"Is Being aware of itself? Can we be who we are and know who we are at the same time?

I think the problem can be approached in the following four steps:

1. Being is conditional only on itself, whether or not it is aware of itself. Let me explain: One way to understand Being is to see it as an expression of the interrelationships that exist within the reality of being, i.e.: the universe, taken to its totality. If everything is in spatial relations to everything else, then nothing exists outside this web of interrelationship and, by necessity, is somehow influenced, or defined, by its position within this totality. If it is allowed, I would call this web an infinite interrelationship.

2. Being within this infinite web of interrelationship is then defined by its position within this totality. This is another way of saying that each thing within existence, because of its spatial position within the whole, is then defined in terms of that totality; i.e., it is its definition in terms of the whole, or if allowed, its infinite identity.

3. Now, if a thing within being is related not only spatially, but also in terms of time, then its connection to this infinite interrelationship also dates back to first life. (This is a big "if", because we can only "guess" that first life started somewhere back in the beginnings of the existence of our universe.) In terms of our awareness, however, this means that we, as each living thing, are connected by a time line through our birth, and the birth of our predecessors, to the beginning of when life began. So, we are both interrelated into spatial infinity, which gives us an identity in terms of the totality of the universe; and we are related to a timelinear identity, which connects us to all the lifetimes that precede us through the continuous (and unbroken, except by species extinction, which no longer counts) chain of successive births into this existence at present.

4. Thus, here is the connection between Being and Awareness: Our minds. Through the process of selective survival, each living thing has succeeded in surviving its infinite interrelationship and, in doing so, has developed its identity through time, which is represented by its mind, which now defines the success of its survival. This success has even granted us humans a degree of self awareness. So there had been an interplay between the real, existence or being, and the mental, awareness or mind, for all of the time that life existed since the beginning. If, and again this is a big "if", there was no discontinuity since the beginning of life and the present, then we, as thinking species who are also aware of ourselves, are then cognizant of our being while at the same time occupying our "identity", the who we are, within this being of which we are aware. Are they the same? Only if the conscious mind could plumb all the infinitely minute connections that define its identity. From my experience, I would judge that this is impossible.

So the answer to the question: Can we be who we are and know who we are at the same time? NO. Not in the present state of our awareness. This does not negate the right to "be who we are", even if we are unaware of this right. However, this is beyond the scope of the initial question stated here. So in the end, we are never consciously aware of who we are."

Ivan D. Alexander February 17 2001

Response:

We disagree that it is "impossible" for us to know who we are, because impossibility is contingent on possibility (i.e. for there to be impossibility, there has to be possibility of it), whereas possibility is not contingent on impossibility. (For further explanation see the Response to Entry 168.) Therefore, though we agree that it is more reasonable that we cannot know who we are than doing so, it is possible that we may know who we are.

Since we cannot help from being who we are as long as we are alive, how can there be a "right" to be who we are?

175. Entry:

"To refute this proposition {"we cannot know who we are and be who we are at the same time"} it must be shown to be false or to contain a self contradiction:
If we can show that {"know"} is equal to {"be"}or (A=B) then(-A=B) or {"not know"} equal to {"be"} is false or contradictory.

1. State a premise or make the assertion that entities projected out of the quantum foam or vacuum are {"be who we are"}.
2. {"be who we are"} is projected with a total and complete construction plan or manual of {"be who we are"} contained within our self or brain. Thus {"know"} equals {"be"}.
3. {"Be who we are"} is contained within the total construction plan which results in the projection with knowledge of {"be who we are"}. Thus {"be"} equals {"know"}.
4. We are projected with total knowledge of how we are projected. Thus {"know"} equals {"be"}.
5. {"know who we are"} is equal to {"be who we are"}. (A=B)
6.{"we cannot know who we are"} does not equal {"be who we are"}. ( -A = B) is false.
7. The original proposition is false."

Eugene Goheen February 17 2001

Response:

Definition of term in the Response:

Direct comprehension: refers to knowing something, within the self-referent limit of knowledge, based on sensa of the thing and reasoning. (Indirect comprehension refers to knowing something based only on reasoning it.)

