"There is a profound difference between "WHO we are" and "WHAT we are." What we are can be considered the objective nature of a being, and the perspective of human consciousness has no access to this theoretical objectivity.

Who we are, on the other hand, is a conclusion we reach in each moment of self-definition. It is the conviction we hold about our very nature as individuals, and we only accept this conclusion in moments of introspective clarity.

Thus, contrary to the proposition, we can only "be who we are" in a moment in which we "know who we are," because our being as INDIVIDUALS is a product of our own introspection, not an incidental phenomenon of existence.

See Sartre's delineation of the being "for itself" versus "in itself" for a more articulate, albeit lengthy, refutation of this proposition in Being and Nothingness in which he distinguishes the objective and subjective aspects of a human from one another."

Paul M. Lantos March 9 2000

Response:

"WHO we are", in the Challenge the Philosophy competition, refers to the deepest level of us ourselves, or as defined in the competition, our "fundamental level of being from our limited perspective". In other words, "WHO we are" refers to Sartre's "in itself".

However, if we accept your "difference" between "who" and "what", we face the problem that "who" is an extension of "what" and that in terms of their essence, they appear to be the same. (ie. who we are is ultimately from what we are). Hence, since we have "no access to the theoretical objectivity" of "what we are", it follows that we have "no access to the theoretical objectivity" of who we are.

Also, it follows that since we can't know who or what we are, in terms of our fundamental level of being, everything we know, including "our own introspection", is not who or what we are.

24. Entry:

"If one admits the validity of scientific method into the realm of logic, two point become evident: (1) Depth and breadth of knowable things is indeed infinite, but (2) consistency of the knowledge base can be maintained. Thus though I cannot know all of the neurons firing in my brain cells, or the paths of individual electrons, or the states of all the quarks that all together, and any given instant, conprise "who" or "what" I am, I can look in a mirror every day and see my reflection and say "That's me", or I can call or visit any number of friends and acquaintences, and recognize them - and they I. At any given time, I have a cohesive framework of my identity, and have access to all facets of my self, should I care to indulge. If I accept the validity of memory as a recording of past experience, I also have continuity. Scientifically, these factors sum themselves into a consistent self image. One who cannot do these things lives by definition in a "fantasy" universe, and is identifiable (sometimes with great difficulty) as psychotic.

One may argue that no matter where one looks, or to what granularity one chooses to perceive, that there is always a perceiving entity invisible to itself. At the level of brain function, this may be a neural group charged with, say, visual perception. The "mirror" resolves this problem for us. Through use, the mind can - and probably does - create mirror neural sites (the brain probably does this for the purpose of backups in case of errors). Thus the perceiver can see a copy of itself, know it is a copy, and therefore know itself.

(This communication, of course, depends on our acceptance of language as a representation of the perceptual world. I beleive I have chosen a form of argument that can be represented without language, solely on the basis of perception. For instance, instead of verbally asserting that there are volcanoes, and launching into a detailed description of what they are, I could drag you to the slopes of Mt. Etna in Sicily, and show you.)"

Curtis Wilbur March 11 2000

Response:

Because all knowledge appears to bottom out into unknown, a point in the "realm of logic" becomes evident: (1) limit on what we can prove and thereby know. Hence, even though the "depth and breadth of knowable things" appear to be infinite, it may not be so. Further, the consistency of the "knowledge base" appears to be consistent only within system(s) of thoughts. For example, the result, 1+1=2 is consistent in the mathematical system of thoughts, and similar systems, though outside of them, it can be shown to be false, because in terms of space and time, there is no such thing as two identical things, so 1+1 does not equal two, and can never produce the same result.

Yes, we can identify ourselves through a mirror, friends and acquaintances, and our memory. Though it is unclear whether we are really identifying us ourselves through these means, or just an invented identity of ourselves.

We agree that there appears to be some kind of "mirror neural sites" in the brain, though again it is unclear whether the "copy" of the perceiver (ie. self) is really the perceiver himself or herself in terms of fundamental level of being, or just an invented self of the perceiver, whoever he or she is.

In our view, the "basis of perception" does not resolve whether the knowledge we perceive through is really the object of our perception. For instance, we could be in the same room as you, and you confirm to us verbally that in fact we are, and yet it does follow that our perception of you is really you. It could be an invented identity based on a system of thoughts. The same reasoning applies to us viewing a volcano or any other object. Sure, we can look at the volcano from a distance, and climb its slope, and feel 100% certain that it is a volcano. Though at the same time, we feel uncertain whether the object we are certain about is really a volcano, or something beyond our minds which we attach, through our unconscious sensory, thought process, and knowledge base, the label volcano and its invented meaning to.

