Reply to the response to Entry 248

"First let me explicitly point out that any disagreements with my statements and assertions, will dictate a direct change in the model offered. That's certainly all right, but the concerns brought up in the reply do not serve as a disproof of my proposed model and subsequently my statements still hold true; again, under the auspices of metaphysics. Some of us are certainly visual learners, so to those who are, I would strongly encourage you to develop a new visual model that reflects all the principled points of your conceptions as I have done, that is if you do not find my proposed model to be satisfactory/ correct.

With that said, I will now parse through the statements of the reply to test validity and evaluate whether or not the statements of my entry have indeed been disproven.

---------------------------------------------

Response Sentences 1 & 2:
‘Your proof of a ‘Dynamic Consideration’ is contingent on the assumption that you can state with certainty that you currently exist, and by doing so, you can know the manner(s) of how you exist, which then allows you to put values on them, creating levels for the summed value of your existence. However, it is unclear whether or not you can state with certainty that you currently exist.’

This Entrant's Reply to Sentences 1 & 2:
Ok, first I'll point out that these statements, in no way, disprove my original statements, since the concern here is hinged entirely on my opening IF/ THEN statement, which was stated as follows:

-- If I can state that I currently exist
-- then I must assess the manner & value of my existence.

The concern expressed in sentences 1 & 2 have two components.

The First Component:
Sentence 2 is immediately disproven by sheer virtue of the fact that you posted a Response to this Entry. -- If you were non-existent
-- Then it would be impossible for you to post a reply.
So this simple logic statement deductively proves that you do indeed exist (with certainty), since a response to this entry was posted. This means of determining the responder's existence by a single means of assessment (namely: offering a response to my entry) serves as a static (trivial) consideration.

The Second Component:
Sentence 1 immediately proves that your concern is with the opening logic statement and not with the model put forth. Also, I get the sense that you may not be convinced of the fact that our manners of existence will sum to a finite value. If you do have that sense, then consider the following.

I know that it lies beyond the means of a human to offer 20 differing responses to this reply by hand all simultaneously. I also know that it is perfectly within your means to offer some fractional (less than ‘<’ 1) response to this reply.

These two finite values, of the numbers of differing responses you may develop to this reply all simultaneously, set up a range of ‘y’ for which I may have a sense of your existence. I may only have a sense of your existence within the range of y because I am not you.

You, however, can determine the precise point of convergence at a fixed resolution. So let's consider the resolution of whole valued responses you can create to this entry all simultaneously; namely 1, 2, 3, etc. number of responses. You can know for yourself that maybe 2 responses is all that you can perform simultaneously; creating 20 differing simultaneous responses to this entry may in fact be beyond your manner of existence. We certainly know that you can offer 1 whole response, since I'm currently replying to the one you offered.

Again, a fixed resolution must be set in order to determine a precise point of existence. If this is not done, then your 1 whole response may in fact be a partial response if we are evaluating 1.0, 1.1, 1.2, etc. numbers of differing responses you may offer to this reply all simultaneously. Each decimal point location attests to a differing resolution.

So this second component to your response is satisfied by the dynamic (non-trivial) consideration.

Response Sentence 3:
‘If we consider that knowledge is created at the point of sensory reception, so that sensory information is only an indirect representation of external stimulus, it then follows that we can only state we currently exist, including the manners we attach to our existence, in an indirect, limited sense’

This Entrant's Reply to Sentence 3:
Here I'm going to use the tools of linguistics to breakdown this sentence in order to show that you are in direct agreement with me.

Sentence 3 is a logic statement. This logic statement has the two primary parts: the Introductory Consideration and the Concluded Assessment. There also happens to be a Purpose Clause, a Gerundive Phrase, and a Prepositional Phrase. That is:

-- The Introductory Consideration:
If we consider that knowledge is created at the point of sensory reception

-- The Concluded Assessment:
it then follows that we can only state we currently exist

-- The Purpose Clause:
so that sensory information is only an indirect representation of external stimulus,

-- The Gerundive Phrase:
including the manners we attach to our existence,

-- The Prepositional Phrase:
in an indirect, limited sense

A logic statement only needs The Introductory Consideration, which is marked by the ‘if’ and The Concluded Assessment which is marked by the ‘then’. The remaining phrases are indeed extra and need not be present since they do not add or subtract any measure of validity to the introductory consideration and the concluded assessment.

That being the case, this is your proposed logic statement:
‘If we consider that knowledge is created at the point of sensory reception it then follows that we can only state we currently exist’

My Response to this logic statement:
I totally agree; as do the statements in my original entry. This is precisely the static (trivial) consideration since we lack any other point of contrast or comparison beyond or past the point of sensory reception; the ‘sensory reception’ being our fixed resolution.
(A quick aside, the introductory conclusion does beg the question: can knowledge reach absolute ‘destruction’ or non-existence?)