1. To refute the proposition is not a matter of showing it to be false or self-contradictory, but a matter of showing the proposition to be less reasonable than antagonistic propositions, because all thoughts or propositions themselves are inherently reasonable. (i.e. all thoughts or propositions have conscious meaning, and if they do not, they are not a thought or proposition.) [Garvey, The Critique of Reasonableness]

2. The proposition is not stating that (cannot know "be") is equal to ("b") as in fundamental level of being. Rather, the proposition is stating that in order for an individual to "be", "know" cannot contain "be". So if we can more reasonably show "know" contains "be", than "know" does not contain "be", then (cannot know "be") is refuted.

3. Just because ("be who we are") is a conscious phenomenon, thereby a projection of our minds, ("be who we are) in the context of the competition is a symbol representing the existence of {"be who we are"} as non-label, unconscious entity. In other words, we are using the symbol ("be who we are") to represent an entity apparently outside of our minds. Therefore, ("know") does not necessarily equal or contain "be" as fundamental level of being. (i.e. {"be who we are"} as non-label entity is not necessarily contained in the total construction plan of ("who we are"), because the construction plan is incomplete. (The plan projects that there is a basis outside of our minds, which is behind our individual existence, thus beyond our direct comprehension. Even if a plan is based on direct comprehension, the plan would not necessarily be "total" because of the self-referent nature of knowledge.)

176. Entry:

"If we say that we know who we are, we must then define our knowledge. Because knowledge is most likely to be associated with the familiarity and acquaintance with undeniable principles or facts, we will see that our knowledge of ourselves is subjective, as we do not know all the aspects of our existence and therefore are unable to see and understand who we are objectively. As a result, the question is not whether or not we can know ourselves and be ourselves at the same time, but rather, can we know who we are at all?
At that point we must define what it is we want to know. If we say that we want to know ourselves, then who are WE? By saying "we," we usually mean individual and independent people; and yet we are not exactly independent individuals. Rather, we are all connected to a source of unity in the world. When we understand this unity better (although we shall never KNOW it) we will loose our own "I" or "ego," and then the knowledge of ourselves will only be possible with the knowledge of all existent - both physical and metaphysical. Until we reach that point of high understanding and knowledge, we would never be able to either know or be ourselves."

D. Zalkind February 18 2001

Response:

The question, "can we know who we are at all?", leads to the challenge proposition because we cannot help being who we are. So the fundamental question, from our limited, self-referent perspective, is whether or not we can know who we are and be who we are.

How does our apparent lack of knowledge of all existence--both physical and metaphysical, stop us from being who we are? How can we not be who we are and still exist?

177. Entry:

Reply to the Response to Entry 172

"Is there anything to strive for, when we ourselves may be the whole reality?" (From Response to Entry 172)

Reply: One must be true to their inner moral compass because there is no other course of rational action. We cannot prove the relevance of such a compass, but it is consistent with our observations (as subjective as they are) and it follows by an argument of induction; that everything we perceive is based on a process of creation, and a graduation to a higher level. If we believe the induction, even if it can't be proved, then our direction is clear. And if you perceive the world as I do, then you will be moved to a cautious harmony with all of reality, but not in the direction of gullibility.

"Also, could the harmony we strive for be disconnecting us further from the whole reality, as alluded to in our response to Entry 170 about the apparent intrinsic separation between what we know and who we are?" (From Response)

Reply: It is true we may delude ourselves. Some people may foolishly make their own hell, an observer created hell. It is even possible for those that seek harmony to find servitude instead.

I am unconvinced we would separate ourselves from reality by following my prescription, as it has been outlined. My argument is one of induction. We have observed the universe as a whole, and we find that creation has followed the same holistic pattern; not as a replacement of reductionism, but as a supplement to correct its mistakes.

One would get lost by my prescription only because reality has been made tricky, and because our observations are confusingly subjective. As far as I know, this curse belongs to everyone, not just me. And at least I am consistent with my observations, whereas pure reductionists are not.

I believe pure reductionists have a greater probability than I do of getting lost outside of reality. At a deep level reductionism is false, but also there is a lack of appreciation of creativity and this is where most people disconnect. You see, an examination of the singular may lead to discovery, but creation has always required a celebration of the many.

