"The way to deny the proposition is to deny that the proposition itself is specific enough to be meaningful in such a manner as to produce a contradiction. I do not believe that the proposition, as stated, is meaningful or meaningful enough to carry such weight as to be declared a contradiction.

The obvious problem with the proposition is the word "we". Are we to take this that there is such a thing as knowing as we? That there is some type of collective knowing? Here, I think the burden is on Mr. Garvey to demonstrate that there is if such is the proper meaning of the proposition. If this is not the proper meaning, then I daresay that the ambiguity and the vagueness of the proposition is what gives Mr. Garvey the edge in his alleged unbeatable proposition. He can manipulate between "we" and "I" so that any contender falls short in one way or another.

Yet, this is simply unfair and philosophically unsound. To perform such a fallacy of equivocation eliminates the proposition immediately from any serious philosophical investigation and as such exposes that there really is no contradiction to overcome. In short, the proposition is empty.

But, let us suppose that we give Mr. Garvey the benefit of the doubt and believe that what he is really proposing is more of a neo-Kantian psychologism that though there is a world external to us we cannot say anything about it since the only way by which we have access to it is through perception. Add to that a more nihilistic attitude that this "prison of the mind and the senses" skews our perception of the way things really are, and we eliminate any possibility of self knowledge as well. This is an individualistic type of knowledge and cannot be categorized under the category of "we" since such an approach would isolate an individual to such a degree that he could not in right conscious propose that there is a we much less make propositions concerning what type of knowledge a we would have. We are left then with only I, and the proposition then could only be stated accurately as "I cannot know who I am and be who I am at the same time." This restatement gives a great deal of credit to Mr. Garvey, but let us proceed with the loan.

If such a neo-Kantian approach is the proper understanding of Mr. Garvey's proposition, then we can proceed with what I think is a justifiable critique and method to circumvent the problem in such a matter to satisfy the criteria for disposing with the proposition altogether.

Mr. Garvey's assumption about "being" or existence is much like the Lockean "thing I know not what." It dooms to us to eternal ignorance because we cannot isolate what being is. There are also seems to be another fallacy of equivocation with "being". The problem is that some of the time Mr. Garvey treats being as though it is an action (as stated in the proposition, and then at other times as a thing. If this critique is valid, then many of the defenses that he has offered cannot be seriously considered. Moreover, there is an underlying assumption that our being is something of which we cannot be aware. This is a troubling assumption. I will attempt to detail why.

I am a direct realist. To a large extent, this philosophy stands in contrast to the neo-Kantian approach. The neo- Kantian approach would have us believe our awareness is greatly limited and that is colored by our senses and our thoughts. Any input we have is "filtered" by our judgments and our senses. Therefore we have NO immediate access to the world. We cannot make true statements about our world which means that we cannot have knowledge about our world. All we can say about the world is how it appears to us. Inasmuch as we are in the world, then there is a great deal that we cannot say about ourselves as well. So by denying that we can have immediate access to the world we can be easily lead to believe that Mr. Garvey's proposition is airtight (given this generous reading).

As a direct realist, however, I believe that we have immediate access to the world and to who be are. Since it is immediate, then there is not a problem of knowing who we are and being who we are at the same time. For it is entirely possible that we can be a person knowing who we are at the same time since the action of knowing is immediate and NOT a process.

This position is supported by the Sartrean Theory of Consciousness. This theory states that consciousness is only conscience of something else. That consciousness is neither something nor is it nothing. It dissolves itself in its object. If we adhere to this theory, then it is not the case that consciousness is conscious of itself. Further, it is then the case that our consciousness BECOMES the object and therefore we have IMMEDIATE access to that of which we are conscious. Therefore if we are conscious that we know something, then we ARE being a being that knows immediately at that moment.

To take this even farther, since we have learned from Sartre's theory that consciousness is not conscious of itself, then we can safely assume that we ARE NOT our consciousness since it is certainly possible, and often is the case, that we are aware of ourselves. With this being the case, then we are immediately conscious of ourselves, and since our consciousness has dissolved itself into its object (in this case ourselves) then we know who we are immediately at the same time that we are being what we know.

Now, this refutation of Mr. Garvey's proposition requires that one assume that the Sartrean theory of consciousness is correct, but this is no less a valid assumption than the neo-Kantian one. In fact, the direct realist assumption is actually simpler. For with Mr. Garvey's approach one my concede that there are mental things, sensual things, and things we know not what, yet with the direct realist approach all that is required is consciousness and its objects.

So, there are several philosophical ways to challenge the proposition:

1/ Challenge that the proposition as stated is meaningful enough to produce a contradiction.

2/ Demonstrate that certain defenses of the proposition must rely on a fallacy of equivocation

3/ Deny the neo-Kantian approach to knowledge and perception by offering another reasonable approach.

I am not sure how you, the committee, will treat this challenge, but I do not see how this could not be said to eliminate the challenge. Denying the assumptions of the proposition eliminates the seeming contradiction, and therefore eliminates the challenge. If, on the other hand, you are just wanting someone to take the proposition and accept all the assumptions and then refute the challenge by showing that the conclusion does not follow from the premises, then that is strictly a matter for a logician, and there is no real need to discuss the matter in a broader philosophical setting."

Mitch Hodge January 15 2001

Response:

"We" as defined in the competition refers to the individuals who make up humankind. So "we" and "I" can be used interchangeably without effecting the meaning of the proposition. (i.e. "I cannot know who I am and be who I am", or "we cannot know who we are and be who we are") Therefore, we disagree that the proposition is contingent on a fallacy of equivocation between the individual or "I" and the collective of individuals or "we". (Note, we are asserting that no individual, and thereby collective of individuals, can know who they are. So by more reasonably showing how an individual can know who they are than not doing so, the proposition could be overcome.)

