"The proposition asserts the impossibility of identity between knowledge and being, in a contemporaneous context. However, if this is not to be an exploration of a logical tautology, then the grounds for disproof must centre on the meanings of terms in the statement, and suggest that the reasonableness of these meanings is unreasonable. The general features of parameters of reasonableness preclude the subject from the known which become understood in terms of the absence of the subject. The subject is later included to find that the immediacy of knowing has been placed in a position of mediacy that is permanently one step removed from him/her/it, and exists in the form of representation. In such forms of representation, the notion of Being is excluded since this implies a certain Totality of awareness, and the representation is always partial. Consequently, not only is there no possibility of disproof, but there can be no discussion and, in fact, no problem. There are variations of this form of position, but they generally come to similar conclusions.

The form of reasonableness needs some alteration if there is to be headway. The type of knowing implicit in the proposition is essentially scientific. It is no surprise to find quantum theory presenting itself as a possible route, but that is a blind alley since the disproof must contain an element of suspension as a relation, and the quantum realm is one that defines its realism in terms of collapse of suspension.

The form of reasonableness must contain the subject from the outset, and not introduce him/her/it after the event. This points at reflective intention, a feedback loop of perspectives in which subject and object are in a state of dialectical tension from which there is no respite. This points towards an existential expansion of reasonableness, and leads to a 'felt' evaluation. Consequently, the proposition becomes transposed to this arena inclusive of subject, and reformulated: it is impossible to be both complete and incomplete at the same time.

The notion of incompletion is common to both parameters, in that knowledge bears the Popperian hallmarks etc. and is always liable to improvement/ expansion etc. In terms of existential evaluation, it is necessary to circumvent this categorized form of knowledge in order to include the excluded self-that-knows. In this evaluation, the state of completion refers to the movement from the aspectual to the Total, which has been referred to as the in-itself. The in-itself infers its significance from a plenum or Totality. It is also paradoxically a state of emptiness and it is this dual character of Totality that is part of the significance of Being. The knower, on the other hand, is not a Totality but is an aspect of it, represented by the partiality which is given as read. This knower is referred to as the for-itself, and so the proposition then becomes an exploration of the relationship between the for- itself and the in-itself. Being who you are is expressed in the statement 'I am not yet myself'. By this awareness, the Totality calls the knower into existence and draws the knower towards itself. In effect, the for-itself is striving towards the in-itself. Again, the proposition transmutes: 'I am for-myself, therefore I am not in- myself'. Again, the terms demand this distinction, retaining in the notion of striving the essential 'I am'. The incomplete, striving for completion, is destined to fail (the hallmark of the scientific category of reasonableness and non-finality). Yet by this sense of striving, the sense of completion generates the reality of a sense of lack. That is, the Totality is experienced in the for-itself as a sense of lack, or absence. It is that feeling, a desire, (which is an inner state the usual rationale would represent in terms of external force and thereby preclude desire) which provides the motive of action: the search for Being (in-itself) in the presence of its impossibility. In Whitehead's philosophy, the sense of completion is called satisfaction, but he is astute enough not to make this idea collapse into the merely emotional by equation. In Sartre, however, there is a meeting-point when in-itself and for-itself finally meet, which is the point of death. It is this point that presents the proposition with a solution which is not a real solution but a dilemma. The point of death melts the for-itself and the in-itself into each other and appears to disprove the proposition, for then they are coincident. This is not the solution one would like it to be, which is hardly surprising since such a fusion dissolves the terms so that the contemporaneous becomes meaningless. In that case, even though the proposition is transposed, it would appear that the disproof is just as elusive on the existential plain, as it is on the epistemological and metaphysical. However, all is not lost. There is a sense in which the proposition is disproved at a more dynamic level. Given the call to completion by Being, and given that completion is synonymous with dissolution as final resolution, then it gives rise to momentary satisfactions as symbolic referents that fractalise the completion in aspectual form. In effect, the movement to completion is not a long chain of experiences moving uniformly towards resolution, but a series of jumps that are united one to the other in a rhythm that capture this constant unification. Indeed, if this did not occur, then experience would be that of a fungus, or various forms of bacteria that proliferate without reproduction. For everything else, the sense of end-state is contained in aspect in every moment. This sentence, for instance, has an intention to end at the mark. This sentence announces its own newness with a capital letter. This capital letter and its adjacent full stop represent as a singularity the fusion sought for. Cyclic patterns and natural rhythms contain this beginning/end mark as matter of course. A rhythm is a pattern which, on the mark, announces both a closure (completeness) as well as an expectation (incompleteness). This is called Becoming, which is a rhythm with a dipole action of Being and partial being. To be more accurate, it is more the case that this is contained in the gaps between rhythms, like the space between electron orbits which cannot be visited, yet which define the orbits. It is in this sense of future conjunction, in which it is represented in terms of structure in the present moment, however fleeting (and usually unconsciously), that the disproof is symbolically present.

