"To overcome this statement is impossible. How can we if we are not one step away from god and utopia but instead a single lifetime away from death. If we end after our lifetime the common goal which we all seek will die with us. In this I conclude that I will find out when I accept my existence is over. Be that 1 second or 80 years is up to my body so my mind has no control."

Lee Stocks November 19 2001

Response:

We agree that overcoming the proposition is impossible, but we would add that it is impossible to overcome within the limit of what we can know as defined by more reasonableness. This addition is important because it establishes that it is possible to overcome the proposition. (Note, in our response to Entry 168, we show that impossibility is defined by possibility. (i.e. there is no impossibility without the possibility of it; whereas, possibility is obviously not contingent on the impossibility of it.))

If we cannot truly know who we are, within limits, in our lifetime, how can you know with certainty whether we can or not when you accept that your existence is over? If you are still alive then according to your argument you cannot know, and if you are dead, you are dead.

We find it interesting that you equate not truly knowing who we are with a problem or condition of life. What is it about life itself that prevents us from truly knowing who we are, or could the problem have to do with the nature of what we know itself in relation to our existence, or even simply knowledge itself from ontological and epistemological standpoints? Also, how can we say it is life that prevents us from truly knowing who we are, when in death we clearly cannot truly know who we are? It appears that in both realms we cannot truly know who we are, which means that the problem is not exclusive to life. Death can be ruled out, because we are not alive, and therefore we cannot know in anyway. However, in life we can know. So it appears that we must look for solution to the proposition or explanation of it in the nature of our knowledge....

300. Entry:Kasana

Reply to the response to Entry 294

"I feel that some of the examples I chose to support my argument that 'there is nothing called absolute reality and therefore we cannot truly know who we are', has caused some misunderstanding. May be I should not have mentioned the film 'Matrix'!

What I am suggesting is that, all our models of universe are created by processing evidence we receive from our senses. Isn't it possible that different kind of species might comprehend the universe in entirely a different way? Moreover, can we do anything more than building better and better models about universe and all of us with in it? Our scientific, social, economic, political models will get better and better but can we reach something called absolute model? The way Stephen Hawking put it in his famous book 'Brief History of Time' is that ‘All we have are models and these models does not have anything to do with reality, whatever it might mean.’

I really don't even see a semantic meaning in the statement 'knowing who really are'. What is the definition of 'real'? Does the world 'reality' have any 'real' meaning at least?"

Prasad Mapatuna November 20 2001

Response:

We agree with your argument that based on the invention of our models through the processing of evidence we receive through our senses, we cannot know absolute reality. (i.e. what we know is a representation of reality through our senses, rather than absolute reality.) However, your argument needs to be qualified by "limited perspective", otherwise as Michael De in Entry 249 implies, the argument succumbs to contradiction by stating that there is no absolute reality from a position of absolute reality, or in the case of skepticism, there is nothing we can know from a position of knowing. (i.e. we know that we do not know anything.)

The same reasoning applies to Hawking’s point that there are only models that have nothing to do with reality. He can only make this assertion from a limited perspective, or succumb to contradiction by saying that there are only models devoid of reality from a model that is not. Hence, it is possible in a semantical, ontological, epistemological, or neurological sense, or any other sense, that we can truly know who we are. What is important is that due to infinite regress or recursive reflexivity, we apparently cannot know with absolute certainty that we truly know who we are or anything else. We are left with a gradation of truth-value with no absolute endpoints to determine what is more or less probable (or what is more or less real), and even then our determinations may not be correct.

301. Entry:

Reply to the response to Entry 298

‘it does not necessarily follow that it is a valid claim or a claim with absolute truth-value’ (Excerpt from response)

"Indeed, this is true, and hence the reason I said it was more reasonable, not certain. Your challenge was to show how your problem can be overcome by demonstrating that an alternative position is more reasonable, which I believe I sufficiently demonstrated.

