"I regret that I don’t have the answer yet, merely another question. I found the question rather confusing so I tried to reword it with your definitions of the key words which I have delineated by enclosing them in quotation marks.

'We' cannot "truly 'know'" "'who' we are" and 'be' "'who' we are" at the same time.

Here are your definitions:

We cannot know": our ability to refute or prove a proposition, using reason, by only contradicting our use of reason.
"Who we are": the fundamental level of our being from our limited perspective.
"Existence": things and life-forms occupying space.
"Truly know": more reasonably showing how something can be known in entirety.
"We": the individuals who make up humankind.
The "who" in "who we are" refers to the basis, essence, or life-force behind our individual existence. (i.e. we as individuals exist, and there is an entity, we label basis, essence or life-force, behind or outside of our conscious "we" that allows us fundamentally to exist.)

This is as far as I got with the rewording:

The individuals who make up humankind cannot "truly 'know'" the basis behind their existence and exist (with the basis as their basis) at the same time.

The problem came when I tried to substitute your definition of know. I think I am being very weak minded but it seems to me that it creates an infinite loop:

The individuals who make up humankind cannot prove this proposition: it is possible to "truly 'know'" 'who we are' and 'be' 'who we are' at the same time.

Of course I have interpreted your definitions to put them in this form so I have probably misunderstood their meaning.

Please tell me what I am doing wrong as it is really annoying me."

Louis Barson October 26 2001

Response:

We agree that when viewing the proposition as a statement of absolute truth-value, there is an "infinite loop", because we cannot prove, without contradicting ourselves, that it is possible to truly know who we are; so there is an endless loop between the proposition and our view of its absolute truth-value. However, the proposition is stated within the limit of more reasonableness, which eliminates the "infinite loop" by allowing for the possibility and probability of truly knowing who we are. (Note, in Entry 287, Michael De takes a similar position as your own, by arguing that the proposition as a statement of absolute truth-value lacks the "logical necessity" to be a statement of absolute truth-value, whereas as mentioned you argue that the proposition as a statement of absolute truth-value results in infinite regress by eliminating the possibility of truly knowing who we are, thereby invalidating the competition.)

289. Entry:

Reply to the response to Entry 287

"Actually, I wasn't using ii) ('Representation knowledge is limited') to demonstrate the frivolity of ii). I was using it in respect to the entire argument. But as I pointed out, the problem that you so call "inconsistency" inherent with the claim that ii) is YOUR problem, since you contend that ii) (that representational knowledge is limited, including the limitedness of knowing that very claim). Also, i) does not entail ii) (and iii)), but i) AND ii) entail iii). So you seem to have the logical reasoning of the argument confused. It might be better worded as such:

i) All knowledge is representational
ii) All representations are limited [epistemically]
iii) Therefore all knowledge is limited
iv) Therefore knowledge of ourselves is limited (trivial but emphatic, as it 's contained in iii))

This is a simple syllogistic argument. And ii) renders the argument irreparable since there's an antinomy of sorts at play, akin to, say, the skeptic's claim that 'Not anything is known', as I mentioned earlier. However, here the problem isn't as detrimental as I make it out to be. Why? Because ii) can still externally impinge on a system of knowledge other than the one in which it consists (is a member of). This point, of course, could lead us onto an entirely different subject matter and will thus be avoided.

Reasonably showing the existence of true knowledge is possibly an impossible task. That is, if assumptions, rules and axioms aren't accepted as true to begin with, then the task will never get off the ground. This is why I avoid the task altogether. There is another way however, and in fact, I mentioned it previously.

To show that not 's' is more reasonable than 's' is actually quite easy, especially within your own framework. You maintain that all statements are dubious (the Cartesian program), though some are more reasonable than others. Out of all statements, there only seems to be a few that are the most reasonable, and they are as follows.

a) I, the one responsible for this utterance (statement), exist.
b) I exist as thought at most, and as utterances at least.
c) That I know that I exist is the only thing certain.

Therefore, the most reasonable position to maintain is that I exist (not even you, Garvey) as at least utterances. Is there anything else to know beyond the fact that I exist as at least utterances to know who I am? No. What else could there be? Therefore, I know who I am. This would suggest a substitution of 'we' in your challenge with 'I' is in order.