Interestingly, the transposition to the existential does not work in the reverse direction. Because of this, it is always liable that the disproof can be easily discredited and denied. However, in the denial is contained an inherent objection to any kind of proposition that does not conform to its terms of reasonableness, and that includes the perception of death as a passive event with no representation (and therefore no influence on the present). But in the traditional format of the existential position, this rejection is a fleeing from death, which in existential terms is a fear that is its own realization. There is no Being that does not contain its own negation, and there is no knowing except in terms of lack. Neither of these are represented in the terms of reasonableness, and so the intuition must extend beyond these parameters to find coherence elsewhere.

Naturally, this is a threadbare position, which merely hints at the direction of resolution. The implications of solution, however, must be left as a resonance in the mind of the reader to tease out."

Sam Nico August 19 2001

Response:

The main premise for your challenge is Sartre’s claim that the in-itself and for-itself meet in a state of unification at the point of death. From here, you argue that the unification of the in-itself and for-itself are reflected in every living moment, or in your words, ".... momentary satisfactions as symbolic referents that fractalise the completion in aspectual form.... a rhythm [made up of a series of jumps] that captures this constant unification.... [an] end-state contained in aspect in every moment.... in the sense of future conjunction [in which] the disproof is symbolically present." However, you acknowledge that death may be viewed as a "passive event with no representation (and therefore no influence on the present)", and therefore death as a passive event cannot be used as a basis to explain the present. More significant from our standpoint and in terms of the proposition is that though the in-itself and for-itself appear to meet in a state of unification at the point of death (i.e. a unification of non-living), the union does not occur at the conscious level; so it does not follow how the union at the point of death or non-conscious can be equated to the conscious (for-itself) and unconscious (in-itself). In other words, the condition (non-living) for unification at death does not correlate to the condition (living) for the existence of life, and therefore a comparison to living in terms of unification based on non-living cannot be made without inconsistency.

Also, it is questionable that death is a state of completion or closure, because an individual’s influence on other life-forms apparently occurs after his/her death, and at the biological level, his/her remains apparently contribute to the existence of other life-forms, so that no pure state of completion is ever reached.

Moreover, we understand why you argue that the statements, "no being that does not contain its own negation", and "there is no knowing except in terms of lack" are not represented in terms of reasonableness, thereby "intuition must extend beyond the parameters to find coherence elsewhere", because without coherence elsewhere you cannot explain or justify the notion of "end-state being contained in aspect in every moment". Yet your argument of incomplete reasonableness applies to any position, since we apparently cannot completely know that we know something. Though intuition cannot extend beyond reasonableness and maintain its coherence, because coherence is defined by reason viz., the comparison of thought. So we are left in the realm of reasonableness, and thereby its apparent incompleteness, with the notion of more reasonableness to find limited coherence.

In short, we do not think your position that the point of death defines the state of living is more reasonably correct, because the non-conscious is not equatable to the conscious and unconscious, and therefore there does not appear to be a fractalization of the completion at death in aspectual form. More significant, the point of death does not appear to be a point of complete closure, and therefore it cannot adequately be used as a basis to explain the proposed union of conscious and unconscious based on completion in the state of living. Though we agree with you that your position hints at a direction for the possible resolution of the proposition, especially your thoughts on rhythm as a pattern which announces both closure (completeness) and expectation (incompleteness), with dipole action of Being and partial being.

269. Entry:

"I have taken some time to read through a great deal of the other responses people have put forth. We are asked to ‘in concise words’ say ‘how the proposition that we cannot truly know who we are and be who we are at the same time, can be overcome’. Where ‘overcome’ is defined as ‘our ability as individuals to more reasonably refute the proposition’.

