"We can ONLY know who we are by being who we are and observing ourselves.

We learn by feeling and thinking, then analyzing our own processes of feelings and thoughts, as only WE can: because only we have access to this information.

When I am inhibited, I must figure out why. When I am free, I must know why. If I do not, I do myself a disservice. And those around me. And they must do the same."

Elena Suhir March 12 2001

Response:

How can we observe ourselves while being ourselves? In other words, since we need to be ourselves in order to observe, how can we observe ourselves? Or how can we observe ourselves through ourselves?

What is it about "feeling, thinking, and analyzing" that allows us to know ourselves through ourselves?

195. Entry:

"We is? I suppose humanity. What is who we are? Our name? Our specific physiological processes? What is "who we are", what is that? I suppose it is a name. Names are relative, you can something anything that you want. Therefore you can be who you are and be who we are at the same time. Perhaps if you were omniscient(assuming who we are is determined by our specific physiological processes), then you could easily know who you are and be who you are at the same time. Simply because, if you somehow be someone else at different times, then you would know would know exactly who you are, because you know everything. It's simple. There, we can know who we are and be who we are at the same time, depending on who we are and what name we give ourselves, but that all depends on what you consider "who we are" to specifically be."

David Duke March 13 2001

Response:

1. The relativity of terms/labels/symbols and their meanings imply non-absolute. So we agree with you that the proposition can be overcome through redefining the meanings of its terms. For instance, we could redefine the meaning who we are as a name for a human being, thus overcome the proposition. However, in the context of the competition, merely redefining the terms of the proposition is not enough. It must be shown what is the more reasonable position, including the meanings of the terms. Though the general meanings of the terms must be accepted, while being open to refutation, for there to be a competition.

2. If an individual is omniscient, and knowing who we are is within our cognitive capability, then yes the proposition could be overcome. Although it would have to be shown how an individual could be omniscient, and that who we are is within the bounds of knowing.

3. If an individual could change into another individual, thereby get outside of himself, the individual would no longer be who he is, and therefore, even if the individual could know who he previously was, he could not know who he is and be who he is.

196. Entry:

Reply to the Response to Entry 195

"If the individual did change himself, consciously, (perhaps as a highly advanced species) he could know who he was because he created the new "himself" by his own means. For example, if he is an omniscient supreme being, he would know all the physical and/or spiritual processes of his universe/world/whatever it is, and therefore know what the world is, because he knows everything about it. It is the same with the new creation of the same being, except for being put in a different vessel for the mind."

David Duke March 14 2001

Response:

Yes, if an individual consciously changed himself, he could know who he was. (i.e. he would be outside of who he previously was, while assuming that he has the cognitive capability to know who he was.) Though the individual would still face the problem of knowing who he is.

As you mentioned, he could overcome this problem through omniscience, assuming that who we are is within the bounds of knowing. However, this position is not relevant, because all thought is inherently possible, unless it can be more reasonably shown how an individual could consciously change himself and be in a state of omniscience, and that who we are is knowable.

Other issue:

Through your statement, "... put in a different vessel for the mind", you appear to be equating being with mind. What grounds do you have to make this claim? (Note, the existence of a conscious voice is not enough to make the equation between being and mind, because conscious voice or identity is a necessity of consciousness. (i.e. we need some kind of identity, whether real or illusory, for us to have consciousness. In other words, conscious identity does not necessarily imply conscious being.) Also, we appear to be the creators of knowledge through our sensory and thought process, and that we cannot create who we are through who we are, which means that consciousness appears empty of being.

197. Entry:

"My entry is really more in the nature of a clarification of the problem than a proof.

Although it may be difficult to overcome this proposition, I don't see that the statements that we cannot know who we are and be who we are simultaneously are necessarily mutually exclusive, either.

Because of the existence of the condition "at the same time," this proposition really has three parts, not just two. If we can in fact know who we are at certain moments in time, and be who we are at certain moments in time, but these moments are contiguous but not overlapping, then we have achieved two of the three conditions. Then the only issue that remains is the one of simultaneity.

