"Knowledge stems from perception; perception stems from reality (i.e. our physical environment, in whatever capacity we understand it). All ideas, no matter how abstract, have originated from something in reality, no matter how far back (e.g. abstract numbers from counting items, metaphysical beings from perceiving patterns that cannot be explained otherwise, the idea of the soul from the contrast between the self, others and the inanimate parts of the environment, etc.). To borrow something Einstein said: "The only source of knowledge is experience." Physical understanding stems from the physical examination of things. Philosophical understanding stems from the examination of ideas (which stem from reality) and emotions (which we also perceive, albeit not from the outside).

In order to perceive, we have to be; there must be some connection to reality through which perceptions flow. Hence, knowing originates from being. And since learning and perception are continual processes, we must continue being in order to be able to continue knowing. Otherwise, we are stuck with a limited set of ideas that limit us to a fraction of what we can know -- and by a score of definitions, that can't really be said to be "knowing." Hence, both being and knowing become continual, and since no mechanism exists to regulate the universe in such a way as to alternate us between being and knowing, we can only assume that the two are simultaneous. Hence, we know who we are and we are who we are at the same time."

Sergiy Grynko February 24 2001

Response:

We agree that all ideas, no matter how abstract, originate from the external world. (i.e. we need sensory of the external world [or the world outside of our minds] in order to have ideas, otherwise there would be no basis or referent for them. However, it is questionable that all ideas stem directly from the external world (direct realist position), because for instance our sensory and perception of the external world implies a relation or difference between two things. Also, the notions that we know through what we know (i.e. we use our existing knowledge to know), and the source of conscious meaning appears to be from the firing of neurons and their mental representations, contradicts the notion that ideas are determined directly from things in the external world.

Your statement "knowing originates from being" contradicts your other statement, "all ideas originate from something in reality", unless you define "being" as the same as "reality". Being is reality; reality is being; ideas are from reality/being; knowing is from reality/being, which implies a difference between reality/being and ideas/mind, otherwise you would not be able to make a distinction using "from". (i.e. "from reality")

We agree that knowing is an extension of being, and that it appears they occur simultaneously. (i.e. we cannot be knowing without being.) Though this simultaneous occurrence does not mean that what we know as form is the same as who we are. In other words, it is not necessary that in order for being and knowing to occur simultaneously, being and what we know (knowledge) are intrinsically identical. If anything, it appears that being and knowledge have to be intrinsically different, otherwise it is problematic how we could know in the oneness of what we know and who we are.

182. Entry:

Reply to the Response to Entry 173.

Your 4th point goes as follows:

"It does not necessarily follow that everything we come to know changes who we are as in fundamental level of being."

Reply:

"This seems to me to continue what I saw was the confusion over the notion of 'knowing'. Wittgenstein says we come to know something when we learn how to use language properly as we grow up. The concept of 'red' is learned when a child learns to apply the word appropriately. This is not what I call knowing. It is more like communicating than knowing. Socrates said that if a person 'knows' what is good he will do what is good. Western philosophers have had a hard time accepting this idea simply because they have an incorrect notion of knowing. To know anything in a way that is meaningful 'must' change the knower. And the knower will from that time on act according to what he knows. You also said that not all knowledge comes as a 'flash' of intuition. The example you gave of a mathematician seems to me to be an example of someone rearranging existing blocks. New blocks of knowledge 'always' come as a flash of intuition because they are completely new ideas that could not have been derived from the existing body of knowledge."

Martin Bebow February 26 2001

Supplementary comment (as requested by the Inexpressible Committee):

"Knowledge is what enables man to change his condition. It is not created by man but received by man from 'outside'. Once received it is clothed in words which can only approximate that which is received. To be effective in changing man's condition knowledge must approximate reality. It can only approximate it because reality is inherently beyond reason. That which is 'outside' is the origin of knowledge. It has been called God. It could also be called the ground of existence. Kant was only partially right when he said knowledge is limited by the mind. It's true that we can only know what has been received and embodied in words until now. But we are always receiving new knowledge which expands the horizons of the mind. The reception of knowledge always comes to an individual. Einstein's insights on the relativistic nature of time and space changed the world. Knowledge is not just scientific in nature but also religious. Religion is that which unites people. It makes civilization possible. Religious truth precedes scientific truth. Religious truth also comes from individuals who are the founders of the worlds great religions. Knowledge must produce fruits. Systems of thought that begin in words and end in words do not contain knowledge. Knowledge is a two-edged sword. It can both create and destroy. The nation-state that came into existence with Islam has now become the biggest obstacle in addressing the global problems that face mankind."

