"To ‘overcome’ this proposition, it is possible that one can know who they are and be who they are at the same time. But I reason that first one must know who they are and have that Self-awareness to be who they are. But, however, if the person who finds who they are, or believe that they are what they want to become, they must apply the person they have become in order to be who they are. This would also imply that if the person, upon reflection, found who they only thought they were, they in fact could not be who they are. For they have not truly found out who they are..."

Dan Walsh October 7 2001

Response:

The mere existence of the possibility of overcoming the proposition, does not necessarily mean that the proposition can be overcome.

Your argument is that an individual "must know who they are and have that Self-awareness to be who they are" and that the individual "must apply the person they have become in order to be who they are." In other words, being who we are stems from knowledge of who we are (or who we want to be), and the application of it.

The main problem with your position is that it does not follow how we could not be who we are prior to knowing and applying our conception of who we are. (i.e. who we are at some level must exist prior to knowing who we are, which suggests that being who we are is not exclusive to knowledge of who we are.)

Also, it is unclear how self-knowledge equates exactly to who we are. For instance, if an individual decides that he wants to be a freedom fighter, and successfully applies that decision, is the individual, as who he is, truly a freedom fighter? We say no for the following reasons:

1. the apparent representative and relative nature of human thought suggests that truth cannot be known.

1.1 the lack of a fixed reference, due to the apparent unfolding and emerging nature of things, also suggests that truth cannot be known.

2. the apparent fact that conscious knowledge stems from ourselves through sensorial, biochemical, and neurological responses, or any other responses, to interaction suggests that we cannot create who we are through what we know, because the basis for what we know is who we are. (i.e. we cannot get outside of ourselves through conscious knowledge because we ourselves are behind the knowledge, thereby we have no separation to truly create who we are.)

In our view, the best we can say is that the term freedom fighter, or any other term, is only who the individual is in a limited, representative sense.

284. Entry:

"Rather than present a counter-argument, it is sufficient to recognize that none of listed 'proof' is exempt from arbitrary assumptions, and therefore is no proof at all. It seems, unless I am very much mistaken, that you are arguing a number of assumptions. I take the following from the ‘Basic proof for not knowing who we are’

‘Form refers to the fundamental basis for things’.

This assumes there is a fundamental basis for things, and furthermore that the symbolic representation of this is contained within the above statement.

‘Knowledge refers to conscious meaning in the form of symbols’.

This assumes that knowledge refers to conscious meaning, and that no knowledge is exempt from symbolic representation.

‘We’ refers to the individuals who make up humankind.

This assumes that there is such as a thing as ‘we’, which may not be the case, since individuals are not necessarily part of any collective, symbolic or otherwise, and furthermore this assumes there are individuals, which is not necessarily the case since if there is a collective there is no true individuals. A relationship between individual and the ubiquitous ‘we’ is assumed.

‘Who we are / us ourselves refers to the fundamental level of being (i.e. soul, essence, life-force) of the individuals who make up humankind’.

This assumes there is an ‘us’ (see above), and that this ‘us’ had a fundamental level (see above), and there are both individuals and a collective (see above), and that all these things somehow relate to the symbolic representation which are the words in the sentence (see above).

The assumptions listed can be made more clear from the following ‘Proof’:

‘We are consciously aware of thoughts’.

This assumes there is a collective, or 'individualistic collective' ‘we’, and there are thoughts, and that we are consciously aware of them. It can be simplified to ‘we’ being somehow separated from thoughts. This is an assumption.

‘We must exist’. This assumes that there is such a thing as ‘existence’, and that this relates to the collective ‘we’. It furthermore assumes there is a direct and causal relation between elements of the collective and existence, as in ‘must’. This is an assumption.

‘In order for us to exist, there must be a being or basis behind our existence. (i.e. we are not nothing or everything, nor are we our thoughts as form.)’.

This assumes that causal relations exist between or behind ‘existence’, and that everything or nothing are not symbolic representations of external reality, that everything or nothing both exist and are mutually exclusive, and furthermore that our thoughts are not form. These are assumptions.