‘then you are asserting that you are what you utter’ (Excerpt from response)

Actually, that isn't correct. Again, your statement implies that something is doing the uttering, when in fact nothing of the sort is being implied. In other words, I'm not asserting that I am what I utter, rather I'm asserting that I am an utterance (or that it is at least a more reasonable assertion than anything else). Moreover, I'm not sure what you mean by ‘first awareness’, or how that ties into the reasonable of beliefs. I know that such a belief is certainly not something I'm firstly aware of, if that's what you mean. We'll leave the ‘argument from reasonableness’ alone for now, since it seems to have been rather exhaustively considered.

As far as physics is concerned, Heisenburg's Uncertainty Principle isn't so much proof that, say, microphysical structures or properties are unknowable as it is proof of our inability to remove the observer from observation. Being not able to know simultaneously the position and momentum of a sub-atomic particle doesn't entail the impossibility of knowing the rules, laws, principles, and so on that govern the sub-atomic world. The creation of particles in a vacuum ‘ex nihilo’ can be known through the physical principles that govern them.

‘it does not follow how ourselves as utterances, or thought, in each moment can deal with the apparent dynamic nature of utterances, whereby as soon as we know who we are, we cease to know who we are, or as Laon Shelley says in Entry 296 and with reference to Gödel, we face the ‘recursive reflexivity’ of utterances.’ (Excerpt from response)

I’m not sure what you mean by the ‘dynamic nature of utterances’. Granted that utterances and statements are identical, utterances are surely not dynamic, even given a non-propositionalist account of statements (propositions). If what Laon meant by ‘recursive reflexivity’ is the problem of indexicals or ‘token reflexivity’, then there's hardly a problem. First, all statements can be stated as to not contain indexicals. An indexical is a particle (i.e. pronoun) of a statement that changes the statement's truth-value (or conditions) depending on context or reference (i.e. the utterer, location, etc.). So the statement ‘I am here now’ contains three indexicals: i) 'I'; ii) 'here'; iii) 'now'. The said statement can be restated excluding indexicals as such: ‘Michael is at such and such spatial/geographic coordinates at time t’. Problem solved. Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem (which I assume is what the reference to Gödel was about) has nothing to do with reflexivity. It merely shows that for any formal system adequate for number theory, there exists a formula not provable in the system (i.e. not derivable from axioms within the system) - hence ‘metajustification’.

Sartre's theory doesn't actually equate consciousness with utterances or the like (that was simply used to show that an alternative position is more reasonable than yours). Instead, it explains what consciousness is, viz., an impersonal spontaneity.

Finally, concerning the notion of creation ex nihilo, you mention a causality to be a necessary condition for something's existence. Indeed, in Humean fashion, it is impossible to determine cause and effect since all we really see is correlation. We project causality on things. Moreover, it is not impossible that creation ex nihilo is without cause. However, the cause (or correlation) may be unintuitive - this is certainly plausible given the nature of sub-atomic particles."

Michael De November 21 2001

Response:

In an attempt to get around representational knowledge without refuting it and with showing how we can truly know who we are, you argue in Entry 265 that we must be "thought (or only thought)", and that "it is possible that we are only thought, since it is the only thing indubious (as we could doubt a thinker doing thinking, but not thought itself, from ‘Cogito ergo sum.’" You reiterate this position in Entry 289, in which you say that "the most reasonable position is that I exist as at least utterances", and in Entry 298, you take your position further, claiming that "it is most reasonable to assert that something, viz., this utterance, exists, and nothing more,... and a non-reflexive pronoun - ‘I’ - be used to express what it is that is responsible for this utterance... and [that these assertions] are the only things certain." Now in Entry 301, you summarize your position in a concise statement, "I am an utterance (or that it is at least a more reasonable assertion than anything else)."

In our response to Entry 289, we contend that what is first apparent is the ground for your claim of more reasonable. (i.e. you are first aware of utterances than anything else, and therefore the notion is utterances is more reasonable...) However, you say in Entry 301 that it is not the ground, which leaves us wondering what is the ground(s) for your position that you are most reasonably an utterance?

In review of your arguments, you claim,

1. "It is possible that we are only thought..." (Entry 265) (Yet it can also be said that it is possible we are not thought, or not just thought.)

