"I have a comment to make about the response to Entry 203.

I had written earlier that our understanding of the brain, and our ability to understand consciousness at the neuronal level, is still in its infancy.

While this is certainly true, it might reasonably be claimed that at this juncture in time neuroscience has attained an understanding of perhaps 5% of the brain's functionality due to the efforts of the last 50 years. This doesn't sound like much, but it is probably 100 times as much as has been learned in the past 2000 years by all other methods.

Although we may not understand consciousness at the neuronal level very well yet, this doesn't mean that someday consciousness won't be completely reduced to a neuronal explanation. Even if complete reductionism is unattainable, it still seems an unavoidable conclusion that consciousness must depend on the brain as a result of studies based on many areas, of which I will only mention one here: those related to the study of brain damage.

For example, it is easy to demonstrate that as a result of certain degenerative brain diseases and syndromes, neurons in different parts of the brain begin to deteriorate and die off. Eventually, the person becomes extremely impaired intellectually, and ultimately, consciousness itself fades away into nothing.

This progressive deterioration of the mind and consciousness as the brain cells die off, with the degree of impairment being proportional to the degree of brain damage, provides powerful evidence that the brain is behind these phenomena, despite our current inability to arrive at a complete explanation. In fact, it seems impossible to reconcile them in any other way.

If the physiology and anatomy of the brain are not behind the mind and consciousness, then how are the above facts to be explained?"

Steve Burwen April 22 2001

Response:

How can we reasonably expect to completely reduce consciousness to a neuronal explanation, when even now we realize that consciousness is contingent on more than neurons? In other words, just because there is a clear connection between the physiology and anatomy of the brain and consciousness, does not mean that brain is the only connection to consciousness. If we reflect upon the brain, we see that it is contingent on sensory information, rest of the human body, external world, and who we are. Therefore, it follows that since the human brain is contingent on other things, and consciousness is contingent on the brain, consciousness is contingent on other things as well. This point means that it is highly unlikely that someday consciousness would be reduced solely to a neuronal explanation, which does not mean that neuroscience will discontinue to have a necessary role in our understanding of consciousness.

208. Entry:

Reply to the Response to Entry 203.

"Your Response (I follow with A:)
1. We agree that our thinking needs input from outside of our rational thought. The "heart-mind" or who we are-mind is one such relationship, with others being the relation between our mind and sensory, mind and thought process, and mind and external world. However, we disagree that the who we are-mind relation necessarily means "co-dependent origination", because if we consider the progressive nature of knowledge, and the origin of knowledge derived from non- thought, it follows that who we are must precede mind (i.e. mind as in conscious knowledge).

A: I'll go with William James on this one.

'The world of our experience consists at all times of two parts, an objective and a subjective part . . . The objective part is the sum total of whatsoever at any given time we may be thinking of, the subjective part is the inner 'state' in which the thinking comes to pass.'
- 'Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature', p. 499

2. We agree that the western ego, "I" and "we", appears not to be the source of the human mind's awareness, because the western ego is just a conception. (i.e. we create conceptions, and yet we cannot create who we are through who we are. So it follows that the concepts "I" and "we" cannot be who we are.)

A: OK

2.1 Also, we agree that the non-self or who we are appears to be the source of our conscious awareness, because the non-self represents fundamentally what we are.

A: OK, and here's what Petrus suggests to back that up.

"The I (ego) as a proposition-like self-representation can be treated as an attractor or gestalt of the highest order (as far as its phenomenal character could be neglected - strictly it could not). Deep meditators can transcend their I's (egos) as soon as the corresponding global attractor is erased (see also Deikman, 1996)."

3. Though the non-self may read neuron networks and co- dependently arrive at thought, it does not follow that non- self is innately part of our thoughts. In other words, it does not follow that the non-self has to be inherently part of our neuron network or thoughts to read them. In fact, it appears that the non-self has to be outside of them to read, because non-self apparently cannot read itself through itself.

