"First note that we must always ‘be who we are’ - we can't be anything else. So it's clear (I hope) that the proposition is equivalent to saying ‘we cannot truly know who we are’. Further, it's impossible for me to know whether some other person is capable of knowing something: their mind is a closed book to me. So to make this statement meaningful it must be translated: ‘I cannot truly know who I am’. Obviously it's impossible to prove or disprove this statement, since no one else can ever know who I am, nor pass judgment on whether I know who I am (since the contents of my mind and knowledge are forever unknown to them). Thus if I feel like claiming that I know who I am, it can never be disproven. Likewise if I feel like claiming the opposite. In other words there is no logical standard by which the statement can be falsified: it's purely a matter of personal opinion, and therefore evidently not worth further argument."

Rick Rush August 31 2001

Response:

Your challenge that there is no logical standard by which the proposition can be falsified, is contingent on the premise that the mind of an individual is a "closed book" to all other individuals, or the contents of an individual’s mind is "forever unknown" to all other individuals. However, it does not follow that an individual needs to get inside another individual’s mind in order to know whether or not the other individual can truly know who he or she is. The individual can reason based on a number things like the biological and neurological makeup of the individual in question, and any interaction he has had with the other individual. More important, an individual’s mind though closed to other individuals, does not allow the individual to know entirely from within his/her mind, because conscious knowing is contingent on knowledge of the external world. (i.e. there is no pure internal knowledge that we can know that we know.) So the challenge of showing how more reasonably we can truly know who we are, whether on an individual or collective basis, than not doing so, comes down to not personal opinion, but the more reasonableness of our reasons.

For example, for you to claim that you can truly know who you are, because you simply believe that you can, is less reasonable than us claiming that your conscious knowledge, based on your biological and neurological makeup, is representational, and therefore, you can only know in a representational sense, rather than in an absolute truth-value sense. For you to respond that our claim is invalid because we cannot get inside your mind to know exactly what you are thinking is irrelevant and inconsistent, because we do not need to get inside your mind to more reasonably know that you cannot truly know who you are, and your own conscious knowledge is contingent on knowledge of the external world. (i.e. you cannot know something solely from inside your mind--there must be a connection to the external world at some level.)

In short, the basis for the evaluation of whether or not you can truly know who you are is the reasons for positions which we both have access to. So the notion of a "closed mind" is not relevant, nor is it consistent since your conscious knowing is contingent on knowledge of the external world. (i.e. world outside of your mind itself.)

272. Entry:

Reply to the response to Entry 270

"To discard reason on the grounds of its limitations would be philosophical suicide, and I emphasize this is not the position being pursued here. The excluded middle suggests the metaphor of a rind of reason parenthetically containing (or derived from) an untouchable (unknowable) something that may or may not be nothing. My emphasis on limitation is not the old Kantian notion of the limits to knowledge, for these were prejudiced in favour of a Newtonian perspective, but rather that this rind of the knowable is becoming somewhat emaciated in the sense that, in terms of reasonableness, it has become synonymous with epistemology. To extend the metaphor somewhat, it is a detailing of the map of knowledge to the exclusion of the inhabitants represented by it, and whose lives are shaped by it. Consequently, the emphasis given to death as active participant in structure of knowledge is intended to act as counterpoint to the more dominant view that represents death as a passive event in the state of things. In fact, to talk of death represented as passive event is not so much to represent death as to not represent it, which is how I read the notion of excluded middle, and what in existential terms is the fleeing from. This empty centre will never be filled to completion, for reasons given in entry 268, but its scope can be reduced by representing that which is currently not part of the picture. This is what is meant by the expansion of boundaries.

Connected to this is the more significant criticism concerning Being-in-Totality and its relation to memory. It should be made clear that these are not terms that are equated but rather, memory is derived from it. How can this be shown? This is the crux of the matter.

To begin with, the notion of representation has its modern roots in the Schopenhauerian scheme which moved philosophy away a little from the Kantian position of thing-in-itself, though not sufficiently far enough not to be subservient to the Newtonian view and still dependent on an archaic form of sufficient reason. However, what is of significance here is that representation is regarded in a fundamental manner that has echoes in the modern quantum scheme in that what is meant by representation is objectification of Will and never Will itself (which has sometime or other been referred to as Idea, thing-in-itself, the noumenal, consciousness-in-itself, transphenomenal etc. In short, the unrepresentable.) By echo in the quantum realm, I mean that the representation of complementarity never refers form to an ideal state, but to one in which a potential that is ontic in its essential nature gives rise to a particular experience which is set up to detect a particular type of participation, and it is this that is represented.