Here is a very extreme example. Molecular genetics would probably fail if the goal was to engineer a modern dairy cow from gene insertions taken from the wild ancestor of the bovine; it is just too complicated to break the wild genome sets down to their smallest parts in a vain attempt to reassemble the whole dairy cow from these "isolated" parts. And indeed, because modern dairy cows don't exist in the wild, our molecular biologists might tell us erroneously that no useful genes can be found for this novel purpose. However, the animal breeder will tell us how to breed dairy cows (from scratch) by exploiting much of the genetic diversity that can be found in wild populations; by breeding whole organisms, perhaps by bringing hundreds of genes together in new combinations. This points to the main difference between today's molecular genetics (described as pure reductionism above) and yesterday's plant and animal breeding (found to be consistent with the holistic process of creativity). Alternatively, molecular genetics has found a lot of success with issues of discovery as to our understanding of the genome, or in pharmaceutical applications.

Stephen P. Smith February 19 2001

Response:

Even if everything is based on a process of creation, it does not necessarily follow that the creation is based on a "graduation to a higher level". Nietzsche from his concept of "eternal return" would argue that everything is on the same level. (Note, your induction argument about the process of creation is limited, like all thought, by the self-referent nature of knowledge.)

We disagree that the universe necessarily follows a pattern of correcting its mistakes. If humanity is used as an example, then it appears that the universe is repeating its mistakes. (Note, the term "mistake" is far from clear, because we are the ones who define what a mistake is. (i.e. mistakes are a matter of perspective rather than being absolutes.)

As we stated in our previous response, all human thought appears reductionist, (i.e. because the essence of the whole or absolute cannot be known, all we can do is reduct meaning), so that your distinction between induction and pure reduction translates into a distinction between different degrees of reductionism.

We disagree that a pure reductionist position (i.e. a position that is focused solely on a single object) is "false" because the understanding of the object must indirectly include its relation to other things (i.e. apparently there is no such thing as an end itself), like contributing the erosion of a rock to a stream and wind, and through that relation, a limited holistic view can be attained similar to your own and possibly even more reasonable than your own. (In our view, because of the neither certainty nor uncertainty of knowledge, it would be a mistake to rule out a particular way of looking at things.)

Moreover, we question the existence of induction and deduction, because human thought tends to follow an abductive pattern of going from a general rule, or meaning, to a general or specific knowledge. As Yuri Kuzyk writes,

"On a more fundamental level, much reasoning is actually abductive as opposed to deductive or inductive. That is, reasoning tends to follow from the concrete to the general; but, unlike induction, it is according to a general rule. This type of reasoning by analogy cannot be captured with the use of crisp sets yet we use it all the time." (Entry 146)

Since language and knowledge is made up of general rules and meanings, and that language cannot be separated from knowledge, it appears that human reasoning is inherently abductive. (Note, the apparent self-referent nature of knowledge contradicts the notion of "concrete" associated with induction. Added to this point, the notions of general and specific, used to distinguish induction and deduction, are a matter of perspective.)

178. Entry:

"What is truly forgotten by the proposition itself is the fact that we are what we believe we are. There is no entity which has the capability to determine what one is other than oneself.
My analysis is that absent a deity, which I believe is the case, the determination of what we are is left to us. And given that our perception of anything is dependent on our individual experiences and past, that shape our thinking, the perception of what we are should also follow these lines.
However, then the question can be presented of "Why do I know what I am, as opposed to my neighbor knowing what I am?" This brings up a very valid question. It can be argued two ways, one being that you are the object of the discussion, so you are inherently the most valid judge of your substance, and the other being that there's no way to know who is right. I find in favor of the former because the latter has a flaw. That flaw is that you have the privilege of knowing your own mind, and your mental composition, firsthand. This would necessarily mean you understand yourself better than someone else could, even if that person had second hand knowledge about you, from you. So the only realistic proposition is the former, that you know yourself the best. The fact that you have the best knowledge of your own mind makes this true. We might ask how we know that an individual's subjective perception is correct, but this is the one single place in which subjectivity doesn't matter. Perceiving something outside yourself is open to argumentation, because other people can look at it and perceive it from a standpoint equal to yours, and disagree with you. But perceiving yourself isn't something anyone else can do on an equal level to you, so your perception ought to be taken as the best possible description of what you are.
So, with this, your perception of yourself is necessarily who you are, the proposition is disproved."