A: Petrus statement above suggests the 'gestalt' higher order construct. Also, I think Global Workspace Theory elegantly covers that too. Here's what Bernard J. Barrs says:

"I would suggest that GW theory has a number of plausible implications for understanding subjectivity. The really significant distinction is not between inherently hard vs. easy problems, but between the contents of consciousness and what we intuitively think of as an observing self. 'Subjectivity' from this point of view corresponds to the sense of an observing self."
- in 'Understanding Subjectivity' (see full essay at Subjectivity)

3.1 Just because non-self may have "trawled" all inputs to our neuron networks, including our resulting thoughts, does not mean that the non-self is inherently the same as the inputs or our thoughts. (i.e. the concept "trawl" implies separation between the thing doing the trawling and the thing being trawled.) Ultimately, the inputs have their origin outside of non-self, in the external world, and therefore, it appears questionable that somehow through our sensory, non-self would become innately part of the input. Also, if our sensory creates unconscious information in relation to the external world, it does not follow how the non-self can create itself through itself.

I'll opt for gestalt, higher order level.

4. The application of quantum physics to the human mind faces three serious problems:
a) Since we (i.e. human beings) are apparently the creators of knowledge, it does not follow, how we can create who we are (non-self) through who we are.

A: I like Petrus on this. See above.

b) Since we know through what we know (i.e. we use our existing knowledge to form new knowledge), we cannot know what we already are. (i.e. we cannot know something solely through itself--there is no space to know.) So it follows that we cannot know at the epistemological level who we are.

A: They call it global workspace, where the brain works it all out. David Chalmer's supports it as an explanation of the Easy problem in knowing consciousness

c) Superposition the fundamental principal behind quantum physics is beyond space and time, thereby beyond our comprehension. So there is no direct evidence supporting the existence of quantum mind. All we can do is infer something which we cannot observe, compute, or comprehend.

A: Superposition, gestalt, name your poison.

I'll concede its currently beyond our comprehension anyway. but the guys (bless their little research hearts, are working on it, all for our benefit too I bet). It seems our brain has a good grasp of it, and it gives us space-time to stop us being overwhelmed with the immediacy of the whole thing. The direct evidence is your very typing of that statement in a nice safe space-time sequential construct which the brain has neatly worked out from its co- dependently arising actions outside space-time. And my consciousness, which co-arose with yours, can easily translate back into my non-space-time region for reprocessing in the global workspace, because of what we knew before our conscious minds came to be. Yes, and inference is another neat trick of the brain too huh? Including the inference that 'we cannot know who we are at the same time as being who we are' which itself is not subject to observation, computation, or comprehension, except in the neuroscience, and consciousness studies fields I suppose, at least they're making the best inferences in that regard today IMHO.

Other issues:
1. How can knowing invoke a "non-rational mind", when all thought is defined by reasonableness (i.e. conscious meaning)?

A: Well people might argue that intuition is of the non- rational genre. Intuition inspires doubt, or love when the rational mind has not yet ascertained the reasons why one is doubtful or loving.

2. Though neuroscience may tell us that the mind works at the level of quantum spin, quantum physics as mentioned above is a highly subjective theory. Also, neuroscience is far from definitive knowledge as neuroscientist Steve Burwen points out, "our understanding of the brain science is still fragmentary and in its infancy.... The issue of consciousness is mostly beyond our ability to understand at the neuronal level." (i.e. the relation between the firing of neurons and thought is still unclear, as is the relation between the external world and sensory information.)

A: Exactly. So you agree the subjective is most important.

Consider Stephen Garvey's essay 'The Origin of Knowledge: A Rationalist Investigation', which appears at : Origin

[QUOTE]
From the axiom that we can't know knowledge solely through itself, it appears that what we know cannot be knowledge itself, which means that what we know must be an empty form...

Where does our imagination come from? To answer this question, we turn to who we are, UNCONSCIOUS SENSORY THOUGHT PROCESS... [UNQUOTE]

A: It seems to me at the outset, that the premises are questionable in that they are open to 'antinomies', yes/no endless loops.

But to pursue it, in order to answer the question, where does our imagination come from, it is suggested that we should turn to 'who we are'. The predicate for who we are becomes 'unconscious sensory thought process' (ahh!!, someone knows who we are and is not telling!). It seems to me that this could just as adequately answer the question 'who we are not'. But it's starting to look like it's empty.

It was suggested in the essay, that 'knowledge cannot come from outside of us nor is it a self creation'. We must conclude according to this construct, that, even though knowledge is not a self creation, knowledge IS in our being. Since our being encapsulates many forms and sub- forms, i.e. 'you are being contrary', or 'you are being sick' at the same time as being who I am, which is 'unconscious sensory thought process'. This means that I must be able to be who I am at many levels.