‘Our sensory information, in the form of our sensory receptors' responses to external stimulus, implies an indirect relation with the external world’.

This assumes that there is an indirect relation to external existence in the form of sensory, even though in other points direct or causal relationships are assumed.

‘We create knowledge through our sensory information’. This assumes that knowledge is indeed created by sensory, and furthermore that knowledge exists, and furthermore that we create it. An indirect relationship between the external and 'created' knowledge is assumed, on the basis of sensory defining knowledge. This is an assumption.

‘In order for us to exist, there must be a being or basis behind our existence (i.e. we are not nothing or everything, nor are we our thoughts as form.) and thought process’.

This assumes a direct causal link between existence and ‘us’. It also assumes that thought process is linked to being. These are assumptions.

‘At a fundamental level all things contain a fundamental property of existence, including knowledge as form’.

This assumes a fundamental property, a fundamental level, causal links, and knowledge as form. These are assumptions.

‘In the process of creating knowledge, we do not create who we are through who we are. Rather, we use materials like neurons and sensa which contain a fundamental property of existence. (i.e. we cannot exist from who we are, while at the same time who we are also be contained in the materials we use to create.)’.

This assumes we create knowledge, our identity is fixed, the sensory is involved, and they have a fundamental property external to who we are. These are assumptions.

‘Thoughts as form do not contain who we are’. An inference, which proceeds from above assumptions.

‘We cannot get outside of our minds and know that we are’. This is unusual. It assumes a spatial component to identity, and to mind. Alternately, it assumes a fixed reference as mind, that is symbolically immovable and furthermore unknowable. Furthermore it assumes that we need to get outside our minds to know anything. These are assumptions.

‘We cannot know the form of knowledge because we cannot know something solely through itself’. This assumes there is a form, it is external from us knowing, and that it is not contained in any way from our intrinsic knowledge of it. In short this assumes knowledge is wholly external. This is an assumption.

‘What we know is knowledge or meaning we create from information created from responses to interactions at the sensorial, biochemical, and neurological levels’. An assumption, similar to above.

‘We cannot know who we are because we cannot create who we are through who we are. All we can do is indirectly represent who we are’.

This assumes we create, that it is external from knowledge, and is external from who we are. An argument from previous assumptions.

The other points listed in the proof are re-iterations of the above.

Weak points:

1) The language game is used selectively as a counterargument against the proposition, since it is also clear the proposition is not exempt from the same language game, symbolic representation, and assumptions used against it.

2) There are several apparent contradictions. It is assumed that there is fundamental properties of existence, and being, but not fundamental properties of knowing, or sensory. Or put another way, fundamentality as a concept is used selectively.

3) Other major assumptions which could be challenged include separation in terms of being and knowing, and yet not in terms of being and form, knowing and form, or sensory and form. In other words separation as a concept is used selectively.

4) The argument assumes that reason is a valid and reliable method in determining aspects of existence. It takes little or no account of other methods.

5) The argument assumes that reason of committee is of greater reasonableness than the reason of non-committee.

6) The argument does not satisfactorily address its own side issues, agendas, inconsistencies, and paradoxical end points. It is selectively critical.

7) The argument does not satisfactorily account for mind- being, and/or knowing-being complimentarity."

Signed: Review committee for arbitrary assumptions. October 9 2001

Response:

We think you are raising important issues about assumptions. However, we are confused by your entry. What is the difference between an arbitrary assumption and a non-arbitrary assumption? We contend that because of the apparent groundlessness of conscious knowledge (i.e. our inability to know with absolute certainty due to infinite regress), there is only arbitrary assumptions. Though in a limited sense, we can use reason to make limited objective assumptions. If we are correct, you are arguing that the assumptions behind the ‘Proof’ lack limited objectivity. (i.e. they are unscientific, or have been asserted without being tested by experimental method.) The problem with your position is that scientific method succumbs to a number of inherent inconsistencies, limitations, and contradictions which all together question its basis for more limited objectivity than not using the method. For instance, from the apparent fact that there is no fixed reference due to the relative nature of things, it follows that there cannot be an identical re-testing of an experiment except through misperceiving human thought as fixed and what really is. Also, the interactional (or representational) nature of human knowledge implies that scientific knowledge indirectly corresponds to the external world, and all hypothesizes, and even experimental method itself, cannot be tested by experimental method.