And finally and conclusively, it can be argued that it is more reasonable to accept Sartre's existentialist conception of consciousness (from 'Transcendence of the Ego: An Existentialist Theory of Consciousness’) rather than those you mention. If his theory is accepted, then we know who we are, since who we are is an impersonal spontaneity created ex nihilo and knowing itself at each moment. While our talk about "us" is merely a reflection of that consciousness (unreflected consciousness vs. reflected consciousness vs. reflecting consciousness)."

Michael De October 28 2001

Response:

Your argument that our claims,

1. all we can know is representational knowledge
2. representational knowledge is epistemically limited

are problematic because we can only know the claims from a position of epistemic limitedness, is not a problem from our standpoint, but merely a limitation on our claims, and even then an insignificant limitation since all claims, due to infinite regress, are apparently subject to the same epistemic limitation. However, you go further in your reply and one of your previous entries (249), by implying through reference to an argument against skepticism (viz., the contradiction from knowing that we cannot know anything,) that we are making our claims on representational knowledge from a position of epistemic ‘unlimitation’, which as we stated, is not the case. We are making the claims from a position of epistemic limitation, thereby our claims are not subject to the skeptic contradiction of claiming that we cannot know anything from a position of knowing, or all knowledge is epistemically limited from a position of epistemic ‘unlimitation’. (Even if we did take this position, there is a possible way out, as you mentioned, by distinguishing between the epistemology of different systems of knowledge, thereby avoid contradiction. Though we would then face the difficult task of showing how systems of knowledge themselves could have different epistemology.)

Turning to your main challenge, we do not view all statements as "dubious"; rather, because of the apparent representational nature of conscious knowledge, we view all statements as epistemically limited. (i.e. we are not questioning the absolute truth-value of statements themselves, but our ability to know that we know the absolute truth-value of statements.)

Also, in our view your so-called three 'most reasonable statements' establish that you exist without showing in what epistemic sense that you know that you exist, or that you can truly know who we are.

To illustrate, statement (a) ("I, the one responsible for this utterance (statement), exist.") which establishes your knowledge of your existence is circular by claiming that "I" produces the statement, and yet "I" is part of the statement. In other words, you cannot know "I" except through the statement, and yet you claim that "I" is responsible for the statement.

Statement (b) ("I exist as thought at most, and as utterances at least.") which establishes you are at least your utterances succumbs to the same circularity as statement (a) by claiming that "I" exists as utterances at least, and yet it does not follow how you can know that "I" exists as utterances because it is an utterance. This point suggests that there is something outside of "I" and your utterances which is really who you are.

Though statement (c) ("That I know that I exist is the only thing certain.") concludes that you truly know that you exist, thereby truly know who we are, the conclusion does not follow from the incomplete, circular statements (a) and (b). (i.e. who is this "I"?, and how can you truly know it?)

We disagree that the 'most reasonable position' from your perspective is that only you exist as at least utterances, because it simply does not follow how only you could exist, and you still exist, just as it does not follow how you could exist as utterances only when there must be more to your existence than utterances. (i.e. where do these utterances come from?, and from a position of more reasonableness, how can utterances simply just exist with nothing behind them like a brain, nervous system etc.?) (Rick Rush in Entry 271 takes a similar position as you, by claiming that all anyone can know is from within their own minds, and therefore it is impossible to come to anything more than personal opinion regarding the proposition, thus the competition is "not worthwhile". The problem with Rush’s position and your own is that the content of both of your knowledge is not exclusive to your own minds, while reason the basis for the determination of more reasonableness and a commonality of all human thought, eliminates the perceived separation between enclosed individual minds.)