It does seem to me though, that the limitations of the 'language' of philosophy is brought into light when discussing something as inherently complex as our mind. It gets caught up in circular sounding, rather unconvincing statements.

I find I can do nothing other than to conclude that:

Knowing who we are and being who we are, are eminently equivalent, that is nothing, and it happens now and at all times, at many levels, and thus at the same time.

A perfect expression of dependent co-arising!"

David Tyrrell April 24 2001

Response:

For an explanation of Global Workspace and Gestalt see (Link is not working. Will be updated by tomorrow) ">GW (http://www.inexpressible.com/wwwboard/messages/434.html).

The "I" (ego) as a representation treated as a "gestalt of the highest order" faces the problem of showing how the "I" is part of the whole and determined by the intrinsic whole. For example, how do you account for the apparent reality that we create knowledge ("I"), and that we cannot create who we are through who we are? How can you refer to an actual whole, when you cannot fully comprehend whole? How can the non-self read itself without being outside of itself, and yet by being outside of itself, the non-self ceases to be itself?!

In response to these criticism, you argue that the premises of Garvey as stated in his short essay, ‘Origin of Knowledge: A Rationalist Investigation’, are open to "antinomies", and yet you do not state what these antinomies are. Sure, there are "yes/no endless loops" in his premises, but there are with any stated position, due to the self-referential nature of knowledge.

Moreover, you misquoted Garvey, by stating that he claims that imagination comes from "unconscious sensory thought process", when he stated clearly that from his perspective, imagination comes from "who we are, unconscious sensory, and thought process". Also, the predicate for who we are is not "unconscious sensory thought process" as you suggested. Rather, it is not known because who we are as non-label, unconscious entity is beyond our comprehension.

Further, Garvey’s statement that "knowledge cannot come from outside of us nor is it a self-creation" does not mean that knowledge is our being. The statement means that knowledge itself does not exist. (i.e. we imagine knowledge or what itself that does not exist, which takes us to the problem of how we can create who we are through who we are.)

You then turn to the argument that our being encapsulates many "forms and sub-forms", while overlooking that we cannot help from being, and that the form and sub-forms we apparently encapsulate are through our perception. In other words, you use consciousness to posit varied forms onto being, without actually showing that being itself is varied.

You then attacked the limitation of the language of philosophy, or its circular nature, while not acknowledging that its limitation is no different from any other language whether biology, physics, or psychology.

In regard to your quote by Petrus, it does not make sense how deep meditators can transcend their "I" (egos) as soon as their identities are erased, unless these meditators are simply not conscious. (i.e. identity at some level is an inherent part of conscious thought.)

The Global Workspace, in which at the unconscious level, thought process is worked out, does not mean that the unconscious level can work anything out. All it means is that there is an unconscious thought process. Also, you assume that unconscious processing is non-space-time. You support this assumption by stating that conscious thought is worked out. Yet, it does not follow that non-space-time is necessary to work out conscious thought.

Just because intuition may inspire love or doubt, does not mean that intuition is devoid of reason ("non-rational genre"). All it means is that intuition may have less reasons than other forms of thought. (i.e. all thought by the mere fact that we are conscious of it, is defined by some level of reason. In other words, we cannot be conscious of a thought without also being conscious of its meaning.)

In short, your arguments using Global Workspace and Gestalt, have not more reasonably shown that the concept of "dependent co-arising" pertains to our consciousness. Two problems, among others, that you need to address, are how the non-self can read itself through itself, and how we can create who we are through who we are.

209. Entry:

Reply to the Response to Entry 207.

"In your response, you wrote "...just because there is a clear connection between the physiology and anatomy of the brain and consciousness, does not mean that the brain is the only connection to consciousness. If we reflect upon the brain, we see that it is contingent on sensory information, the rest of the human body, external world, and who we are."

I agree with you that consciousness is also made up of sensory information and information from the external world, including bodily or somatosenory input. Thus, consciousness is comprised of at least several different components.

However, all of these things are underlain by neural mechanisms in the brain or sense organs. We are aware of our body, for example, because we have amazingly precise peripheral sensory and central brain mechanisms that are devoted to processing and interpreting somatosensory information, just as in the case of vision and hearing.