Stephanie Kirmer February 20 2001

Response:

Are we ourselves literally what we believe? Sure, what we believe has an influence on our existence, yet it is questionable whether what we believe and know as forms are who we are as in fundamental level of being.

In absence of deity, the determination of what we are is not solely left to us, because of our dependency on the external world. Also, we apparently have no control over the origin of our individual existence, thereby we have limited control over what we believe or know, and how we determine our individual existence.

Yes, we agree that our perception of what we are is determined by our individual perceptions and experiences. Though we would add that our perceptions are determined by reason and its epistemic limitation. However, more important, our conception of what we are, though derived through individual perceptions and experiences, is not necessarily the same as what we actually are. In other words, we did not consciously create existence nor can we determine existence itself, which implies that there is something outside of our conscious control. (i.e. it does not follow how we can determine what we really are through what we really are.)

Secondary point:

Individual perception of oneself is not necessarily the most correct, because it depends, for instance, on the state of mind of the individual in question. (An outside observer of an individual may see and hear things that the individual does not, and put things in better perspective than the individual can do, thereby come up with a more accurate description than the individual can do of him or herself.)

179. Entry:

"There is nothing to overcome. The proposition "we cannot know who we are and be who we are at the same time" is just flat-out false. There is no apparent reason to believe it, and every reason to DISBELIEVE it (e.g., everyday experience). Contrary to what the originator(s) of the proposition (ostensibly) believe, there is no logical incompatibility whatever between the propositions "we can know who we are at time T" and "we can be who we are at time T," viz., the two conjuncts of the proposition in question. However, if that proposition were truly problematic (as said originator[s] seem to mistakenly suppose), then presumably that would be so as a result of just such an incompatibility, i.e., the given conjuncts would entail the sort of incompatibility at hand. But, as stated above, no such incompatibility exists; there is NOTHING to be "overcome" here. If there exists a paradox of some kind, then it exists wholly within the misguided mind of its inventor."

Steven Conifer February 21 2001

Supplementary comment (as requested by the Inexpressible Committee):

"The expression "who we are" cannot be equivalent to the expression "fundamental level of being," since the former contains both a subject and a verb, whereas the latter contains no verb. Moreover, "who we are" contains a plural subject (i.e., "we"), whereas none of the words in "fundamental level of being" is plural. Thus, to suggest that WE (i.e., human beings) somehow constitute a "fundamental level of being" would be both misguided and archetypal of the sort of linguistic confusion to which sloppy metaphysics all but invariably gives rise. That is, "fundamental level of being" is incoherent metaphysical nonsense without any actual referent (indeed, where might this "fundamental level of being" be located in spacetime?); it is no more cognitively meaningful a phrase than "the undetectable, nonmaterial souls that inhabit our bodies."

If, on the other hand, you mean simply to submit that there exists some sort of "collective consciousness," then I would reply that, while perhaps meaningful in a certain political or sociological sense, literally taken that phrase has no actual referent, either, and is perhaps downright unintelligible as well. (After all, it is hardly the case that all of our brains are connected to one another.)

Hence, in the given scenario, the only accurate interpretation of "we" is "those persons distinguishable and identifiable by both certain physical features and emotional dispositions (or personalities)." Therefore, the only legitimate translation of "we can know who we are" is "those persons distinguishable and indentifiable by certain physical features and emotional dispositions (or personalities) are able to distinguish between, and identify, themselves." Likewise, the only veracious construal of "be who we are" is "exist as those persons distinguishable and identifiable by both certain physical features and emotional dispositions (or personalities)." Accordingly, I stand by my initial claim that there is no incompatibility whatever between the propositions "we can know who we are at time T" and "we can be who we are at time T," viz., that the proposition "we cannot know who we are and be who we are at the same time" is simply erroneous.