2. "... we are only thought, since it is the only thing indubious (as we could doubt a thinker doing thinking, but not thought itself." (Entry 265) (We think this point is the ground for your position. We agree that by the mere fact that we are consciously aware of thoughts, something must exist at some level and in some form. However, it is unclear what this "thought itself" is, and what grounds you have to assert that it is "indubious"? Moreover, it is unclear why you equate existence with the thought itself, when it is possible that there is no thought itself. What we think you are doing is arbitrarily stretching the existence of something from our awareness of thought, ("Cogito ergo sum") to the existence of thought itself, and then contradicting your assertion that "the thinker can be doubted" by attaching yourself or "I" with complete certainty to thought itself viz., "I exist and I know myself in every conceivable way since I am at most an utterance." (Entry 298) For your argument to make sense, you need to more reasonably show how Descartes’ statement, "Cogito ergo sum" entails the logical necessity that existence is centered on thought itself, and that "I" (or yourself) is thought itself over anything else, and further, that your position is "the only thing certain" or "conceivable in every way" (Entry 298).

Other issues:

We disagree that rules, laws, principles can be used to show that sub-atomic particles are created ex nihilo, because the rules, laws, principles are defined by our projection of causality on things, while ex nihilo refers to a realm outside of causality. From our perspective, ex nihilo is not impossible, but at the same time it is less reasonable than causality because we can only know in a causal way. This point is important because it shows the less reasonableness of Sartre’s theory of impersonal spontaneity, which in Entry 289 you describe as, "who we are is an impersonal spontaneity created ex nihilo and knowing itself at each moment.... talk about us is merely a reflection of that consciousness." Without ex nihilo, the concept of impersonal spontaneity is refuted because there are no grounds for either impersonality or spontaneity. (i.e. who we are becomes a reflection of what we are and whatever interacts with us.) (Note, even if who we are is an impersonal spontaneity created ex nihilo, it does not follow how we can know who we are through conscious meaning, because we would be what we know as form. (In other words, we cannot know ourselves through ourselves because there would be no space to know ourselves, or from another angle, we cannot know ourselves through what we know, because that is all we know.) Also, to say that what we know as in conscious meaning is a "reflection" of who we are (or "that consciousness") is not the same thing as truly knowing who we are.)

We disagree with your claim that utterances are static, because our perspective of them is dynamic, and utterances as form due to the interaction of things, are dynamic as well. Your claim can only be justified from a general standpoint, but in our view that is not helpful, because from what we reasonably know, utterances, statements, propositions etc. as form and from our perspective, are not truly static. Therefore, it does not follow how your assertion that "I am an utterance" (Entry 301) can be truly who you are, because as soon as you know you are an utterance, you yourself change--you become "I am an utterance that knows I am utterance", ad infinitum. (Laon Shelley in Entry 296 clearly illustrates this "recursive reflexivity".)

Finally, non-indexicals only provide a partial solution to change in a statements’ truth-value or conditions for it, because non-indexicals are subject to infinite regress regardless of the levels of metajustification. To separate meta-justificatory grounds from a system of thought, does not make sense because the metajustication is the justificatory basis for the system. Therefore, since metajustification is subject to infinite regress and thereby uncertainty, it follows that the system is as well.

302. Entry:

Reply to the response to Entry 295

‘We do not claim that the proposition is ‘irrefutable’. We claim that the proposition is irrefutable within the limit of more reasonableness.’ (Excerpt from response)

"Well, this is plainly unfair. This limit of more reasonableness can be nothing else but your version of it. I stress that your claim on irrefutability within the limit of more reasonableness is precisely what I claim as well. MY limit of more reasonableness. In the end you can't keep hiding behind this limit of more reasonableness, without acknowledging that democracy, oligarchy or plain dictatoriality makes the final call. Your view is limited, my view is limited, can you imagine what this implies for our supposed consensus concerning this elusive ‘reason within limits’? I bet Marx was quite sure of himself too.