If you feel that the logic statement was somehow tampered with, then witness the following as proof that it wasn't.

The Purpose Clause ‘so that sensory information is only an indirect representation of external stimulus,’ *does not* add to or subtract from the introductory statement's validity. So just because I have a pen doesn't mean that the pen only always serves the purpose of writing; it may be used as a pointing device or it may not even be used at all. So purpose does not add nor does it detract from any introductory consideration. That handles the purpose clause.

The Gerundive Phrase ‘including the manners we attach to our existence,’ by definition acts as an adjective marked by the word ‘including’; a gerund based off of the verb form ‘include’. Since this phrase merely serves as an adjective, then it doesn't add to nor take away any validity to the logic statement. If my pen, including printed information on the side of it, runs out of ink then I am no longer able to write with that pen. This logic statement remains true independent of the gerundive phrase. So that takes care of any concern regarding the gerundive phrase.

The Prepositional Phrase ‘in an indirect, limited sense’ does not add or subtract from the validity of the logic statement. The reason for this is similar to that of the purpose clause. If I walk to point A from point B, in an indirect manner, then I will eventually arrive at point A. The prepositional phase reflects an added concern of direction, but the validity of the logic statement remains the same. This logic statement would be true (not false) because the introductory consideration was accepted as self-evident; namely, I am leaving B towards A. This takes care of the prepositional phrase and subsequently proves the proposed logic statement above as a direct equivalent.

Response Sentence 4:
Regarding your ‘Static Consideration’, whereby you exist independent of your body in an empty cubic room, (thereby know who you are from a lack of knowing anything else), it does not follow how you could exist in a cubic room independent of your body, which means that the conclusion you draw from the example, is not applicable to our perceived existence. (i.e. our existence in which we are dependent on our body.)

This Entrant's Reply to Sentence 4:
So now that you have conceded that we exist, it does not matter what value we assess to the static consideration. We will always parameterize this value to the origin of the graph. So the case of existing independent of your body is a point of existence at ‘x’ = negative infinity. As was stated earlier in the entry, negative infinity can never be attained. So my consideration of this was purely a hypothetical (i.e. ‘not applicable to our perceived existence’). So we agree on that point. But if you wish to consider a point that *is* ‘applicable to our perceived existence’ then the model I have proposed gives us the tool to evaluate this and we do so by picking any fixed value of ‘x’ within the range of negative infinity and positive infinity.

Response Sentence 5:
More important, in terms of the competition, it does not follow how you could know who you are from the lack of knowing anything else, because you apparently would not be able to know without your body, and even if you were part of your body in the cubic room, you would face that your sensory reception, in terms of sensory information, is in an indirect relation with external stimulus.

This Entrant's Reply to Sentence 5:
Ok, again reverting to the tool of linguistics, the following is the basis of the compound complex statement offered: ‘it does not follow how you could know who you are from the lack of knowing anything else’

I would disagree with that basis on the following example: How do we know what a child is? A child is by definition defined by his or her lack of knowledge contrasted from that of an infant and that of an adult. So clearly ‘lack of knowledge’ plays an equally important role in determining who we are, as does our attained knowledge.

Response Sentence 6:
Also, lack of knowing anything else does not necessarily equate with knowing who we are, and if anything, it equates with not knowing anything at all, because knowing is contingent on comparison.

This Entrant's Reply to Sentence 6:
This sentence is actually a reinforcement of the basis of sentence 5, so you may revert to the above response again.

---------------------------------------------

So having parsed through the response statements, I have explicitly shown that my original model and subsequent statements have not been disproven. Furthermore, any concern expressed was simply a differing parameterized value ‘x’."

Donald Changeau July 28 2001

Response:

To claim that your statements which underlie your model "hold true under the auspices of metaphysics" is outside of the realm of this competition. What we are interested in is whether or not your statements and model are more reasonable under the auspices of reason. (Note, in our view reason underlies metaphysics or any other system of thought.)

Regarding your fundamental premise, "[we] currently exist", we are not challenging your premise on grounds that "we" are non-existent. We are challenging the premise on grounds that we cannot know with complete certainty that we exist, so that all we can do is reason, within the limits of what we know, whether or not we exist. If we are correct, then we have established an indirect relation between our existence itself (which we can only reason within limits) and the "manner and value" of it. Therefore, your model is based on things on we reason, and not necessarily who we really are. (i.e. you cannot assess the manner and value of something, unless you can show that you know the something you are assessing the manner and value from. We do not think you have shown this knowledge. Rather, you appear to have incorrectly assumed that it is part of your reasoned observation that we currently exist.)

