaming presupposes that we can distinguish the two cases.

As for our world being created in our minds, this is because the standard of knowledge being asked for requires us to compact into one proposition which is actually two different ones. The first, is what criteria will we use to judge what is going on in someone else (suppose they're feeling pain). The other, is how can we know if it's true?

The answer to the first proposition, in the case of pain is easy. Suppose I see someone with his leg under the car screaming in pain. They have satisfied the criteria for pain, since they're engaging in a natural expression of animals in pain. The same way we can tell when a dog is in pain (by yelping) or other animals similar to humans.

The answer to the second proposition, (How do we know this man is actually in pain, and not just faking it?) will come out in the long-run. Suppose, shortly after we see the unfortunate man, we hear someone say "Cut!", and the actor gets up from the ground walking around fine. We would then probably think that our initial assumption was false. However, if instead of this happy outcome, we see ambulances rushing to the scene, frantically moving about trying to help the man, then we have better evidence to suggest that he actually is hurt.

Does this mean that someone can't be lying about their inner experience? No, they could be lying, but in the long term it's more likely to show if they are.

Anyway, since the problem has been properly understood, we can turn our attention back to the problem at hand.

When I have an inner experience, I just have the experience. I don't say "There is knife in my arm, I suppose this is an appropriate time to feel the experience of pain". I just feel it. So knowledge about my inner self comes in the form of retrospection. Clearly, then, we can have knowledge about our inner experiences and still maintain our current self.

Finally, the conclusions that we become someone "less" of ourselves cannot be made from this "paradox". This is an epistemic problem, not a logical one. So, while it may be true that humans are losing something due to the rapid proliferation of technology, the argument cannot be made from epistemic premises."

Santiago Zorzopulos April 3 2000

Response:

We disagree with your claim that through "sense data", we can understand outside of our minds. You appear to be overlooking that all sense data in the form of knowledge, including sense data itself, is from in our minds. So we can’t get outside of our minds using sense data. Though we can compare sense data, which may give us the impression that we can understand , and thereby know, outside of our minds. However, through our unconscious sensory and thought process, we appear to have a limited understanding of outside of our minds.

In response to your remarks on the first proposition, using the case of pain, you appear to be making the assumption that what we perceive is what really is, when we appear to perceive through system(s) of thoughts, including the labels and meanings of "dog", "pain", "expression" ect. Also, in your remarks on the second proposition, you make the same assumption about perceiving outside of our minds, instead of recognizing that we appear to perceive through our minds at whatever is outside of them. For further explanation see Entry 24 and Dispute 9 (10-12).

We agree that we can sense our inner experience; though as mentioned, from our standpoint, we can’t really know what we sense, because we can’t get outside of our minds and know that we are. So all we can perceive is what is in our minds, without really knowing what is outside of them. And since we can’t know knowledge solely through itself, knowledge itself appears to be an empty form, which in our view does not correlate to whatever is outside of our minds (ie. surely, we ourselves and other life-forms are not empty forms).

We disagree with your claim that epistemology is separate from reason, or logic, because in our view, we can’t have epistemology without reason (ie. all systems of thoughts, in a limited sense, appear to have their basis in reason). So we assert that arguments about our relationship, as a species, to the proliferation of technology can be made through epistemic premises.

See reply by Santiago Zorzopulos, and further response, at Dispute 11.

Entries 23-29 Entries 38-46