Here is (in concise words) a more reasonable statement of why ‘we’ may state that the proposition is false.

1) Let us begin, for argument's sake, saying that I both know who I am and exist as who I am at the same time.

2) Let us say that this simultaneous knowledge and existence is identical to the value ‘1’ (i.e. one).

3) Let us also say, again for the sake of argument, that you know who you are and exist as who you are at the same time.

4) Let us say that your simultaneous knowledge and existence is identical to the value ‘1.1’ (i.e. one and one-tenths).

5) Finally, let us also say that both ‘you’ and ‘I’ comprise ‘we’; furthermore, the value by which ‘we’ discern ‘you’ from ‘I’ is 0.1 (i.e. one-tenths).

With these assumptions, hear are the reasons why the proposition that ‘we cannot truly know who we are and be who we are at the same time’ can be overcome.

6) The value of ‘we’ (0.1) cannot be disputed, because ‘5)’ above implicitly set up a global frame of reference (where the phrase ‘frame of reference’ is used as in Newtonian physics).

7) ‘I’ may have a different resolution at which I view ‘we’ (0.1), however. Namely, ‘I’ may know 0.1 to be 0.2.

8) Furthermore, ‘you’ may have a different resolution at which you view ‘we’ (0.1). Namely, ‘you’ may know 0.1 to be 0.02.

9) ‘We’ in ‘5)’ is a global frame of reference as just mentioned. ‘I’ and ‘you’ separately represent local frames of reference. Both local frames of reference offer truthful information but must be translated to a global frame (a frame that reparameterizes - or rescales - local frame of reference values to the global frame).

10) So our global frame shows us that 0.1 equals the local respective frame values of 0.2 and 0.02. A global frame of reference is required to show that the two differing local values are indeed equal. The global frame of reference shows us that 0.2 = 0.02, where the left hand side is part of a different value system than that of the right hand side. Regardless, the global frame of 0.1 remains.

So here I have explicitly shown how ‘you’ and ‘I’ may have different (i.e. reparameterized) knowledge (truthful views) of who we are, but the global frame is in no way discounted or any less truthful. My own prior submissions reveal the nature of the global frame of reference. Reference my prior submissions for further details on the nature of the global frame of reference. (Entries 248, 253, 257)

In reading the many other submissions, I've concluded that we're being bogged down by translation, reparameterization, rescaling, or what ever other word you can think of that captures the same notion. I haven't seen any statement (pro or con) which disproves the global fact of 0.1 constituting that ‘we’ both know who ‘we’ are and exist as who ‘we’ are at the same time.

Note:

The assumptions made above ‘for argument's sake’ are not invalid and need not be assumptions, because if I can truthfully state that I do not know who I am, then I must truthfully have knowledge of the fact that I am one who does not know who I am. In which case I do, indeed, know at least ‘1’ thing about who I am and exist as ‘1’ who doesn't know who ‘I’ am."

Donald Changeau August 27 2001

Response:

We agree that within your system of thought regarding global and local frame of references, the proposition is overcome. However, it is unclear to us why and how your global frame of reference of "0.1", constituting that we both truly know who we are and exist as who we are at the same time, is a "global fact" outside your system of thought. What grounds do you have to assert from your local frame of reference the universal objectiveness of the "0.1" global frame of reference? How do you distinguish local and global frame of references, when you apparently can only know from your local frame of reference?

Also, your argument that ‘true knowledge of not knowing who we are implies that we truly know who we are in order to know that we do not’, is not relevant, because we are stating from our limited perspective, rather than true perspective, that we cannot truly know who we are and be who we are. (To state from our limited perspective that we cannot truly know who we are, does not require that we truly know who we are. All that is required for consistency is that we have a limited perspective on not truly knowing who we are, including a limited conception of who we are.)

