"‘Reason’ and some ‘objectivity’ being the sole standard of ‘knowing’, we may not know that we cannot truly know who we are and be who we are at the same time. Knowing being that which is surely believed--a fuzzy matter of degrees--we may. Believing being that which not only is subconsciously held to somewhere in the psyche, but that which makes up the conscious noetic structure as well as that which is acted upon, it is sure that we may know who we are.

Knowing must necessarily originate from without. We know ourselves, because it has been suddenly ‘injected’ (I have an essay upon this subject) into us--just like we were suddenly injected into this world of existence. Taking the sensus divinitatis as knowledge, we attain some sort of sensus omnis. This includes the sensus ipsius. In that we act, think, and believe upon the foundation provided by the sensus omnis, we do know ourselves. We may not have privileged knowledge of who we are, but we do know it.

Knowledge being a ‘fuzzy matter of degrees’, there is no such thing as knowing something in its entirety for us finite men. Rather, we know things insufficiently and sufficiently.

Lastly, it is more rational that we know who we are than that we know that we cannot know who we are, because not only do we act and think as though we know ourselves, but because it is irrational to think that we do know sufficiently [1] our own self. And, it is also irrational to think that we can somehow step out of our own skins. Whatever the case, be it that we do know ourselves, because all knowledge starts from a direct implantation and revelation from the Creator.

[1] We do not know, for example, when we will die, what we were thinking about precisely three years ago, etc. However, we do know enough about ourselves. Many of us may even have a clear *calling* in this life, which tells us most certainly who we be. For, it is in knowing that which we live for that we know what it is that lives for it. Although Jeremiah 17:9 says, ‘The heart is deceitful above all things, and desperately wicked: who can know it?,’ it is speaking poetically. We do know ourselves sufficiently, and that is enough."

Berek Qinah Smith November 10 2001

Response:

We agree that it is possible who we are is "subconsciously held to somewhere in the psyche" and "makes up the conscious noetic which is acted upon", and therefore we may truly know who we are. However, we disagree that it is more probable that we truly know who we are than we do not based on the reasons you give.

You argue that knowledge of ourselves has been "suddenly injected" by the Creator, which ties to your claim that "knowing must necessarily originate from without". In other words, you appear to be claiming that all knowledge originates from without through the Creator of our existence, so that we have no control over what we know. Yet you also claim that we can only know in degrees of fuzziness with no absolute endpoints. So it follows based on your argument and regardless of the injection of knowledge that we can only know who we are in a degree of fuzziness rather than with absolute truth-value.

The issue of whether we know ourselves "sufficiently" or not, does not pertain to the competition which is focused on whether we can truly know who we are or not. Though if it is more reasonable that we cannot truly know who we are, then the notion of sufficient knowledge of ourselves would lose meaning, because there would be no basis for it. The best we could say is that we have sufficiently limited, representational knowledge of who we are, without actually knowing who we are. Our limited identity of ourselves would simply be a means.

Also, if you argue that we can only know who we are in a degree of fuzziness, but what we know of ourselves is truly who we are because it has been implanted by the Creator, then your argument would face a number of problems that need to be addressed:

1. the injection of knowledge from without is inconsistent with the notion of knowledge being derived from what we reason of past knowledge.

2. it does not follow how the Creator or anything else could have true knowledge itself and know it. (i.e. in order for the Creator to have true knowledge of ourselves and implant it, the Creator must have true knowledge of itself since it is the creator of ourselves. To create implies an act of infinity.)

3. there is no empirical evidence of knowledge being injected into our minds (Also, how is this knowledge being implanted? In what form is the knowledge being implanted? How can we know within the bounds of reason that there is a Creator since it is apparently beyond our comprehension?)

4. it does not follow how something can be directly transplanted into ourselves, without a relation being established between the thing transplanted and ourselves, so that what we know of the thing transplanted is mere representation of it. In other words, even implantation faces a relationship. One way around this point is to say that knowledge of who we are is inherently part of ourselves, but this leads back to the notion of implantation.

