Reply to the response to Entry 255

"I am not following your assertion that the truth-value of even analytic propositions are uncertain because we cannot know what any given statement ‘means’. Even if that's true, it's beside the point. You need not know the meaning of the component terms, let alone the meaning of the entire statement to know a statement's truth-value. ‘p is p’ is meaningless semantically, but it is true.

‘We have merely defined know in a limited, representational sense, whereby we claim that we cannot know who we are except in a limited, representational sense.’ (Except from Response)

So then admit you've defined know in a representational sense? If so, then we certainly know ourselves, viz., through mental representations as provided by sense perception. Otherwise, you agree that we at least know ourselves in a ‘limited, representational sense’. This is peculiar. The entire point of my previous response was to emphasize the meaningless of theorizing outside the limits of reason. That is to say we cannot know if there is anything to know beyond a representational sense of knowing ourselves since it is the only way we can know ourselves. And even if this sense of knowing ourselves is limited and representational, if offered any given definition of ourselves, there would be no way of knowing whether or not that definition is correct/incorrect. To simply claim that it's false because you contend our knowledge of self is limited isn't enough.

Also, is knowledge of self acquired through sense perception? If we say that the self is consciousness, i.e. a Sartre-like spontaneity, then certainly it is not. Thus knowledge of self isn't representational in any sense since it is known ‘prior to’ perception, not through or by it. What may be limited is not our knowledge of self, but our ability to express it linguistically or by any other intelligible means. This is because any reference to self is reference to a state of reflected consciousness, not consciousness itself. That is, when you say ‘I am...’, the 'I' is representative of a reflected state of consciousness (viz., consciousness reflecting upon itself). Therefore you cannot define consciousness except reflexively.
So the challenge seems to ask whether or not we can express/evince who we are in any non-reflexive fashion (since you seem to be equating 'limited' with 'reflexive'), even though we do indeed know ourselves.

On a side note, I was using logical positivism and the verification principle as only an example to show that your definition of 'know' is too narrowly defined for anything to be considered knowledge, and that the narrowing of its definition is why its fallacious (commits the fallacy of ignoratio elenchi by redefinition)."

Michael De July 30 2001

Response:

Why is the statement "P = P" true? What is the ground(s) which allows you to say that the statement is true beyond any doubt? Have you considered that it is possible from our perspective and in terms of space and time, that no two things can be identical, so that "P" on the left side of the equation is not equal to the "P" on the right side of the equation?

Yes, we have defined "know" in a representational sense, and that from our perspective, we can know who we are only in a representational sense. Though we do not claim that our perceived representational identities are false. We claim that through the following points:

1. the implied indirect relation between our sensory and the external world

2. the origin of knowledge viz., human creation of knowledge, whereby we cannot create who we are through who we are

that our perceived representational identities are representational realities, thereby false from our limited perspective. (i.e. our representational identities are not truly our identity.)

Just as we cannot know if there is anything beyond representational knowledge because that is all we can know, we cannot know anything within representational knowledge because our knowledge apparently never reaches an absolute. So knowledge which refers to either beyond our representational knowledge or within it, is equally possible, thereby meaningful from our limited perspective.

How can anything, including self, be known prior to sense perception? What is the ground(s) for knowing without sensory information? How can knowledge of self not be representational, and we know it is not representational? Where does non-representational knowledge come from? If knowledge of self is non-representational, are you saying that it is absolute knowledge? If so, how can you know something that is not self-referential?

The challenge asks participants to more reasonablely refute the proposition by either more reasonably showing contradiction/invalidation with it and its terms and the concepts behind them, or by more reasonably showing how we can truly know who we are than knowing who we are only in a limited, representational sense. For instance, if it can be more reasonably shown that there is no "who we are" as Alistair Burrowes in Entry 245 attempted then the proposition would be overcome, or if it can be more reasonably shown that the proposition is invalid on grounds of being "self-defeating" as Ken Bell attempted in Dispute 9 Reply 9 then the proposition would be overcome, or if it can be more reasonably shown that we can truly know who we are through "Aristotelian Nous--direct realism" as Nathaniel Hannan suggested in Entry 123 then the proposition would be overcome.

Why is our definition of "know" too narrowly defined because it accounts for self-referencing? What is this absolute knowledge you appear to be implying when you write, "...too narrowly defined to be considered knowledge"? Also, why is it too narrow to say that knowledge amounts to degrees of knowledge based on reason?

