Reply to the response to Entry 273

'The global frame of reference does not stand because it can only be stated from a local frame of reference.' (Excerpt from Response)

"This is the fundamental means of overcoming the proposition.

'Or in your words, 'you' and 'I' can only know our own local frames of reference.' (Excerpt from Response)

We know our own local frames of reference in so far as, I cannot say that your asserted statement of simultaneous existence and knowledge of such existence is any less 'true' than my asserted statement.

'However, even if the global frame of reference does stand, how is it relevant to the question of knowing/not knowing who we are? (i.e. what makes the global frame of reference more reasonable than local frames of reference?' (Excerpt from Response)

The global frame of reference (i.e. 'we') does stand. The question asks if the proposition that 'WE cannot truly know who WE are and be who WE are at the same time' can be overcome. The global frame, which is equivalent to 'we' bears direct relevance to the proposition.

The proposition is overcome for the following reasoning (in concise words):

- There exist 'j' number of people in this world.

- ‘We’ is comprised of these ‘j’ people.

- Every individual can be referenced as an ‘i-th person’

- It is POSSIBLE for each i-th person to simultaneously know who he or she is AND exist as who he or she is at the same time.
(Note: The question asks if ‘we CANnot truly know...’ which attests to potential and not actual (or realized) simultaneous existence and knowledge of such existence.)

- That i-th person's knowledge of their simultaneous existence and knowledge of such existence constitutes an i-th local frame.

- The compilation of all i-th frames constitutes the global frame; the global frame is equivalent to ‘we’ (i.e. the j-th frame).

- An i-th person CAN (i.e. it is possible to) claim that that i- th person's simultaneous existence and knowledge of such existence is identically equal to their unique i-th (numerical) value.

- It is POSSIBLE for NO i-th person to claim another i-th person's value of simultaneous existence and knowledge of such existence is any more/less truthful than their own.

- It is also POSSIBLE for each i-th person to know of the j-th value; notice, the requirement here is not that the i-th frame be equivalent to the j-th frame. Namely, the proposition to be overcome is NOT ‘I cannot truly know who WE are and be who WE are at the same time’. That is the same thing as NOT expecting the local frame to be equivalent to the global frame.

- In these concise terms, since every i-th person knows of their own i-th value (which constitutes simultaneous knowledge of that person's i-th valued existence and knowledge of such existence) and knows of the j-th value (which constitutes the compilation of every i-th persons' simultaneous existence and knowledge of such existence), then the j-th frame must also constitute simultaneous knowledge of the j-th valued existence and knowledge of such existence).

This shows that ‘WE CAN truly know who WE are and be who WE are at the same time’

So let's work through some actual numbers. Let's say the world population is 7 (i.e. the compilation of the 1-st, 2-nd, 3-rd, 4-th, 5-th, etc. persons). And for the sake of consistency in the ‘i-th’ notation, let's say that the 1-st, 2-nd, & 3-rd persons died and no longer exist, leaving the 4-th, 5-th, 6-th, and 7-th persons remaining.

The following is basically a cut and paste of the process above, adjusted to consider the case of the 4-th through 7-th persons constituting ‘we’.

- There exist ‘4’ number of people in this world.

- ‘We’ is comprised of these ‘4’ people.

- Every individual can be referenced as an ‘i-th person’; namely, 4-th, 5-th, 6-th, & 7-th.

- It is POSSIBLE for each i-th person to simultaneously know who he or she is AND exist as who he or she is at the same time.
(Note: The question asks if ‘we CANnot truly know...’ which attests to potential and not actual (or realized) simultaneous existence and knowledge of such existence.)

Namely, we are not asking that the 6-th person must ACTUALLY know who the 6-th person is and simultaneously exist as that 6- th person. We are merely asking that it be possible.

- That i-th person's knowledge of their simultaneous existence and knowledge of such existence constitutes an i-th local frame.