What we think is important, is fundamental ideas and the reasons behind them. In this light, we agree that we selectively take positions which support the proposition, but from our perspective, reasoning is the basis for our selection. How else could someone take a position without being selective at some level?

We agree that the ‘Proof’ falls short of an in-depth analysis, but our intention is merely to introduce a position supporting the proposition. Note, the title of the ‘Proof’ is "Basic Proof". However, we agree with your criticism, and we plan to re-work the ‘Proof’ to give it the level of analysis that you hinted at.

In terms of your claim that the "language-game" is being applied to challenges and not to the reasons supporting the proposition, it is false. We have consistently maintained that we can only know from our limited perspective or language-game, as illustrated by our response to Entry 282, ".... we [know] that we cannot know who we are without succumbing to contradiction, because our knowledge of who we are which allows us to make the assertion is limited." Moreover, your contention that the reasons of the committee is viewed with "greater reasonableness" than non-committee reasons is false as well; the whole purpose of the competition is to define a level of more reasonableness for the proposition, whether for or against it.

If you think that the proposition, and the arguments supporting it, do not satisfactorily account for mind-being complementarity, and that there are inconsistencies and paradoxical endpoints with the proposition, we encourage you to enter them as a refutation of the proposition, while bearing in mind that the ‘Proof’ as mentioned, is a mere introduction of arguments supporting the proposition. The main argument is that the nature of conscious knowledge is interactional. (i.e. conscious knowledge appears to stem from responses to interactions internal to a human being on sensorial, biochemical, neurological, and conscious levels, or any other levels.)

285. Entry:

"If we truly know who we are, we necessarily be who we are, because knowing is a form of being. If we truly we know some thing, therefore the proposition 'We cannot truly know who we are and be who we are at the same time', is overcome. Moreover, to truly know who we are implies necessarily thus objectively that we know who we are, and that is consequently we are capable of being inside and outside ourselves, which is a condition of being and knowing who we are."

Berrada Mohammed Ali October 15 2001

Response:

If by the phrase "knowing is a form of being", you mean that knowing is contingent on being, we agree with you. (i.e. we cannot know without simultaneously being.) Hence, if we truly know who we are, and knowing is contingent on being, it follows that we are truly knowing who we are at the same time as being who we are. However, the mere possibility of a solution to the proposition is not enough to overcome the proposition. It must be more reasonably shown that we can truly know who we are than not doing so.

Also, we agree that if we can truly know who we are, then we are capable of being inside and outside of ourselves. However, this assertion does nothing to more reasonably show that we can truly know who we are. All it does is support the notion of truly knowing who we are as a possible solution to the proposition.

286. Entry:

Reply to the response to Entry 281

‘Finally, your assertion that ‘to be who we are’ appears to claim that ‘we know what speak of’, and therefore should be replaced by simply ‘to be’, is inconsistent, because ‘to be’ also claims to speak of what we know by begging the question, to be what? Also, since we have established that ‘who we are’ is a symbol, representation from our limited perspective, we see no inconsistency or contradiction in using it.’ (Excerpt from response)

"First of all, the supposed claim in the first sentence of the above fragment of your response to my entry was not made by me. I wrote: ‘In my opinion ‘To be who we are’ sounds like ‘To say what we speak’. I was referring to a double statement, like ‘to drink what we imbibe’. ‘To BE who we ARE’.

Secondly, I disagree with the statement that ‘to be’ necessarily begs the question: ‘to be what?’ I strongly feel this is a case of ‘Wrong question’! This objection is somewhat related to Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle. There is a distinct dynamic property to being. For us humans to know exactly ‘what’, involves a static object definition that will always be forced to ignore a dynamic component. There is no place for dynamics in definition. We can try to overcome this by trying to find the most reasonable way of dealing with this, but of course this imports the dynamic component into the discussion, which will automatically produce a different truth in every consecutive instance of space/time.