Finally, in our view, Sartre’s existentialist conception of consciousness falls short of an explanation of how we can truly know who we are, because it does not follow how who we are, as conscious entity, can know who we are through who we are or itself. (i.e. since all we can know is what we know, and who we are is our consciousness according to Sartre, it follows that we cannot get outside of what we know or our consciousness to know who we are, and therefore, it appears we could only know who we are in a limited sense.) Also, it does not follow how who we are can be created "ex nihilo" (out of nothing) when the notion of "creation" imputes causality or something out of something else. (i.e. what is the basis for the creation of who we are, if there is no basis for it? It appears that you are saying that there is no creation of who we are, because we ourselves are in a state of eternal existence. Though as we stated in the response to Entry 287, the notion of something coming from something else (causality) appears to be more reasonable than the notion of something coming from nothing (absoluteness), because of the apparent interactive nature of things including our thoughts and our own existence. Though even if our consciousness could more reasonably come from nothing, we would still face the problem of how we could truly know who we are.

(Note, saying that consciousness is who we are so that in the moment of consciousness we know who we are or what we know reflects who we are is not enough to show that we truly know who we are. We think what you are doing is assuming that consciousness is really who we are, so that anything we think in the moment is who we are, but how can that be the case due to the relationship between our knowledge and the external world? Also, how is the thought in the moment, "I want to read", for example, true knowledge of who you are?)

290. Entry:

Reply to the response to Entry 288

"I am sorry to take up more of your time but I'm afraid I don't really understand your response. I didn't realize that I was viewing the proposition as a ‘statement of absolute truth value’ - I don't even really know what this means. I will take it as meaning ‘a statement that is definitely true or false’. So within the ‘bounds of more reasonableness’ I assume the proposition would be worded more like this:

The individuals who make up humankind (most probably) cannot say that the proposition: 'it is possible to ‘truly 'know'" 'who we are' and 'be' 'who we are' at the same time' is more reasonable than the proposition: 'it is not possible to "truly 'know'" 'who we are' and 'be' 'who we are' at the same time'.

Doesn't this exacerbate the loop?

And if I ‘allow for the possibility and probability of truly knowing who we are’ the loop becomes even more prevalent:

It is possible and probable that the individuals who make up humankind can say that the proposition: 'it is possible to "truly 'know'" 'who we are' and 'be' 'who we are' at the same time' is more reasonable than the proposition: 'it is not possible to "truly 'know'" 'who we are' and 'be' 'who we are' at the same time'.

However,

The individuals who make up humankind, most probably cannot say that the proposition: 'it is possible to "truly 'know'" 'who we are' and 'be' 'who we are' at the same time' is more reasonable than the proposition: 'it is not possible to "truly 'know'" 'who we are' and 'be' 'who we are' at the same time'.

This one almost seems like a contradiction.

I would be most grateful if you could write out the proposition in long form for me, or at least word it so that it is not a 'statement of absolute truth value'. A definition of absolute truth-value would also be nice."

Louis Barson October 28 2001

Response:

The proposition in long form, within reason, is the following,

"It is more reasonable that the individuals who make up humankind cannot truly know who they are and be who they are at the same time."

In short, it is more reasonable that we cannot truly know who we are. Or in other words, the individuals who make up humankind cannot more reasonably show that they can truly know who they are. Note, we are not denying the possibility or probability of truly knowing who we are. We are denying the more reasonableness of truly knowing who we are. (More reasonableness refers to the evaluation of ideas based on their consistency and soundness. Hence, an idea which is shown to be more consistent and sound than another idea, will be deemed more reasonable than it.)

We agree that the proposition, no matter how we define it, is subject to an infinite loop viz., infinite regress. However, that criticism of the proposition is canceled out, because all propositions and other conscious forms, are apparently subject to infinite regress as well.

The notion of "absolute truth-value" refers to a symbol of 100% completion in all possible respects.

291. Entry:

Reply to the response to Entry 286

‘... However, we still do not entirely agree with you, because ‘be’ in the context of the proposition, refers to an action verb, whereas ‘who we are’ refers to an object, and when combined, they mean the action of existing or being who we are.’
Also, your position that ‘to be’ avoids the static object of who we are, is not necessarily the case because it depends on how we define the object of ‘to be’’. (Excerpt from Response)

"First you make the distinction between to be and who we are, saying that to be is an action verb and who we are refers to an object.
Then follow the above statement, saying that this depends on definition.

‘ and the position is problematic because it does not follow how something can be ‘being’, without having a basis or object for its being.’ (Excerpt from Response)
This being we assume to be talking about cannot depend on our definition: It simply is there, whether we see it like this, our like that. Our definitions do not sustain it in any way. It does so on its own, whether we know or understand it makes no difference.

