Reply to the response to Entry 272

"It is impossible to answer all the criticisms to reply 272, so I shall focus as best I can on one or two, and hope that a resonance will spread outward to the others.

The problem is tightening around two - the issue of reasonableness and the problem of boundaries to knowledge as an epistemological process subsuming other kinds of knowledge.

It is significant that when words fail, an appropriate metaphor is chosen to continue communication. In the reply, the metaphor is a boat set afloat far from shore without a keel, which is described as a potentially disastrous situation. The use of the ocean as a metaphor may well be a conscious selection in order to communicate a certain thought in accessible terms, but there is another level of consciousness that may steer this selection unconsciously in that the ocean is an archetypal expression of the unconscious. Consequently, the metaphor is also an inner dialogue, expressing something of the relation between the conscious and unconscious in terms of a boat (conscious = epistemological thought) and ocean (unconscious = ontic and ontological thought). Now the unconscious is not an unknown in the sense of inaccessible, since the boat is not in the shape of an airplane or a house. These would not float or be steerable. In other words, the concept of a boat is determined by what is known about the ocean, and in this sense the boat emerges as an idea from what is known about the nature of the unknown. This may seem like a contradiction, but the contradiction itself discloses a problem in the rational camp, when the boat seals itself from the ocean. Such a boat would have many protective features, countless lifeboats, be as unsinkable as is possible to construct, and regard the ocean as an impediment to be surmounted in order to get from one place to another. In this sense, its steering mechanisms may well be their most important feature, but then it must be asked: what is it that is elsewhere that provokes a journey across the unknown when it is simply a transposition of circumstances to another place? In other words, the form of perception is carried elsewhere and is unaltered by the journey. It is in this sense that the boundaries of one place are no different qualitatively from the boundaries of another, since it is what is carried within the perceiver as attitude of mind that determines what will become known. If the unconscious is thought of in terms designed to ignore it as best as is possible, then in this sense the epistemological becomes restrictive: if the unconscious is perceived as a state of potential disasters, then every effort will be made to isolate the epistemological and thus create a boundary of everything that excludes something, which is the source of the epistemological in the ontological from which it emerges. But assume the following: the unconscious is the source of the conscious in that it does not wish to be unconscious. The method of emergence from one to the other is dialectical in that the Totality of unconsciousness expresses itself in terms of a particular consciousness and thus engenders a plethora of individuated existents all of which are an expression by emergence from Totality. This, in a sense, is the history of philosophy since Plato, and to take the view that it is safer to isolate the epistemological from the metaphysical is to turn philosophy into nothing more than a science, which is always a selective methodology determined by assumptions that exclude the metaphysical in the first instance, and then point at the products and the successes achieved by this method as evidence for continual exclusion. But this is not philosophy; it is a state of mind enamoured by success. For philosophy, the task is always an adventure in thought to root out assumptions and to bring them to task. Unfortunately, our age holds science in such esteem that its assumptions have become something of a dogma which are accepted unquestioningly.

With regard to the limits of knowledge, it may appear that I have argued a case for expanding boundaries, but in a more important sense, it is a search for the limit that establishes the non-limit. By this I mean that the search for a ‘theory of everything’ (TOE) in rational terms is already an indication of the tendency to assume that such a theory as a rational perspective is contingently possible. On the other hand, the argument I am trying to outline is that the limit in terms of individuation is the only proper route to a theory of everything since it is only through the limit that the limit is surpassed. It is in the dynamic coupling of knowledge and being in such a form that simultaneity occurs. From a rational perspective a TOE will always have a problem in exploring individuation since it has to adopt a historical or political perspective which will never be capable of containing all that there is about the notion of individuation, particularly since death is so central to being at this level, while totally ignored as a dynamic process in the TOE.