For further explanation of the limit of (1+1=2) see (1+1=2)=false.

25. Entry:

"'Knowing oneself' should be clarified. It seems impossible that anyone can know himself in totality at any given time. This is clearly because the "self" is relative to something other than self. In order for the self to know its place among other objects there must be other objects present. These objects are thoughts, stimuli, etc. that may originate from within or from without. It seems clear that any object is temporally bound, whatever its duration, as are we -- we do not exist in steady state indefinitely, we are bound up with time. Therefore, the only self that could ever be known at any time is that which is in contrast or harmony with present objects.

Given this, it seems not only possible to KNOW oneself and BE oneself simultaneously, but essential to existing as a conscious being at all. This seems like semantics more than substance to say otherwise. In order to move forward in time and act as ourselves, the self must be present in the mind vis-a-vis other objects. In essence "being" and "knowing" are the same thing. Since the self is part knowing entity, the very being is the knowing. As a rough example, the particular arrangement of particles that makes your mind what it is right now is the very knowing that allows it to move forward to the next instant.

I will illustrate this as follows:

P: Particle in larger system of self
T(x): Instant in time

T(1) T(2) T(3)
P(1)--->P(1)--->P(2)

The particle position, state or energy level changes in the larger system from P(1) to P(2) to P(3) over time T(1), T(2), T(3). Clearly this particle, which is part of the "self", and is also part of memory and knowledge is existing at each time T simultaneously, given that the particle is itself, (law of identity).

Given what was said above regarding being and knowing, to say that knowing cannot happen in the same instant as being is to suggest that being cannot exist simultaneous with being. But this is clearly on the wrong track."

Robert Burnier March 12 2000

Response:

"Knowing oneself" refers to expressing in thoughts our fundamental level of being. It includes being able to reasonably show how we can actually express us ourselves.

We agree that we need some form of conscious identity, like self, for us to exist as conscious beings, otherwise the thoughts in our minds would lack the necessary connection to ourselves, thereby lose their meaning to us as beings. However, it is unclear why it is essential that we really need to know who we are for us to exist as conscious beings, when it appears that we could exist as conscious beings with conscious identities which represent who we are rather than really being who we are.

We agree that knowing and being appear to occur at the same time. However, the challenge proposition shows that our knowing itself is not the same as our being itself.

Moreover, just because our conscious identity appears to change simultaneously with time, it does not follow that our identity has to be really who we are. It may, as mentioned, be an invented identity with who we are behind it. So our identity reflects, in a limited sense, who we are without really being who we are.

We claim that we, as conscious beings, can only exist with invented identities, and that we must exist with them. The identities appear to have limited connection, through our unconscious sensory, thought process, and knowledge base, to everything else.

26. Entry:

"The answer to your riddle is that it is tacitly part of the neo-Kantian philosophy of the Unknowable thing-in-itself.

I invoke two philosophers who are themselves incompatible with each other, but both agree that Kant was mistaken in his notion that some things are beyond knowing. These two philosophers are GWF Hegel and Ayn Rand. Whatever else their merits or demerits, they were quite correct in their critique of Kant.

The first premise of your proposition, 'we can't know who we are and be who we are at the same time,' is that some things are naturally beyond human knowledge. This is an error, and human knowledge has no limits at all, given enough time to pursue the problem. But modern philosophy has almost made a dogma of Kant's doctrine of the Unknowable, and Hegel's critique has barely been heard.

The second premise of your proposition is that if we "know" the self, then the "knower" and the self are two different selves. Actually Kant struggled with this same problem. His answer was insufficient, and, as I said, Hegel's answer has not been well-disseminated.

The correct response is that the self does not exist in snapshots of time, so that the self at one second is different from the self at another second. The same self exists through time, and although it changes bit by bit through time, it remains the same self. Self-knowledge must occur through time. Thus your position sees a paradox because it perceives that a split second is needed to go from being to knowing and back again, but it presumes that in each split second the self is not the same self.

One of the most charming proponents of your position is the colorful Alan Watts, who attempted to show that the absolute truth he and other intellectuals had attained was nevertheless inexpressible and beyond mere human words. So, despite his brilliance, Alan Watts was a neo-Kantian and he did not think his position through methodically (and he would be among the first to admit that).

