"There are a number of issues to be addressed, if Entry 230 concerning 'encoded knowledge' (e.g. archetypes) is to be shown to be insufficient or invalid.

1) The problem of indirect relation to the external world as defining 'who we are' is resolved if we have 'sensory remembrance' encoded as who we are as we enter the world, and not who we are as we presently relate to the external environment. Knowledge then, could be properly defined as encoded or remembered sensory. Remembered sensory circumvents the problem of the indirect relation of the senses, because the time -offset extends from before the physical senses develop. This is the contention of unconscious theory.

2) The problem of defining who we are through who we are is, once again, resolved if who we are is defined from before the time we are born (i.e. the genome).

A conceived embryo, is who we are (1). A genomic programme, with DNA inherited from both father and mother in Homo Sapiens. As we grow and develop, who we are (1)creates who we are (2) (a human being), through both encoded programming, and the interaction of the external world. Who we are (1), (the genes)appear unable to change through life, only to be expressed or non-expressed (non- Lemarckian), (although there is some debate over whether the immune system can circumvent this by passing learned immunity to the sex cells- a clearly Lemarckian mechanism- see the book "Lemarck's Signature"). Who we are (2) changes all the time, due to genotype/phenotype expression, food, the external environment, learning, experience and so on. Thus who we are 1 (the genome, with some inherited knowledge) creates who are (2), with the added interaction of the external world as we develop.

The point I guess, is not that we are not the external world- what you call 'fundamental level of being'. It is just that I disagree with how this is defined. Our fundamental level of being, 'who we are', is an indirect remembrance of reality, interacting indirectly with a changing and uncertain world."

Roger McEvilly June 11 2001

Response:

Even if we accept the notion of ‘sensory remembrance’ encoded as who we are as we enter the world, the sensory remembrance still has to come from some point in our existence (ancestors), thereby entail the indirect relation problem. In other words, the sensory remembrance which is biologically passed on must have been originally attained through an indirect relation with the external world. Though if you are contending that sensory remembrance is separate from human existence, we would like to know how? (i.e. how can there be human sensory without human existence?)

By defining who we are as a "conceived embryo", ignores that there must be something behind an embryo in order for it to exist. (i.e. a conceived embryo cannot exist from nothing, nor can it exist solely from external factors like a woman’s womb.)

233. Entry:

Reply to the Response to Entry Entry 231

‘Therefore, since we cannot comprehend infinity, we must conclude in terms of your challenge that we cannot know the basis for the mechanism or who we are.’

"I am very challenged by your last sentence in the response, shown above. Indeed, I can understand your objections to my other points, since they are unproved, if they can be proven. How does one 'know' what is infinity? Because it is an unknowable, like God, then we are forced to either reject it, like the atheists do, or embrace it, like a true believer. I did use the word 'Totality' to explain an infinity of interrelationship, but that may not be sufficient. So unless one accepts infinity as a totality on faith, where does that leave us? I don't know. So either we accept that 'we cannot comprehend infinity' as you say, and then let the concept of interrelationships build itself to its totality, which I chose to call infinity; or we are left with concepts we create to understand reality, and then are left with a 'true belief' with what we have constructed. So there goes the challenge: do we see things as we see them, and become who we are through who we perceive we are, or do we see them through an external system which describes who we are, or at least that we are, in terms of a self constructing mechanism, and then accept that we are who we are? This is not meant as a response to the Challenge, merely an expression of why I am puzzled by your response."

Ivan Alexander
Humancafe
June 12 2001

Response:

How can we embrace something like "infinity" which we cannot comprehend? Why not just posit something outside of our conscious perspective, without giving it a defining quality like infinity?

The notion of totality as an explanation for the infinity of interrelation is contradictory, because totality implies limit, whereas infinity does not.

You mentioned that we can see things practically with an underlying theoretical basis, or see them through a theoretical outlook which explains things as a whole. Though there is a third way: to see things from a theoretical realization that we cannot comprehend the fundamental nature of things in part or as an interactive whole, so that what we perceive is a limited reality of what really is.