Namely, the 5-th person's simultaneous existence as the 5-th person, and knowledge of such existence as the 5-th person, constitutes the 5-th local frame.

- The compilation of all i-th frames constitutes the global frame; the global frame is equivalent to ‘we’ (i.e. the j-th frame).

Here the 4-th frame is our global frame. Notice how we also have a 4-th local frame. In my prior entry, you may read the explanation of ‘1 = 1’ from different systems if this upsets you.

- An i-th person CAN (i.e. it is possible to) claim that that i- th person's simultaneous existence and knowledge of such existence is identically equal to their unique i-th (numerical) value.

Namely, the 7-th person can claim that their simultaneous existence and knowledge of such existence as the 7-th person can be stated by that 7-th person as being identically equal to the numerical value 7.

- It is POSSIBLE for NO i-th person to claim another i-th person's value of simultaneous existence and knowledge of such existence is any more/less truthful than their own.

Namely, the 6-th person CANNOT claim that the 7-th person's stated numerical value of 7 is any more/less truthful than that 6-th person's claim to the value 6.

- It is also POSSIBLE for each i-th person to know of the j-th value; notice, the requirement here is not that the i-th frame be equivalent to the j-th frame. Namely, the proposition to be overcome is NOT ‘I cannot truly know who WE are and be who WE are at the same time’. That is the same thing as NOT expecting the local frame to be equivalent to the global frame.

Namely, the 4-th through 7th persons can know of each stated values (4 through 7). Knowing that the compilation of the stated values constitutes ‘we’, the global frame.

Here the global frame (as concluded above) is equivalent to the value 4.

- In these concise terms, since every i-th person knows of their own i-th value (which constitutes simultaneous knowledge of that person's i-th valued existence and knowledge of such existence) and knows of the j-th value (which constitutes the compilation of every i-th persons' simultaneous existence and knowledge of such existence), then the j-th frame must also constitute simultaneous knowledge of the j-th valued existence and knowledge of such existence).

Namely, since the 4-th through 7-th persons knows their own respective 4 through 7 values, AND since they also know of the compilation of their values as 4, they both exist as and simultaneously hold knowledge of the 4-th global frame.

That is to say that the 4-th through 7-th persons must retain knowledge of their own values in order to be compiled into the global frame.

This is to also say that the 4-th through 7-th persons must retain knowledge of each other i-th persons' respective value in order to assign a value to the compilation of these values.

The means of compilation agreed upon by the 4-th through 7-th persons (implicitly) as their global population, sets the global frame to be valued at the 4-th frame.

The 4-th through 7-th local frames are distinctly different from the global frame of 4. The local frame of 4, although different, happens to equal the global frame value. 4 = 4. Again, reference my prior entry if this does not sit well with you.
So in these concise words, the conclusion drawn is a conclusion that overcomes the proposition:
‘WE CAN truly know who WE are and be who WE are at the same time’"

Donald Changeau September 5 2001

Response:

We do not challenge, refute, or deny the possibility of overcoming the proposition. In fact, in Entries 244 and 259 for example, we have pointed out that by the proposition being asserted from our limited perspective, it implies the possibility of truly knowing who we are, which in our view is necessary for the validity of the proposition and competition. However, the competition is not about the possibility of truly knowing who we are, but about the more reasonableness of truly knowing who we are. (i.e. is it more reasonable that we truly know who we are than we do not, with the basis for determination being self-consistency and soundness?) So your assertion that the proposition has been overcome by showing within your system of thought that truly knowing who we are is possible, does not stand. If anything, it may only point to a direction for overcoming the proposition.

Moreover, we disagree that the proposition can be overcome only from a global frame of reference because the term "we" refers to the individuals who make up humankind. Therefore, as Steve Burwen from Entry 198 states, "…. if during a typical lifetime of 70 years or so (a period comprised of approximately 2.2 billion seconds) [an individual is] able to know who [he is] for even a second, or even a millisecond during that period, [he] shall know who [he is] and be who [he is] simultaneously, and [if he can more reasonably show it], the proposition is overcome." In other words, the proposition would be overcome, because it has been more reasonably shown that at least one individual of humankind can truly know who he is, or not all individuals of humankind cannot truly know who they are.