‘Even if a definition is in the ‘eye of the beholder’, it does not necessarily follow that the individual behind the definition can know who he or she is.’ (Excerpt from response)

And who are you to know that? If I ask this individual: ‘Do you know who you are?’ And he says:
‘Yes’.
He will always be right within the only limited reason that will ever exist within his universe, namely his own. I think that this points to what I object to in your position:

‘To illustrate, we do not view the second half of the proposition as wordy and redundant, but as a necessary part of the proposition because it establishes a context for the first half of the proposition, without which the proposition would be ambiguous. For instance, by simply using ‘we cannot truly know who we are’, it leads to the question, in what sense can we not truly know who we are? When we are asleep? Not alive? Infants?’ (Excerpt from response)

First you take the option away for searching for an absolute refutation by stating that there is nothing but a ‘limit within more reasonableness’ and then you also take the individual's reason away by stating that this individual can never prove his point, solely by the fact that your individual reason does not concur. This way, all that can ever come out of this, is the establishment of your reason as the limit within more reasonableness that's supposed to stand for everyone. Once again, I have no illusions concerning my version of this limited reason, but you haven't convinced me so far of the fact that you don't either. This limited reason cannot exist beyond the borders of the individual in my point of view and you seem to be claiming that it does. These rules can never be yours and they can never be mine either. So where would we find them? We will never advance beyond a more or less sizable group of kindred spirits. We will never advance beyond a majority in a philosophical parliament.
And what's more, as always some unpredicted event will bring that government down anyway.

‘To make this connection, you need to more reasonably show the epistemology for the individual in question. Also, a definition itself does not have to be inherently part of 'being' to be dynamic.’ I state that definition, per definition (which literally means ending), is static, whether considered a part of being or not.. ‘In other words, we see no reason to believe that being has a monopoly on the notion of dynamic. (Note, it appears that whatever form or non-form a definition itself takes, it cannot help from being dynamic at some level.’ (Excerpt from response)

Yes, at some level, but not the essential one in this case: The sequence of symbols that express it's meaning (‘1+1=2’ has moving ink molecules, but it's symbolic content is forever static).

‘1. There is no direct evidence that the properties of the universe transcend space-time, as in the superposition of electrons. More specifically, the superposition of Quantum Mechanics is an unprovable/unverifiable hypothesis, because it refers to something beyond human cognition. (i.e. we can only think in terms of space-time, so the notion of something outside of space-time is also outside of our cognitive capability’. (Excerpt from response)

If you read precisely what I wrote, you see that I used quantum mechanics for imagery, not as a piece of evidence. I would be perfectly content if you could acknowledge the unreason in all this, represented by your reasons being necessarily the ‘Emperor’. Simply put: If I were you and you were me, this discussion would be different in that you would fail to prove your point to me and it would be you being confounded by my replies. This phenomenon cannot be circumvented in any way, proving to me that a common standard of optimized reason (within limits) is unattainable. Therefore I feel that your position can only be reasonable if you accept your imperial status in this discussion.
In other words: Either acknowledge the fact that in the end only democracy, monarchy, anarchy or any other related specimen will decide, or show us exactly what this optimized limited reason is. This definition of course, by it's own limited nature, will be limited...

‘We can't truly know who we are’ in your view needs to be in a context with ‘to be who we are’, for otherwise we face the question : ‘In what sense can we not know who we are?’ (Excerpt from response)

This to me is an other important point where I strongly disagree. You ask the same question twice! To not know who you are implies that all ways in which you don't know are necessarily beyond your limited reason, and therefore devoid of any form of limited reason whatsoever. In that sense the proposition can be called nonsensical.
In other words, to say that we can't know who we are is mirrored by asking the question: ‘In what sense can we not know who we are?’. To state one is to state the other. The whole point of not being able to know is that a reason for ‘the impossibility of truly knowing’ also lies beyond the limits of our reason. So of the question didn't already beg in its first instance, namely at the statement ‘we can't truly know who we are’, then I see no added reason in wondering about it on a second (merely paraphrased) appearance.

So first ‘We can't truly know who we are’, needing the context ‘and be who we are’, which both in turn require the context ‘at the same time’ to finally arrive on firm ground. This reminds me of the ancient tale of the column of turtles that support the earth in space. What about space anyway ?

‘We can't truly know who we are and be who we are at the same time and in a different space’?

-The option that we could know who we are is excluded by the proposition itself, because we could never stop being and do some knowing at the same time.
-So we don't know. This implies that the ‘to be who we are’ which follows, is something we can attain no true knowledge about. How can you state that something we can't truly know can't coincide with something we don't truly know about at the same time?