However, to address the comments made by Ken Bell*, to say that each moment is a moment of death is to say very little. It would require a far deeper analysis of the concept of moment than is currently available in this form of discussion, nor does it add to knowledge or understanding to speak of death in these terms. This is not a problem if the discussion were spiritual or poetic, but this is a philosophical debate and so should be pursuing a philosophical form of enquiry. He correctly states the need of a dialectical form of expression here but it is absent in the tone of language, as though it has got as far as it can and must now rely on something a little more mystical to carry the message. In other words, there seems to be a lack of reference point in the comment. However, on looking through his own solutions, I note the dependence on logical form, and it seems to me that the question concerning the notions of being and knowing could just as easily have been ‘buying and selling’ or ‘sense organs and sensing’. It is always the problem with seeking solution in logical form that the subject takes second place to the structure, and then this becomes the predominant theme to the exclusion of the subject as though it can be re-inserted at the conclusion.

Having said as much, I should say that an exploration of the logical form as it applies to the principle of inaction (the most influential and yet most ignored principle of action in our culture) is necessitated by these comments, but I feel that unless the notion of reasonableness, which is the real impediment in this debate, is expanded, then the problem as I am trying to make it visible will still remain unseen."

Sam Nico September 18 2001

Supplementary comment:

* Ken Bell made the following comments on Entry 268 and the response to it:

"Every moment is a moment of death. The perception of self as a continuity is simply a reference created by our brains so that conscious perception can be correlated through reason. The being (or more appropriately the state of the phenotype) is in constant flux as long as the being lives. Organic death can thus be defined as the cessation of change, whereas the death of the moment remains the omnipresent dialectic through which being is manifest. It becomes clear that a snapshot mentality is an inherently unreasonable approach to the experience of being. So what can be said? Our language limits our expression of experience to forms and categories. I can, in no way describe to you, the taste of an apple without resorting to non-apple references, and no matter how skillful my description, it falls far short of the actual experience. What is this ‘self’ which demands to be known? By whom shall it be known? Certainly the ego projection ‘I’ could lay claim to title ‘knower’ until it became clear that impermanence is a property of all interaction.

Further, if the self were a static entity, capable of retaining a knowledge of itself, there would be increasingly little to know as each moment would fold in upon itself. Like Narcissus, immobilized by the love of his own image, or the gorgon, Medusa turned to stone by her reflection, reality becomes unavailable through self-consciousness.

Perhaps we put too much emphasis on the self as a unitary entity. In my own experience I have found that a more complete description lives within the interaction or superposition of self states, be it my own or with others.

So what can be said? Attention!"

Response:

We applaud your attempt to find a solution to the proposition, which can be encapsulated in the following statements by you:

1. ".... what is carried within the perceiver as attitude of mind [is] that [which] determines what will become known."

2. ".... [include] the metaphysical in the first instance."

3. ".... the unconscious is the source of the conscious in that it does not wish to be unconscious."

4. "Expand" the notion of reasonableness.

Or in other words, by considering the limits of what we know and paradoxically our control over what we know, and expanding the definition of reasonableness from the restrictive rigor of experimental method and confined analysis of reason, we can perceive the relationship between the unconscious and conscious, whereby the conscious is a reflection of the totality of the unconscious. Though immediately your position faces inconsistency by being bound by reason, and yet implying that it should not be evaluated by reason. As we stated in our response to Entry 272, the boundless perspective would lead to anything being accepted for no reason at all, which would be like the boat without a keel set afloat far out in a ocean.

Also, we agree that science is generally guilty of excluding the metaphysical, though the same criticism does not apply to our position, since we have acknowledged the apparent existence of the ‘inexpressible’, and that the competition is centered around our ability or inability to consciously know it. To that end, you argue that the unconscious is the source of the conscious, or in other words, "it is only through the limit that the limit is surpassed." Yet, just because being is a necessity for knowing, does not necessarily mean that they are the same in a fractal sense. In fact, it means that they are not, because we apparently cannot know ourselves through ourselves. What you appear to be overlooking is that a solution to the proposition already exists, namely that we cannot truly know who we are on grounds of the representational, relative nature of human thought, or as mentioned our inability to know ourselves through ourselves, and therefore, reasonableness from our perspective is not impeding the debate, but a necessary means for a limited solution.

If you wish to expand the notion of reasonableness to further include the metaphysical, we would welcome it; but by using reason, you must expect your position to be evaluated by it, otherwise your position succumbs to inconsistency and self-defeat by transforming itself into the ‘anything goes’ or non-evaluation position.