The solution is Hegel's dialectic (on this Ayn Rand was mistaken). The continual change of reality is not a splitting of reality into bits, but an organic flowing of reality, and the self 'reveals' itself to itself, from the unconscious to the conscious, continually. It is the same self, and this self is prototyped in the image of the Divine Trinity, which is three selves in one, to indicate abstract being, expression into the world, and then return to being in a concrete mode. This is change but at the same time it is only the dance of the original being."

Paul Trejo March 13 2000

Response:

It does not follow how the self can "reveal itself to itself", since there would be no basis to reveal. It is like a person literally facing himself or herself in a person of identical being and body. They would be able to describe the features of one another; though it does not follow how they could express the fundamental being of each other. (ie. they would have no basis to know who the other is, since they would be perceiving from the same basis).

Moreover, it does not follow how the "self", a label with invented meaning and unknown basis, can be who we are.

We agree that we as living beings cannot help from existing, and thereby our consciousness appears to be part of who we are. Though it is unclear whether our thoughts themselves are the same as who we are, or they are, through our unconscious sensory, thoughts process, and knowledge base, just an empty form of existence.

If we view our existence as "oneness", so that the "self stays the same", it does not follow how we could know anything, since it appears that we can’t who we are without getting outside of who we are. Yet by getting outside of who we are, we would have no basis to know, and even if we could get outside of who we are, we could not return to who we are and still know who we are.

Finally, since we can’t get outside of our minds and know that we are, and we can’t know thoughts themselves solely through themselves, it follows that what we know itself is not thoughts themselves, which does not make sense. So our thoughts appear to have an empty form of existence, and thereby our existence, including our consciousness, appears not to be in intrinsic oneness.

27. Entry:

"Isn't this question basically just another variation of the rather familiar problem of circularity which haunts even the most rarefied attempts to produce a maximally objective account of 'that which is' -- which entails, among so many other things, an account of how the basic constituents of the universe constitute creatures, such as ourselves, with the capacity to speculate that there is a way in which the world is in itself, independent of any such speculation? While we most certainly can aspire to and achieve a progressively more objective understanding of the universe and ourselves as a part of it, the prospect of arriving at a conclusion to such extension is an unitelligible prospect indeed. For how can we expect to explain the reasoning capacities of creatures such as ourselves (or, for that matter, reasoning creatures per se) except by more of the same -- that is, by more reasoning (in cooperation, of course, with imagination, appearances, and speculation)?

We can know, in an ultimate sense, who we are because we can explain our reasoning capacities except by virtue of our reasoning capacities. Reason can't explain itself in the way that other things are explained by virtue of reasoning.

Thus, "we can't know who we are and be who we are at the same time" because, on the one hand, we simply CAN'T attain to what we think we are aspiring to when we strive for an ultimate account of who we are. On the other hand, in contrast, we are helplessly, necessarily, and absolutely, at every instant of our lives, being who we are. Being who one is simply being."

Rob Sica March 18 2000

Response:

Yes, the challenge proposition is another variation of the problem with knowledge’s circularity, thereby limitation. However, in our view, what distinguishes the proposition from other variations is that it illuminates a profound dilemma: us ourselves appear intrinsically different from thoughts themselves, which means that our thoughts, and their material extensions, appear empty of who we are. So by existing through thoughts, we appear to be absorbing ourselves into their emptiness. Further, since knowledge appears limited, our view about its limitation may be limited as well. In other words, we have no way of being fully certain about what we know, including our perceived limitation on what we can know.

We agree that the prospect of arriving at a definitive conclusion about our existence is unlikely, if not impossible. However, as long as we are guided by reason, we must continue to improve our limited understanding. To not do so is unfathomable, because it contradicts the apparent progressive nature of us, the individuals who make up the human species, and thereby knowledge.

Just because we can’t get outside of our reasoning or our minds, it does not follow how we can know who we are in an ultimate sense. For instance, reason may not be an end because it appears dependent on our unconscious sensory and who we are, and that the basis for reason, a comparison of meanings including reason itself, may stem from an unconscious assertion by us that there is conscious meaning. In other words, reason and all other concepts may be illusions with existence only because we assert and imagine that they have it.

We agree that we can’t help from being who we are, while at the same time, it appears that we can’t really know who we are. This point implies that what we know, and know itself, has only a limited connection to who we are.