And the sense organs in a human being are really only extensions of the cerebral cortex itself, unlike in lower organisms, such as cats and frogs (whose visual systems have been extensively studied and are well understood) but whose visual systems are much more independent of central control. But this is not the case in a human being.

I believe the main problem here is that as human beings we have an aversion to being reduced to our biology, as if this makes us some sort of machine, or at least a "biological machine." Human beings are a very creative and resourceful species. Our imaginations take flight so easily, both as individuals and as a species, that we shudder at the thought that the mind can be reduced to mere matter, to "ordinary" biology.

This biology, however, is far from "ordinary." Your brain contains 12 trillion neurons, which are connected to anywhere from 3,000 to 100,000 other neurons. This is a lot of interconnections. To calculate how many connections this is, is very interesting. Mathematically, this is known as a "combinatorial explosion" problem because of the large numbers generated.

In practical terms, this means that the number of interconnections in a human brain is greater than the number of atoms in the Milky Way galaxy, which contains 80 billion stars. Another way of saying it is that your brain is the equivalent of millions of the most powerful computer chips. Your brain is thousands, probably millions, of times more complex than the most powerful computer we can build-- not bad for a blob of "mere matter" that weighs only 3 pounds.

This having been said, is it really so bad to have one's consciousness reduced to neuronal mechanisms?"

Steve Burwen April 25 2001

Response:

Just because the human brain is the central mechanism in terms of sensory information, does not mean that the human brain is the central mechanism of consciousness or "underlies" it. What we see is that without information from the external world, the human body less the brain, sensory information, or who we are, there is no consciousness. So it follows that in terms of these main features, including the human brain, there is no underling thing for consciousness.

In our view, it is not a question of "badness" to have one’s consciousness reduced neural mechanisms, but a question of whether or not neural reduction is more reasonable. As we implied above, consciousness cannot more reasonably be reduced to neural mechanisms without ignoring other things of equal importance for consciousness.

(However, even if we were to accept your contention that neural mechanisms of the human brain underlie all the other things behind consciousness, the neural mechanisms of the brain are underlain by thought itself, since we must first have the thought of neural mechanisms. (i.e. we cannot get outside of our minds.) In other words, consciousness underlies consciousness because we cannot know outside of it. (i.e. there is no neural mechanisms from our perspective without our thought of them, and yet it is possible that there is thought of neural mechanisms, without neural mechanisms.)

210. Entry:

In your response to my Entry 209, you said:

"Just because the human brain is the central mechanism in terms of sensory information, does not mean that the human brain is the central mechanism of consciousness or "underlies" it. What we see is that without information from the external world, the human body less the brain, sensory information, or who we are, there is no consciousness. So it follows that in terms of these main features, including the human brain, there is no underlying thing for consciousness."

On the contrary, since without the brain the sense organs cannot function, the body cannot perform its work, and the mind in all of its many aspects, including consciousness, completely disappears, the brain is both the necessary and sufficient cause and creator of consciousness.

Furthermore, although we can't explain fully how consciousness arises from neuronal mechanisms, this doesn't mean we don't know where it is in the brain. In fact, we can localize it to a particular structure. Thus, it is not just the entire brain that gives rise to consciousness, but a specific part of it which can be easily identified.

This part is the cerebral cortex itself. In Greek, cortex means "bark," or thin layer, and that is exactly what it is. The human cerebral cortex is only a few millimeters thick, but without it, there is no consciousness, no lower or higher mental or cognitive functions, no language capability, and no personality as we know it. Remove this thin sheet of neurons, and what remains in a human being is only very primitive vegetative and physiological functions such as thirst, hunger, fear, and basic motor functions. However, even motor control in a human is irreparably damaged, resulting in a condition known as "decerebrate rigidity," where the skeletal muscles become excessively rigid and inflexible.

Hence, if we grant that consciousness exists, then the cerebral cortex, which is a specific part of the brain, is the sole cause and the only source, of it (however one wants to express it).

Steve Burwen April 27 2001

Response:

Yes, apparently if we take away the cerebral cortex, we lose consciousness. But the same can be said, if for instance we take away oxygen (external world), our sensory receptors, or who we are. So your assertion that the cerebral cortex is the "sole cause" of consciousness is incorrect, and your assertion that the cerebral cortex is the "only source" of consciousness is only correct in that the cerebral cortex appears to be the last cause in a multitude of causes.