Response:

1. Meaningful knowing does not necessarily change the knower, because the basis for the knower may be static. (i.e. the interaction may be one-way from being to meaningful knowing. Consequently, meaningful knowing would result from the static being.)

2. Even if meaningful knowing changes the knower, it does not necessarily follow that what we meaningful know as form is the same as who we are. (i.e. change through meaningful knowing is not contingent on meaningful knowledge as form being the same as who we are. Actually, it appears that change through meaningful knowing is contingent on meaningful knowledge being separate from who we are, otherwise there would be no ground for change. (i.e. intrinsic change cannot occur between two things that have identical intrinsicity.)

3. We disagree that completely new ideas cannot be derived from an individual’s existing body of knowledge. We contend that part of conscious/reasoned knowing involves thinking about ideas on conscious and unconscious levels, and through that thought process, connections are made through existing ideas. The connections synthesize, through the use of reason, into completely new ideas. To claim that new ideas are not derived partly from existing ideas would undermine the purpose of thinking, because nothing new could be derived from it, while leaving what we know to luck or as you say disconnected flashes of intuition.

3.1 We agree that knowledge allows humanity to change its condition. Though we think that our ability to change our condition is limited because we cannot change who we are through who we are, which means that our knowledge becomes a means to act out who we are. Hence, it appears that ultimately humanity cannot change its condition.

3.2 How is knowledge received by humanity from "outside", when our sensory and perception implies that we interpret the external world rather than receive directly from it?

If knowledge is received from "outside", how come our minds are not overloaded with knowledge?

What causes knowledge to directly transfer into our minds, and what aspect of knowledge is directly transferred into our minds?

What is the mechanism that allows us to "cloth" knowledge received from outside with words?

What is knowledge without the cloth of words? Is it possible to separate words and knowledge and still have knowledge?! (For further problems with the direct realist position see Entry 152)

Secondary issue:

It is debatable that Islamic Nation-states are the more significant obstacle in addressing the global problems of humanity.

183. Entry:

Reply to the Response to Entry 179.

"We disagree that there is no apparent reason to believe that we cannot know who we are and be who we are at the same time. For instance, it appears that we need intrinsic separation from what we know in order to know, otherwise we would be in oneness with what we know which implies there would be nothing we could really know." (From Response to Entry 179)

This statement is HUGELY problematic, not to mention exceedingly muddled. First of all, please define "we." So far as I can tell, the only actual referent of that pronoun is "human beings," which are defined as those physical, bipedal organisms with highly evolved brains (and perhaps mental states of some sort to which brain states give rise) that exist in that physical environment known as the planet Earth and which are capable of relatively highly advanced levels of cognition (including abstracting, reasoning, etc.). If you should like to formulate an alternate definition of the term (i.e., "human beings"), then please do so. Second, please clarify "intrinsic separation." (For example, what need is there to use the word "intrinsic"? What sort of special circumstances might that be intended to denote?) Third, and most important, what do you mean by "we would be in oneness with what we know"? How so? What sort of oneness? PHYSICAL oneness? Merely SYMBOLIC/METAPHORICAL oneness? SPIRITUAL and/or METAPHYSICAL oneness?

If the last, then how is that supposed to be at all coherent (or intelligible), let alone verifiable? Keep in mind that YOU bear the onus of proving your claims, and if you're going to postulate some kind of Platonic, metaphysical state/realm, then it is incumbent upon you to DEMONSTRATE that such a state/realm really exists. Moreover, even assuming for the moment that we WERE "in oneness with what we know" (which carries the incredibly peculiar implication, I might add, that we are somehow ontologically "bound" to our knowledge, whereas clearly the fact that we know anything at all is wholly contingent), how would that in any way imply that "there would be nothing we could really know"? That is, why believe that that is the case? I do not see that you have provided any reason whatever to assent to such a prima facie absurd assertion; and, furthermore, if we were truly in some way or another united with our knowledge, then it seems only obvious that we would HAVE to know SOMETHING, namely, that we are united with our knowledge! Given such circumstances, how possibly could we be ignorant of that fact? To be certain, you have all but constructed a reductio ad absurdum of your own view here.