257. Entry:

Reply to the Response to Entry 253

The Sections of this Reply are ordered with the respective paragraphs of the Response, but the order of my replied sections have been rearranged so as to better reflect continuity in my clarifications. The order is: Sections I, II, III, V, and IV. ----

Section I

Response Noted:
"(Note, in our view reason underlies metaphysics or any other system of thought.)"

Entrant's Reply:
Ok, we're on the same page

----

Section II

Response Noted:
"Regarding your fundamental premise, '[we] currently exist', we are not challenging your premise on grounds that "we" are non- existent. We are challenging the premise on grounds that we cannot know with complete certainty that we exist, so that all we can do is reason, within the limits of what we know, whether or not we exist."

Entrant's Reply:
From Section I, I'll use logic statements (a simple subset of reason). So the premise is that we cannot know with complete certainty that we exist.

IF I can state with "complete certainty" that I am certainly NOT non-existent,
THEN I therefore may conclude with "complete certainty" that I do, indeed, exist.

The premise behind that logic statement lies in the fact that we DO know with "complete certainty" that we are NOT non-existent. The "IF" clause is a double negative: "NOT non-existent". Remove the double negative and we attain the "THEN" clause. This is using the tool that is "logic" (a subset of reason) in order to show that we do know with "complete certainty" that we do exist. And why can we conclude this with "complete certainty"? Because I would not be able to construct the IF clause if I were, indeed, non- existent.
So here we can conclude that we do, indeed, exist with "complete certainty".

----

Section III

Response Noted:
"If we are correct [from Section II], "

Entrant's Reply (A):
Which we ARE

Response Noted:
"then we have established an indirect relation between our existence itself (which we can only reason within limits) and the "manner and value" of it."

Entrant's Reply (B):
I totally agree. But note that just because I establish an indirect means of representing "4 ice cubes" to other people by means of the characters "4 - i-c-e - c-u-b-e-s", it does NOT mean that I do not know what the 4 ice cubes are. Maybe in my communicating what the 4 ice cubes are, there may be imperfections, but it still doesn't discount my knowledge of the fact that they exist and the manner of their existence. The "limits" you refer to deal with deviations from prototypes in communication; basically meaning that I can state that the 4 ice cubes have air pockets in the center (therefore deviating from our prototypical notion of what an ice cube should be). The "limits" in our communication do not discount our knowledge "within certainty".

Response Noted:
"Therefore, your model is based on things on we reason, and not necessarily who we really are."

Entrant's Reply (C):
That's perfectly fine. If you don't think so, then reevaluate "Entrant's Reply (B)".

Response Noted:
"(i.e. you cannot assess the manner and value of something, unless you can show that you know the something you are assessing the manner and value from."

Entrant's Reply (D):
The problem with the above response is this: On the one hand, you don't like the fact that my model is "not necessarily who we really are" - a mere representation. In addition to the knowledge drawn from the model, any basic form of language which serves as yet another explanation/ representation of such knowledge is not sufficient, since that too is "not necessarily who we really are".
On the other hand, the competition only asks for us to assess (show/ represent) that we may "exist" AND "know the manner of that existence" at the same time, by means of these forms of explanation/ representation.

If no form of representation is acceptable, then the competition is null and void from the start. My model *shows* that representations of all sorts are indeed sufficient. Language, mathematical models, visual representations, etc. etc. are all forms of communicating knowledge of "who we are" to others. As we already determined, "I" know with "complete certainty" that "I" exist. "I" may AND *must* use ALL the means of representation possible in order to convey/ communicate to "you" who "we" are. THAT is why I have restated that the model is "under the auspices of metaphysics"; what the model captures is ALL the possible forms (manners) of representations one may put forth as being "who they are" and assigning a numerical value to it (y).

We already conceded that the model meets the standards of reason (Refer to "Section I Entrant's Reply" above). We also then conceded that the value is non-zero in order to prove that we do know "with certainty" that we exist. Once we concede that we exist (also proven again above in "Section II Entrant's Reply"), we then re-parameterize this non-zero value (which was only used to confirm that we do exist) to the value zero. We then use your concept of "limits" which is equivalent to my concept of "resolutions" in order to assess "with certainty" where we vary from "y = 0". The "value of variation" we assigned was "x" (Note: earlier I only referred to "x" as simply the "value" - this may be a point of clarification). Our variation of "x" has "limits" (to use your term) and these limits exist according to the relation:
x = n * tan (y)
That is "x" equals "n" times the tangent of "y".
Your notion of "limits" concedes the point that the mathematical derivative of this relation does indeed exist. So as any "x" variation approaches any "limited" value, there will always exist a known "limited" form of existence "y".