It is considered that the Newtonian picture has been superseded and that the absolutes are all gone and incorporated into a more relativised view. However, the base assumption is still intact and still in place and still informing much of what is regarded as reasonable, which is the principle of inertia from which the laws of motion are derived and which are yet to be superseded or revoked. Even though there is a hint that their claims relate to a pragmatic perspective, there is also a kind of hidden satisfaction that they describe, or represent some feature of reality corresponding to them. However, it should be noted that it is impossible from a logical position alone to derive from a deductive structure based on inactivity a state of reality that is self-activating. Conversely, and in search of exclusive rights to explanation, the reverse is usually regarded as the way to proceed, to demonstrate that what is called self-activation derives its significance from the inactive; in short, to demonstrate the lack of impulse in-forming the shape of reality, and to prove the external force as motivator. Space and time as absolutes have passed away into a sort of hybrid solution, but inertia remains as the warrant underwriting the known. This restriction can be easily demonstrated in the following classical thought experiment.

Newton’s spinning bucket experiment was designed to show that the relative nature of motion was an incomplete description in terms of influence. What is it in the spinning bucket of water that causes the centre to hollow, giving rise to the notion of centrifugal force? The answer awaited Ernst Mach who replied that it was the presence of the distant stars giving rise to a principle of universal inertia. The water ‘somehow knows’ of the distant stars. In this way Mach raised the status of inertia. The problem for philosophy is the meaning of this phrase ‘somehow knows’, and that the fact that a system of thought predisposed to inertia is bound to conclude that which is assumed. It argues that it is senseless to discuss the spinning bucket in the absence of the universe, and so its meaning must be derived in relational terms. This is classic stuff in terms of philosophy, for it really concerns the relation of the particular to the universal. It is pointless to look at science in the hope of reasoned debate on this matter, since it has a level of satisfaction built in that it is unlikely to relinquish and which is determined by the principle that has given rise to it in the wake of material successes. But there is a problem undisclosed in the example which sheds light on this relation in a manner which is outside the scope of science.

Instead of considering the spinning bucket in terms of its motion, one instead was concerned with its weight. In this sense then, if it weighed 50 kilos, say, this represents a particular fraction of the whole of the earth. It is a numerator over a denominator that is always smaller. The earth in turn is also a fraction of a larger whole and so on, so that what any one part might measure on a scale, this part represents a fraction in terms of the nested whole which is Totality. Now, the question is this: what is the weight of the bucket of water if one removed the universe? The answer is both simple and pregnant with implication: it is no longer the fraction but the whole. In such a state, it is hardly liable to remain a bucket of water, for we are, at this point in the thought experiment, presenting the conditions most likely resembling the singularity of the primordial Big Bang.

However, it is impossible to ‘remove’ the universe in order to demonstrate this. It does however, give rise to a question that current knowing is not in a position to answer which is this: what is it in the presence of the universe that prevents the bucket from exploding into a new universe (or even collapsing into extinction) and which thereby gives it the appearance of being inert? Answer: it must know that it is there. The first thing to note is that inertia is an appearance and not a fundamental description of reality. Secondly, what is meant by knowing cannot be restricted to that epistemological form which is borrowed second-hand from science in the hope of emulating its successes. Clearly, what is meant by ‘knowing’ cannot be limited to its epistemological interpretation. Any one entity must invoke the presence of the whole if it is to define itself in terms of part. What this means is that the notion of part emerges to the foreground and retains the background as a fundamental feature of its definition.

Here, then, are the beginnings of definition which show the current limitation of reasonableness preventing the perception of memory as mnemosyne (as opposed to memory as memoria which is the current fashion). The latter is replicated in computers and has come to symbolize all of memory, and consequently define what is meant by ‘known’. But this kind of memory is nothing more than an ordering system, a warehouse of parts in miniature, in which arrangement by time or alphabetical order are synonymous. This is not the meaning of memory in terms of activated entities, but of entities built out of inertia that are enslaved to such concepts. Consequently, to ‘know who I am’ cannot be exhausted by those elements that are currently represented in the categories devised to contain them. There is a level of knowing which is also an awareness of all the things I am not which is the bulk of reality, which in turn are part of the definition of what I am. Without that awareness, I am locked into an isolated form in which background context becomes superfluous, in which the greater form of memory is subsumed for the sake of a process of recall which is also insignificant to the I that knows in terms of the greater notion of awareness. Consequently, there must be recognition of the limitations to thought imposed by the scientific perspective which philosophy must resist if it is to have a role to play in the structure of reality, or be condemned to the same round of ideas that have merely altered their cosmetic form since Newton (and others), in an attempt to escape the infinite regress to which it is clearly addicted.

