"First, one must determine precisely, what question in being asked. In this sense, I intend to invoke a critique of the question itself, a determination of it's preconditions. For, as with all questions, its viability as a question itself is always open to question. Indeed, the proposition may be neither overcome nor not overcome, for there is no a priori determination that it is indeed a proposition, only that it is being offered as a proposition.

Therefore, we shall expand the proposition according to the definitions given by those who pose it.

We begin with the phrase (to use a neutral a term as possible) "we cannot know who we are, and be who we are at the same time". Now, this is capped in a purely natural language, which befits many philosophers and philosophies, but not mine. Let us then attempt a beginning understanding of the meaning.

"Cannot" involves some form of necessity, however conceived, and it applies to the whole statement.

This is necessarily not so "We know who we are, and are who we are at the same time".

Note that we cannot avoid that this statement is a claim about a necessity, for removing the 'can' from the statement, makes it a declarative statement, and not a statement about possible worlds.

Now, to say that a statement is necessarily true, is to say that logic, that is reason, requires it to be true, and to say that it is necessarily false, is to say that logic, that is reason, requires it to be false, in all possible worlds. This can only be, if it be a self-contradiction.

It is most important to note at this point, that if the statement, the claim, that is being called necessary, is itself meaningless, then the claim of it's necessary falsehood is to be considered false, for meaningless statements are neither true nor false, and necessarily so.

Now, as to necessity of the truth or falsity of statements, this is directly reducible to the concept of analycity, or the concept of material necessity. However, the concept of material necessity is insufficient here. One need only posit the possibility of a differently constituted 'we' or 'I'. In short, the materially necessary is not itself necessarily necessary, either in the material or logical sense. In any event, that is clearly not what is being meant.

However, the concept of analycity, while grand in it's origin, is meeting with grave doubts in our post-post- modern philosophical climate. Indeed, ever since philosophers like Quine began to analyze it from the linguistic point of view, the presumptions that, at the very least, the conception of analycity contains within it anything of import, has been blown out of the water.

In short, the absolute necessity being attributed to the situation, namely, that we necessarily cannot know who we are, and be who we are at the same time, is itself a petrified bit of ancient philosophy, which on careful analysis, shows to be, if not definitely a false conception, a highly questionable one that cannot be used as a foundational point of any philosophy, but that requires argument in order to establish or dis-establish, being as it is now, not a taken for granted premise of our collective reason.

In short, I don't know what is meant by "absolute necessity", and don't think anybody else does either. As such, I am unable, because I do not share in it's implied metaphysics, to understand the very notion being proposed by the question, and thereby I have managed to reach a place whereby the question as to its overcomeablity or in- overcomeablity, becomes a category error.

In short, not holding the principle given, is more reasonable than holding it, because the principle holds within it an unclear conception, namely that of absolute necessity. Note however, that this is not the same as holding the opposite principle, for with absolute necessity also goes absolute contingency."

Jeffrey Wayne Scott August 2 2001

Response:

We agree that the word, "cannot" involves a form of necessity. However, since we are using the word from our limited perspective, it does not involve "absolute necessity". It involves limited necessity. So the proposition by using "cannot" is necessarily true from our limited perspective. Or in other words, it is a requirement of reason, or more reasonableness, that the proposition be true within limits, which means that it is possible for it to be false. Therefore, we disagree that the proposition is invalid or less reasonable for using "absolute necessity", because the proposition as stated is not using the concept.

Why is it "absolutely contingent" that we know who we are? How can you or anyone else claim to know an absolute and know that you do, when all knowledge appears to face self-referential and infinite regress problems, and that the existence of possibility or doubt appears to be an inherent feature of human thought?

Though we think it is necessary for human beings to have some conception of themselves at some stage in their existence, we do not claim it is absolutely necessary. (i.e. we do not claim it is beyond any doubt whatsoever that human beings must have some conception of themselves because we have no apparent grounds to make a doubtless claim. We are apparently confined to making claims within the bounds of reason, thereby from our limited (or non-absolute) perspective. Though it is possible to know an absolute statement without knowing that we do.)