"Also, the apparent origin of knowledge (i.e. we are the creators of knowledge)" (From the Response)

False. Knowledge itself is NOT "created," whether by us or anyone else. Rather, it is perpetually acquired in a piecemeal fashion. The term "knowledge" is simply a description of an abstract body of propositional, procedural, and experiential data some of which (e.g., what it feels like for a human to travel at the speed of light) is merely potential and sundry portions of which we apprehend, process, and (sometimes) retain. There is no "creator" of knowledge, but, instead, merely various states of affairs which occasion the constituents thereof and thus permit the possibility of our obtaining those constituents, which are properly referred to as "pieces (or bits) of knowledge."

"...is inconsistent with the view that knowledge as form is intrinsically the same as who we are, because we cannot create who we are through who we are. (From the Response)

This very poor, convoluted reasoning that, as I intimated in my original composition, typifies the markedly obscure metaphysics produced by fuzzy thinking and unnecessarily complicating the relatively simple, a dark, vast, tumultuous sea of confusion for which we have that ignoble if well-meaning beast known as Continental philosophy to blame.

"Your sole proof that 'everyday experience' proves conclusively that we can know and be who we are is incorrect, in the context of the competition, because the proof refers to our conscious identities rather than who we are as in fundamental level of being." (From the Response)

What are "conscious identities"? What is a "fundamental level of being"? Neither anything you have written here nor anything on your website satisfactorily addresses those questions. Like the proposition at hand itself, they seem irretrievably nonsensical, and, again, quite patently betray the woefully deficient lack of training in analytic philosophy on the part of their author(s).

"Further, we disagree that the only accurate interpretation of "we" is through conscious identities in the form of physical features and emotional dispositions because as you assert, we 'exist as ourselves'. (i.e. there is something behind our existence that allows us to exist--we are not ends themselves, nor are we nothing or purely biological/physical entities.)" (From the Response)

I assert no such thing. Evidently you failed to notice the qualification (contained in parentheses) which followed my use of the term "ourselves" in the last paragraph of my entry, viz., "(i.e., those persons distinguishable and identifiable by certain physical features and emotional dispositions (or personalities) are able to distinguish between, and identify, themselves)." In other words, "ourselves" is synonymous with my definition of "human beings," above. What you write here is simply a misconstrual on your part.

"In other words, we contend that being as in fundamental level of being is a necessity of reason (Kant) (i.e. in order for us to exist, from our perspective there must be a basis behind our existence." (From the Response)

What kind of basis? Kant, alas, supplies no clear or tenable answer. Have YOU one, perchance? If so, then please state it in the most specific terms possible. (BTW, if you should be inclined to contend, in response, that there need exist some sort of "preconditions of experience," then I would challenge you to show [on some sort of cogent philosophical or scientific grounds] that that is indeed the case. Again, the burden of proof rests squarely on YOUR shoulders.)

"Also, just because something cannot be empirically identified like fundamental level of being, does not mean that it does not exist, especially since empiricism is based on reason" (From the Response)

Not at all. Indeed, empiricism (as a philosophical outlook) is diametrically at variance with rationalism (as a philosophical outlook). You need to brush up on your epistemology and get your facts straight.

"...with and its own indirect referent. (i.e. because we cannot get outside of our minds and know that we are, and all knowledge is apparently self-referential, any referent including empirical referent will be indirect, and epistemologically limited.)" (From the Response)

This is pure poppycock. (See above.)

"'Who we are' and 'fundamental level of being' are equivalent in the sense that they refer to something outside of our minds." (From the Response)

To what, then, might it be, exactly, that they supposedly refer?