5. where does the Creator’s true knowledge of ourselves come from? It appears that the knowledge must be representational, since it more reasonably cannot be ex nihilo ("out of nothing"), and therefore the knowledge of ourselves, whether implanted or not, is not true knowledge.

Though we acknowledge that the Creator argument overcomes the problem of getting outside of ourselves to know ourselves, the inside/outside problem is merely shifted to another source. (Point 2) (Note, Kevin Ward in Entries 84, 87, 96, 100, 104, 106, 107 takes a similar position as your own, by arguing that in a moment of selflessness, thereby oneness with the Creator, we can truly know who we are. (Our knowledge of ourselves is "whole" or in oneness with the Creator.) The main problem with his position is that it does not follow how we can know anything about the Creator since according to his argument it is the basis for our existence. You attempt to overcome this problem by arguing that the knowledge is directly implanted into our minds.)

Also, Roger McEvilly in Entries 187, 189 takes a similar position to your own by proposing that conscious knowledge is derived from a direct continuum with an external source, so that there is no transfer or representation of knowledge. Though the main problem with his position is the implied relationship between non-space-time knowledge (unconscious) and space-time knowledge (conscious), and the notion of continuous knowledge ("mind-force") tapping directly through our sensory when our sensory itself implies an indirect relation with external stimulus.

294. Entry:

"Talking of ultimate truth, I suggest that we don't have anything as such. Reality is something defined entirely by way of processing information we human beings perceive through the five senses. Our five senses and processing of information by our brain do not seem to have much significance in the cosmological vastness. (Well, the cosmological vastness is also something we have perceived with our five senses.) So the whole thing becomes a more and more obscure when you think about it. I believe Lord Buddha suggested something similar when he said that entire existence of 'me' 'myself' is an illusion.

Talking about 'five senses' I have read somewhere it said that it is wrong to say that we have only five senses. With the advancement of science and technology we are capable of converting physical stimulus, which were not originally caused by any sensory input to us to forms, which we can perceive. For example we could not 'feel' earth magnetic field. We could not find out direction using this phenomenon. However, with the invention of compass we can 'feel' or see the magnetic field. Compass converts the magnetic field into a movement of a spindle, which we could see and perceive. Likewise, radio-telescopes enable use to 'see' far reaches of the universe. It magnifies the minute amounts of radio energy we receive from faraway galaxies and coverts them to visible from so we can see them as we are seeing them through an optical-telescope. So it seems now we have whole lot of sensory inputs than just five! But we should not get carried away with this idea. After all we have ONLY ONE sensory input! We have these neurotransmitters from all over our body firing sensory input in the form of electric pulses into our brain and our brain interprets them the way it likes. This is the way we humans function. This is the way it had been; this is the way now, and it will be. And talking about this scientific model of our brain where we have neurotransmitters and all, well again this is a model we arrived at using the knowledge gathered from sensory inputs we think we have.

I hope most of you who read this has seen or heard about the movie ‘The Matrix’. This is a sci-fi movie, which I really liked for the fascinating plot. Matrix talks about a future world where artificial intelligence has taken over and human civilization ceases to exist. Humans are 'grown' inside glass chambers, with all their sensory input nerves are tapped to a huge matrix of computer system. The sensory inputs are fed to them by the computer system. Computer system is so powerful that they process information regarding each and every human and feed input to them individually while taking actions of other humans also in to consideration. These humans don't know anything about what's happening. They live in a world created by these sensory inputs, which is no different from the 'real' world. In fact this kind of arrangement is theoretically possible with sufficiently advance technology. The moral of the story is 'REAL' does not have any meaning. We all could be part of some experiment by some super human beings and we don't have a clue. What makes you think that it could not be the case? It could well be! We cannot truly know who we are and be who we are at the same time without contradicting ourselves."