270. Entry:

Reply to the response to Entry 268

"There is a two-fold objection to the solution proffered. The first centers on the 'truly known' as opposed to the known, suggesting that the former is vested with a certainty that aims at absolutism and finality. In attempting a disproof in terms of expanding the horizons of the known and the knowable, the search is not for such a sense of true knowing but an expansion of horizons that is containable in a coherent and self-consistent manner that can be regarded as reasonable. In any such attempt, there must be a link at some point to the epistemological form of knowing as a way of grounding a general principle that is put in metaphysical form. This is not the same as searching for proof, but is nonetheless a search for some kind of translation that makes sense in some (yet to be specified) form. It also indicates something of the nature of approach that aims at Totality but which must also fail. In terms of solution therefore, it is suggested that an indication of a vertical direction is the object, without ascending to some 'top' at which point one can throw away the means of ascension. In effect, such a solution is no final word, and is a dialectical position confronting Wittgenstein's definition of the inexpressible in clause 7 of his Tractatus (from which he, incidentally, throws away his ladder of ascent as though he had discovered some final truth). The point is that while final solution is impossible, the attempt at it is necessary. This process is not so much a philosophical position as an awareness in philosophical terms that this is how reality operates anyway, the not-going-gentle-into etc., the negentropic arising from the entropic, the struggle against death in its presence, or the completion in partiality. This, however, is a footnote to one aspect of the spirit of the replies made, and is not so much a response aiming at solution, but a setting of context within which the terms of solution must be sought.

The greater part of the objection is concerned with the notion of death as incompletion and as a non-conscious state which is a valid point. I should point out firstly that although I have stated that it may be regarded as a passive event, what this means is that the largely metaphysical approach to the solution is always laid open to criticism that may take this position, but it is not the position that I take. The Sartrean perspective which generated this form of solution is encapsulated in his image of Nothingness coiled around Being like a worm. As far as the present state of knowledge and reasonableness are concerned, I regard this as an advance since these two have been artificially separated and do not need to refer to each other in terms of definition, which is the rational perspective of reasonableness. In this sense, (which is the existential position) the partial form of knowing which is the current rational/scientific expression, represents a form of being/becoming which is one half of the existential perspective, while completely ignores the perspective generated by the other pole. In this sense, 'ignoring' becomes a fleeing from, and it is in the terms of expression inherited from this position that what Sartre saw as completion is in fact only a stage in a process and not a completion in itself, or the state of union between the in-itself and for-itself as an ultimate satisfaction.

However, that is not to negate the response; it makes a valid point which must be addressed which is that death may not represent completion, an argument which centers on the use of 'apparently' in the statement "influence... apparently occurs after.. death". The omissions are deliberate in that a solution must question what is meant by life-forms and 'his/her' as though the problem relates only to what are traditionally thought of as living entities. It is not yet possible to question such assumptions because the terms of reasonableness have created such distinctions and must be questioned at some later time when reasonableness is expanded. But the point is taken, and I feel that it reflects the union of being and nothingness in the wrong order. It is Being that is twirled about nothingness like a vine and not the reverse, and I think even stating such a reconfiguration must send a message to the intuition to create a new realization of signification. This can be done in two ways:

Firstly, invoking the principle of contradiction - what kind of life would arise in the absence of death? Answer: to begin with, there would be no need of reproduction or sexuality in general since these are necessitated by the presence of death. It is in the presence of death, therefore, that sexuality begins to become coherent. In the sense of becoming nothing, there is a drive bent on leaving behind a palpable something. Consequently, how is one to think of death as something that is more than a passive, non-conscious state?

Secondly, consider the metaphor: two gas-filled balloons are placed in a sealed chamber. They are equal in size. One of the balloons is removed and as a result, the one remaining expands. It is the image of change in what remains behind that is the focus, and must refer to more than mere physical remains as fodder for future generations, although even this has its symbolic content, if the term 'apparently' is to have a more precise significance.

The way forward is to consider 'knowing' as something that is not a purely mental activity but which is an emergence entirely dependent on a dynamic structure of being, known as body. Body in turn reflects the presence of death as a striving through a sense of lack, which places consciousness in a position derived from impulse of becoming known as desire. In this sense, knowledge, before it is captured in books as an objective organon, grows out of 'knowing', which is an awareness at both a conscious and unconscious level, which is not a purely mental activity but a whole person activity. In such a context, death cannot be a passive event in the history of a life cycle, but an active participant (non-conscious) in the structure of that life-cycle. How does such a view impact on evolution, as one form of example?

