"1. If ‘truly know who we are’ means to have complete and comprehensive knowledge of ourselves, then the proposition is true if we simply stop at ‘we cannot truly know who we are’.

This is because the standard of knowledge implied by the word ‘truly’ is impossible. ‘Truly know who we are’ must at least involve complete physical knowledge, for example of all our bodily systems, endocrine, muscular, central nervous, digestive, and many other systems, plus their complex interactions; and yet that relatively observable knowledge is beyond the capacity of any doctor, or indeed of the whole of medical science. Then add the necessity, to attain the standard implied by ‘truly’, to also know every aspect of our own personalities, all our memories, all our intellectual capacities, all of our hopes and fears and shames and secrets and drives and so on, including - which is surely a contradiction and therefore impossible - knowing the mental events and capacities we are not conscious of. If that is not impossible enough for you (and its impossibility is quite clear to me), then remember that ‘truly knowing’ ourselves must also involve knowing those extraordinary and crucially important things that the particles we are made of do at the sub-atomic level.

So, if it is true (as I think I have reasonably demonstrated) that we cannot truly know who we are, then it follows that it is also true that we cannot truly know who we are ‘and be who we are at the same time’. In fact there is no need even to consider the truth of the second part of the proposition. It would be equally true to say, ‘We cannot truly know who we are and ride a bicycle,’ or ‘We cannot truly know who we are and lie on the couch.’

That is, if A cannot be done, then logic dictates that A + B, or A + C, or A plus anything at all, also cannot be done.

2. There are two ways of moving further. One is to propose that ‘we’ are imaginary beings of some sort, gods for example, that happen to include ‘true’ self-knowledge among our attributes; therefore the ‘we’ we are talking about can ‘truly know who we are’. The goddess Erda, who appears in Wagner's Ring cycle, is called ‘all-knowing’, and therefore part of her identity is that she must know herself. Some people make similar claims for the god YHWH, a character in the Bible.

But the imaginary being I will propose is a simple one: this god is a sentient, though extremely simple-minded, circle.

It is a sentient, simple-minded circle, and it knows that it is a sentient simple-minded circle. In fact, knowing that it is a sentient and simple-minded circle is the only thing that this circle does; that's why it's so simple-minded.

Therefore it seems that it can be itself and know itself at the same time. It knows that it is what it is, and it is what it knows it is.

The problem, of course, is essentially the one described by Gödel a century ago, that no system, no matter how simple or how complex, can include a complete self-definition. Thus my circle, if it knows itself, becomes a sentient simple-minded circle that knows it is a sentient simple-minded circle. Therefore, to truly know itself, it's not enough to know it's a sentient simple-minded circle; it has to know that it is a sentient simple-minded circle that knows it is a sentient simple-minded circle.

Of course, that additional self-knowledge adds to what the circle is: it means the circle is a sentient simple-minded circle that knows it is a sentient simple-minded circle that knows it is a sentient simple-minded circle. If it knows that, then to truly know itself it now has to know that it is a sentient single-minded circle that knows it is a sentient simple-minded circle that knows it is a sentient simple-minded circle. This cycle goes on forever, to infinity, in what Gödel calls ‘recursive reflexivity’. The knowledge never includes the whole system, because the knowledge expands the nature of the system it tries to know.

In short every ‘act’ of true self-knowledge, even in this simplest of systems, inherently changes what the self-knowing being is, by adding to its nature another layer of self-knowledge; the self-knowledge then has to expand to take in that newly expanded being, thus making the being that includes that self-knowledge ever more complex. The self-knowledge becomes more complex to include the more complex nature; therefore the nature becomes more complex to include the more complex self-knowledge. And so on, forever.

Thus even this thought-experiment involving a being capable of knowing itself leads to the conclusion that it cannot know itself and be itself, including its own total self- knowledge, at the same time. (We could explore ‘at the same time’ further, but we won't.)

So even if we were all-knowing gods, we could not truly know who we are and be who we are at the same time.

3. Another way of moving further is to lower the grain, or level of resolution, in the level of self-knowledge required to meet the test of ‘truly knowing who we are’.