Response Noted:
"We do not think you have shown this knowledge. Rather, you appear to have incorrectly assumed that it is part of your reasoned observation that we currently exist.)"

Entrant's Reply (E):
The model I have put forth, not only shows this knowledge of "my" existence, but all possible knowledge regarding existence (i.e. "our" existence). If "I" may know that I exist which was determined and conceded above, then "I" may also know any of my subsequent variations "x" from the said existed state within "limits". On the model, "I" may represent a single point, distinguishing me from "you" (another point). ALL OF THE COLLECTIVE POINTS IN THE MODEL ARE "WE".
The model, itself, stands as a shown proof that "WE DO know who we are AND exist as who WE are at the same time". And as the model shows, it may account for any "value of variation" (x) and subsequently requires a limited (y) to correspond.

This section amounts to the Dynamic Consideration because it is utilizing contrast; that is it differentiates between "you" and "I". Section IV, below, will attest to the Static Consideration (state condition that utilizes the lack of contrast).

----

Section V

Response Noted:
"Though not knowing and knowing appear to play roles in the determination of our existence, we do not understand what grounds you have to assert that not knowing and knowing actually determine who we are. Also, what does the apparent fact that not knowing and knowing appear to be stages in our existence have to do with knowing who we are?"

Entrant's Reply:
Ok. Consider the following:
If at time = "a", I know (as was conceded) that I have a non-zero form of existence (y), then at time = "a", and ONLY at time = "a", who I am amounts to that non-zero value (y). The basis for this lies in the Static consideration. I am not comparing my non-zero valued existence at some time away from "a". So at time = "a", I know the value (y) which enables me to ALSO know what exists less than y (for knowing I comprise of lesser values) and greater than y (for lack of knowing what else I am comprised of). So my non-zero value (y), at time = "a", is a direct reflection of the forms I do know I exist at, and the forms I know I do not exist at. Having seen this, I may use this means of "knowing and not knowing" as tools to determining the "limits" of my assessed existence.
(Note: for simplicity in the shown graphical analysis, you may consider time as it corresponds directly to "x" - i.e. time = "x", as an example)

----

Section IV

Response Noted:
"In our view as author of the statement, the concluded assessment is 'it follows that we can only state we currently exist in an indirect, limited sense.' There is a fundamental difference between the assessments, namely the reference to an 'indirect, limited sense' in the latter assessment. 'Indirect, limited sense' refers to us only knowing we currently exist within the limits of sensory information. (Limits is defined as the indirect relation implied by the sensory reception and external stimulus.)"

Entrant's Reply:
Here you are presenting a static consideration. Your use of the term "indirect" simply concedes what I've walked through above in the initial step of Section III; that being, we assess that we are indeed a non-zero value OR that we are NOT non-existent. You are then saying (which is also what my Static Consideration says) that we "limit" ourselves to that determined non-zero form (y) (i.e. that given by sensory reception). We do not proceed with any of the following steps of Section III above (i.e. we limit ourselves to this strict non-zero value without variation - without contrast).

So when you state that "we can only state we currently exist in an indirect, limited sense", I totally agree with that statement (with the emphasis on the word "state"). The model I have put forth is a statement/ representation and the model is, indeed, limited - Upper and Lower Bounds. But as was pointed out above in "Section III Entrant's Reply (D)", a limited statement, the communicated form (y), in and of itself, does not show us that we do NOT know who we are and exist as who we are at the same time. Whereas it was SHOWN, just moments ago, the non-zero form (y) concedes existence, AND all possible values "x" in the relation x = n * tan (y), concedes that "we" may know who we are at the same time.

This is what the competitions asks for us to show and I know that I have shown this. My communication/ worded representation may need translating but it's all there in the model I've put forth."