"In other words, it does not matter whether these labels are inconsistent in their grammatical structure, because as mentioned they refer by definition to the same thing." (From the Response)

All definitions which refer to the same thing can be constructed in grammatically (or structurally) identical forms. The fact that your definition of "who we are" as "fundamental level of being" and my own (reportive and far more prima facie plausible) definition of "who we are" (formulated in both my original composition and above) CANNOT be so constructed is irrefutable proof that your definition is inherently flawed.

"["Who we are" refers to fundamental level of being as non-label, unconscious entity, just as "fundamental level of being" refers to fundamental level of being as non-label, unconscious entity.]" (From the Response)

How can "we" EVER refer to any single "entity," let alone some "unconscious entity"? This is both bad grammar AND bad philosophy.

"Note, though the subject of who we are is plural, the term as a whole refers to something else which may or may not be plural." (From the Response)

Yes, that is because your sentence, above, is ungrammatical, and hence (necessarily) cognitively meaningless.

"The important consideration is that we are claiming that we exist, and that there is a basis behind our existence." (From the Response)

Yes, and you have yet to prove that (latter) claim.

"We make no claims as to the direct nature or characteristic of this basis." (From the Response)

Nor would I recommend that you do. You have a linguistic and philosophical mess on your hands plenty big enough as it is without endeavoring to expand it.

Steven Conifer February 26 2001

Supplementary comment (as requested by the Inexpressible Committee):

1. what are "pieces (or bits) of knowledge"?

Factual information (e.g., "the Empire State Building is located in New York City") and particular comprehensions (e.g., that of how to play tennis, what it feels like to fight in a war or to live in poverty, etc.).

2. how do human beings obtain "pieces (or bits) of knowledge"?

In several different ways (e.g., via observation, via reason, via experience, etc.).

Response:

1. Our claim is that human beings are not simply dependent-functioning biological/physical life-forms with cognitive ability. Human beings have an inexpressible basis or essence behind their individual existence, which in the context of the competition, we label "who we are". How do we know human beings have a basis if it is apparently inexpressible? We reason the basis [note reason is a way of obtaining knowledge according to your epistemology]:

1.1 we are not ends themselves because of our life-dependency on other things like oxygen and other life-forms.

1.2 we are not nothing because we would not exist even as illusions.

1.3 we are not everything because there would be nothing we could know.

1.4 we are not simply biological/physical organisms because we cannot just exist out of nothing.(i.e. there must be something that allows us to exist.)

1.5 If there is no origin to existence, then it is possible we could exist just as biological/physical organisms. However, since something cannot begin from nothing, or that existence cannot simply exist from nothing, the notion of origin appears more reasonable than non-origin.

Therefore, we agree with Kant that being is a necessity of reason. Though we add that being as necessity is contingent on there being origin to existence. (i.e. if there is no origin, being is no longer a necessity.)

If you wish to refute our claim about the existence of basis, tell us how a human being could exist without a basis or essence? (Note, trying to refute on grounds that basis is not directly verifiable or that it is incoherent does not stand, because no knowledge is directly verifiable or truly coherent.) (i.e. we cannot get outside of our minds and know that we are, and that we perceive through our sensory and perception, so that we are in indirect relation to the external world, and all knowledge, including empirical, is self-referential, thereby epistemologically limited. Note to refute these claims, you need to show how we can get outside of our minds, and how we can overcome the indirect relation stemming from our sensory and perception, and the self-referential nature of knowledge.)

2. The notion of intrinsic separation means that the essence of two things are different. In terms of the competition, we are claiming that there is intrinsic separation between what we know and who we are, because for instance we need intrinsic separation from what we know in order to really know, otherwise we would be in oneness with what we know, and therefore have no space to really know. (If we cannot really know, then what we know equates to illusion with limited connection to the external world. Hence, it appears that with either intrinsic separation or intrinsic connection we have a epistemological problem--the former we cannot really know us ourselves, and the latter we cannot really know anything.) Your retort that we are "ontologically bound" to knowledge is questionable because the origin of the human species does not necessarily coincide with the origin of knowledge, and even if it does, it does not necessarily follow that who we are and knowledge are intrinsically the same. Also, your other retort that if we were truly united with knowledge, we would "HAVE" to know that we are united with knowledge, does not explain why we would have to. (i.e. how can we know our unity with something, unless we are not fully united with the something? (Note unity implies two different things coming together as opposed to oneness.))