Imagine the scenario: a herd of deer swim across treacherous, fast flowing waters filled with ice flows. Some make it to the other side, many do not. But those that survived have done so as a matter of luck and good fortune rather than being more able. How is one to read this? Traditionally, one could argue the case for their better skills etc. making them the most likely to survive. But this is not the case, for it is just as likely that they become the fittest after the event. In effect, because they are now so few, they gain the necessary strength to proceed by inheriting through the death of others their own strength. Now this cannot be a conscious process, and so death itself must participate in this passing on of information. Indeed, some interesting research by a few scientists such as Rupert Sheldrake is beginning to hint at this. What it also hints at is a more organic form in the structure and nature of memory which, like the material corpse, must remain as a presence in that which is left behind. It does not putrefy and decay, but is passed on in the species that remains. The search for some mechanism that demonstrates this is not essential to understanding the principle, although I suppose that one must nod in the direction of Sheldrake's morphogenetic fields if it does become necessary (although these are restricted by the concept of field and do not recognize the function of death in this process). But more significantly, it points at memory as a function of Being-in-Totality in which the world is not all that can be the case, but which by focusing, emerges into the foreground as the part-of-whole representing it. In effect, Being must imply something of the form of nested structure in which knowing (as bodily awareness)resides at a particular level representing the whole. However, at the current time, it is virtually impossible to make such a position totally coherent because of the familiarity in thought and practice of what has become coherent in terms of what passes for reasonableness. It points at the irrealism that is part of the structure of purely rational thought. It filters into the familiar round in terms that suggest a perverse logic of existence: if you cannot prove that an event occurred, then it never happened. This is the defense of the criminal. This emphasis on epistemological structure that acts as warrant for existence actually strips away this level of knowing and being and replaces it with a representation that appears to be the same thing, but which is actually founded on principles of inertia from which nothing self-activating can emerge, and which are 'explained' in terms of external forces. In terms of evolution, the position is the diametric opposite to that given here, and it is those most able to adapt that survive (since there is evidence and one can 'see' this as the familiar). But it is impossible to make of the notion of adaptability after death an epistemology since there can be no evidence; it is purely a matter of a way of seeing and perspective.

The position being proffered here is a dialectical one, in which knowing is derived from an internal impulse and is, firstly, conscious (unconsciously) of the complete/incomplete from the fact of death, but which reaches completion in the passing on of memory into the unconscious of Being-in-totality which remains after death. In such terms, one transcends the image of decay as residue at death by making it symbolic of the life that requires this process in terms of memory. In this sense of reversing the poles of being and nothingness as employed by Sartre, one arrives at a position in which the terms of solution to the problem must involve a temporal component. It is beyond the bounds of this reply to discuss it here, but it is sufficient to point out something of the richness of the texture of a solution that is being sought, and which is indicated by these terms generated by the coincident moments of being and knowing.

There are those who feel that philosophical speculation has had its day and that real problems are the subject of reasonableness as defined by the purely rational. What has been suggested here so far is not a total solution, but an indication of direction. The whole solution must recognize that in the question is hidden a problem of greater complexity than that presented by Fermat's last theorem. However, as an indicator of significance, one is pushed into questioning the wisdom of the purely rational in real, practical terms when one observes the immense investment in armaments and in the promulgation of warfare, against the conclusions being proffered here which indicate that no problem is actually solved by the removal of members of a species, and that in fact the problem remains and becomes intensified by its practice, by structuring the memory of those who survive. This must be a historicist process and not totally dependent on traditional learning. There is, however, an even sharper indicator of significance in terms of the quantum gravity problem. But perhaps the simplest example concerns the current interest in consciousness and the notion of contingent possibility of replication. In its simplest form, the question is 'how is it possible to move from an 'as if' state to an 'is' state?' The answer is that it is not. So the way forward, for the purely rational at least, is simply to ride rough-shod over it.

Consequently, the debate is freed of any philosophical consequence or deliberation. Ultimately, however, it will build a replicant, and still be faced with the same questions that concerned Plato and will be no further forward than Descartes, and yet the machine will stand as a symbol of progress. It is effectively a Golden Calf, testifying to the arrogance of a category construction that attempts to contain all Knowing and Being by dissolving the latter into the former and making of the apparent amalgam a solution to the question being answered here, with no need of reference to death, desire, striving, declining etc. Computers can be made to behave as if they have consciousness, therefore they have consciousness. This is the argument for the case, and bookshops are full of information that demonstrate this to be the case as if weight of consensus is evidence. It obscures the real problem by making it appear that there is no problem. The real solution is not so much a solution as a constant criticism of the position proposed here which is then spurred to presenting itself in other ways to incorporate the criticisms. I venture to hope that in replying to the response, this will not be seen as an end to the story."