Man is somehow the measure of all things. So I guess we are a little group of gods who now will decide what's the more reasonable approach to our issue here. Jupiter and Juno seem to prefer onion soup and Neptune and Pluto insist on bouillabaisse. What do they do?

First thing seems to be that we must be honest about something: Logic isn't going to help us much here, so the ‘reason’ we talk about in ‘reasonable’ must be of another breed.
Can we say anything reasonable about this ‘reason’? Several people have overcome the proposition in certain respects, but not according to the preset rules of the competition. What does this mean?

Another central concept has been: ‘Our limited perspective’. This implies an ‘unlimited perspective’. Kurt Gödel proved that someone with an unlimited perspective will not see everything. There will be questions that someone with an unlimited perspective could not answer. Therefore the distinction between limited and unlimited would in essence be invalid. There probably is nothing more reasonable than Gödel's theorem. ‘All logical systems of any complexity are, by definition, incomplete; each of them contains, at any given time, more true statements than it can possibly prove according to its own defining set of rules’. Our proposition can't escape what is in my opinion the 20th century's most important discovery. To state that the proposition is irrefutable is in conflict with the most reasonable statement available."

Raoul Starren October 23 2001

Response:

We take your point about the confusion and perhaps inconsistency with the phrase, "to be who we are", because according to you, "be" and "who we are" mean the same thing, and therefore, on grounds of redundancy, the "who we are" should be dropped. (to be who we are --> to be) However, we still do not entirely agree with you, because "be" in the context of the proposition, refers to an action verb, whereas "who we are" refers to an object, and when combined, they mean the action of existing or being who we are.

Also, your position that "to be" avoids the static object of who we are, is not necessarily the case because it depends on how we define the object of "to be", and the position is problematic because it does not follow how something can be "being", without having a basis or object for its being. Moreover, by using "who we are" as an object and limited representation of what we are does not necessarily mean what who we are refers to is static. Again as in the case of "to be", it depends on how we define "who we are". Therefore, we see no need to replace "to be who we are" with simply "to be", and in fact, we think it is important to establish the basis for being (action) through the limited representation who we are (dynamic or static object depending on one’s view).

In regard to Jupiter, Juno, Neptune, and Pluto's decision over the better soup, and our decision over the existence or non-existence of true self-knowledge, we feel that we must rely on reason itself as the final arbitrator, otherwise we would be left with our opinions, or one of us with the power to impose his/her opinion on the rest of us. A compelling reason to rely on reason itself (i.e. conscious meaning) is that all human thought is apparently defined by it, and though we concede that reason itself is not a perfect solution for making decisions, we see no better solution. For instance, we could use the ‘majority decide’ solution, but the majority of opinion does not necessarily reflect the best reasons for a decision. Rather, it reflects the quantified opinion of individuals. (Garvey, The Critique of Reasonableness)

Finally, we agree that the concept of "limited perspective" implies an "unlimited perspective", but we would add an unlimited perspective within our epistemic limit. (i.e. the limit on what we can truly know that we know) This point also applies to our claim that the proposition is irrefutable within our epistemic limit, just as we claim that Gödel's theorem is irrefutable within our epistemic limit. (i.e. the theorem is subject to the same incompleteness which it argues for.) Therefore, we think there is no conflict between the proposition as irrefutable within our apparent epistemic limit, and Gödel's theorem as irrefutable within our apparent epistemic limit. In fact, we think the proposition and the theorem support each other, by both arguing for the limit on what we can truly know.

287. Entry:

"Your challenge can be overcome simply by the following fact. The proposition 'we cannot truly know who we are and be who we are at the same time' (known as 's' from hereon for brevity) asserts logical necessity - meaning, it asserts that it is logically impossible that not s (or logically necessary that s). However, nothing asserted by s entails logical necessity. Thus, it is not logically impossible that not s. Therefore, your challenge has been overcome.