260. Entry:

"If you choose to stick to logic then I probably can't refute what you say.. I am happy to believe Godel et al that no logical system can prove itself, therefore the answer, for me, lies beyond logic, so here maybe you stop reading, but bear in mind that I say ‘go beyond’ rather than ‘dispense with’.

An analogy: how can we describe a nonlinear system in linear terms (e.g. marginal sensitivities?); partial answer: local linearization in terms of gradients etc; does this describe the whole system? Only if it is linear. If it is nonlinear there is an information loss/compression and the ‘knowledge’ is locally correct but globally only a (potentially very) bad approximation.

More proposals: my body is a complex system which interacts in highly nonlinear ways with the rest of the universe; my brain - as part of my body, which is part of the universe - constructs a model of the universe, including both ‘internal’ and ‘external’ components, ‘I’ and ‘other’, through direct sensation (‘(reinforcement) learning’), conscious/reflexive monologue (‘reasoning’) and largely unconscious analogy creation (‘intuition’). Only part of this model involves the (one or maybe more) internal (linear) conversation(s) which is/are the most obvious part of consciousness. Meanwhile other parts of the model/system contain non-linearly and dynamically interacting ‘knowledge’ which can come to the attention of the conscious component by a process of ‘coalescescence/relaxation’ towards concepts/solutions (i.e. as in certain types of ‘neural networks’). Our consciousness does participate in some of these processes, of which some can then be partially expressed through language understood as partial analogies and metaphors, or ‘poetry’ (or Zen koans?). I am making a serious point here, because I honestly believe that ‘reason’, whilst being a wonderful faculty, can only capture or indeed access only a part of the knowledge encoded within our minds/models. The analogy in artificial intelligence is that between the logical/symbolic ‘expert system’ approach, and the sub (also super?)-symbolic approach which motivates work on neural networks etc. From this perspective, we are the ‘expert system’ which has evolved within and ‘on top of’ an underlying layer of associative ‘neural’ processing. So a more accurate, holistic, understanding of who we ‘are’ and what we ‘know’ should include but also go beyond the rational component of our being/knowledge.

Thus in one sense, ‘I’ am the self-aware component of a model of the universe which is packaged in a human body which is fundamentally an integral part of the whole universe. This partially overcomes your claim from one side in that the degree of knowledge is very high (I know what I am) but the beingness is only approximate (the ‘I’ is really just part of a larger whole). Alternatively we could come from the other angle: I, we, are really the whole universe (thus the ‘beingness’ is correct) but our degree of self-knowledge is very partial, our models are very limited. As our (joint) knowledge/awareness/understanding evolves/improves then a larger part of the universe has a more complete conception of what it is, but this is (hopefully) an ongoing process and in any case starting to verge on mystical. But if we are simply trying to ‘overcome’ the proposition, I could respond that ‘I am a part of the universe which is aware that it is part of a connected whole.’

As for time, I'll leave that until later, except to say that I have found the ‘normal’ conception of a single time dimension to be sufficient for most things, and that maybe down at a particle/energy level there are multiple ‘time’ dimensions, at the same time I find the notion of an ‘extra cosmic’ time dimension useful - from this perspective our entire space/time continuum/universe can be considered as a ‘static’ whole."

Neil Burgess August 3 2001

Response:

How can we go beyond a rational component of our being/knowledge, since all we can apparently know from is what we reason?

By claiming that you are a "self-aware component of a model of the universe which is packaged in a human body which is fundamentally an integral part of the whole universe", does not necessarily mean that you know who you are. How do you know that you defined as a "self-aware component" is really what you are?

Also, by claiming that our knowledge evolves and improves towards a more complete conception of what the universe is, you appear to imply that our partial knowledge has absolute truth-value, and that it will evolve to more complete knowledge. Yet, what grounds do you have to assert that our knowledge has absolute truth-value? If you want to retract this point, then how can you still claim that our knowledge equates partially with what the universe is?