234. Entry:

"According to the 'groundrules' of the competition, participants are subject to the following assumptions associated with the proposition, viz:

1. ‘The most objective manner possible’ (which) refers to not limiting our reasoning to any system(s) of thoughts, or in other words, making all our ideas and beliefs subject, within limits, to the most scrutiny we are capable of.

2. ‘Limited know’ (which) refers to the more reasonableness, within the limits of our knowledge, of a conscious form, like a statement or proposition, than antagonistic conscious forms. (For example, the proposition ‘we cannot get outside of our minds and know that we are’ is more reasonableness than the proposition ‘we can get outside of our mind and know that we are’, because we cannot more reasonably show how we can get outside of our minds than showing we cannot.)

By entering the competition participants are giving their assent to these assumptions. This writer has seen no entries which would deny such an understanding.

It follows that all parties understand that these limits and definitions must, as needs be, also apply to the proposition itself.

I contend that the proposition is overcome on the basis that it contradicts the statement defining 'limited knowledge'. By issuing the statement in relation to the collective 'we', the proposition has already assumed knowledge of 'antagonistic conscious forms', where such knowledge is clearly beyond any epistemic agent.

This writer accepts the notion that ‘we cannot get outside of our minds and know that we are’ as meaning also that we cannot get outside of our minds and know other minds. The proposition, according to the competition, must be contingent on this understanding.

At best a proposition under these guidelines can state ‘I cannot know who I am’. Other parties cannot refute that because they cannot get outside of their mind and know better than the 'I' issuing the statement.

Just as the term 'we know' cannot be reasonably used in any ultimate way to infer collective knowing (since we can't get outside of our minds into other peoples’ minds as per point 2.), the term 'we cannot know', likewise cannot be issued with any prospect of universal justification.

Without justification and without any resemblance to any fact in the world, the proposition is false and becomes merely a statement of personal belief subject to the conjecture of any other personal view."

David Tyrrell June 13 2001

Response:

Just because we apparently cannot get outside of our minds and know that we are, does not necessarily mean that we cannot know other minds. We can reason other minds, thereby know them from our limited perspective. If you then contend that we cannot truly know other minds, because we are contained by our own minds, then you need to show how we can truly know something.

Also, it does not follow from your assumption that an individual can only know his or her own mind, that an individual can know something (i.e. mind) solely through itself. One way around this problem is to project reason outside of one’s mind, so that our limited identity is contingent on things outside of the mind like the human body and oxygen. Therefore, we disagree that there is significant difference between knowledge of one’s own mind and knowledge of other minds (personal knowledge versus personal belief), which in terms of the proposition contradicts the definition of ‘limited knowledge’.

235. Entry:

Reply to the Response to Entry 233

‘The notion of totality as an explanation for the infinity of interrelation is contradictory, because totality implies limit, whereas infinity does not.’

"If 'infinitesimal' does not approach 'zero', and 'totality' does not approach 'infinity', then there is no hope!

‘Though there is third way: to see things from a theoretical realization that we cannot comprehend the fundamental nature of things in part or as an interactive whole, so that what we perceive is a limited reality of what really is.

I essentially agree with this sentence, 'that we cannot comprehend the fundamental nature of things in part or as interactive whole'. And indeed, from where we are, all we can hope to understand is the 'limited reality of what really is'. This is truly our starting point. To go beyond this point, then, we need to use a concept that can carry itself into dimensions beyond our ability to perceive them. One such 'tool' is the concept of interrelationship, which taken to its totality reverts back on itself and redefines itself. This is meant as an objective concept, outside our subjective mind, if you will. To me, this is a usable tool of conceptual thinking, since it is able to span, dare I say it, an infinity. But then, I conceive of infinity as a totality, so for me it is not a contradiction of terms. The reason that I think this kind of conceptual math is valid is because it then lends itself to many applications, which is why I wrote the book "Habeas Mentem", (which can be found on the web), and the tool of interrelationship as a philosophical concept finds various applications. In my opinion, and it is for the Committee to agree with this or not, I think that this 'interrelationship concept' can reconcile the Challenge, that we cannot be who we are and know who we are at the same time. This is the why for my 8 posts above: 174, 185, 211, 217, 224, 227, 231, 233, your Challenge gives me a chance to test the edge of this conceptual tool. And for this, I am grateful and enjoy the dialogue. I too believe that the ramifications for this proof can be immense, since then we can reconcile 'Being' with 'Who' we are, objective with subjective. I do not believe this had ever been done conclusively. As to whether or not you then judge that this is a valid tool for your purposes, that I cannot influence, and it is in the hands of the Committee. The philosophy of Habeas Mentem, as it is derived from the interrelationship concept, arrives at a basic conclusion as it applies to our conscious human existence: 'It is always our choice'. But more exciting, if your proposition is proven, as I see it, then it opens many doors of possible knowledge."