Indeed, you contend that it is possible that not s, but go on to say that this is unsatisfactory for overcoming your challenge. I, and others before me, say that it is not. In order for your challenge to remain intact from this argument, you must revise the 's'. A revision would most likely look something like this:

'It is likely that/it seems that/it is reasonable to contend that s'

This revised statement will be known as 'sR' from hereon and, it seems, is your intended position.

Now, if this is your position, you must state exactly why it is the case that sR. From what I can tell, your justification is as follows.

i) All knowledge is representational
ii) Representation knowledge is limited (or non- absolute)
iii) Therefore, we cannot have true knowledge of anything, including ourselves

Whether or not there is more to this, including tacit assumptions, I am in the dark. So, all that has to be shown to overcome sR is that either (i) or (ii) is false. (i) itself must thus be representational. Thus, (i) is known limitedly only. Therefore, (i) does not logically entail that (ii) or (iii). Therefore, your argument is unsound and your challenge has been overcome rather simply.

Note: 's' in single quotes is the name of s the statement. Any statement in single quotes is the name of the statement, and not the statement itself."

Michael De October 25 2001

Response:

Yes, we agree that if the proposition is viewed as a truth (i.e. it is asserting a logical necessity that we cannot truly know who we are, thereby a logical impossibility that we can truly know who we are) then the proposition is overcome because we apparently do not have an absolute ground for the proposition’s logical necessity, and if we did, there would be no grounds for the competition. However, we do not view the proposition as a logical necessity; we view it as a limited statement of more reasonableness, or as stated in the introduction to the competition, "the proposition is impossible to overcome within the limits of more reasonableness". In other words, it is more reasonable that we cannot truly know who we are than we can truly know who we are. In consistency with this position, and as you alluded to, we have responded to relevant entries arguing for the possibility of both truly knowing who we are and not truly know who we are, which then centers the competition on the question of whether not truly knowing who we are is more probable or reasonable than truly knowing who we are. (Entries 168, 190, 206, 241, 244, 259, 274, 275)

There are various positions supporting the proposition in which some are our own and some are by participants. These positions include a temporal/dynamic argument which states that temporal and dynamic nature of our conscious knowledge prevents us from truly knowing who we are because as soon as we know who we are we cease to know who we are, and the ontological argument in which at some stage we appear to create conscious knowledge, thereby face the problem of how we can create true knowledge of who we are through who we are, and the causality argument in which the notion of something coming from something else ad infinitum (state of non-truth) is more reasonable than something coming from nothing (state of truth).

Our focus in the Challenge Proof is on the representational nature of conscious knowledge because it contradicts the notion of true knowledge. However, your argument of logic against the basic premises and conclusion for representational knowledge,

Premise 1. All knowledge is representational
Premise 2. Representation knowledge is limited (or non- absolute)
Conclusion 1. We cannot have true knowledge of anything, including ourselves,

does not stand for the following reasons:

You argue that premise 1 itself must be representational knowledge, and then you argue that premise 1 being representational knowledge is "known limitedly only". (i.e. representational knowledge is limited knowledge.) Yet you then argue that because of the epistemic limitedness of premise 1, premise 1 cannot logically entail premise 2 and conclusion 1. Your argument is inconsistent because you concede that premise 1 is epistemically limited, and yet you then say representational knowledge as limited does not logically entail premise 2 which states that representational knowledge is epistemically limited. (i.e. you cannot claim the epistemic limitedness of representational knowledge to deny the epistemic limitation of representational knowledge without inconsistency.)

Another problem with your argument is that you are assuming that logical entailment must stem from unlimited knowledge, without showing any support for the existence of unlimited knowledge. Also, we can avoid your proposed problem of logical entailment by acknowledging that premise 1 from a position of limited knowledge may or may not logically entail premise 2 and conclusion 1, and more important in terms of the competition, from a position of more reasonableness and epistemic limitation which you have conceded, premise 1 does logically entail premise 2 and conclusion 1.

In our view, a significant point of clarification stemming from your entry is that all arguments for or against the proposition are relevant to the determination of the proposition’s validness. Also, it appears to us that an important step to overcoming the proposition would be to more reasonably show the existence of true knowledge.

Entries 278-282 Entries 288-292