Prasad Mapatuna November 11 2001

Response:

We disagree that "with the advancement of science and technology we are capable of converting physical stimulus, which were not originally caused by any sensory input to us to forms, which we can perceive", because the devises for converting physical stimulus whether a compass or radio-telescopes, are invented from our sensory input, and therefore, the sensory input from these devises is indirectly and originally from our sensory input, while the reception of sensory input from these devises must be through our own sensory receptors. Or as you later say, "we have ONLY ONE sensory input [regardless of the devises we use]. In other words, the sensory devises stemming from our sensory input merely extend our sensory reception.

How is it theoretically possible, within a more reasonable limit, for human beings to be exclusively confined to sensory inputs from a computer system? Right away, the theory fails because there is no such thing as an absolute computer system. (i.e. a computer system that receives no external input.)

By suggesting that a computer system could control all of human existence with sufficient advancement in technology, we think you are grossly underestimating the complexity of the human brain and its neural system, and overestimating the power of computers. We support our assertion with reference to Steve Burwen from Entry 209, who has neuroscience background and states "…. Your brain contains 12 trillion neurons, which are connected to anywhere from 3,000 to 100,000 other neurons. This is a lot of interconnections. To calculate how many connections this is, is very interesting. Mathematically, this is known as a "combinatorial explosion" problem because of the large numbers generated…. In practical terms, this means that… your brain is the equivalent of millions of the most powerful computer chips. Your brain is thousands, probably millions, of times more complex than the most powerful computer we can build-- not bad for a blob of "mere matter" that weighs only 3 pounds." To get what you are getting at in terms of complexity, we need to times (12 trillion neurons by 3,000 to 100,000 other neurons) by 6 billion plus, while not even considering the feasibility of how a computer system could control the entire sensory input of a human being, let alone the entire human species.

However, we agree that it is possible that a super human being or computer system, or even a monkey is controlling human existence, or even nothing at all. Yet from our perspective, the important thing is what is probable, or better still, what is more probable. Hence, we disagree with your conclusion that our claim that we cannot truly know who we are is contradictory, because we are making the claim not from a position absolute truth-value, but from a position of more reasonableness. The mere possibility of truly knowing who we are does nothing to contradict our claim, just as your claim that it is possible a computer system could eventually control all of human existence does nothing, assuming possibility is a constant, to show that it is probable.

295. Entry:

Reply to the response to Entry 291

‘You appear to be arguing that our thoughts are who we are, or in your words, ‘an integral part of THAT which is being’. Therefore, according to your reasoning, we can truly know who we are, because what we know is who we are’. (Excerpt from response)

"I do say: ‘An integral part of THAT which is being’, but a toenail is also an integral part of my body, but it can in no way ‘truly know’ me. Neither can my brain.
I do not (and did never) contest the fact that we can't truly know (‘who we are’ attached or not), but the proposition doesn't read: ‘We can't truly know (who we are)’:

It has this odd attachment addressing being (which we can't truly know) and simultaneousness (between something we can't do (truly know)and something we can't truly know (being)).
To call such a statement irrefutable, is what appears unreasonable to me.

‘...If anything, by concluding that our thoughts, and thereby definitions, are an integral part of THAT which is being, and that ‘being is dynamic’, you are implicitly claiming that definitions of being are dynamic as well. So your claim, on grounds of staticness, that the second half of the proposition is identical to the first half of the proposition, and thereby the proposition is overcome, is incorrect according to your own reasons’. (Excerpt from response)

The definitions are a part of THAT which is being, in so far as our perceptions of them are concerned. The definitions themselves only are through the fact that they exist out of paper and ink molecules, photons emitted from a PC-screen, or syllables when they are in spoken language. The reason I said they are static, is that the sequence of symbols by which a definition is expressed doesn't change over time. Everything it claims to refer to (being: quantum particles, DNA, neurons, muscles, etc.) does. This is how I feel definitions themselves are not part of the fabric of existence, while our perceptions of them are. (If we move to conclude that a definition is in the eye of the beholder, then let me tell you that the proposition has been overcome by me!)