Is it thought that this is in fact the case? If so, the problem really comes down to a matter of the temporal exclusivity of the two main statements, and whether this one issue can in fact be overcome."

Steve Burwen March 20 2001

Response:

We agree that the proposition has three parts: cannot know who we are; be who we are; cannot know and be who we are simultaneously.

In terms of your temporal division of know who we are and be who we are, we have the following questions: how can we be who we are at certain moments rather than all moments we are alive? What is behind our knowing that allows us to know who we are without being who we are? How can we know, eat, or walk without being who we are?

We think being is a necessary constant as long as we are alive, thereby being cannot be isolated into certain moments of time. If we are correct, then the problem comes down to the matter of knowing who we are either as what we know or knowledge as form, and the temporal exclusivity argument from the standpoint of being as a temporal constant.

198. Entry:

Reply to the Response to Entry 197

"It would seem from my Entry 197 and your response, that, like the great G.E. Moore, our analytical methods are better suited to coming up with further philosophical questions than answers! (Moore himself pleads guilty to this charge, so we are in good company here).

But getting back to the argument--I agree with you that being is a necessary constant (as long as we are alive) and that it cannot be isolated into discrete moments of time. In that case, the condition of simultaneity can be removed for the statement "be who we are" since our being is not simultaneous with anything, it is simply continuous or a constant. If this is conceded, then the proposition is overcome if one can attain knowledge of one's self or who we are at any point during our existence.

In regard to your question, "What is behind our knowing that allows us to know who we are without being who we are? How can we know, eat, or walk without being who we are?" I don't think that is possible either. However, even if it is conceded that knowledge, and perhaps even the knowledge of who we are, is not a constant and may be fragmentary or isolated in time, this is not a problem if it can be demonstrated that we can know who we are at any point in time (no matter how infinitesimally small) while we exist, which as we have concluded, is a constant.

Therefore, if during a typical lifetime of 70 years or so (a period comprised of approximately 2.2 billion seconds) we are able to know who we are for even a second, or even a millisecond during that period, we shall know who we are and be who we are simultaneously, and the proposition is overcome.

Then the problem really comes down to what is acceptable proof of the knowledge of who we are. You have mentioned that this is really a matter of knowing who we are either as what we know or knowledge as form, and the temporal exclusivity argument from the standpoint of being as a temporal constant. Since we have conceded being is a constant, there is nothing inherent in being itself that precludes the possibility of knowing who we are and being who we are simultaneously.

Therefore, is there anything in knowing who we are that precludes it from being simultaneous with being who we are? If it is conceded that it is not then we are now much closer to overcoming the proposition. We need only attain knowledge, according to your criteria, of who we are as "what we know" or of "knowledge as form."

I think I understand the statement "who we are as what we know," but I am not sure yet what "knowledge as form" means. I may have more to say in the way of a proof when I understand this idea better."

Steve Burwen March 23 2001

Response:

We agree with your comment on the epistemic limitation of our analytical methods. Though we take your comment further by referring to the epistemic limitation of any conscious method. However, in terms of the competition, we reflect this limitation by not asking participants to come up with absolute answers, but more reasonable answers.

We agree that there appears to be nothing in ‘knowing who we are’ that precludes it from being simultaneous with ‘being who we are’. Although you are overlooking the issue of whether or not it is even possible for us to know who we are. In other words, you are assuming knowing who we are exists, but that may not be the case. Therefore, there is a still problem of temporal exclusivity in the context of a continuous state of being who we are.

Yes, the proposition can be overcome if it can more reasonably be shown that we can know who we are at any point in time, no matter how infinitesimally small. So we agree that if an individual can know who he/she is in a second of 2.2 billion seconds of his/her life-span, then the proposition is overcome.

Other issue:

"Knowledge as form" refers to knowledge as phenomena. In other words, the phrase refers to the basis for knowledge as opposed to its conscious meaning, so that there are two ways we could know who we are: we could literally know who we are (epistemology), or we could know who we are without knowing that we do (phenomenology). The distinction is between conscious meaning and the basis for conscious meaning.