261. Entry:

"We cannot know who we are and be who we are at the same time? Why not, the question is not whether or not this is possible. Yes, it is possible, although it is not probable. Probability is directly termed as something being likely to happen under any circumstance. Possibility, on the other hand, is the simple idea that something is able to happen under any circumstance. So, in the context, this idea can be overcome, it is possible, though not probable. A person may be able to know who they are and be who they are at the same time. This can happen through such things as ignorance, arrogance, and honesty. Through any other way is impossible, because emotions then play a factor in the situation, creating a fake sense of truth and this results in a bending of our idea of who we are making the challenge true."

Marc Lane August 5 2001

Response:

We agree that the competition is not about the possibility of the proposition, assuming it is possible, but about the probability or specifically the more reasonableness of the proposition. However, even if we were to accept your notion of probability defined as the likelihood of something happening under any circumstance, the proposition would not be overcome, because your notion of probability would succumb to less reasonableness compared to the notion of probability defined as something likely to happen. In other words, by making probability conditioned by "under any circumstance", you have created a situation in which nothing could be probable, so that we would be left with only the possibility of things. If you disagree, give us an example of something likely to happen under any circumstance.

262. Entry:

"Realizing that we know nothing, is the only thing we are able to know.
Unrealizing that we know something, is the only thing we are unable to know."

DanKY August 6 2001

Response:

How do you know that we know nothing? In consideration of the self-referential and infinite regress problems associated with knowledge, how can you know with 100% certainty that all we are able to know is nothing? By claiming that we are only able to know nothing, you must also know ourselves in order to make the claim, otherwise your claim would not make sense, and yet at the same time, it would contradict your claim that all we are able to know is that we know nothing. Hence, it appears that the best you could claim is that from your perspective (i.e. your realization), all we are able to know is nothing--though it is possible we may know more or less than nothing.

So in the context of the competition, your claim that we are only able to know that we know nothing, supports the proposition that we cannot truly know who we are.

263. Entry:

Reply to the response to Entry 261

"So basically what you're saying is that we cannot fundamentally exist and know why we exist at the same time. It is possible, in fact it exists. Have you ever seen a child unable to comprehend, like a child just after birth? Children simply exist. The basis behind their existence is simple 'because'. 'Because' is defined as 'the reason that' in the merriam-webster collegiate dictionary. 'Reason' is defined as a 'sufficient ground of explanation or of logical defense; especially: something (as a principle or law) that supports a conclusion.' This point makes reason a possible conclusion to the proposition. In other words, 'we cannot truly know who we are and be who we are at the same time', can be overcome by beings who's reasoning capabilities depend on mere logic and instinct. So 'we' only nullify the proposition by evolving into what we become as adults. So in that context, no I can no longer overcome the proposition and neither can you simply because we rely on science, math, engineering, etc., to solve today’s problems. Those of the past, used logic to solve problems."

Marc Lane August 7 2001

Response:

We are not saying that we cannot know why we exist, because that presupposes we already know that we exist, thereby know who we are. We are saying that we cannot truly know who we are.

Yes, the proposition can be overcome "beings who's reasoning capabilities depend on logic and instinct," but we are asking whether or not the proposition can more reasonably be overcome. The mere existence of possibility is not what we are after.

We disagree that the proposition is nullified by us evolving into what we become, because you are assuming that our evolution into adults, or our existence as adults, is truly who we are.

Other issues:

By distinguishing science, math, engineering etc. from logic, you are overlooking that academic subjects like science and math are logical at some level. Also, it does not follow that the basis behind a child’s existence is "because". What you appear to be saying is that you do not know what the basis is for the child’s existence, and yet you perceive the child to be existing.

264. Entry:

"The proposition is simply possible to overcome, due to the definition of possible. According to the merriam-webster collegiate dictionary, the definition of possible is ‘being what may be done or may occur according to nature, custom, or manners.’ In other words, the proposition can be overcome, but cannot be explained through reason."

Marc Lane August 8 2001

Response:

Yes, it is possible to overcome the proposition according to your proposed definition of "possibility". However, to argue for example that according to western nature, custom, or manners we can truly know who we are, does not answer whether or not we can truly know who we are. (i.e. what is it about "nature, custom, or manners" that allow us to truly know who we are? If you cannot answer the question, or if you do, and you cannot show that your position is more reasonable, then your position is less reasonable than the stated position of only knowing who we are in a limited, representational sense.)