If we are to fight this self-made dragon, then let's do so at the first opportunity and not mystify matters in adding turtles to the column. For all common purposes, WE DON'T KNOW WHO WE ARE. Does this pose a problem? Absolutely not. On an individual level identity grows whether understood or not, accepted or not, reasonable or not, and more importantly, known or not / being or not.

‘It does not follow from the Heisenburg Uncertainty Principle that the physical and non-physical realms are a complementary whole (Bohr's Principle of Complementarity). All we know is that through our dependency on observer and technology, we cannot perceive things exactly at the atomic level. To infer from the Uncertainty Principle that there is a non-physical realm not only behind the physical realm, but also directing the physical realm is to make a gross assumption.’ (Excerpt from response)

‘ I assume that we are vast expanses of quantum mechanical activity if you will (by lack of finer imagery) ---Merely chose quantum mechanics as an illustration ---, and I assume that what we perceive of as knowledge is an integral part of this activity, not a detached entity beyond energy and mass.’

Where did I infer in the above that there is a nonphysical realm? By the way, I don't especially care for Niels Bohr's insights. If we can't know who we are, neither does Niels Bohr.

‘Surely, your important point from Entry 86 that we cannot know what is beyond our minds, should define what we know or do not know about the actual nature of being?! Or in your words, How can something that's beyond our minds be known or not known at all? Or in my own words that you quoted: ‘How can the body of knowledge state anything about something it can never know? It cannot even state that it can never know it.’ No definitions, no limited reasons: WE DON’T KNOW WHO WE ARE.

‘In answer to your questions, we do not say anything directly about the nature of being itself. All we do is reason its existence, and use the label, ‘who we are’ to represent that existence. The refutation of our position lies in attempting to refute our reasons for the existence of being, whereby we claim that 'being is a necessity of reason’. (Excerpt from response)

So you decide exactly how, when and where your position is supposed to be attacked?

I do not need to refute your reasons for the existence of being (attack the front gate), if I simply state that the claim: ‘We can't truly know who we are and be who we are at the same time’ is nonsensical (a fortress without walls at the back) because to say that something we can't truly do (knowing who we are) cannot be performed in synchrony with something we cannot truly know (being who we are), overcomes itself.

We can't truly know who we are (= to truly know who we are cannot be done)

In synchrony with:

Being who we are (Of which we can't truly know what it is, according to the first part!)

Whether you care to acknowledge this attack from the rear is beyond my power, but I feel it's genuine in its own right.

‘One final note, when we are referring to conscious and conscious meaning itself, we are distinguishing between conscious meaning and the phenomena/appearance behind the meaning, whereby conscious meaning gives us a vantage point to reason about our thoughts themselves, who we are etc.’ (Excerpt from response)

Reason away. I shall ever do the same. I have to quote Harry Mulish: ‘There is only surface’."

Raoul Starren November 24 2001

Response:

The limit on what we can truly know establishes that we are not claiming knowledge with absolute truth-value, thereby we avoid the contradiction of claiming we do not truly know anything from a position of truly knowing, while the notion of more reasonableness establishes a relatively objective basis to evaluate entries, whereby entries are evaluated based on their reasons, and not the individual perspectives from which they are asserted.

The evaluation of reasons is based on "consistency and soundness" of one position compared to another, which is partly attained through the transparency of the competition and the mechanisms for replies and disputes. Though we acknowledge that the competition is not perfect because the proposition and method for evaluation began from an individual starting point (your so-called "Emperor"). Yet this exclusive starting point cannot be avoided no matter what system is set up, nor can the finality of evaluations coming from one source. However, to minimize these inevitable limitations, everything in the competition is open to challenge and potential refutation and change. More important, it is not a particular point of view, as in individual opinion, which will determine the outcome of the competition. It is the reasons for a position relative to the reasons for antagonistic positions, or as we say in our response to Sam Nico’s Entry 270, "… the solution to the proposition will entail a "constant criticism" rather than an absolute answer, because of our apparent inability to truly know that we know something. Though at some point, the criticism from a particular position will either exhaust itself, or overcome the proposition by creating a situation in which the proposition cannot incorporate the criticism without contradicting itself. Even then and outside the bounds of the competition, there would be no final solution or absolute endpoint, due to the apparent non-absolute truth-value of human perspective." However, in the spirit of the competition even this position of "constant criticism" is not absolute. (i.e. it is open to challenge and possible refutation with the only condition being that the reasons themselves for the possible refutation be more reasonable than those reasons supporting the position.)