For example John ‘truly knows who he is’ in the sense that most people mean by those words. For example, if John were to describe himself physically, any person who has read or heard his self-description would instantly recognise him from that description, if they walked into a crowded room that had him in it. If he were to describe his mind, I expect that a telepath (another imaginary being) would know it was him from his description of the way he thinks, if the telepath happened to mind-meld with him without first being introduced. And his self-descriptions as driver (alternating nervousness and flamboyance), lover (superb!), Trivial Pursuit player (deadly, but weak on the sports questions), and so on, will likewise all prove to be quite accurate, including acknowledgment of his weaknesses and faults. Thus, for all practical conversational, real-use- of-language-by-ordinary-people, purposes, John can say, ‘I truly know who I am’.

And at that level of self-knowledge, we don't need to engage with Gödel's recursive reflexivity paradox, because this kind of self-knowledge is too ‘fuzzy’ to be caught in something as infinitely narrow, or precise, or sharp, as Gödel's paradox.

Thus, if I acknowledge to myself that I am [let us assume that a long self-description follows, covering physical, intellectual, moral, character and personality attributes, also tastes, indulgences, loathings, and the story of my life so far, and much more], then my knowledge of those things about myself, and that I know that I know them, has already been taken into account in that self-description.

In this slightly fuzzy but everyday-usage sense of ‘truly know who I am’, I can truly know who I am, and be that person that I know I am, at the same time.

This less fine-grained self-knowledge is of course not ‘perfect’ self-knowledge. But of course it will do for all practical purposes.

4. That ‘will do for all practical purposes’ is important. In practice the senses in which it is true to say ‘we cannot know who we are and be who we are at the same time’ are not senses that impact on, let alone have important consequences for, ethics, morality, politics, the law etc.

Just as those disciplines ignore the philosophical fact that we can't prove the universe really exists, proceeding instead from the assumption that ‘consensus reality’ exists and is what we think it is, those disciplines rightly take personal identity to be a fuzzy yet robust thing. That is, we need not know a person's every last thought, or desire, or experience, or nerve ending, to ‘know who they are’. We merely need to know enough to be able to identify them and distinguish them from other people, and to expect that there will be some continuity from day to day in the way they appear and the way they think, from day to day, though there may occasionally be surprises.

Similarly, we know who we are well enough to sign a contract, or engage in a relationship, or vote, or express an opinion, without any sense that the gaps in our self- knowledge incapacitate us from doing so.

In summary, there are strict philosophical senses in which it is entirely true to say that ‘we cannot truly know who we are and be who we are at the same time’, but those senses do not have important consequences when we are not speaking in a strict philosophical sense."

Laon Shelley November 14 2001

Response:

The main problem with your position regarding the practicality and thereby sufficiency of self-knowledge, is that the position lacks an epistemology. You define true knowledge as "complete and comprehensive", and yet you only apply it to knowledge of ourselves as a whole, while assuming that our part knowledge of ourselves like knowledge of our intellect, moral, character, personal attributes, and biological make-up, are themselves true knowledge. However, according to your own argument, this part knowledge of ourselves is equally subject to "recursive reflexivity" or infinite regress, as larger systems of knowledge are. Yet your notion of practicality is partly contingent on this part knowledge of ourselves being true, because otherwise there would be no ground to say that this part knowledge is practical. (i.e. it does not follow how we can say our part knowledge of ourselves is practical when we know that it is not really who we are.) Also, the notion of practicality itself, due to its lack of absolute ground, is arbitrary, and therefore, your claim of practicality is simply your opinion.

To get around this problem of arbitrariness you more reasonably defend the practicality of our self-knowledge, by arguing that the claim of no true knowledge of ourselves is impractical because the major systems of the world like ethics, morality, politics, and law are contingent on perceived true knowledge of ourselves. Yet these systems are not absolute, and therefore it is not beyond them to absorb the claim of no true knowledge of ourselves. (i.e. just because the claim of no true knowledge of ourselves is not part of major systems, it does not mean it cannot be part of them.) In fact, a case can be made that law is gradually dealing with this claim through gradually incorporating the notion of interconnectedness.