The importance of this distinction is that the competition is not only asking how we can know who we are as an absolute; it is also asking how can what we know as form be who we are. The questions are exclusive, so by more reasonably answering one of them, the proposition is overcome.

199. Entry:

"Changing 'we cannot know who we are and be who we are at the same time' to 'we cannot know who we were and be who we were at the same time,' should solve your dilemma."

Seth McMillan March 29 2001

Response:

By claiming that we cannot know who we were, does not answer whether or not we can know who we are.

Also, just because we apparently cannot help from being who we are ("temporal constant" argument, Entries 197/198), it does not necessarily follow that we can know who we are. In other words, being who we are does not necessarily translate into knowing who we are. Though we concede that as conscious beings, we need conscious identities at some level. ( Response to Entry 122)

200. Entry:

"This is neither a proposition that relates to us as human beings, nor a reasonable or logical argument pertaining to humanity.

1) I offer the following aspects of 'being human.' (a) mental; subconscience, conscience, and superconscience, otherwise know as the realm of thought. (b) personality; completely differentiated from mind unique in context and content, otherwise know as the realm of individuality. (c) heart; the feelings of being as generated through experience of existence, otherwise known as the realm of emotion. (d) spirit; the will of the whole being incapable of the idea 'cannot', otherwise known as the fused realm of imagination and the power of will.

Being Human we are WILL creatures capable of unlimited imagination and unlimited will. If a being so chooses to will, that which is willed with full intent, IS!!!

Being Human is the discovery that there is nothing that 'cannot.'"

Paul Fucich March 30 2001

Response:

We are going to focus on parts (c) and (d) of your argument:

1. The existence of human emotion does not contradict the notion of not knowing who we are, because thoughts may be just limited extensions or expressions of emotion, without being emotion itself.

2. Your claim that "the will of the whole human being is incapable of the idea ‘cannot’, is self-contradictory because you are claiming something that ‘cannot’. (i.e. the idea ‘cannot’)

2.1 Just because a human being wills with full intent does not mean that which is willed will be attained. In fact there are many examples of things human beings’ cannot more reasonably attain regardless of how much they will them. For instance, without any protective clothing and devises, and without assistance from others, a human being cannot jump into an active volcano and survive it; a human being cannot exist without some form of breathing; a human being cannot have no brain and be able to think; a human being cannot overcome the aging process; a human being cannot be twenty different people in body and mind at the same time; a human being cannot overcome the self-referential nature of knowledge….

3. We agree that anything we imagine is possible. However, possibility cancels possibility out, in the form ‘can know who we are’ and ‘cannot know who we are’. We are left with determining which possibility is more reasonable.

In short, we disagree that your argument more reasonably shows that the proposition does not relate to humanity nor is a logical argument about humanity.

201. Entry:

"Examine the argument on two levels:

One, the idea that we cannot know who we are is preposterous. To admit this would be to eliminate the concrete value of knowledge. But in order to confess that we cannot know anything, we would have to negate that very statement for we would not know of it. Therefore, we know who we are.

Two, the idea that we cannot be who we are is equally preposterous. In order for us to admit this statement, we would have to affirm that we do not exist, but if we do not exist, then we cannot affirm that the statement is true. Therefore, we are who we are.

Since neither statement can be negated, they MUST be true together."

Chris Bennett April 2 2001

Response:

What is the "concrete value of knowledge"? Are you referring to knowledge as an absolute? If so, show us how knowledge can be an absolute when, for instance, our sensory implies an indirect relation with the external world.

Also, if the statement, "we cannot know who we are" is more reasonably correct, it does not mean that we cannot know other things. Though, even if we cannot know anything in an absolute sense, it does not mean that we cannot know in a limited or comparative sense, whereby we determine the value of knowledge based on what knowledge is more comparatively reasonable.

The challenge proposition does not propose that we cannot be who we are. Rather, the proposition proposes that we cannot know who we are while being who we are, and since we cannot help from being who we are (Responses to Entries 197/198), the proposition proposes that we cannot know who we are.