In terms of your linguistic analysis of the statement, "If we consider that knowledge is created at the point of sensory reception, so that sensory information is only an indirect representation of external stimulus, it then follows that we can only state we currently exist, including the manners we attach to our existence, in an indirect, limited sense", we disagree that the "concluded assessment" is "it follows that we can only state we currently exist". In our view as author of the statement, the concluded assessment is "it follows that we can only state we currently exist in an indirect, limited sense." There is a fundamental difference between the assessments, namely the reference to an "indirect, limited sense" in the latter assessment. "Indirect, limited sense" refers to us only knowing we currently exist within the limits of sensory information. (Limits is defined as the indirect relation implied by sensory reception and external stimulus.)

How does sensory reception as our "fixed resolution" allow us to know who we are? Also, if all we can know from is our sensory reception because there is no other point of contrast or comparison beyond it, how does sensory reception allow us to know who we are? You appear to be implying that all we can know is our sensory reception, and that our sensory reception equates with who we are, and therefore, we can know who we are. Yet, sensory information which apparently acts as a basis for what we know, is a product of our sensory reception rather then being our sensory reception itself. In other words, we are contending that there has to be a limited connection between sensory reception and sensory information, and ultimately who we are. To respond that sensory information, sensory reception, and who we are are all the same thing would leave no room, or comparison, for knowing anything.

Though not knowing and knowing appear to play roles in the determination of our existence, we do not understand what grounds you have to assert that not knowing and knowing actually determine who we are. Also, what does the apparent fact that not knowing and knowing appear to be stages in our existence have to do with knowing who we are?

254. Entry:

"As with all problems, in order so solve it, you need to understand it. And, what Wittgenstein himself pointed at, both in ‘Tractatus’ and ‘Philosophical Investigations’, a way to go is to look for the origin of the problem. But also, it is very useful to ask: why am I asking this question? What will I achieve by getting the answer? My answer to your problem is double: I need to talk to the particular questionnaire in private in order to solve the problem in detail. But on the other hand, there is a theoretical solution: ‘look at the words in your question, and you'll find that some of the words are not given any meaning’ (from ‘Tractatus’). The thing is: it makes no difference if the meaning of ‘the world’ is this-and-this, of the other. What matters is what changes in your head when I use the word ‘the world’ in this-and-this way. You may call me a naturalist, but the thing is: ask yourself what consequences your own philosophizing has to your everyday life, and you'll find philosophizing much more meaningful. Otherwise: quit philosophizing! After doing this, philosophy, in this case, remains as the relationship between the problem and your solution of it.
(And it is quite possible to make a theoretical solution: quite many theoretical propositions are already given in this site.)"

snej July 29 2001

Response:

We do not view the proposition as a problem to be solved, nor is the proposition presented in the competition as a problem. Rather, we view the proposition as representative of the limitation of human knowledge, and we are asking anyone to challenge (or more reasonably overcome) the grounds for our position within the bounds of reason. So the origin of the so-called problem apparently lies with you, and perhaps you need to ask yourself why you view the challenge as a problem. (Possibly, it is from you viewing the implication(s) of the proposition as a problem(s) in the context of the contemporary world, and not the proposition.)

We do not find Wittgenstein’s theoretical solution of finding that "some of the words are not given meaning" helpful because the words in the proposition are explicitly and implicitly defined; and in our view, by consciously using words, they cannot help from being defined at some level.

We agree that it is possible to make a theoretical [challenge] to the proposition, and that a number of theoretical [challenges] have already been presented. Though the important question in the context of the competition, are any of the theoretical challenges more reasonable than the theoretical position of the proposition? We have argued that they are not. If you disagree, you are entitled to re-open any previous theoretical challenges or submit additional ones of your own.

255. Entry:

Reply to the response to Entry 252

"When you say all knowledge, including all propositions, are beliefs of some sort because we're not omniscient, are you including logically necessary truths (i.e. analytic truths) as a subset of beliefs? For example, is ‘p is p’ is true (i.e. ‘all bachelors are bachelors’, or ‘all bachelors are unmarried men’) only a belief simply because we're not omniscient? I think what you're arguing for is the uncertainty or dubiousness of empirical propositions, not logically necessary propositions. Then, all knowledge isn't necessarily a form of belief of some sort.

You seem to be arguing the way of the logical positivist. Essentially, even empirical generalizations like ‘all hydrogen has atomic mass ~1’ wouldn't be true, since for that proposition to be true, literally all hydrogen in the universe (or other universes if there exists more than one) would have to be verified as having atomic mass ~1. What it boils down to is that any proposition, barring analytic ones, are meaningless since they can't be verified under such rigorous conditions (viz., they can't satisfy the conditions/criteria of the verification principle because it's too narrow). Note that this does not include falsified propositions; i.e. ‘all hydrogen has atomic mass 5’ is false (or ‘all hydrogen has atomic mass 5 is false’ is true).