This represents the beginnings of direction and are in no way the definitive solution. This can only arise from opposition, so I leave these ideas for now, in the hope of criticism that may help to direct the next step, rather than assume the criticisms and so preempt myself. In any case, without criticism, such views would pave the way to their own isolation and ultimately become only one short step removed from solipsism, which is why it is imperative that ideas remain open in character and welcoming of criticism."

Sam Nico September 3 2001

Response:

In your reply, you articulate a direction for solution to the proposition from various angles, whereby the limitation of excluded-middle logic, scientific perspective, categorized thought is overcome by expanding the boundaries of human thought, thereby attempting to complete the incomplete, fill in the partially filled, make shapeless the rounded. Or in your words, ".... [the empty centre’s] scope can be reduced by representing that which is currently not part of the picture... expansion of boundaries.... detect a particular type of participation... that is represented.... Any one entity must invoke the presence of the whole if it is to define itself in terms of part.... ‘know who I am’ cannot be exhausted by those elements that are currently represented in the categories devised to contain them.... limitations to thought imposed by the scientific perspective which philosophy must resist... or be condemned to the same round of ideas." We are sympathetic to your yearning for a way out of the limitation, containment of current human thought, but we do not see a way out except into limitation and containment from another perspective, so that the same problem of limitation and containment remains. Are we better off with an expansion of boundaries, when we would still be limited by boundaries of the same nature as before? If the notion of boundaries is the issue, then it is clear that we would not be better off with an expansion of them. Also, if we expand beyond current scientific, objective thought into realms of ideas that do not adhere to it, then we would leave ourselves open to accepting any idea just because we do. It would be like a boat set afloat far from shore without a keel. To avoid this potentially disastrous situation, in which we would be at the whims of things around us, we install the keel of reason, thereby give us partial control over our direction. Though this installation does not mean that we are confined to scientific perspective, because it is reason itself which is the final arbitrator of what course we take. Hence, it is up to ourselves to refute scientific perspectives if we want to change our course, by using the very basis for scientific perspectives, reason.

We agree with your relationship between self-active and inactive, whereby the inactive appears to form the shape of reality and provide a motivating force for the self-active. Yet, the distinction is limited to the living and non-living realms, because the inactive must be active at some levels, especially ontological, in order to provide a basis and motivation for the self-active. Also, it is unclear how a relation between self-active and inactive may lead to an explanation of how we can truly know who we are. (i.e. what does the inactive and its relation to the self-active have to do with the nature and content of what we know?)

Moreover, how can our understanding of conscious knowledge not be fundamentally grounded to our interpretation of knowledge’s epistemology? In other words, how can there be sufficient understanding of conscious knowledge without our understanding of its epistemology?

Further, how can the notion of whole, subject to the same limitation as epistemology, be more fundamental to our understanding of conscious knowledge than our interpretation of knowledge’s epistemology? Surely, epistemology precedes any limited notion of whole because the limited notion of whole stems from an epistemology rather than the epistemology stems from a limited notion of whole? Though it is possible that our interpretation of knowledge’s epistemology includes the notion of whole, but even then we are expressing an epistemology rather than just a notion of whole.

273. Entry:

Reply to the response to Entry 269

‘However, it is unclear to us why and how your global frame of reference of ‘0.1’, constituting that we both truly know who we are and exist as who we are at the same time, is a ‘global fact’ outside your system of thought. What grounds do you have to assert from your local frame of reference the universal objectiveness of the ‘0.1’ global frame of reference?’ (Excerpt from Response)

"‘0.1’ is indeed my own frame which overcomes the proposition. What ‘you’ and ‘I’ know to be true from our respective local frames may differ or vary as freely as we wish to change our frames of reference. In as much as ‘we’ differ from ‘0.1’, we also agree, in so far as there will always be a value that relates our differing frames. What is that value? No one can predict (i.e. make a future assessment of) what it will be, since we are all free to change local frames as much as want and when we want.
BUT
IF ‘you’ presently state your local truth of simultaneous knowledge and existence is identical to the value '1.1' (i.e. one and one-tenths).
AND
IF ‘I’ presently state my local truth of simultaneous knowledge and existence is identical to the value '1' (i.e. one).
THEN
‘We’ (the composition of ‘you’ and ‘I’) will exist identically equal to ‘0.1’ (i.e. that which discerns ‘you’ from ‘I’).