Also, since as you acknowledge that individuals can only know from their own local frames of reference, it follows that there is no global frame of reference, except from a local frame of reference. Even if all individuals agree on a global frame of reference for themselves, their individual perspectives of the global frame would be different, because no perspective, when scrutinized, is identical to another. Therefore, we think your conception of global frame of reference only stands in a limited sense, barring agreement on the values of perspectives and non-scrutiny of the global frame of reference. Hence, we do not feel that the conception is an adequate direction to overcome the proposition, especially when the fundamental means of overcoming the proposition by showing the more reasonableness of a perspective over all other antagonistic perspectives is available.

275. Entry:

"One implication derivable from the proposition (amongst many others, no doubt) seems to be that both activities, namely 'being' and 'knowing', are mutually exclusive as far as we, humans attempting to be reasonable, are concerned. Again, (I entered a few statements a year ago (86, 98, 117)), I have to conclude that the statement itself implies we can never know at all, unless we concede that it is possible to momentarily stop being at certain points, and start "knowing", after which we switch back into being-mode. Fascinating indeed, but to give this proposition a more reasonable status, is dubitable at its very best. I'd like to illustrate my point further with a little variation on the proposition that's being discussed:

Since there is no reasonable way for us to stop and start being who we are, except by birth and death, and furthermore assuming that none of the participants in this discussion are fetuses or corpses, none of the participants is in a position to know who we are. Were one to state that we can know within reasonable limits, another can say with equal justification that we can stop being who we are, within reasonable limits. (Which in my view is nonsensical)."

Raoul Starren September 11 2001

Response:

Your argument appears to be saying that knowledge requires something to have knowledge in, and since we apparently cannot get outside of ourselves while in a living state, and even if we could we would have no basis to know, there is no knowledge we can know of who we are, except for what we represent as who we are. One way around this inside/outside problem is to argue that some knowledge is innate (Entries 265, 267), although it does not follow how there can be absolute innate knowledge because due to the apparent interactive nature of existence and our inability to comprehend absolute innateness, it is more reasonable that existence is defined by causality rather than a mixture of causality and nihility viz., it is more reasonable that things come from other things, than things come from both other things and nothing.

Another way to challenge the inside/outside problem is to attack the proposition using the inside/outside problem by arguing that the impossibility of overcoming the proposition is more reasonable than the possibility of overcoming the proposition (Entry 168). However, since all thought is defined by possibility, and we apparently do not know the future, and the inside/outside problem is not the only way of attacking the proposition, it does not follow how the notion of impossibility could precede the notion of possibility. What we could say based on your inside/outside argument is that the probability of not overcoming the proposition is more reasonable than the probability of overcoming the proposition, but even then the gamut of positions need to be first evaluated.

We agree that the proposition implies that "we cannot know at all." (i.e. we cannot truly know.) Though this point does not mean that we cannot know in a representational sense. Also, the assertion that we cannot truly know is not contradictory (Entries 22, 77, 249), because we are asserting it from our limited perspective. (i.e. we do not truly know that we do not truly know anything. Rather, we know from our limited perspective that we do not truly know anything.)

276. Entry:

Reply to the response to Entry 275

'There is no knowledge we can know of who we are, except for what we represent as who we are.' (Excerpt from Response)

"Absolutely. All I told you in the initial entry is what I represent as who we are.