We contend that the human brain is a necessary cause of human consciousness, while the creator of consciousness must be whatever is behind the individual. A human brain itself cannot create consciousness. There must be something behind it, which uses the brain, and other things, to create consciousness. (i.e. a neuron cell from our perspective is not self-existent. (i.e. it does not come from nothing.) There must be something behind the neuron cell itself which gives it existence.)

211. Entry:

"In answer to the proposition: We cannot know who we are and be who we are at the same time; I would refer the reader to the Philosophy of Objectivism by Ayn Rand as described by Dr. Leonard Peikoff, which can be viewed at: Peikoff.

In A Brief Summary, Dr. Peikoff states; "Existence exists -- and the act of grasping that statement implies two corollary axioms: that something exists which one perceives and that one exists possessing consciousness, consciousness being the faculty of perceiving that which exists."

If this were to apply to oneself, then one can say: "I am in existence. I am." In so doing, then one proves that one exists within one's consciousness, and is conscious of it. This is of necessity at the same time, since time is a human construct resulting from the perception of change in reality's interrelationships, as it exists in any infinitesimal moment of time. Therefore, to say: "I am my existence," is to fix both consciousness and being at the same time. Thus, objectively, it disproves the above proposition."

Ivan D. Alexander April 29 2001

Response:

1. Just because the statement, "I am my existence" implies that consciousness and being are simultaneous (i.e. in order to be conscious, we need to be being), does not necessarily mean that consciousness and being as in who we are are identical or both occurring in consciousness.

2. We agree that in order to perceive something, the thing that an individual perceives must exist at some level. However, through the statement, "I am in existence. I am.", it does not follow how you can perceive yourself through yourself, nor does it follow that you can perceive something "I" solely through consciousness. What you appear to be doing is making a statement about something without actually perceiving it, thereby without showing that it exists. Though obviously by having a thought in your mind, the thought must exist at some level, otherwise there would be no thought you could be aware of. Yet, just because a thought like "I" exists, does not mean it is the same as who we are.

212. Entry:

"This is a reply to your response to my Entry 210.

In your response you said, "Yes, apparently if we take away the cerebral cortex, we lose consciousness. But the same can be said, if for instance we take away oxygen (external world), our sensory receptors, or who we are. So your assertion that the cerebral cortex is the "sole cause" of consciousness is incorrect, and your assertion that the cerebral cortex is the "only source" of consciousness is only correct in that the cerebral cortex appears to be the last cause in a multitude of causes."

If we grant that there can be no consciousness without oxygen, just as an engine can't have life without gasoline, this implies that the brain, like the engine, are machines, which can be explained by well-known mechanical and physical principles.

If the brain is just a machine then there is no reason to look any further for a cause to consciousness, because the brain, as a biological machine, can be explained completely by reference to biological principles."

Steve Burwen April 29 2001

Response:

The problem with equating the human brain to a machine is that the human brain is part of a living organism. Though even if the human brain can be equated to a biological machine, it is questionable that the brain can be explained completely by reference to biological principles, because the brain is contingent on things like who we are as in fundamental level of being or sensory information, which cannot be explained completely by biological principles. The same can be said for material machines except in terms of mechanical and physical principles, because machines are not self-existent. (i.e. a living system invents and builds material machines, so that the living system is an integral part of machines. Or in other words, material machines are an extension of living systems, thereby to come to a complete understanding of material machines, we need to completely understand living systems.)

213. Entry:

"This judgment meets the validity up to only the certain step of development of Life according to its Idea. Like when man realizes himself only after birth and each of us at different ages. Besides, we do know almost nothing. Even life as such for our degree of development of brain and feelings seems impossible, but to some extent it is necessary to agree with its present. So it can be possible for anything you like or dislike."

Vladimir Parkhomenko April 30 2001

Response:

We agree that it is necessary to agree with the present, because we exist in the present. Though our agreement with the present, like our identity, does not mean that what we agree with, in terms of its meaning, has to be absolute.

Also, we agree that it is possible to believe anything we want, but it is another matter to show that what we believe is more reasonable than antagonistic beliefs.

Entries 194-206,  Entries 214-223