Are we being less reasonable or influenced by the restrictive nature of science? We do not think so, because the metaphysical is a central part of our position, and we do not adhere to experimental method as the only source of limited truth. All we ask for is comparative justification for a position based on internal consistency, and soundness in relation to all antagonistic positions presented. To remove the constraint of reason would leave us with no constraint, thereby with no basis for limited solution.

279. Entry:

"We cannot truly know who we are and be who we are at the same time ‘on our own’. But we can know 'who we are' if this knowledge is revealed by 'someone' who possesses this knowledge.
This someone has to be either the All-Knowing, or someone who has been enlightened by the All-Knowing."

Anonymous September 25 2001

Response:

We acknowledge that it is possible we can truly know who we are through the knowledge being revealed to us by someone who is either All-knowing or enlightened by the All-knowing. However, in our view this assertion is not saying much because of the apparent groundlessness of what we know, in which anything we think about knowing who we are is possible. What is important in terms of the competition is not showing the possibility of truly knowing who we are, but the more reasonableness of truly knowing who we are.

Your challenge is contingent on the existence of an All-knowing individual who as part of his/her knowledge truly knows who we are. Yet, how can an individual be All-knowing when what we know appears representational and relative? What is the basis for All-knowing? Since things appear to be constantly unfolding, how can anyone’s knowledge pertain exactly to what things are? How does an All-knowing individual know who he/she is and be who he/she is?

If you respond that there is a creator of our existence, thereby is All-knowing in relation to our existence, it follows that the creator must be whole or have no origin, because by coming from something else, the creator cannot be All-knowing. Yet, the notion of non-origin or things coming from nothing is less reasonable than the notion of origin or things coming from other things, because it does not follow how something can come from nothing when all things around us are interactively unfolding or coming from other things, and we have no way to logically explain something coming from nothing.

280. Entry:

"How much you know of yourself does not change the fact that you do exist. You exist as you are, therefore you are being who you are.

Ones current state of existence may include a certain amount of ignorance about their trueself, preventing them from being their trueself, but they are who they are now none the less. Ones self may change over time as they learn more of the world and their projection of self will change with this knowledge, but who they are (limited true knowledge of ones self and all) at any one time is who they are.

In my opinion the proposition as worded is easily overcome, however stating ‘we cannot truly know who we are and be who we TRULY are at the same time’ is much more difficult."

Dave Adams September 27 2001

Response:

We agree that we cannot help from being who we are while we are alive. Though you assume that who we are equates to what we know of who we are, or in your words, "…. who they are (limited true knowledge of ones self and all) at any one time is who they are." However, it does not necessarily follow that what we know of ourselves is who we are. It may be an expression or extension of who we are without actually being it.

Also, we agree that overcoming the proposition becomes considerably more difficult when the notion of true knowledge is considered. In our view, it is the crux of the problem because it can more reasonably be shown that we have limited knowledge of who we are.

281. Entry:

Reply to the response to Entry 277

‘.... because from our standpoint, the second half of the proposition helps to define the problem between being and knowing. (i.e. we apparently cannot know ourselves through ourselves.)’ (Excerpt from Response)

"From my point of view, there is no problem between being and knowing. Knowing is, in an object oriented sense, simply a class amongst the many, like eyes, hair, racism, love, etc.

‘What you appear to be overlooking by concluding that the primary proposition is ‘nonsensical’.... ’ (Excerpt from Response)

I entirely agree with Steve Burwen. [Entries 197 and 198]
He says that the condition of simultaneity can be removed. I say that the presence of the condition of simultaneity in the proposition is non-sensical, but this originates from the exact same logic Steve Burwen uses.
This to me is the flaw in the proposition: If one can know truly at all, one has no choice but to know truly and be at the same time. And if one can't, the fact that one is busy "being" while one is failing to know truly, seems a totally superfluous piece of information to me. Something like: "We can't fly by flapping our arms and be who we are at the same time".
This might not be the kind of refutation one looks for at first, but in my view it should not be taken lightly.