Also, you defend your position by claiming that a "consensus reality" on knowledge of who we are exists. Yet it does not necessarily follow that majority opinion or consensus on self-knowledge or any other knowledge, is correct. (i.e. the quantification of opinion does not necessarily result in the most informed, accurate decision. In fact, the concept of democracy as a decision-making method is inherently flawed because it focuses on the quantification of opinion instead of the actual reasons for a decision.) Hence, it does not necessarily follow that consensus equates with practicality, nor does it follow that the claim of no true knowledge of ourselves cannot form a consensus reality.

In addition, you argue that we know ourselves "well enough" in the world whether through having a relationship, playing on a team, or expressing our opinion, without any significant gaps in our self-knowledge. Yet it does not follow that the lack of true self-knowledge results in inaction. Moreover, your notion of "well enough" takes us back to your initial claim of having part true knowledge of ourselves, and the lack of epistemology to support the position. So it is unclear that our knowledge of ourselves is well enough, because it may not even be accurate knowledge of ourselves. (i.e. your notion of "well enough" is contingent on having part true knowledge of ourselves, which may not even exist. According to the proposition, which you have conceded in a strict philosophical sense, it does not.)

If there is no true knowledge of ourselves, in part or whole, due to the representative nature of our conscious knowledge, how can disciplines like ethics, morality and law which are contingent on knowledge of individuals, continue to exist without eventually succumbing to internal inconsistency? Also, if there is no true knowledge of ourselves, how can society be maintained based on knowing, within limits, the untrue nature of self-knowledge?

Why is the strict philosophical sense disconnected from other disciplines, when the basis for them is a strict philosophical sense? It appears that we are on the edge of change, in which the other disciplines must refute our strict philosophical sense of who we are or absorb it, or eventually be overcome by it. A discipline by ignoring an external philosophical sense, while shielding its own, will eventually succumb through its own dogma. Therefore, we disagree that the strict philosophical sense has no important consequences in a practical sense. In fact, we maintain it has profound practical consequences, as illustrated by the ideas of Marx, Socrates, Nietzsche, and Kant; though the undercurrent of its profundity may not be seen until it actually topples a system of thought from its philosophical base, or significantly alters it.

In short, for your argument to work, you need to establish an epistemology for part true knowledge of ourselves, while more reasonably show that the notion of no true knowledge of ourselves, in a holistic and strict philosophical sense, has no practical application. Merely saying that the notion is not part of current major systems and consensus reality, and that current self-knowledge works well without significant gaps, is not enough.

297. Entry:

"This proposition is quite an interesting one. When one first looks at it, it is very easy to say that the proposition can be easily proven. To do so is to act under the assumption that one knows one's self through one's observations of one's self. Upon deeper thought and exploration into this website I realized that quite different premises were present. First I restate the proposition. We cannot know who we are and be who we are at the same time. There are several things which stem from this proposition being true. I am not giving the observer a gender here.1. An observer may know who other observers are, by observing them.2. An observer may not know who it is, by observing itself. A man standing in a forest can observe everything around him in terms of his eyesight. He can see how things appear fully. In the same way we can see how others are ‘fully’. However, when the man tries to see himself as he fully is, he is met with the problem at looking at himself from his head and only seeing several parts of his body. He also cannot see that which provides that which he is observing in terms of. Or, he cannot see his eyes which partially account for him seeing everything around him fully. (In this analogy knowing who someone is, is defined as seeing them fully.) In the same way we cannot know who we are by direct observation of ourselves by us. Just as the man cannot see what allows him to see by looking at himself, so we cannot know who we are by looking at ourselves. A next possible step would be to appeal to another principle. A principle of somehow delving into the mind of another observer. However this goes against the proposition and must be discounted. Since theoretically being in the mind of another observer makes us no longer be who we are. But maybe there is a way of knowing who we are and being who we are at the same time. Then the solution must be to know who we are in terms of the knowledge of who we are of another. I.e. Object A must observe the observation of Object B, when object B is observing object A. For the man in the forest this would be a mirror. Although the mirror may not be alive, the man can see how he is in terms of how the mirror observes him. And so we must know who we are by knowing what another knows that we are. In this way we remain who we are and know who we are at the same time. I wish it would, but the problem does not stop there. Although a concise response has been asked for, I must continue the puzzle in search of an answer. When the man sees himself in the mirror he sees a distorted image. Although it is a reflection, it is an opposite of him. So he still does not see himself fully as another observer sees him. Therefore our knowing ourselves in terms of someone else knowing us, is an incomplete and a distorted knowing. I was a bit stumped at this point, but after a few minutes of careful analysis I tried an experiment with a mirror. The experiment leads me to conclude: In order for the man in the woods to see himself fully and how he really is, the man must not use one mirror but must instead use two. In all that would be three observers. This is how it works out. The man looks into mirror B. He also stands in front of the much larger mirror A. He holds his left hand to his left ear. In the large mirror A he observes a man who looks almost exactly alike but is grabbing his right ear with his right hand. That is the previously mentioned distorted and ‘untrue’ image. However the man then holds up the small mirror B in his right hand and looks at the reflection of mirror A in mirror B. All this while he still holds his left hand to his left ear and faces mirror A. In this way he sees himself as he really is, and in the case of the proposition he knows himself as he is. So it is possible to know who we are, while at the same time being who we are by knowing how someone knows how someone knows us."