As regards "everyday experience," on a daily basis we experience (and employ) our ability to simultaneously distinguish between, and identify, ourselves (i.e., those persons...) and exist as ourselves (i.e., those persons...)."

Response:

We disagree that there is no apparent reason to believe that we cannot know who we are and be who we are at the same time. For instance, it appears that we need intrinsic separation from what we know in order to know, otherwise we would be in oneness with what we know which implies there would be nothing we could really know. Also, the apparent origin of knowledge (i.e. we are the creators of knowledge) is inconsistent with the view that knowledge as form is intrinsically the same as who we are, because we cannot create who we are through who we are. For further reasons see Entry 168; Entry 166; Entry 153; Entry 146.

Your sole proof that "everyday experience" proves conclusively that we can know and be who we are is incorrect, in the context of the competition, because the proof refers to our conscious identities rather than who we are as in fundamental level of being.

Further, we disagree that the only accurate interpretation of "we" is through conscious identities in the form of physical features and emotional dispositions because as you assert, we "exist as ourselves". (i.e. there is something behind our existence that allows us to exist--we are not ends themselves, nor are we nothing or purely biological/physical entities.) In other words, we contend that being as in fundamental level of being is a necessity of reason (Kant) (i.e. in order for us to exist, from our perspective there must be a basis behind our existence. For you to deny this necessity on grounds that fundamental level of being has a limited referent (i.e. merely connected to our bodies and minds), is to deny your belief that we exist as ourselves. Also, just because something cannot be empirically identified like fundamental level of being, does not mean that it does not exist, especially since empiricism is based on reason and its own indirect referent. (i.e. because we cannot get outside of our minds and know that we are, and all knowledge is apparently self-referential, any referent including empirical referent will be indirect, and epistemologically limited.)

"Who we are" and "fundamental level of being" are equivalent in the sense that they refer to something outside of our minds. In other words, it does not matter whether these labels are inconsistent in their grammatical structure, because as mentioned they refer by definition to the same thing. ["Who we are" refers to fundamental level of being as non-label, unconscious entity, just as "fundamental level of being" refers to fundamental level of being as non-label, unconscious entity.] Note, though the the subject of who we are is plural, the term as a whole refers to something else which may or may not be plural. The important consideration is that we are claiming that we exist, and that there is a basis behind our existence. We make no claims as to the direct nature or characteristic of this basis.

Other issue:

No, we do not claim the existence of a collective consciousness.

180. Entry:

"You assume that there is this fundamental level. There may not be. We may be constantly changing beings that have no essence other than change, and simply give ourselves this fundamental essence. If you cannot know it, how do you know it is even there?

Assuming it is; if it is dynamic, how can we know it, because as soon as we get a grip on it, it has changed?"

Trey February 22 2001

Response:

Yes, we assume that there is a fundamental level of being through what we reason: we exist, and there is basis behind our existence because we cannot be nothing or everything and still have individual existence. (Being as a necessity of reason or necessity of the idea of that we exist.)

If we are constantly changing beings, what is behind the change? We contend that change cannot occur without a basis for change, which takes us back to not being nothing or everything, and having a basis behind our existence whether it is dynamic or static. (In order for your argument to work, you need to deny that we exist, but by doing so, you contradict your own position.)

If you respond that we are purely biological/physical entities, then what is behind our biological and physical make up that allows us to exist? (i.e. what is behind the functioning of our organs? How do we breath and consume without a basis to do so? What is behind the existence of our individual cells? Do they exist as ends themselves or must there, from our limited perspective, be a basis behind them?!… How can an individual cell, the fundamental biological unit of the human body, exist without having a basis to do so?…. If we go back to the origin of the human species, there has to be a basis for the origin otherwise the species could not begin; and if there is no origin, then it is possible that we may not need a basis, except we face the problem of more reasonably showing that there is no origin than there is. Note, lack of origin does not necessarily imply that there is no basis.)

Just because we cannot know something that is dynamic, because we are always a step behind knowing it, does not mean that what we are trying to know does not exist.

Entries 167-173 Entries 181-184