Where it comes to humans only being able to know in a representational sense and being unable to know "truly", we could just as easily state that we cannot know "falsely, since we know nothing about anything beyond our own representations.
If one tries to refute the following proposition, one will find the same issues as in refuting the one we are discussing:
‘We cannot falsely know who we are and be who we are at the same time.’

It seems as if there is no truth to our knowledge, no falsehood. Only representation. However, we are unable to rid our representational minds of the representations of "truth", "falsehood", or "representation" itself.
Being reasonable, in relation to the proposition, might mean that we concede that there is no reasonable basis from which the proposition was formulated. In other words, it is like poetry: Fascinating, inspiring and boundless. The irrefutability only emerges if we presuppose a (misplaced) semi-scientific frame of reference.

We can't say: I know everything about myself. When we talk about "being", we perceive "being" as the dynamic process constituted of everything conceivable, "knowable" and "not-knowable", which constitutes us.
Since this sentence (and the proposition) contradicts itself, in stating that being is at least partly constituted of the "unknowable", while still claiming to say something about what "being" really is, based solely on knowable fragments of "being". It's like looking at four wheels, and claiming to see what the whole car looks like. For all we know, the wheels belong to the propulsion system of a Ferris wheel, or a piece by Andy Warhol. Or to something looking like this:

1. We cannot truly know who we are and be at the same time
2. We cannot falsely know who we are and be at the same time
3. We can falsely be who we are and know at the same time
4. We can truly be who we are and know at the same time

Finally, I think that "-be who we are" should be simply "be", since "who we are" implies, spoken out loud or not, a definition of what being is. The way the proposition wishes to look upon "being" however, is as a "ding an sich", that can't be truly defined.
In my opinion "To be who we are" sounds like "To say what we speak".
Two verbs in this sentence, and if you make them switch places, the exact same sentence comes out. My suggestion therefore, is to change the proposition to:

We can't know who we are and be at the same time.

The word "truly" could just as well be "falsely", or any other word for that matter, so I suggest we leave that out as well. An interesting proposition remains, which gives us interesting choices: Do we conclude that we can't know, or do we conclude that we can't be? Do we conclude that time is never the same, saying that nothing ever happens simultaneously?
Many things can be said for either alternative, no doubt."

Raoul Starren October 1 2001

Response:

We will attempt to address the number of issues you have raised.

Though Steve Burwen points out that the "condition of simultaneity" can be removed, he concedes that "being" appears to be a constant, so that the issue of simultaneity still exists, with solution stemming from the question of whether or not the conception of truly knowing precludes simultaneity with being, thereby the basis for the conception’s own existence. Or as Steve Burwen states, "is there anything in [truly] knowing who we are that precludes it from [occurring simultaneously with] being who we are?" In our view, Burwen’s question raises the competition’s central issue of whether we can truly know who we are, or is all we know of who we are simply representational.

Your contention that it is "superfluous" to assert "the fact that one is busy ‘being’ while one is failing to know truly", and that the assertion equates to "we can’t fly by flapping our arms and be who we are at the same time" is your opinion. Also, the notion of superfluous does not challenge the validity of the proposition. (i.e. superfluous does not correspond to invalidity; if anything it reinforces validity, by supporting the obvious, and in this case, not truly knowing who we are.)

Your argument that we should replace "know truly" with "know falsely", since "we know nothing about anything beyond our own representations" overlooks an important issue, namely that just because we cannot know that we know the limits of what we know, DOES NOT from the standpoint of more reasonableness allow us to set any limit or non-limit on what we can know. The limit or non-limit is determined by what we know from our limited perspective or what we reason about our knowledge. Hence, if we examine your contention that we know nothing beyond our representations, thereby cannot place any restriction on what we know, it succumbs to contradiction by placing a non-limit on what we know, similarly to Roberto Macías Barrientos in Entry 241 who claimed that we cannot know the limit to what we know, but then in Entry 242, conceded that he had fallen into the "mistake of trying to limit knowledge".