We turn to your arguments directed at the proposition with the basis for evaluation, as stated, being reasons themselves:

1. You argue that "to not know who you are implies that all ways in which you don't know are necessarily beyond your limited reason, and therefore devoid of any form of limited reason whatsoever. In that sense the proposition can be called nonsensical." In other words, you appear to be claiming that we cannot know the reasons for what we do not know viz., since we cannot know who we are, we cannot know the reasons for why we do not know who we are. However, if we do not know who we are, we must have a limited conception of who we are to allow us to know that we do not know who we are, which would then allow us to know, within limits, why we do not know who we are. Therefore, we disagree that not knowing who we are implies that all the ways in which we do not know who we are is beyond our limited reason.

2. We are not claiming to "arrive at a firm ground" by adding the contexts of "be who we are" and "at the same time" to "we cannot truly know who we are". We are simply establishing the context for "not truly knowing who we are"--"be who we are", and the context for "be who we are"--"at the same time", which connects the three parts of the proposition into an epistemic whole. You assume that the statement, "we cannot truly know who we are" applies to all situations, and yet that may not necessarily be the case. Also, how does the context of "different spaces" add to the proposition, when we have established that anytime we are being who we are we cannot truly know who we are?

3. You contend that "not truly knowing who we are" poses no practical problem because on an individual level, our identities grow whether we truly know who we are or not. However, if we cannot truly know who we are, in part or in whole, so that what we know of ourselves is not really who we are, it does not follow we can rationally invent an existence out of our identities when we know that they are not really our identities. Also, without actual identities, the grounds for law, ethics, morality, society, and science appear to collapse or simply become "language-games" (Wittgenstein). Further, if our identities are more reasonably shown to be false, it follows with our identities as the center of what we know, that everything else we know will be false as well.

4. You contend that the option that we could know who we are is excluded by the proposition itself, because we could never stop being and do some knowing at the same time. Yet you overlook that the proposition itself is asserted not as a truth, but as a limited assertion of more reasonableness, and therefore the proposition itself through its epistemic limitedness does include the possibility of knowing who we are.

5. You argue that the proposition is "nonsensical" because to say something we cannot truly do (i.e. truly know who we are) cannot be said to perform in synchronicity with something we cannot truly know (i.e. being who we are). The problem with your position is that you ignore or overlook that we are asserting the proposition from our limited perspective. (i.e. we do not need true knowledge of being who we are to establish its connection with not truly knowing who we are. We can reason the connection from our limited perspective.)

Also, you contend that the proposition is a "fortress without walls at the back", but you tell us a proposition which is not subject to infinite regress at some level or extension!

All we basically need for the proposition to make sense is the limited premise that we ourselves exist; and that is the weakness in your position, because you cannot challenge the notion of being who we are on grounds that we cannot truly know it, without contradicting your own position. (i.e. it does not follow how you can know the proposition "overcomes itself", without establishing that you yourself exist, and therefore, you have some conception of who you are, and since you agree that "we do not truly know who we are", it follows that what you know yourself as has limited truth-value, which is no different from our view of who we are in the proposition. Hence, your position is self-defeating because the reasons behind your attack from the rear on the proposition (saying something about being who we are even though we do not truly know it) are the same reasons supporting your position of attack (saying something about who you are even though you do not truly know it).)

Other issues:

It does not follow how the symbolic content of the equation, (1+1=2) is "forever static", because our perspectives are apparently constantly changing at some level.

You quote Harry Mulish, "there is only surface". But does that mean his assertion is only surface as well?! We think that due to the apparent uncertainty of what we can truly know, there may or may not be only surface.

Entries 296-298 Entries 303-306