'One way around this inside/outside problem is to argue that some knowledge is innate although it does not follow how there can be absolute innate knowledge because due to the apparent interactive nature of existence and our inability to comprehend absolute innateness, it is more reasonable that existence is defined by causality rather than a mixture of causality and nihility viz., it is more reasonable that things come from other things, than things come from both other things and nothing.' (Excerpt from Response)

One can't escape the arbitrary nature of this statement. One option deemed more reasonable than the other. Furthermore, I don't think it's causality versus a mixture of causality and nihility, but rather causality versus a 'missing first cause' (causality's incorporated refutation, in other words). Knowledge of causality (or nihility, for that matter) in my opinion offers no solutions were it comes to fathoming 'what we are'. This doesn't pose any problem for me, since I still know that the cause of working every day leads to bread on my table, and the cause of entering this discussion is inspiration, not solution.

'It does not follow how the notion of impossibility could precede the notion of possibility.' (Excerpt from Response)

Exactly. My point is, that both notions evoke each other like a positron and an electron can: out of nowhere. Therefore, if there is any dichotomy at stake, it isn't between possibility and impossibility, but between (possible/impossible) and ?
(?) being what we don't know: What we, and all around us, IS. Not 'something' or 'nothing', but (?). What you refer to as knowledge of who we are, I call architecture (or opinion).

'What we could say based on your inside/outside argument is that the probability of not overcoming the proposition is more reasonable than the probability of overcoming the proposition'. (Excerpt from Response)

Exactly. And I can say the opposite. Therefore, this concept of reasonableness doesn't help us any further, unless we wish to turn this philosophical issue into a democratic one.

'Though this point does not mean that we cannot know in a representational sense.' (Excerpt from Response)

Indeed. We can't help but know in a representational sense, although it might be more accurate to say that We can't help but Construct from any material at hand, much like philosophical imagery first based on gods and elements, and later on computers and turingmachines.

Finally, we can always debate the definition of the word 'knowledge', but I feel we only would be tackling the same problem in a different scene. I think I see your point, and again, as I've stated in previous entries, I'm not trying to prove your point of view wrong, I merely try to prove mine equivalent in the same sense as a positron and an electron are: Both viable and existing. This insofar the reasonableness of your view is concerned.

I believe in lots of forms of knowledge: Knowledge of chess, fish, opinions and stars, but not in knowledge of who or what we are.

Where the bare proposition is concerned, 'we can't know who we are and be who we are at the same time', I have to insist that each time we indulge in the 'knowing who we are'-activity, we have no choice but to do both things (being who and knowing who) at the same time, since being is a prerequisite of everything involved in 'knowing' and 'reasonableness'. In this base fashion only can I claim to overcome the proposition."

Raoul Starren September 13 2001

Response:

We agree that by using your base position whereby knowing and being must occur at the same time, and that being is a "prerequisite" for knowing, you can claim to have overcome the proposition, just as by taking an even more base position like you believe we can know and be who we are at the same time, for no other reason than you believe it, you can overcome the proposition as well. Though your notion of overcome does not correspond to that of the competition, in which all positions presented must be evaluated in terms of consistency and soundness. Therefore, it can be said that your base position supported on grounds of simultaneous occurrence of being and knowing, and being as a prerequisite for knowing, does not necessarily mean that we can truly know who we are; and if we consider your inside/outside position in which we need to get outside of ourselves to know ourselves, and yet by doing so we cease to be who we are, or even if we could get outside, we would have no basis to know who we are, it then follows that your base position does not overcome the proposition.

However, your argument cuts deeper at the determination of more reasonableness by claiming that the determination is "arbitrary". We agree that the determination is arbitrary in the sense that there is apparently no absolute ground for the determination, so your criteria for what is more reasonable is not less relevant or objective than the competition’s criteria. Yet, there is a limited, all-inclusive ground from our perspective, because all thought is defined by reason viz., conscious meaning. Hence, from an objective standpoint, it can be determined what is more reasonable within a system of thought or between systems of thoughts, and based solely on the validness of reasons presented. Though this method does not stop you or anyone else from believing your position is more reasonable. What it does provide is an objective evaluation based solely on reasons, and their validness, which no system of thought can get away from. (i.e. there is no system of thought that is devoid of reason.)