Ivan Alexander
Humancafe
June 14 2001

Response:

How can we go beyond our limited reality by using a concept that can supposedly carry itself into dimensions beyond our ability to perceive, when the concept is part of our limited reality? It appears that you are trying to separate the perceiver from knowledge, thereby avoid the self-referential problem, and yet it does not follow from our perspective how there can be conscious knowledge without the perceiver of the knowledge. In other words, we contend that knowledge and the perceiver of knowledge are intertwined, so that the two of them cannot be reasonably separated. (i.e. there is no conscious knowledge without the perceiver of it.) Therefore, it does not make sense to assert that a concept itself has meaning which is beyond our perception.

Also, as stated in the response to Entry 233, the concept of interrelation is limited because relation is contingent on things and the basis for things. Therefore, we do not think that the concept of interrelation "spans" infinity as a totality, nor do we think that the concept reconciles the proposition. If anything, the concept of interrelation reconfirms "our inability to comprehend the fundamental nature of things in part or as an interactive whole".

236. Entry:

Reply to the Response to Entry 234

"Yes, your arguments were entirely predictable, once again. I have to admit I can't beat you playing with your ball on your turf, with your referee. It all must be getting a bit laborious and circular for you - maybe its time to call a halt. Especially since you are basically aware that Ken Bell has sufficiently overcome the proposition early this year.

If you want to keep it going, out of entertainment value maybe, then do you think it might be about time to present the necessary disclaimer, perhaps on the front page of your website. I'm hoping that you are aware of what the disclaimer is; that this project is a purely intellectual and academic (fun) exercise related to just one, quite limited, mode of human thought. Maybe you could add that the team at Inexpressible would like to express their recognition that human moral agents and thus moral actions in all their forms must assume an a priori superposition of intuitive knowledge as to 'who they are', which no person or ideas can deny them. After all, such a denial could be argued as a quite subtle, yet rather nasty form of denial of basic human rights.

Maybe you could extract something like Ken Bell's raising of the ethical position in disputes (say Dispute no. 9 Reply 16), and admit that you deliberately bypassed the ethical question for the purposes of keeping the 'game' going. We all understand (I'm sure), that ethics must, when it boils down, override epistemic judgment and sophistry. D Day and the Atomic bomb demonstrate those ultimate truths and the lengths that humans have gone, and always will go to in order to defend against 'dangerous ideas'.

I guess what I'm saying is that you have a duty to republish something like the following:

"1. ((b)itself in (k)itself) = (c)itself (unknown variable)
(b)itself does not equal (c)itself, but (b)itself exists in
(c)itself (superposition)
(b)itself in all of (k)itself (i.e. (k) is all of us
ourselves and something else).
2. (b)itself (i.e. who we are) + ((b) in (k)) (i.e. consciousness)
((b) in (k)) equates to ((b)itself in (k)itself)
The first equation leads to an unreasonable conclusion that all of who we are and then something else is transferred to (c)itself. This result suggests that not only do we transfer who we are to (k), but that (k) is already existing."
Excerpt from Dispute 9 Reply 17

In other words the (c) and (k) that are already existing are human ethical judgment, and societal order respectively. And are conceded to include realities such as ethical insight, parental moral training, even reference to Religious doctrines if the agent so prefers etc. It is the superposition that you had denied but in fact agree must exist in order for society (and epistemology) to survive.