2. ‘We can use our reason to represent who we are, just you did by claiming that ‘It [who we are] is simply there’, or ‘[our representations] are an integral part of THAT which is being’. (i.e. the ‘It’ and ‘THAT’ are representations of whatever we are. We think the important distinction here, is that what we know in terms of conscious meaning is separate from the conscious meaning itself. In other words, our vantage point lies in meaning rather than meaning itself.)’ (Excerpt from response)

Knowledge and conscious meaning are in my view not separable. Show a dream catcher to a Chinese file clerk and an Indian shaman, or the equations of the theory of relativity to Jennifer Lopez and Albert Einstein.

4. ‘By claiming that there is no basis for being, you are claiming that being or who we are comes from nothing (‘ex nihilo’). Yet how can something simply come from nothing?’ (Excerpt from response)

I do not need to show how something comes from nothing to claim that the universe came from ‘something’ I understand as to be ‘nothing’. This claim is perfectly equivalent to the claim that the universe sprang from ‘something’.
The great question of ‘Who created God (or the universe)?’ is being paraphrased here. Himself (something)? Or no One (nothing)?

‘How can something come from nothing, and yet at the same time be dynamic? How can something be dynamic without having a basis for it to be dynamic?’ (Excerpt from response)

If something COMEs from nothing, it will allways be dynamic. And were it to come from nothing, its basis will be nothing, meaning ‘no - thing’.

- nothing IS dynamic. BEING has no basis. In the latter case we would still have something to define, in the first we would not.

5. ‘You assume that our thoughts are an integral part of who we are [or THAT which is being], without explaining in what sense they are an integral part of who we are. Nor have you shown why our thoughts are an integral part of who we are’. (Excerpt from response)

I assume that we are vast expanses of quantum mechanical activity if you will (by lack of finer imagery), and I assume that what we perceive of as knowledge is an integral part of this activity. Not a detached entity beyond energy and mass. We can perceive in this something we then call ‘static’, but the underlying quantum-mechanical sea knows it not. This sea to me is the fabric of being. This is how I explain that our perception of ‘to know who we are’ will always exist in parallel with the quantum-mechanical sea which is being, simply because there is no other medium present in the universe.

‘...But even if you did, you would face the problem from point 3 on how we can truly know who we are from a position of epistemic innateness’. (Excerpt from response)

I do not face this problem in my opinion. I agree that we can't know who we are, but for god's sake tell me what this ‘...and be who we are at the same time’ is doing in the proposition then!
I mean: What discerns it in this perspective from:
We can't truly know who we are and bake pancakes on the lawn at the same time?
In my opinion absolutely nothing.

I repeat that I fully agree that we can't truly know, since this word ‘truly’ can be meaningful only within one's self and I would never call my own knowledge true. Sincere perhaps, perhaps I can sincerely know, but to know truly seems without meaning to me. To paraphrase Madonna:
‘Knowledge isn't true, it's just something that we do’.
The second half of the proposition to me holds no reason and is therefore the Achilles' heel of the proposition, which I have shot my arrows in already."

Raoul Starren November 12 2001

Response:

We do not claim that the proposition is "irrefutable". We claim that the proposition is irrefutable within the limit of more reasonableness.

Also, we disagree with you that the second half of the proposition is the Achilles’ heel of the proposition. Though you have shot your arrows at the proposition, by claiming in Entry 281 that the second half of the proposition is wordy and redundant, and in Entry 277 that the second half of the proposition makes the proposition nonsensical, we feel that your arrows have missed their target. To illustrate, we do not view the second half of the proposition as wordy and redundant, but as a necessary part of the proposition because it establishes a context for the first half of the proposition, without which the proposition would be ambiguous. For instance, by simply using "we cannot truly know who we are", it leads to the question,
in what sense can we not truly know who we are? When we are asleep? Not alive? Infants?
The answer is, as the second half of the proposition states, when being who we are. (Note, this answer does not mean or imply that we can truly know who we are when not being who we are, nor does it necessarily mean we can know anything directly about what who we are represents. Also, we could delete the phrase, "at the same time", but then we would be without a context for "be who we are", thereby succumb to ambiguity as well.)