265. Entry:

Reply to the response to Entry 258

"Actually, there are probably more persuasive arguments for innate knowledge than not. Arguments by Chomsky and others give convincing support for innate knowledge as a foundation for learning language - i.e. as some sort of, say, basic structural language for learning the syntactico-grammatical structures of language. There's further arguments for the innateness of ‘synthetic a priori’ knowledge - i.e. generative spatio-temporal knowledge (generating/projecting concepts of space-time in reality and thought) - and mechanisms for consolidating, mediating and processing sensory information (otherwise sensory information would go ‘in and out’ without some sort of initial knowledge base). So the claim that all knowledge has its basis in sensory information is without warrant.

How is my decision to push a door using x strength a symbol which represents meaning? And where is this mysterious ‘meaning’ coming from? Do I sense something, generate a symbol in my mind, and it automatically has arbitrary ‘meaning’? How is a symbol generated in the first place? What are the relational properties between sensory information and symbols, and symbols and meaning, and sensory information and meaning? And so on and so on.

My point is that not all knowledge is representational. Therefore, not all knowledge is ‘limited’ in your sense. Thus, it is possible that we can know who we are, and moreover, we actually do know ourselves and that knowledge of ourselves is justified in an externalist sense of epistemic justification.

‘... representation itself in terms of sensory responses to external stimulus implies that the representation is not the same as the external stimulus which it represents.’ (Excerpt from Response)

Of course. How can a representation and whatever it is that's represented be one and the same? It seems as if you're implying that our knowledge of self must be ourselves, and not knowledge, in order to truly be knowledge of self (since it must be us, not a representation of us). This doesn't make any sense unless we are thought (and only thought). It is possible that we are only thought, since it is the only thing indubious (as we could doubt a thinker doing the thinking, but not thought itself, from ‘Cogito, ergo sum’).

Granted that it is a more reasonable hypothesis that we are thought than anything else, it would seem that you must accept, by your own terms, that your challenge has been overcome. And probably in more ways than one.

On another note:

‘What is it about the ‘logical identity of propositions’ that allows you to say that ‘logical identity’ is a ground for complete truth?’ (Excerpt from Response)

What is it that you mean by ‘complete truth’? If you mean, true in all ‘acceptable’ formal systems, then logical identity is completely true. If you mean, true in any formal system whatsoever, then logical identity is incompletely true (albeit true in some systems nonetheless). I could create a formal system such that logical identity is not necessarily true (even necessarily false at that). What would the strength of my, or like systems, be? - not very strong. So, I would still maintain that all logically identical propositions are completely true."

Michael De August 9 2001

Response:

At this point, we do not agree that it is more reasonable that innate knowledge exists than it does not. Nor do we agree that innate knowledge does not imply representational knowledge at some stage or in some sense. What is the origin of innate knowledge? Does it just appear/exist in our brains or minds? Does it have a context from which it refers, and comparative which it refers to? What is its relationship to the external world? It appears that without any other more reasonable explanation, so-called innate knowledge originates from sensory information, which is not to say that the motor mechanisms of the brain, involved in the processing of knowledge, come after sensory information. (i.e. some mechanism at the origin of human knowledge must have been in place in order for the initial sensory information to be processed into conscious knowledge.)

We are not implying that our knowledge of self must be ourselves, and not knowledge, in order to truly have knowledge of ourselves. We are arguing that we cannot truly know who we are through representational knowledge, so that we must know who we are through non-representational knowledge, which then we face the problem of showing how we could know who we are in a non-representational sense at the conscious level, or we must show a way in which we could truly know who we are through representational knowledge.