Jay Nakonechny November 16 2001

Response:

How can an observer truly know who you are even though the observer is outside of you? (i.e. how can the observer know every detail about you including your inner most thoughts and your physical make-up like the complex interactions entailed in your nervous system. (In your brain alone that amounts to about 12 trillion neurons interacting with 3,000 to 100,000 other neurons.) Also, what is it about the observer’s knowledge of you that makes it true viz., complete?)

If truly knowing oneself is just a matter of getting outside of oneself, then an observer could simply share his/her knowledge of you with you. But it does not follow that every observer of you would have identical knowledge of you, and therefore getting outside of oneself in terms of an observer, does not equate with true knowledge of oneself, otherwise the knowledge of you by all observers would be the same. Hence, it appears that getting outside of oneself is not a direction for solution to the proposition. Yet to overcome this non-identical problem, we could settle for general knowledge of you, but then we would face the problem of how that knowledge itself could be true or complete?

In your example with the two mirrors, the man in the woods, or anyone else, would still be perceiving through himself except his observation visually would be in an indirect way. In our view, the significance of the two mirror example is that it allows us to perceive ourselves in a detached manner, but it is unclear how that detached manner allows us to truly know who we are. What is it about our perception of ourselves in mirror A through mirror B that allows us to truly know who we are? How can we be more reasonably certain that our knowledge of ourselves from mirror B is truly who we are?

298. Entry:

Reply to the response to Entry 289

"You start with ‘To illustrate, statement (a)...’. My first most reasonable belief is not actually circular, it is, at most, question begging (that is, begging the question of whether or not I exist). However, (a) could be restated as to exclude the use of ‘I’ or any reflexive pronoun for that matter. For example:

a') Whatever is responsible for this utterance exists

This reformulation is not subject to the ‘begging the question’ argument. The reason I didn't pose it as such initially was because 'I' does not necessarily imply a reflexive pronoun, though in natural language (English in particular) it is used exactly for such a purpose. It is because the existence of the utterance itself entails the existence of the utterance, of course. That is, the existence of the utterance entails that something exists (at least, the utterance itself). Even if the utterance is ‘created’ ex nihilo (or alternatively, eternally existed), it does not disqualify the existence of something, viz., the utterance itself.

There are some issues that need to be raised regarding the Cartesian program. First, ‘I think, therefore I am’ does not entail the existence of a thinker. It rationally implies the existence of thought at most. Similarly, the revised (a') does not entail a something doing the uttering, since of course it is logically possible for the utterance to exist in and of itself - independent from anything else. So your question that ‘where do these utterances come from’ and that like is irrelevant.

Second, and furthermore, it is not more reasonable to assert that beings other than myself exist, since it is impossible for me to know this with more certainty than that I know myself to exist. Therefore, it is the most reasonable to assert that something, viz., this utterance, exists, and nothing more. It is also reasonable to assert that a non-reflexive pronoun - 'I' - be used to express what it is that is responsible for this utterance. And finally, that what I have previously asserted is the only thing certain. And therefore my previous argument holds. Namely, that I exist and I know myself in every conceivable way since I am at most an utterance.