‘How do you distinguish local and global frame of references, when you apparently can only know from your local frame of reference?’ (Excerpt from Response)

‘You’ and ‘I’ can only know our own local frames of reference. In so far as ‘I’ concede that ‘you’ exist, then I also concede that another local frame of reference exists.

So if ‘I’ know my local truth of simultaneous knowledge and existence is identical to the value '1' (i.e. one)
AND
if ‘You’ know that your value is identically equal to '1' as well,
THEN ‘we’ must concede that, at that resolution, ‘we’ (our value of discernment between ‘you’ and ‘I’) is Zero.

It was just pointed out, however, that ‘you’ and ‘I’ must concede different local frames of reference exist.

This shows us that even if ‘1 = 1’, each value (from the left and right side of the relation) is from a different value system.

‘How do you distinguish local and global frame of references?’ (Excerpt from Response)

We ALWAYS know to distinguish between frames of reference, since even under the case ‘1 = 1’, we must concede differing value systems of relation.

So the idea that ‘we’ is known to be identically equal to ‘Zero’ shouldn't be of concern.

For example:

If ‘I’ know that the temperature outside is ‘Zero’, it doesn't matter what the ‘global frame’ dictates, but that I was able to distinguish that value from any set of arbitrary values of temperatures inside my house. If the temperature inside my house was ‘10’, then what matters is the difference (i.e. the discerning value = ‘10’).

If ‘you’ say that the difference in temperature inside and outside is ‘12’, then ‘we’ concede differing value systems of reference, and in so far as these two frames exist, there will exist a global frame from which to distinguish our own.

So the value of ‘we’ can be anything that ‘you’ and ‘I’ (who comprise we) wish it to be. We can make we the middle value between both of our known frames (i.e. ‘we’ = ‘11’), or we can make it based on some other means of distinguishment.

Another Example:

If ‘you’ state that you are human, and ‘I’ state that I am human, then ‘we’ concede differing frames of reference evaluating ‘human’, but none-the-less, ‘we’ simultaneous know to be and existence as ‘human’. This is also an example of ‘1 = 1’; namely, the human to the left of the relation (i.e. ‘1’) is certainly different from the human to the right of the relation (i.e. ‘1’). So this is an example of knowing two things to be different but equal. If we wanted our frames of reference to reflect difference, then ‘you’ can change the resolution of your knowledge to ‘1.001’ and ‘I’ to ‘1.002’. This would define ‘we’ (the discerning value to be ‘0.001’ rather than simply ‘0’). Now ‘we’ (i.e. ‘0.001’) reflects that the human to the left of the relation simultaneously exists and has knowledge of his ‘blue’ eyes, whereas the human to the ‘right’ simultaneously knows of and exists with his ‘brown’ eyes. And we could go on and on... The end of this process of distinguishing, which was noted as always taking place, is a function of agreed upon resolution. Namely, is ‘we’ = ‘0’ sufficient, or must we analyze ‘we’ with additional decimal places to reflect distinguishment.

So let's now run through the response again, and I'll give the short reply (i.e. without much explanation or analogy use).

‘However, it is unclear to us why and how your global frame of reference of ‘0.1’, constituting that we both truly know who we are and exist as who we are at the same time, is a ‘global fact’ outside your system of thought. What grounds do you have to assert from your local frame of reference the universal objectiveness of the ‘0.1’ global frame of reference?’ (Excerpt from Response)

Let's say that (for simplicity's sake) only ‘you’ and ‘I’ exist. If ‘you’ and ‘I’ constitute ‘we’ then ‘we’ concede a global frame of reference, when both ‘you’ and ‘I’ state local truths. There is no such thing, however, as a ‘global fact’ outside of ‘we’, since ‘you’ and ‘I’ constitute ‘we’. It's tantamount to saying that there is a ‘global fact’ of temperature difference; there isn't - the only thing that matters is the difference between two locally know temperatures. We concede that there may exist an infinite range of temperature differences, but what matters is the temperature difference that ‘you’ and ‘I’ determine since ‘we’ constitute the global frame.

‘How do you distinguish local and global frame of references, when you apparently can only know from your local frame of reference?’ (Excerpt from Response)

‘You’ distinguish between local and global frames of reference, by conceding
1) that ‘I’ exist
2) that ‘I’ will always hold a different local frame (even under cases of ‘1 = 1’)
3) Knowing that ‘you’ and ‘I’ comprise ‘we’, which is our global frame."

Donald Changeau September 4 2001

Response:

Entries 268-270 Entries 274-277