‘Moreover, by using ‘who we are’ as an object and limited representation of what we are does not necessarily mean what who we are refers to is static. Again as in the case of ‘to be’, it depends on how we define ‘who we are’...’ (Excerpt from Response)

A definition (per definition) is a static object: whether we call it ‘dynamic’ or ‘probabilistic’ makes no difference. What a Schroedinger equation means to describe may be dynamic in nature, but the equation itself is very much static. I say the same thing for being: Being is dynamic in nature, but any conceivable definition of being will always be static. We should not confuse the real thing with a linguistic construct. Whether this lingo is mathematical or English is of no consequence. Have you ever seen a proposition in either of the above languages that suddenly started to move?

‘... Therefore, we see no need to replace ‘to be who we are’ with simply ‘to be’’... (Excerpt from Response)

Based on the above remarks I state that the ‘to be who we are’, which must refer to a definition no matter what kind we would eventually decide upon, must be eventually identical to the ‘to know who we are’ from the first part of the proposition. If accepted, this would overcome the proposition.

If I know what I am, I am what I am.
If I don't know what I am, I am what I am.
We can't help being what we are, whether we know this or not.

‘...we feel that we must rely on reason itself as the final arbitrator.’ (Excerpt from Response)

Reason in my view can be nothing else than THAT which makes things go the way they go, namely BEING itself. The very thing we are trying to define is this final arbitrator. I can see no better candidate. This is not a problem that should be solved, but a fact to be dealt with.

‘...and in fact, we think it is important to establish the basis for being (action) through the limited representation who we are (dynamic or static object depending on one's view)’. (Excerpt from Response)

I claim there is no basis for being, so stressing to establish it is something I will never do. Furthermore, stating that we have a limited representation is meaningless, since it can only be limited from a vantage point we do not possess. Calling our only available representation limited conveys nothing, nor does the claim that it is unlimited. Our representations ARE, just like our definitions, propositions and knowledge, they are processes within our brains. All are an integral part of THAT which is being. Thereby the proposition is also overcome."

Raoul Starren November 3 2001

Response:

You appear to be arguing that our thoughts are who we are, or in your words, "an integral part of THAT which is being". Therefore, according to your reasoning, we can truly know who we are, because what we know is who we are. To support this argument, you contend that there is no basis to being, and that as mentioned our thoughts are an integral part of THAT which is being.

However, even if we were to accept your argument, it does not follow from it that we can truly know who we are. (i.e. just because we cannot help from being what we are, and our thoughts are what we are, does not mean that we can actually know who we are. All your argument shows, if it is accepted, is that who we are is partly contained as an "integral part" in our thoughts. So if we follow your argument through, we can at best only know who we are indirectly and incompletely through the partial containment of who we are in our thoughts.

In addition, there are several other problems with your argument that need to be addressed:

1. By claiming that definitions of being are "static", you appear to be overlooking that our perceptions of definitions of being are dynamic, and that you have shown no reason why the definitions themselves are static. If anything, by concluding that our thoughts, and thereby definitions, are an integral part of THAT which is being, and that "being is dynamic", you are implicitly claiming that definitions of being are dynamic as well. So your claim, on grounds of staticness, that the second half of the proposition is identical to the first half of the proposition, and thereby the proposition is overcome, is incorrect according to your own reasons.

2. Your claim that our limited representation of who we are is "meaningless" because it can only be limited from a vantage point we do not possess, does not stand. We can use our reason to represent who we are, just you did by claiming that "It [who we are] is simply there", or "[our representations] are an integral part of THAT which is being". (i.e. the "It" and "THAT" are representations of whatever we are. We think the important distinction here, is that what we know in terms of conscious meaning is separate from the conscious meaning itself. In other words, our vantage point lies in meaning rather than meaning as appearance/phenomenon.)