Finally, creation does not imply creation from something. Hence ‘creation ex nihilo’. Indeed, sub-atomic particles are created ‘ex nihilo’ in a vacuum, and are then ‘instantly’ annihilated as to preserve the law of energy/mass conservation. But anyway, that example is used as analogy only. And as for Sartre's theory, I suggest looking into it yourself, since it has already been articulated by Sartre, and there's no further need for me to attempt its articulation. The theory has its merits, and definitely at least as meritorious as the one you propose for consciousness. This theory however does overcome your proposed challenge, which is why I strongly suggest looking into further."

Michael De November 18 2001

Response:

Though you make a persuasive challenge to the proposition, we think your challenge falls short, because you equate the notion of first awareness with more reasonableness, and yet there is nothing about more reasonableness that favours what is first apparent. (i.e. you argue that you as an utterance is first apparent, as suggested by Descartes’ assertion, "I think therefore I am", and because of that first awareness, you argue that it is most reasonable that you are an utterance over anything else.)

Also, your challenge lacks an epistemology so that even if your claim that ‘you are at most an utterance’ were accepted, it does not necessarily follow that it is a valid claim or a claim with absolute truth-value.

Further, it is unclear what this "utterance" is, and yet you claim to know yourself in "every conceivable way". To get around this problem you assert that "I" or "whatever" is a non-reflexive pronoun, thereby also avoid the problem of how you know yourself through yourself. However, if "I" is non-reflexive, then you are asserting that you are what you utter, which still leaves us with the problem of how you can know you are an utterance, because that is what you are? The way ahead is to use a reflexive pronoun, but then you contradict your claim that you are an utterance, because the use of a reflexive pronoun suggests you are more than an utterance. (i.e. an utterance cannot reflect upon itself because that is what it is.) So either way, reflexive or non-reflexive pronoun, and despite the first awareness of utterance, you fall short of showing how you can truly know who you are through utterance itself.

In further critique of your challenge, you assert that the belief, "whatever is responsible for the utterance exists", means that the utterance must entail something that exists, and at least the existence of utterance itself. We agree with your position because it does not follow how something can exist, in whatever form, without actually existing. However, just because the utterance itself must at least exist, does not necessarily mean that the utterance itself actually exists. (i.e. the utterance may be an illusory form in your mind, so that there is no utterance itself as in actual object.) This point is important because it throws into question your claim that you are at most an utterance. To get around this problem, you argue that it is "logically possible" for the utterance to exist in and of itself, and yet the same can be said for something doing the uttering. So again you fall short, and in this case in showing that you are at most an utterance.

By arguing that you know that you exist with more certainty than the existence of other beings, you confuse first apparent viz., "I think therefore I am" with more reasonableness. In other words, just because you are first aware of your thoughts does not mean it is more certain that you exist over any other being. (i.e. you are assuming that it is you who is aware of the utterance (or is the utterance), and that you know what "you" is in relation to other beings.) If we follow your argument, all you know is that at least the utterance itself exist, and yet you then insert your exclusive identity as though the mere existence of the utterance means with most certainty that only you exist, which is not necessarily the case.

We do not understand your notion of "creation ex nihilo". How can something be created simply out of nothing? (i.e. how can there be creation without a force, impetus, or cause for it at some level?) You refer to sub-atomic particles being created ex nihilo in a vacuum, and yet Heisenburg shows through his Uncertainty Principle that the actual physical structure of atomic particles, including sub-atomic particles, cannot be fully known, which suggests you are assuming that the particles are created ex nihilo.

We agree that Sartre’s theory of consciousness is worthy of further investigation ['Transcendence of the Ego: An Existentialist Theory of Consciousness’], but at this stage we disagree that his theory overcomes the proposition, because it does not follow how ourselves as utterances, or thought, in each moment can deal with the apparent dynamic nature of utterances, whereby as soon as we know who we are, we cease to know who we are, or as Laon Shelley says in Entry 296 and with reference to Gödel, we face the "recursive reflexivity" of utterances.

Entries 293-295,  Entries 299-302