Other issues:

We mentioned the distinction between causality and nihility to show that absolute innate knowledge in the form of something coming from nothing is less reasonable than limited innate knowledge in the form of something coming from something else.

We agree that because of the causal nature of our thinking, thereby the problem of self-reference and infinite regress, there will likely be no final solution to the proposition as Sam Nico from Entry 270 states, ".... The real solution is not so much a solution as a constant criticism of the position proposed here which is then spurred to presenting itself in other ways to incorporate the criticisms", and we respond to him, ".... We agree with you that the solution to the proposition will entail a "constant criticism" rather than an absolute answer, because of our apparent inability to truly know that we know something. Though at some point, the criticism from a particular position will either exhaust itself, or overcome the proposition by creating a situation in which the proposition cannot incorporate the criticism without contradicting itself. Even then and outside the bounds of the competition, there would be no final solution or absolute endpoint, due to the apparent non-absolute truth-value of human perspective."

277. Entry:

Reply to the response to Entry 276

"I have never believed that we had to get outside ourselves to know ourselves. That wouldn't help one bit and, more importantly, is not possible. We can never know who we are in a consistent, sound way, is what I say. There is and never will be a basis for such knowledge. Unless of course, we admit this elusive ‘reasonableness’ to come to the rescue.

We cannot know who we are and be who we are, at the same time.
Does this imply that:
We can know who we are and be who we are, at different times?
Probably not, since you didn't think the point I made using this position was valid enough.
(I consider this interpretation reasonable, reading the sentence in a logical way.)

Or can't we know who we are period, and is the second half of the proposition entirely superfluous, thereby becoming: ‘We cannot know who we are’? From this last one I say it's irrefutable, the original one simply makes little sense to me.

Please show how you can uphold your position, without acknowledging the fact that to know who we are in a reasonable fashion, implies that we will stop being in a reasonable fashion at the same time. In my view, you would be forced to accept this nonsensical side-effect.

To put it more clearly, I feel forced to choose between two distinct alternatives:
-If we can know within reasonable limits, it follows that we can stop being within reasonable limits, according to the proposition.
-Otherwise, within reasonable limits, we would actually be able to know who we are and be who we are at the same time, and the proposition would be overcome within reasonable limits.

So I feel that one or more of the following must now be established:
-I've proven that the proposition is nonsensical.
-I've overcome the proposition.
-I've shown that the concept of reasonableness offers no help in resolving the issue."

Raoul Starren September 17 2001

Response:

The proposition, "we cannot truly know who we are and be who we are at the same time" equates to "we cannot truly know who we are". Though we disagree with you that this equation makes the second half of the primary proposition "entirely superfluous", because from our standpoint, the second half of the proposition helps to define the problem between being and knowing. (i.e. we apparently cannot know ourselves through ourselves.)

What you appear to be overlooking by concluding that the primary proposition is "nonsensical", is that we are proposing that we cannot ‘truly’ know who we are and be who we are, which does not mean that we cannot know who we are in a representational sense and be who we are. So your contention that the proposition implies that in order to know who we are, we need to stop being within reasonable limits, or the alternative we can know and be who we are within reasonable limits, does not stand.

Other issue:

We agree with you that the proposition implies that we cannot know and be at different times, as explained by our response to Steve Burwen's Entry 197, ".... We think being is a necessary constant as long as we are alive, thereby being cannot be isolated into certain moments of time. If we are correct, then the competition comes down to the matter of truly knowing who we are and the temporal exclusivity argument from the standpoint of being as a temporal constant," and Steve Burwen in Entry 198 responds, ".... I agree with you that being is a necessary constant (as long as we are alive) and that it cannot be isolated into discrete moments of time. In that case, the condition of simultaneity can be removed for the statement "be who we are" since our being is not simultaneous with anything, it is simply continuous or a constant. If this is conceded, then the proposition is overcome if one can attain knowledge of one's self or who we are at any point during our existence."

Entries 271-273 Entries 278-282