We wouldn't want the more impressionable folks to think that now that they've escaped HAL in his hard form, that they may have to face him in his epistemic/logical form as a kind of intellectual 'power of suggestion'. It would be like a kind of inverse form of the 'inmates taking over the asylum'. Next thing we'd have the accountants suggesting that we would be just fine as long as the accounts were maintained without any connection to any human forms, given that humans are notoriously late in making payments.

Good point?"

David Tyrrell June 16 2001

Response:

Your assertion that Ken Bell has "sufficiently overcome the proposition" overlooks Ken Bell’s later concession that the proposition is valid. We quote from Ken Bell’s Dispute 9 Reply 32, "We are not our thoughts, but we would not be who we are without them." The quote suggests that from Bell’s perspective, there is only a limited connection between our thoughts and who we are.

Also, we quote from Ken Bell’s last reply on the validity of the proposition:

As in the old aphorism "hindsight is 20/20" we can rationalize every bend and turn along a trodden path, but this doesn't tell us what’s ahead. Any path is the interplay of an organism’s movement and the relative non-movement of an environment. The path is not a function of the organism OR the environment, it is a function of the organism AND the environment, and as such represents a superposition of each. Further, since the path is likely to be referenced again, we may consider it (from the organism’s perspective) as part of the environment, and (from the environment’s perspective) as an extension of organisms. Therefore a degree of self-reference is required to come to a more complete understanding of what a path actually is.

Through this reasoning, its easy to see that the dichotomy between subject and object is in fact an illusion of causality, and no single perspective can give a complete description. We are not our thoughts, just as we are not our actions. I agree that in saying "we are the universe in action", I have taken a somewhat biased view, but after all, I'm only human. (Excerpt from Dispute 9 Reply 36)

Clearly, Bell is saying from an epistemological standpoint that even though our thoughts and who we are are interconnected, we cannot completely know who we are.

However, Ken Bell’s main contention against the proposition, prior to his concession above, is that the proposition is inconsistent, thereby invalid. He writes:

If you believe that, Response 8, A)4a "the source of knowledge is from an "unconscious assertion" by us that conscious meaning exists." Then the statement has no objective basis and is inconsistent... In this forum, I certainly don't expect to change your opinions or your beliefs. However I have shown that there is inconsistency within your belief system, using logic as a basis. I have successfully "Challenged the Philosophy". (Excerpt from Dispute 9 Reply 9 )

The problem with Bell’s position is that he assumes that if knowledge is derived from "unconscious assertion", we have no way of knowing that we cannot know who we are because everything we know is a fabrication. In other words, everything we know is without an objective basis. We disagree with this contention, because the self-referential nature of knowledge ensures that we cannot know something with complete certainty, so that fundamentally there is no absolute objective basis to know from. Or as Ludwig Wittgenstein writes in "On Certainty", "At the foundation of well-founded belief [or knowledge] lies belief that is not founded."

Moreover, Bell’s contention overlooks that a limited objective basis can exist from the comparison of knowledge (or fabrication) through our use of reason, so that we can know that we cannot know who we are from a limited perspective.

Other issues:

We agree that the competition is limited to one mode of human thought, namely reasoned thought. Though we contend that all thought, by the mere fact that we are conscious of it, is defined by reason. (i.e. conscious meaning at some level) In other words, a thought devoid of reason from our perspective is not a thought. Therefore, we also disagree that there are other modes of thought with something other than as reason as their basis, and since reason is the basis for judging the competition, the competition includes all modes of thought, including issues of morality and ethics.

Why must moral actions assume an a priori superposition of intuitive knowledge as to who human moral agents are? Where does intuitive knowledge come from? What is morality in the context of being unable to distinguish in absolute terms a morally right action from a morally wrong action? Why must ethical observations override epistemic observations when ethical observations are contingent on the epistemic validity of their observations? (Note, Martin Bebow in Entry 173 uses intuitive knowledge to challenge the proposition.)

Your contention that consciousness (defined as being in knowledge) and knowledge are "all ready existing" in relation to who we are, assumes that knowledge is an inherent part of who we are, rather than something created and progressed over time. Also, if knowledge is all ready existing, where does it come from prior to the state of all ready existing? How do you account for the connection between knowledge and the external world?