Supplementary information:

The below relationship is:

X = n · tan (Y)

THEN place yourself at the origin of the graph for that then "current assessment"

Every position assessed thereafter will be on the graph X = n · tan (Y) and referenced to the origin for contrast. The values of Y aren't of importance, but consider the "Upper Bound" as infinitely many forms of existence; consider the "Lower Bound" to be "non-existence" (zero existence). X, being the position of assessed existence, is a value corresponding to the change (variation) in forms of existence; so a decreased form of existence (as referenced from the origin) entails a negative X value. The Range of Y runs from the "Upper Bound" to the "Lower Bound" - neither bound may ever be reached (holding the properties of absolute zero and +infinity). The Domain of X runs from negative infinity to positive infinity.

The Band of Existence is the range of all possible assessed existence locations, which all must pass through the origin (the reference location). "n" may be dynamically varied, allowing the graph above, to no longer reflect the simple tangent function, however, transition, from positive X (or Y) to negative X (or Y), must entail passage through the origin which is depicted below. The "circled" position marked on both graphs can be considered to have a radius "r" if you wish; this explicitly shows that we may know who we are and exist as who we are within the limit "r". As was stated earlier, the Responder's notion of "limits" is equivalent to my notion of a "resolution". "r" must approach a finite value; that is to say that it can neither be infinitely large nor infinitesimally small - always approaching a fixed known value.

Donald Changeau July 31 2001

Response:

Your argument that we can know who we are exists with complete certainty, and that within that certainty, through the limits of our communication, we can know the manners of who we are, does not stand because of the following reasons:

1. It does not follow that you know "we are NOT non-existent", because when what we know like "we" is broken down in terms of its meaning, at some point it references back on itself, so that we do not have complete knowledge of "we", nor of any other concept. Or if you were to claim that our knowledge of "we" or any other concept is absolute, then you would face the problem of infinite regress. Hence, your argument that you would not be able to express a thought if you were non-existent, overlooks the self-referential and infinite regress problems. (i.e. you cannot know you are completely certain of what you do not fully know, or if you believe you are completely certain, your justification for believing you are completely certain leads to limitless reapplication of the justification.)

2. The notion of complete certainty rules out the possibility of any other outcome, other than what you are completely certain about. Yet, your statement that you could not express a thought if you were non-existent, does not uphold this no-possibility condition, because for instance it is possible that your conception of yourself does not actually exist, or that the "you" exists only as an illusion stemming from something else.

Therefore, based on the self-referential and infinite regress problems which either prevent you from knowing something with complete certainty or show the self-defeating nature of your justification for believing you know something with complete certainty, and the fact that we have shown that possibilities do exist for you to express a thought while being non-existent, your claim that you know with complete certainty that you exist does not stand. More important, your model is not anchored by a completely certain premise, thereby does not allow you to say that the limits of our manners exist "within [complete] certainty". Hence, through your model, you have not shown that we can truly know who we are. All you have shown is that we can represent who we are at the same time as being who we are.

258. Entry:

Reply to the response to Entry 256

‘... in terms of space and time, that no two things can be identical, so that ‘P’ on the left side of the equation is not equal to the ‘P’ on the right side of the equation.’ (Except from Response)

"I am referring to the logical identity of propositions, not actual corporeal objects existing in space-time. Two things existing in space-time can't be identical for the simple reason that they cannot share the same spatio-temporal location. Though if any two objects were to satisfy the Principle of Indiscernibility, they would, for all intents and purposes, be identical. This is beside the point however.

If what you're alluding to is the indeterminacy of the truth of propositions within a given formal system, then you might have a point. Of course, you can increase the strength of a formal system through metajustification so that, say, its coherence isn't justified within the system itself. One lingering problem however is unprovable propositions (viz., p and ~p) within any formal system adequate for number theory (i.e. one at least complex enough for arithmetic)(~ = not/negation). Language, essentially being a formal system of sorts, is susceptible to this problem (i.e. the liar's paradox).

I don't see this being a problem for invalidating the truth of propositions within a given formal system as it is a problem for invalidating the ‘completeness’ of a formal system; that is, any formal system will never contain the set of all true propositions without contradiction (ones w/ less are stronger). But whatever set of true propositions they do contain, they can still be said to be true in that system. Again, the strength of the system comes into question which can be increased by metajustification (and is proportionate to the number of contradictions).