Yes, it is possible that we may be only thought. Though your argument that we could doubt a thinker doing thinking, but not thought itself, and therefore we are thought more than anything else, is contradictory, because you are denying the existence of the thinker, and then referring to the thinker through the use of "we". (i.e. "we are thought") Also, it does not follow how we could just be thought itself and exist. (i.e. there must be a basis for thought’s existence, that would connect thought to the thinker of thought and his/her biological makeup. In other words, how can there just be thought, without the thinker of thought? What is the meaning of thought without the individual behind the thought? How does thought alone just exist, and what purpose does it serve?) More important, even if we were to accept that we are just thought, it does not follow that we could know ourselves, because all we would be is thought. There would be no knowing, just the existence of thought. Therefore, there would be no way you could know that we are just thought, because there is no you to say that there is just thought. Hence, your argument is self-defeated. However, if you want to make the distinction between thought itself and thought, whereby thought itself knows through thought, there is still no you as in thinker to know that there is just thoughts. Also, it does not follow how thought itself, assuming we equate it with who we are, can truly know thought itself through thought.

Other issue:

Just because the strength of a formal system which states that logical identity is not necessarily true may not be very strong, does not give you grounds to maintain that all logically identical propositions are completely true. In fact, we contend that you have no grounds except for faith alone, in spite of the adequate and coherent grounds, like infinite regress and self-referencing, which show that from our limited perspective, you or us, or anyone else, cannot know that they know anything with complete certainty.

266. Entry:

"It should be obvious that because we cannot be other than that which we are at any moment, knowing who we are would not negate our being. Therefore, the proposition boils down to 'we cannot know who we are'. You have not provided any reason that this proposition is true, and I do not see what reason there could be. It would of course be difficult to produce criteria to test whether a person really knew themselves or not but I do not see that it should be logically impossible for them to do so. In conclusion, the proposition can be overcome because the second half of the problem is an illusion and the first is simply a hollow assertion."

A. M. Trotter August 10 2001

Response:

Just because we apparently cannot help from being who we are at any moment as long as we are alive, does not make the second half of the proposition, "be who we are", an illusion. If anything the assertion that ‘we cannot truly know who we are while being who we are’, supports the second half of the proposition. However, you appear to be interpreting the proposition as if by knowing who we are, we would negate our being, which is not what the proposition is saying. The proposition is saying that there is no truly knowing who we are while being who we are, and since we cannot help from being who we are, and we need to be who we are in order to know, there is no truly knowing who we are. (i.e. we cannot truly know who we are.)

Also, we disagree that we have provided no reasons for the proposition being true within limits. We have responded to each entry with reasons and provided a proof related to the proposition. In our view, the three main reasons for accepting the proposition are:

1. all conscious knowledge appears to be representational, and therefore based on our apparent representational knowledge, we cannot truly know who we are. (i.e. we can only represent who we are, without actually truly knowing who we are.)

2. the origin of knowledge appears to stem from our sensory receptors’ responses to external stimulus, so that we ourselves create knowledge through our receptors, which takes us to the problem of how we can create true knowledge of ourselves through ourselves.

3. the problem of self-referencing and infinite regress prevent us from proving that we truly know something. (Though obviously it is possible that we could truly know something without knowing that we do.)

Hence, we disagree that the first half of the proposition or the proposition as a whole is a "hollow assertion".

We are not saying that it is logically impossible for someone to truly know who they are. We are saying that it is less reasonable for someone to truly know who they are than not being able to truly know who they are.

267. Entry:

"To overcome the proposition, you must define your perspective of self. If you adopt the belief that we begin our physical experience truly knowing who we are and that subsequent external stimuli alters our perspective, then the absolute elimination of acquired perception should return our inherent knowledge of self. Elimination of definition allows the convergence of knowledge and existence without conflict."

Marianne Bartley August 17 2001

Response:

We agree that "elimination of definition" or simultaneous origin of 'knowledge of who we are' and physical experience, allows convergence of knowledge and existence without conflict. (i.e. knowledge of who we are is inherent in our existence from the start of our physical experience.) However, the problem with your position is that it does not follow how we could have knowledge of who we are, or any other conscious knowledge, without physical experience at some stage. If you respond that knowledge of who we are is encoded or pre-programmed in our brains from ancestors, then where does that knowledge come from in our ancestors? What is the basis for inherent knowledge? How can it just be part of our existence? Where does the knowledge come from? (For similar entries see Entry 230 and Entry 232)

Also, overcoming the proposition can entail various approaches like more reasonably redefining who we are or knowledge of who we are, or more reasonably refuting the terms or concepts behind the proposition.

Entries 256-258,  Entries 268-270