So we can't know anything other than analytic truths. This is certainly a problem with your epistemology, as it seems less than valuable as an epistemic system. In fact, it's analogous to the Russellian high-redefinition of 'induction', where 'induction' too narrowly defined for any knowledge to constitute inductively founded. Edwards calls his ‘fallacy’ ignoratio elenchi by redefinition. An example of ignoratio elenchi by redefinition is the redefinition of 'physician'. If 'physician' is defined as ‘a person who can cure any conceivable disease in 1 day’, then there's a high-redefinition of the term 'physician' such that criteria is added to the definition that narrows its usage. A low-redefinition would be ‘a person who knows means of alleviating pain’.

You've committed a fallacy of ignoratio elenchi by redefinition of the term 'know'. The common-sense notion would have it that we do in fact know who we are (viz., the way I previously defined humans). Your redefinition of 'know' makes it impossible for us to know who we are by definition. The only way to overcome it would be to say ‘Humans are Humans’ which is analytically true. Does this tell us who we are?

As for your Kantian view of the noumenal world, it is probably a correct notion of sense perception and sense phenomena. What we see isn't what it is in and of itself, but our mental representation by sense perception of what it is. Does this make what we know of things invalid/false/untrue/etc.? I don't think so. Since there's no way of seeing things any other way but through sense perception, it's meaningless/unavailing to consider things as they are in and of themselves. It seems clear that our perception of things is a relatively accurate representation of them. Though it isn't 100% accurate and cannot be, it does allow us to have knowledge of things, even if we define everything as a representation of what it is in and of itself - which would be pointless yet again. That is, we could define, say, a peach as ‘a representation by perception of what seems to be a round, fuzzy, sweet fruit’. Would that help an epistemic system in any way? I don't think so.

Your problem of knowing who we are has been overcome a long time ago. We 'know' who we are, without knowing all the grounds that constitute that knowledge (as even you contend), and that that knowledge does constitute who we are given a proper definition of 'know'.

Finally, you say that we need to overcome the proposition '', which doesn't make much sense in the first place. How can you overcome a proposition itself? What I think you mean to say is overcoming , not the proposition itself."

Michael De July 30 2001

Response:

Yes, when we say all knowledge, including all propositions, are beliefs because of the apparent uncertainty of what we know, we are including so-called "logical necessary truths" as well. So statements like "P = P" and "bachelors = bachelors" are only beliefs, because we cannot know with 100% certainty what the statements mean. What you appear to be doing by claiming that these statements are necessary truths is perceiving these statements from within their concise systems of thought, while overlooking the statements' uncertainty which lies outside their systems of thought. For instance, the terms "P" and "bachelor" when broken down in terms of their meanings become self-referential, so that we never end up knowing absolutely what the terms mean, and therefore, we cannot say that "P = P" or "bachelor = bachelor" is a logical necessary truth, except from within a system of thought.

We are arguing not just the uncertainty of empirical and logical propositions, but the apparent uncertainty of human perspective. It means that all ways of consciously expressing our perspective whether through empirical or analytical propositions is uncertain. So the issue of uncertainty does not hinge on "verification", but the apparent nature of human perspective itself. Therefore, we disagree that we have committed a "fallacy of ignoratio elenchi" in terms of unreasonably high redefinition of "know". We have merely defined know in a limited, representational sense, whereby we claim that we cannot know who we are except in a limited, representational sense, and therefore we cannot truly know who we are. (i.e. our definition of know, which can be challenged, is not about empirical verification, but the limits of our perspective from which we empirically verify.)

For you to claim that our definition of know makes it impossible for us to know who we are, overlooks that possibility does exist by, for example, showing that our knowledge is not representational, but what really is. (i.e. direct realism) However, since you have acknowledged that our notion of mental representation is "probably correct", you must also agree with the proposition. (i.e. we cannot know who we are except through limited representation.)

To argue that our representational knowledge is "relatively accurate", and therefore we can know who we are, is a contradiction because of the fact that we are using representational knowledge. In other words, we cannot truly know who we are through representation, because what we know of ourselves is fabricated knowledge with limited sensory connection to the external world. Also, to argue that representation does not make our knowledge of things "invalid/false/untrue" does not stand, because by using representational knowledge, there are no absolute grounds for truth, falsity, or validity. There are only comparative grounds for truth, falsity, and validity.

Also, we are not asking participants to overcome the proposition itself. We are asking participants to overcome the proposition as defined by more reasonably refuting it. (i.e. show how we can know who we are other than through limited representation, or show that the proposition as defined is invalid etc.)

Entries 250-252 Entries 256-258