Your argument that human knowledge must contain who we are in order for society to survive, focuses on the implication of knowledge not containing who we are, rather than answering whether or not knowledge contains who we are. Therefore your argument cannot be used to refute the position that knowledge does not contain who we are.

237. Entry:

"In between ‘it is it’ and ‘is it is’ is Mind: ‘I am I’.

Can we know who we are and be who we are at the same time? Yes, because I know 'who I am' at the same time 'that I am'. ‘I am I.’

Is this 'ego'? No. It is a conscious 'being' (it is it); not only in the self, but rather also in what is (is it is). We as human beings with a self-aware mind are positioned in our existence between the two. 'I am I' is at the center of our conscious existence, whereby we are who we are at the same time that we know we are. This is always true for all self-conscious living beings. When they can say ‘I am I’, they are consciously in their mind at the center of their being."

Ivan Alexander
Humancafe
June 24 2001

Response:

We agree that human beings have a "self-aware mind", and we assert further that a sense of conscious identity at some level is a necessary feature of the human mind, otherwise thought would have no meaning to the individual. However, the important question in the context of the competition is what is the limit of the self-aware mind? (i.e. can the self-aware mind be consciously aware of itself, or can the self-aware mind only be aware of itself in a limited, representational sense?)

You contend that because "I", or our conscious identity, is at the "center" of our conscious existence, "I" is at the center of our being as well, and therefore we can know who we are. Yet, it does not necessarily that just because our conscious identify is at the center of conscious existence, that it is who we are or at the center of our being. The "I", though a necessary feature of our conscious existence, may be a limited representation; and if we consider that we ourselves appear to be the creators of knowledge, in terms of the epistemology of knowledge, we cannot create who we are through who we are. Also, we cannot create from who we are, while the materials, like sensa and neurons, we use to create knowledge also contain who we are. (i.e. we ourselves cannot be existing from one location while being present in another.) Therefore, unless you can refute this ontological and epistemological position, we conclude that it is more reasonable that "I" though a necessary feature of our consciousness and at the center of it, is a representation of who we are, thus we can only know who we are in a limited, representational sense.

238. Entry:

"The proposition is falsifiable with words, but cannot be overcome by words. It can only be overcome by experience. Experience can never be reduced to words, and words can only point a finger at experience.

I cannot share my experience with another. I can only assert to have had the experience that overcomes the proposition, and to know a number of others who have had the same experience.

The proposition is falsified by recognizing that the second term (cannot) excludes a possible future change in the experience of the perceiving consciousness. It would be a more accurate proposition if it stated: "we presently appear not to be able to know who we are and be who we are at the same time." This would agree with our naive self perceptions.

I can state from experience that this state can be gone beyond, first through a thorough examination of inner life through introspection, which then must be followed up with the practice of concentrated thinking without an object.

Once this concentrated thinking gains sufficient strength, both moral and practical, it will experience the overcoming of the proposition."

Joel A. Wendt June 25 2001

Response:

Since words are necessary to express experience, and the proposition according to you cannot be overcome by words, it does not follow how experience can overcome the proposition. (i.e. you cannot separate experience from words, still know or "assert" that you have experience.)

Even if you could have an experience that overcomes the proposition, and you know that it did, it is unclear what that actual experience would be. As an example, you refer to experience of the "examination of inner life through introspection" and "concentrated thinking without an object", but what is it about these activities and your experience of them that allows you to know who you are? Introspection and concentrated thinking allows an individual to compare different thoughts at a deep level, but what it is it about the comparison of thoughts that allows an individual to know who he or she is? Also, since us ourselves apparently create knowledge (i.e. conscious meaning), and we cannot create who we are through who we are, how can we know who we are through our creation of knowledge?

Moreover, your contention that the proposition is falsified on grounds of excluding possible future change overlooks that the proposition is proposed not as an absolute, but from our limited perspective. Therefore, the term, "cannot" is not rigid to exclude possible future change as you contend.

Entries 224-231 Entries 239-245