You seem to question any epistemology as valid due to problems concerning epistemic justification and the limits of human understanding, yet you contend that we do exist, and an external world exists to provide sensory stimuli. This is certainly odd. If we accept your epistemology, then we cannot even be said to exist with any certainty. But your challenge surely assumes that we exist by the very presumption of our existence contained in the proposition ‘We cannot know who we are and be who we are at the same time’.

Putting all of this aside, I shall attempt to get at the root of the problem. Here is a brief synopsis of your position:

1) We exist
2) We know ourselves to exist (as well as objects which provide sensory stimuli)
3) All of our knowledge is representational
4) Representational knowledge is limited

You deny and assert (1). This is certainly a problem. If your challenge is to make sense, you must make clear the assumptions, terms, etc., that are involved in the challenge. If we cannot assume/assert (1) to be true, then (2) and (3) are false. If you assert (1), then you must retract some of your statements made against various entries which claimed to prove who we are (i.e. Entry 248) by assuming we exist, but at least we can move on.

(3) is clearly false when considering abstract notions/propositions. My knowledge of the proposition ‘p is p’ is not representational. The idea is not a representation of any external sensory stimulus. My idea of red is not representational, as it is amorphous/non-corporeal. When I think of red, I do not think of instantiations of red. Ideas of arithmetic, i.e. adding 23+17, are not representational. My decision to push the door using x strength is not representational. The continuous influx of sense phenomena is not representational, though reflecting upon it might be.

Consciousness - who we are - is not representational in any sense. Even granted that we can only express or think of ourselves through a reflected state of consciousness, our conception of consciousness if not representational. Consciousness itself, not reflected consciousness (consciousness reflecting upon itself) is certainly not representational. We do think non-computationally and non-representationally. If you would like specific problems with Computational Representational Understanding of Mind (CRUMB) theories, there's plenty to offer (see Thaagard).

You have offered no reason to accept (4) other than saying reflexivity = limited which I'm still not completely following. When you say all propositions are self-referring, what exactly do you mean? I'm familiar with indexicals (token-reflexivity), reflexivity, but not all propositions are reflexive in these manners. Also, even if all propositions were reflexive in some way, how is that epistemically limited?"

Michael De July 31 2001

Response:

You have raised a number of issues which we will try to address below:

When we say that all knowledge is representational, we are referring specifically to knowledge that we are conscious of. Though we claim that all conscious knowledge has its origin in sensory information, because there would be no abstract knowledge to begin with, we do not think that all conscious knowledge directly refers to external stimulus. However, we contend that abstract ideas like "P = P", the ideas of "red" and "consciousness", "23 + 17", and "your decision to push door ‘y’ with ‘x’ strength" are representational knowledge in the sense that they are symbols which represent meanings. To take away their meanings, then there would be no conscious knowledge or symbols, in terms of these symbols. In other words, we contend that all conscious knowledge must be representational at some level.

Our position in terms of the competition is that representational knowledge of who we are is not true knowledge of who we are, and that since we can only know in a representational sense and know that we do, we cannot truly know who we are. The reasons we think that we cannot truly know who we are is that representation itself in terms of sensory responses to external stimulus implies that the representation is not the same as the external stimulus which it represents. Also, through abstract knowledge we cannot truly know who we are, because we apparently cannot know who we are through who we are, without getting outside of ourselves, and yet by doing so, we cease to be who we are. The argument of self-referential, whereby a position when broken down in terms of its meaning at some point in its causal chain refers back to itself, and the argument of infinite regress, whereby a position when held as an absolute reaches a point of limitless and self-defeating reapplication of a causal link, come into the picture to refute claims whether explicitly or implicitly of absolute knowledge.

In terms of our epistemology, we disagree that "we cannot even be said to exist with any certainty". What cannot be said is that we know we exist with complete certainty. Also, within our epistemological system, we can show a gradation of certainty or uncertainty, which then allows us to say for example that we are more certain we exist than we do not exist. Though as mentioned we cannot say this distinction or any other with absolute certainty. (The basis for our gradation is reason, which is also defined by uncertainty, and yet to deny reason as a ground because it is uncertain, is self-defeating because the ground(s) for your denial is uncertain as well. Two possible ways to refute our gradation is to show the invalidness of human thought, or to show a more reasonable alternative to reasoned gradation. In either case, we do not think they are probable.)

Other issue:

What is it about the "logical identity of propositions" that allows you to say that "logical identity" is a ground for complete truth?

Entries 253-255 Entries 259-267