If you wish to challenge the proposition on the "concrete value of knowledge", you need to show a more reasonable theory of knowledge than the theory of indirect knowledge, whereby knowledge comes from who we are and through our sensory and thought process.

202. Entry:

"We tell ourselves this proposition because we want to know exactly who we are. But we will never know exactly who we are because we are changing every day, always making life more suitable, and trying not to make any mistakes."

Troy Wilber April 4 2001

Response:

We want to know a more reasonable way of knowing exactly who we are, to overcome the implications from not knowing exactly who we are. (i.e. the notion that our thoughts as form are empty of who we are.) The basis for our want is not concern about making mistakes, but about survival.

Even if who we are is continuously changing, it is still possible that what we know as form is the same as who we are. Though we acknowledge that what we know in terms of conscious meaning would more reasonably fall short of who we are.

203. Entry:

"Knowing is traditionally considered in Western circles to align to the use of reason or the rational mind. In both modern neuroscience and Eastern wisdom traditions, knowing must also invoke the non-rational mind (the neo-mammalian, and reptilian regions for neuroscience) and the heart-mind (Eastern view).

In keeping with the 'rule' that we must be utilizing the best of our rational thinking, I contend that the best of our rational thinking cannot be reached without input from other than the rational mind. By invoking the heart-mind we can come to an understanding of co-dependent origination. This is the Buddhist teaching succinctly summarized in the saying 'where there is this there is that, where this is not that is not, with the arising of this, so that arises'. This teaching is somewhat confirmed with modern physics explanations of the arising of matter and anti-matter.

The 'we' in the statement is a notion of the western 'ego' we, or the knowing self. Eastern views teach us to let that self go. And this notion can again be supported by modern neuroscience's research into neuron-networks, the mind's reading of quantum 'spin' of the particles which make up neurons and which combine together for a 'thought'. The western 'ego' knowing self is a reading of the mind's awareness, but it need not be so. It may equally be a reading of not-self, again as taught in the Buddhist tradition, and again commonly attained through meditative and contemplative states.

The not-self is what reads the neuron-networks current state (rational/non-rational/reptilian) and co-dependently arrives at the current moment's thought. It must be co-dependently (i.e. acausally), because we experience the pattern as a 'stream' of thought. If we thus say that the 'we' of the statement in question is indeed the not-self, then we must say that we can know, since we presents us with the stream of consciousness. And the we of the not-self has 'trawled' all inputs, otherwise no thought would arise. So, I would suggest that 'we can know'.

As to the second half of the statement 'being who we are at the same time', again for the not-self, it is being exactly who it is. As neuroscience tells us, the mind works at the level of quantum spin, and at this level time is literally still or non existent. So it quite easy to project from this that the not-self is knowing and being exactly who it is at precisely the same time."

Reference:

The source for my neuroscience material is Mitja Perus and a paper relating to the above is at Perus.

David Tyrrell April 16 2001

Response:

1. We agree that our thinking needs input from outside of our rational thought. The "heart-mind" or who we are-mind is one such relationship, with others being the relation between our mind and sensory, mind and thought process, and mind and external world. However, we disagree that the who we are-mind relation necessarily means "co-dependent origination", because if we consider the progressive nature of knowledge, and the origin of knowledge derived from non-thought, it follows that who we are must precede mind (i.e. mind as in conscious knowledge).

2. We agree that the western ego, "I" and "we", appears not to be the source of the human mind’s awareness, because the western ego is just a conception. (i.e. we create conceptions, and yet we cannot create who we are through who we are. So it follows that the concepts "I" and "we" cannot be who we are.)

2.1 Also, we agree that the non-self or who we are appears to be the source of our conscious awareness, because the non-self represents fundamentally what we are.

3. Though the non-self may read neuron networks and co-dependently arrive at thought, it does not follow that non-self is innately part of our thoughts. In other words, it does not follow that the non-self has to be inherently part of our neuron network or thoughts to read them. In fact, it appears that the non-self has to be outside of them to read, because non-self apparently cannot read itself through itself.