In terms of Entry 277, the proposition if true within limits, does not mean that we can stop being within reasonable limits, because we are not claiming to know with absolute truth-value. (i.e. we are claiming that we can know who we are within the limit of more reasonableness, but not truly know who we are either in the more reasonable limit or no limit at all. Therefore, your argument, as stated in your words, "if we can know within reasonable limits, it follows that we can stop being within reasonable limits, according to the proposition. Otherwise, within reasonable limits, we would actually be able to know who we are... " does not hold.)

Even if a definition is in the "eye of the beholder", it does not necessarily follow that the individual behind the definition can know who he or she is. To make this connection, you need to more reasonably show the epistemology for the individual in question. Also, a definition itself does not have to be inherently part of ‘being’ to be dynamic. In other words, we see no reason to believe that being has a monopoly on the notion of dynamic. (Note, it appears that whatever form or non-form a definition itself takes, it cannot help from being dynamic at some level.)

Your play on the word "nothing" --> "no-thing" is consistent with our view that there is an unconscious basis to being, which by definition is beyond our comprehension. However, you use quantum mechanical activity to express an assumed relation between the unconscious (being) and conscious (non-being). However, from the response to Entry 189, we think your use of quantum physics falls short:

"1. There is no direct evidence that the properties of the universe transcend space-time, as in the superposition of electrons. More specifically, the superposition of Quantum Mechanics is an unprovable/unverifiable hypothesis, because it refers to something beyond human cognition. (i.e. we can only think in terms of space-time, so the notion of something outside of space-time is also outside of our cognitive capability.

1.1 Though empirical evidence may 'suggest' that all electrons (and some other particles) of the universe have exactly the same properties--mass, charge, and so on, it cannot show that they do, because of the Heisenburg Uncertainty Principle, which states that our need to use light photon particles to observe electron particles alters the electron particles, so that we cannot know with certainty the atomic structure of electrons. Also, empirical evidence is dependent on an observer and the technology used for observing, and therefore, we may not have the technological or physical capability to observe property differences in electrons, even though structural differences in electrons may be present.

1.2 It does not follow from the Heisenburg Uncertainty Principle that the physical and non-physical realms are a complementary whole (Bohr’s Principle of Complementarity). All we know is that through our dependency on observer and technology, we cannot perceive things exactly at the atomic level. To infer from the Uncertainty Principle that there is a non-physical realm not only behind the physical realm, but also directing the physical realm is to make a gross assumption."

Surely, your important point from Entry 86 that we cannot know what is beyond our minds, should define what we know or do not know about the actual nature of being?! Or in your words,

"The word ‘being’ can in my opinion never refer to what it's supposed to refer to, namely this state that's forever beyond the grasp of language. It merely creates the illusion that we know what we're referring to (In a similar way as with the word ‘God’). Since we can't get outside our minds and know that we are outside of them, we can't speak reasonably about being, when we KNOW that we are speaking "truths" concerning it. Therefore, we can't know what we're talking about. Somehow we merely "are" in the talking itself. I suppose that the proposition can't possibly be clear on what it's referring to. Hence, the challenge is insurmountable in one sense and artistic in an other. In the end one could say, that it's the proposition itself that claims to have exceeded the limits of knowledge. It's the proposition itself, that makes assumptions about a phenomenon, supposed to be forever beyond its grasp, since the proposition itself is founded in knowledge (and language). This phenomenon is supposed to be unknowable. How can the body of knowledge state anything about something it can never know? It cannot even state that it can never know it."

In answer to your questions, we do not say anything directly about the nature of being itself. All we do is reason its existence, and use the label, "who we are" to represent that existence. The refutation of our position lies in attempting to refute our reasons for the existence of being, whereby we claim that ‘being is a necessity of reason’. (This challenge to the proposition has been attempted on several occasions, most notably by Alistair Burrowes in Entries 245, 246, 247 in which he argues the non-existence of who we are.)

One final note, when we are referring to conscious and conscious meaning itself, we are distinguighing between conscious meaning and the phenonmen/appearance behind the meaning, whereby conscious meaning gives us a vantage point to reason about our thoughts themselves, who we are etc.

Entries 288-292,  Entries 296-298