3. If everything about ourselves is in oneness of being, it does not follow how we can know anything except that oneness--or the so-called integral parts of oneness without actually knowing oneness as a whole. If there is only parts of oneness, it means that there is no actual oneness, and therefore, it does not follow how it can be said there is parts of oneness. If there is oneness itself, then it follows that the parts of oneness must be separate from it. If there is only oneness of being with no parts, it does not follow how we can know the oneness because there is no room to know it. (i.e. we cannot know something solely through itself, except in a limited, representational sense.) Therefore, in any of these scenarios, we cannot truly know who we are.

4. By claiming that there is no basis for being, you are claiming that being or who we are comes from nothing ("ex nihilo"). Yet how can something simply come from nothing? You appear to be arguing as Michael De does in Entry 289 that who we are is eternal. Yet you also argue that who we are is dynamic, and thereby subject to causality. How can something come from nothing and at the same time be dynamic?

5. You assert that our thoughts are an integral part of who we are [or THAT which is being], without explaining in what sense or why they are an integral part of who we are. We acknowledge that in order to consciously know we need to be, but that does not necessarily mean that what we know itself is innately part of being itself. To show this innateness, you need to establish an epistemology which more reasonably shows the connection between what we know and being. But even if you did, you would face the problem from point 3 of how we can truly know who we are from a position of epistemic innateness.

292. Entry:

"Our brain creates thought just like our kidney creates urine. Someone walking along creates no more than a rock rolling along. So piss on rolling stones that gather no moss."

Dale Clifford November 9 2001

Supplementary comment as requested by the Inexpressible Committee

"The entry and my answer is a categorical syllogism, the most concise form of argument. Your entry statement, is a beg the question argument, which makes assumptions not supported or even accepted. (Yes, we have no bananas). Chemical by-products, neurotransmitters and electrical patterns are no different by-products than uric acid, ammonia, calcium phosphate, etc. Because the one organ reacts to it by doing what your assumption calls thought is wrong. There is no more meaning to it than the ph of the urine to tell the kidney to shut down. Questions such as Gödel's (yours basically reworded) and Feryer-Abends incommensurate only provide boundaries to teleocentric arguments. Cognition, the term for your concept of information becomes meaning, is just that. (Actually it is not unclear how our brains create thoughts)-love those double negatives, but only unclear to people who keep trying to define the process with a broken method of description."

Response:

Your argument appears to be saying that things are meant to be, so just leave them alone. (i.e. we cannot change that our kidney’s create urine or that our brains create thoughts.) Moreover, you argue that there is no difference between the by-products of our brains and other parts of our bodies, which means that they are simply unquestionable parts of what we are. However, we are not questioning that our brains create thoughts or our existence through thoughts. We are questioning, or attempting to define within the limit of more reasonableness, the epistemological nature of our thoughts. (i.e. do our brains create true knowledge viz., absolute truth-value, or false knowledge viz., non-absolute truth-value?) You argue that this question does not matter, as mentioned, because our brains’ creation of knowledge is what is or meant to be, and yet we feel that you are overlooking an important issue, namely how we view our knowledge in terms of epistemology will effect how we value and use our knowledge. For your argument to hold, you need to show that what we say about the relevance of epistemology is somehow not meant to be. It appears that you are caught by saying that some thoughts are meant to be, while other thoughts are not.

Similarly, you argue that it is clear how our brains create thought, and that lack of clarity stems from a "broken method of description", and yet your claim of certain clarity is subject to relativity and opinion, and the epistemic limit implied by Gödel's theorem. In other words, we question that science’s understanding of how our brains create thought is as clear as you say, especially in consideration of Steve Burwen's remark from Entry 207, ".... neuroscience [at the year 2000] has attained an understanding of perhaps 5% of the brain's functionality due to the efforts of the last 50 years....", and the uncertainty surrounding the actual relations between external stimuli and sensory receptors, and neurons and consciousness.

Also, your claim that "our brains create thought", assuming there is no other sources of thought, supports the proposition, because it does not follow how we can create or truly know who we are through who we are via our brains. The notion of creation implies causality, thereby interaction, which means that our thoughts are representational rather than absolute truth.

Finally, to claim that the proposition makes assumptions not supported or accepted is not enough to refute the proposition. What are these unsupported and unaccepted assumptions? Also, what does acceptance have to do with the actual validity of a statement?

Entries 283-287,  Entries 293-295