28. Entry:

'We agree that we can’t help from being who we are, while at the same time, it appears that we can’t really know who we are. This point implies that what we know, and know itself, has only a limited connection to who we are.' (Excerpt from response to Entry 27.)

"What is meant by 'limited connection' is unclear. What we know -- or, more cautiously, think that we know -- is ESSENTIALLY connected with who we are in that what we believe results from the force of our reasoning capacities as well as that of the appearances of things from our peculiarly human perspective. Both our reasoning capacities and our perspective are features of whatever we in fact are. Thus, our beliefs about anything (including ourselves) have, not a 'limited connection to who we are,' but rather an absolutely essential relation to who we are as creatures with reasoning capacities and a peculiarly constituted perspective. Advances in knowledge consist in a progressively slighter reliance upon those perspectival peculiarities.

Thus, it seems to me that we don't even arrive at a consideration of the second clause of the proposition because we have sufficient (Kantian) grounds for doubting that the first clause (i.e., knowing who we are) could be adequately realized.

The obstacle to 'overcoming' the proposition is, at bottom, a variation of Kantian transcendental idealism.

Rob Sica March 19 2000

Response:

We agree that our beliefs about anything (including ourselves) have, in one sense, an "absolute, essential connection" to who we are. For instance, it appears that we cannot have any beliefs without having an essential connection to who we are. In other words, our beliefs, or thoughts, are not ends themselves; rather, they appear, from our perspective, to be dependent on who we are, unconscious sensory ect. for their existence. However, in terms of intrinsic value, our beliefs themselves appear to have a limited connection to who we are, in that our beliefs themselves appear empty of who we are, while at the same time reflect our "peculiar constituted perspective". How can our beliefs reflect who we are and yet inherently not be who we are? One explanation is that we ourselves are the creators of our beliefs, so that they are only beliefs from our perspective, though they themselves are not who we are. It is like someone designing and building a house. When it is complete, he can say that the house is a reflection of him, though the house itself is not. It is made up of natural and unnatural materials, and the conception of the house is an invention of the designer’s mind, with meaning only because he asserts meaning to it.

Just because you may have sufficient Kantian grounds for doubting that the first clause of the proposition could be adequately realized, it does not follow that your grounds are absolutely sufficient, because of the apparent limitation of all knowledge. Hence, you may be overlooking a concept or have not yet realized a concept which would make your grounds insufficient.

We are reluctant to associate the "obstacle" to overcoming the proposition to a variation of Kantian transcendental idealism, because from our perspective, Kant attaches intrinsic, and even divine, value to pure reason, which in our view contradicts his notion of "noumenon". However, we concede that one "obstacle" to overcoming the proposition appears to be a variant of Kant’s "noumenon", or the limit on what we can really know. Another obstacle, from a deeper perspective, is the apparent intrinsic difference between who we are and knowledge itself shown through the statements that we can’t get outside of our minds and know that we are, and that we can’t know knowledge solely through itself, so what we know is an empty form of existence, thereby inherently different from who we are.

29. Entry:

"Your opposing descriptions of "knowing" and "being" parallel Nietzsche's critique of reason as limited and his characterization of true vitality as natural and non-rational. Wouldn't Nietzsche's vision of the free spirit answer this riddle? Simultaneously, the free spirit "knows" that his essence is inherently self-defined and dynamic via experimentation with various doctrinal perspectives and is "being" by employing instinctual acts of will to resist fixed constructs. In other words, both a use and overcoming of reason in service of the natural."

Gerry May March 22 2000

Response:

It is unclear how the "free spirit" knows that his essence is "inherently self-defined and dynamic". What "doctrinal perspectives" allow him to know these things about his essence?

Also, how can the free spirit employ "instinctual acts of will" over fixed constructs when he is guided by reason (ie. everything he does appears to be directly or indirectly influenced by what he knows)?

"Both a use and overcoming of reason in the service of the natural" appears contradictory, because reason is non-natural, thereby cannot be in the service of the natural.

If reason is overcome, in the sense that the free spirit realizes it is limited and non-natural, it does not make sense why he would continue to use reason. Moreover, using reason and overcoming it, does not get us away from the dilemma that we appear to be existing through what is empty of who we are. In our view, the only way to overcome this dilemma is to detach from reason, and even then we would face the effects of our past attachment to reason.

Entries 1-22 Entries 30-37