3.1 Just because non-self may have "trawled" all inputs to our neuron networks, including our resulting thoughts, does not mean that the non-self is inherently the same as the inputs or our thoughts. (i.e. the concept "trawl" implies separation between the thing doing the trawling and the thing being trawled.) Ultimately, the inputs have their origin outside of non-self, in the external world, and therefore, it appears questionable that somehow through our sensory, non-self would become innately part of the input. Also, if our sensory creates unconscious information in relation to the external world, it does not follow how the non-self can create itself through itself.

4. The application of quantum physics to the human mind faces three serious problems:

a) Since we (i.e. human beings) are apparently the creators of knowledge, it does not follow, how we can create who we are (non-self) through who we are.

b) Since we know through what we know (i.e. we use our existing knowledge to form new knowledge), we cannot know what we already are. (i.e. we cannot know something solely through itself--there is no space to know.) So it follows that we cannot know at the epistemological level who we are.

c) Superposition the fundamental principal behind quantum physics is beyond space and time, thereby beyond our comprehension. So there is no direct evidence supporting the existence of quantum mind. All we can do is infer something which we cannot observe, compute, or comprehend.

For further discussion of superposition, see Entry 50 and Entry 189.

Other issues:

1. How can knowing invoke a "non-rational mind", when all thought is defined by reasonableness (i.e. conscious meaning)?

2. Though neuroscience may tell us that the mind works at the level of quantum spin, quantum physics as mentioned above is a highly subjective theory. Also, neuroscience is far from definitive knowledge as neuroscientist Steve Burwen points out, "our understanding of the brain science is still fragmentary and in its infancy.... The issue of consciousness is mostly beyond our ability to understand at the neuronal level." (i.e. the relation between the firing of neurons and thought is still unclear, as is the relation between the external world and sensory information.)

204. Entry:

"I think that in order to find what we are, we must find something that is very basic, common to all of us. In my opinion, what we are is beings that think and exist.

Existence doesn't require any effort from us in order to take effect; therefore what we are, existing beings, is inherent to us, and as we know we exist, we know what we are. This knowledge cannot affect who we are because it depends on it (knowing that we exist cannot allow us to not exist anymore)."

Thierry Georges April 17 2001

Response:

We agree that humanity appears to be made of beings who think and exist. Yet, what is behind the existence of us beings? (i.e. what allows us to think and exist?)

Also, how can the statement, "beings that think and exist", a product of our conscious invention, be what we are as in fundamental level of being?

We contend that "beings that think and exist" cannot be what we are, because there must be something behind our thinking and existing. (i.e. we are not ends themselves.)

205. Entry:

Reply to the Response to Entry 204.

"In answering to this entry, you implied that we cannot know, at least for now, what we are because this knowledge comes from something that is beyond us.

Therefore, in order to find who we are, we would have to find the secret of existence, what created us (god, big bang, etc.). Humans have searched this for as long as they existed and have not yet found an answer. So until you find the source of our origin and prove it without a doubt you will not be able to refute your idea because every answer will be an invention of our conscience, an idea limited by our straight knowledge."

Thierry Georges April 19 2001

Response:

The challenge is not to know who we are. Rather, the challenge is to more reasonably show how we can know who we are than not doing so.

Other issues:

How can we find the source of our origin, when we are the ones’ behind the finding? (i.e. how can the source of origin find the source of origin?)

Also, how can we prove an idea without doubt, when all ideas, due to their self-referential nature, are defined by possibility, and therefore doubt?

206. Entry:

"The only Truth is that there is no Truths. Any proposition therefore which claims to be always true is automatically false."

eif April 20 2001

Response:

If there is no truths, how can the statement, "there is no truths" be the only truth?!

The self-referential nature of knowledge makes for the possibility of propositions, and ensures that there is no truth that is known. Though there is still the possibility that we may know a truth without knowing that we do. So it is possible for a proposition which claims to be always true to be a truth. The only stipulation, as mentioned, is that from our limited or self-referential perspective, we cannot know the proposition is a truth.

Entries 185-193 Entries 207-213