3. If we do not create knowledge through our sensory and thought process, you appear to be implying that we directly obtain knowledge from the external world. Or as you say, "the Empire State building is located in New York City" because you have seen it or know other people who have. Your position translates into--what I see, and thereby know, is what really is. (Russell, direct realist position).
However, your position overlooks a few issues:

3.1 our sensory and perception implies we are indirect relation to the external world.

3.2 we know through our existing knowledge, rather than directly receive knowledge from outside.

3.3 we coin or create language, and we cannot separate language from knowledge, knowledge from language, which means that we create knowledge. (i.e. there is no knowledge from our perspective without language.) (For further problems with the direct realist position, see Entry 182.)

184. Entry:

Reply to the Response to Entry 177.

"Reductionism is only a tool, like a hammer. Turning it into an abduction does not make it a philosophy because it creates an illusion that puts an artificial boundary on future events; putting man at the top of the order. Therefore, as a philosophy it is incomplete, and therefore, it cannot be used as a structure to debate moral issues, or forward looking creations. Using reductionism, a mere tool, as a philosophy is a fallacy. This is all that needs to be said, and I guess I don't understand how people can argue the merits of reductionism as they have, so it has been misused as I have already implied.

Creativity is not like reductionism in this regard. Creativity leaves everything open, until an observation is made, and so it is consistent with the observer creation principle; ironically, the same abductive behavior seen in electrons that find an observer. And it can be made consistent with Bell's Theorem when non-local interactions are permitted, that is when used as an abduction to represent reality. Therefore, Creativity, as an abduction, can be used as a platform to debate philosophical issues, particularly those that relate to our evolution. And this abduction explains why we perceive a moral compass; for example, because we want to be near our loved ones that preceded us in death, so we instinctively search for wholeness with them as an extension of our evolution as an observer creation.

As a philosophy, reductionism is in error because it needs to reinvent itself every time there is a new creation. That creativity and intuition are part of the future, as well as the past. This is because time cannot be fragmented forever; that the past and future are connected, perhaps at many levels. Evolution then leads to a higher order because the observer is partly in the future, and we give birth to creativity and free will, and a ever expanding consciousness. This key provides the insight to reconcile our differences of opinion between reductionism and creativity, between determinism and free will, and many more conflicts. But the fragmented will should never again confuse itself with the all of creation because of the misuse of reductionism.

But these observations are only by agreement that this will be done; because it is pleasing to the all. No scripture can force allegiance, it must be by agreement. The observer creation principle has been upheld."

Stephen P. Smith February 27 2001

Response:

Definition of the principal term in the response:

Reductionism refers to synthesizing ideas into new ideas, whereby the previous ideas are reduced in terms of their relational significance. (For further perspectives see reductionism)

Assuming that the whole of existence, if there is such a thing, cannot be known, how can reductionism at some level not be avoided? Surely, all perspectives are reductionist in terms of their meanings, because meaning by its nature points to a limited epistemic whole. Yet, we apparently know through our existing knowledge, which implies creativity. (i.e. the creation of new knowledge from our existing knowledge.) Though overall knowledge as creation appears reductionist in relation to the unknown whole, and in terms of deriving new ideas which make the previous ideas less significant. (i.e. new ideas replace old ideas.)

Creativity nor reductionism leaves everything open. It is the perceiver of creativity and reductionism who either leaves things open or closed. For instance, we may reduce the universe down to chemicals, micro-quantum superpositions, or an inexpressible essence, but it does not mean that our perspective has to stop there. (i.e. because of the self-referential nature of knowledge, the creation/reduction of knowledge does not stop unless the perceiver stops it.)

In short, it appears that conscious knowledge is a form of both creation and reduction, whereby we create knowledge through our existing knowledge, with connection to our sensory, and reduct our knowledge into more meaning, whereby the value of meaning is determined by the relation between meanings. (What results is a continuum of knowledge in which the movement is towards more meaning through our existing meaning.)

Note, reductionism does not necessarily imply simplification. What it does necessarily imply is change.

Entries 174-180 Entries 185-193