Sam Nico August 29 2001

Response:

You raise three main issues--reasonableness as limitation, death as non-passive event, and constant criticism of proposition--which we will address:

You argue that reasonableness as defined by what is acceptable, coherent, adequate, and formal is biased to a set range of perspective, while being self-contradictory from justifying things like the promulgation of warfare, and believing things like the reapplication of consciousness in non-living forms. Hence, according to you, your perspective on the relation between life and death is unacceptable and incoherent in relation to the formal, middle-excluded logic perspective, thereby cannot pass for reasonableness. Or in your words, ".... it is not yet possible to question such assumptions because the terms of reasonableness have created such distinctions and must be questioned at some later time when reasonableness is expanded.... it is virtually impossible to make such a position totally coherent because of the familiarity in thought and practice of what has become coherent in terms of what passes for reasonableness." We cannot do anything about the bias in human thought towards excluded-middle logic than to run the competition as we have been doing--the entries are evaluated based solely on their reasons according to reason, rather than from a particular formal system of thought. Though we feel that you are alluding to a more profound problem: the limitation of reason itself, due to self-reference and infinite regress, to ground absolute truth-value of knowledge. We cannot do anything about that limitation (i.e. it is a necessity that conscious knowing entail reasoning), and to discard reason because of its limitation, would leave us with no basis to evaluate, which would inevitably lead to self-contradiction. (i.e. any conscious knowing would be a form of reason, and even the rejection of reason based on its limitation would be as well.) So in our view, we have no choice than to exist true to reason, despite its epistemological limitation. (Though it is possible that when reason is turned on itself in terms of our existence, it is contradictory as you partly alluded to about the self-contradictory nature of some formal perspectives. Even still to discard reason would not make sense, because of its limitation. In other words, the limitation of reason is its Achilles heel and yet savior, because from a rational standpoint and due to the limitation on what we can truly know, we must allow room for error in our decision making. Therefore, the notion of discarding reason is out of the question.)

In defense of the notion of death as non-passive event, you argue that death has an influence on human reproduction and human life itself through an avoidance of non-life. More important and with reference to Rupert Sheldrake, you argue that the organic form of memory in terms of structure and nature, passes on at an individual’s death, so that what remains is a "part-of-whole" representing "Being-in-Totality", or a particular level of knowing representing the whole, which means that the current perspective of an individual represents the dynamic "Being-in-Totality" of the individual at that moment. Hence, there is a continuum of knowledge that is in constant flux, but which at any particular moment we are conscious of one aspect of the continuum, while at the same time, the totality of it. If you are correct, then this position would be grounds for a solution to the proposition. However, you are assuming that what you know through memory represents the whole, and yet you do not provide grounds for making this assumption, other than the claim that memory is passed on at death. We do not question that some memory is likely passed on at death, so that there may be a collective or whole of knowledge. What we question is that the whole of knowledge represents "Being-in-Totality". We contend that all conscious knowledge, including memory we are conscious of, whether derived from sensorial, biochemical, or neuronal interactions, is representational, thereby in terms of knowledge we know, cannot be "Being-in-totality". Also, we contend that we are the creators of conscious knowledge at sensorial, biochemical, and neuronal levels, thus it does not follow how we can create who we are through who we are. So in terms of memory being passed on, and it representing a collective of human knowledge, it does not make sense how memory itself can be viewed as "Being-in-Totality". Even by viewing knowledge as a complete whole in the living state, it is unclear how that whole equates with "Being-in-Totality".

We agree with you that the solution to the proposition will entail a "constant criticism" rather than an absolute answer, because of our apparent inability to truly know that we know something. Though at some point, the criticism from a particular position will either exhaust itself, or overcome the proposition by creating a situation in which the proposition cannot incorporate the criticism without contradicting itself. Even then and outside the bounds of the competition, there would be no final solution or absolute endpoint, due to the apparent non-absolute truth-value of human perspective. Pertaining to your position on memory, we feel that your criticism has been refuted, until you more reasonably show how memory (and all conscious knowledge) can be equated to "Being-in-Totality". (i.e. what is it about knowledge, other than memory being passed on, that allows you to equate knowledge to "Being-in-Totality"?)

Entries 259-267,  Entries 271-273