More important than the contradiction from placing a non-limit on what we know, we think you are overlooking the significance of the word "true" by claiming it could be replaced "just as well" by "false". In our view, the word "true" sharpens the proposition by establishing the nature of knowing in question, and the use of word "falsely" ignores that we are evaluating from our limited perspective. (i.e. by acknowledging the contradictiousness of claiming that we cannot know anything beyond our representation, the use of the word, "falsely" loses ground--not knowing beyond our representation is an insufficient ground to claim non-falsity from our perspective. We may know for instance falsity without knowing that we do, or we may know falsity from a position of more reasonableness. To respond that our knowledge is not absolute as in truth-value is self-defeating because neither is your knowledge absolute.)

Your other argument that the apparent lack of "reasonable basis" for the formulation of the proposition makes it insignificant because it is not grounded in reason or a full scientific frame of reference, overlooks that all propositions, hypothesizes, theories etc., due to epistemic uncertainty stemming from self-reference and infinite regress, do not have an absolute reasonable basis as well. Therefore, it follows that your argument of lack of reasonable basis is self-defeating.

Your next argument that the proposition is contradictory in the sense that "being" refers to the "inexpressible" or in your words, "unknowable", and yet through the notion of "being" we are claiming to say something about the "inexpressible" (i.e. we cannot say something about something that is inexpressible without contradiction.), overlooks that we are not claiming to say something directly or truly about the "inexpressible"; rather, we are claiming to say something indirectly from the apparent limits of what we know by using "being", "who we are" as a symbol, representation of the "inexpressible". In short, our fundamental claim about the "inexpressible" is that it is behind our existence as in fundamental level of being. We then go on to assert again from our limited perspective that we cannot truly know the "inexpressible" or who we are. (For you to respond that since the "inexpressible" is unknowable, there is no ground to know it, is not necessarily correct because it may not be inexpressible or even exist at all.) Though we agree that due to the apparent uncertainty of what we know, anything is possible like the following statements:

1. We cannot truly know who we are and be at the same time.
2. We cannot falsely know who we are and be at the same time.
3. We can falsely be who we are and know at the same time.
4. We can truly be who we are and know at the same time.

But what is important from our standpoint and in terms of the competition, is the more reasonableness of our assertions without claiming to come to an absolute level of more reasonableness.

Finally, your assertion that "to be who we are" appears to claim that "we know what speak of", and therefore should be replaced by simply "to be", is inconsistent, because "to be" also claims to speak of what we know by begging the question, to be what? Also, since we have established that "who we are" is a symbol, representation from our limited perspective, we see no inconsistency or contradiction in using it.

What the competition in our view comes down to is the issue of true knowledge of who we are viz., can we truly know who we are assuming that being is a constant? The issue of "not being", though a consideration, faces an immediate contradiction of knowing that we cannot "be" from a position of being, as illustrated by our responses to Alistair Burrowes in Entries 245, 246, 247. Hence, the "not being" position leads to internal contradiction, and ultimately self-defeat.

282. Entry:

"The proposition can be overcome by acknowledging it. If we acknowledge that we can't know who we are and be who we are at the same time, then we are the ones who can't know who we are and be who we are at the same time, and who know it."

Peter van Diest October 2 2001

Response:

What you appear to be arguing is that by acknowledging that we cannot know who we are and be who we are at the same time, we must know who we are at the same time as being who we are in order to know that we cannot know who we are, thereby contradict our acknowledgment that we cannot know who we are. However, you are assuming that in order to know that we cannot know who we are we need true knowledge of who we are, and yet this is not the case because we can know that we cannot know who we are from a representational perspective, thereby avoid the necessity of having true knowledge of who we are, and the contradiction from not knowing who we are through knowing who we are.

Michael De in Entry 249 takes a similar position as your own, arguing that the proposition implies that we cannot know anything, and yet by knowing that we cannot know anything, we contradict ourselves. This position is a common argument used against skepticism "I cannot know anything", found in many philosophy books and articles, but falls short of overcoming skepticism or the proposition because true knowledge is not a necessity for knowledge. So as mentioned, we acknowledge that we cannot know who we are without succumbing to contradiction, because our knowledge of who we are which allows us to make the acknowledgment is limited.

Entries 274-277 Entries 283-287