Also, we disagree with your argument that the proposition is not meaningful enough in terms of "we" to produce a contradiction, because all the proposition is claiming is that no individual human being can know who they are, and it is asking how an individual can do so. (i.e. more reasonably show how an individual can know who they are than not doing so, and you have overcome or "contradicted" the proposition.)

Though from the neo-Kantian perspective all knowledge appears individualistic, thereby cannot be categorized by "we", reason is the common link between the knowledge of individuals, that allows knowledge to be categorized by "we". (i.e. from what we reason, there are commonalties between the knowledge of individuals, like the use of reason, which allows us to group individuals into "we", just as reasoning the necessity of a ‘fundamental level of being’ behind our existence, allows us to consciously identify "who we are." Further, to claim that all knowledge is absolutely individualistic, because of the apparent "prison of the mind and senses", ignores the apparent connection between the knowledge of one individual and another, or in other words, the capacity of individuals to communicate their knowledge to each other, thereby share knowledge with each other.

Garvey does not claim with absolute certainty that we cannot know who we are. He claims through what we reason, and the conscious representation "who we are", that we apparently cannot know who we are as non-label. Also, though his use of "being" may in one context represent "who we are" as in fundamental level of being, and in another context, represent the action of being whatever we are, it does not create a problem of inconsistency, because two uses of "being" are consistent with each other. (Note, Garvey’s use of different terms for whatever we are, like "inexpressible", "essence", and "life-force" reflect Garvey’s inability to know whatever we are, so the terms he uses to describe whatever we are, are mere labels. Hence, it would be inconsistent on his part to attach more meaning to those labels than just as labels for something we apparently do not know.)

No, the neo-Kantian position does not claim that we cannot have knowledge about the world. The positions claims that we apparently can only have limited or indirect knowledge of the world.

In terms of your direct realist position, we have the following questions:

How can knowledge be "immediate" when we apparently know through what we know? Also, how can knowledge be immediate, when you distinguish consciousness from objects? Further, if knowledge is something that exists outside of us (i.e. we consciously "dissolve" into external objects), how do we dissolve into an object without first being consciously aware of it? How do we first become consciously aware of an object without dissolving into it? If we are not consciously aware of an object (i.e. know an object), how can we dissolve into it? If we need to be conscious of objects to dissolve into them, and need consciously dissolved objects in order to be conscious of objects, what is the origin of our first knowledge?

We agree with Sartre that "consciousness is only conscious of something else" (i.e. knowledge is comparative). Though we do not understand how knowledge can be neither something or nothing, or in other words, non-existent? Also, how can our knowledge be something or nothing, and yet become an "object"? (i.e. the object we are conscious of) For instance, if you look at a rock, how can your knowledge of that rock, become the rock?

By distinguishing consciousness from ourselves, you are conceding that our consciousness is not ourselves. Yet, you then assert that by observing ourselves, we can know and be ourselves at the same time. What and where is this object, "ourselves" that we can observe? How do you know that we can observe ourselves as in fundamental level of being?

In short, we have pointed out a number of problems with your direct realist position that need addressing. Also, we feel that you have not shown that the proposition is not meaningful enough to be overcome (i.e. the meaning of "we" in relation to "I"), nor have you shown that Garvey’s different uses of the term "being" like "fundamental level of being" versus being whatever we are, is equivocal.

Other issues:

Just because the direct realist position (i.e. consciousness and its objects) appears simpler than the neo-Kantian position (i.e. thoughts, thought process, sensory, who we are, and external objects), does not necessarily mean it is more reasonable.

No, we are not interested in participants accepting all the assumptions behind the proposition. Overcoming the proposition can entail refuting its assumptions or terms.

153. Entry:

THE THINKING CONUNDRUM

"Thinking about thinking is meaningless. It’s like the dog chasing its tail, or looking into an infinity of mirrors. Or, like us, when we talk about ourselves. All self-referencing is meaningless. The idea of meaning suggests going somewhere, from here to there, from A to B, not staying in one place, like the dog does when it’s chasing its tail, or like we do when we talk about ourselves.

One of the easiest ways to truly grasp the "meaning" of this concept is to consider a hypothetical scenario, one in which we might find ourselves in the (highly unlikely) situation of having a conversation with aliens. If, during the course of this conversation, we were to use a particular word that they didn’t understand (a most likely development), such as the word "box" for example, it would mean absolutely nothing to them if we were to say, "A box is a box." In order to impart any meaning to our alien friends about what a box was, we would have to go "outside" the word, using other words to describe it. We’d have to use words like, "sides," "container," "storage," "carrying" and so on. This of course conforms to the basic rule of defining, which, as we all know, forbids us to use the word we’re defining in its definition. Why? Because it’s meaningless to do so. The word "definition" itself has a definition, a definition which suggests that we impart meaning to a particular word (or group of words) when we define it (or them). In the same way, we can’t use that which we are using to gain meaning about that which we are using. We can use vision to see objects, but we can’t use vision to see vision.

In other words, we can’t use thinking to think about thinking. To be sure, we can do it (just as we can say that a box is a box), but such an action wouldn’t mean anything. Why? Because it doesn’t "go" anywhere. But (you may ask) where is it supposed to go? Well, there is only one place it could possibly go: outside of itself, from A to B. In the same way that we’d have to go outside of the word "box" in order to properly define it, and thereby impart some kind of meaning to it, we’d have to somehow go outside of thinking, to impart some kind of meaning to it.

But it’s in our very nature to think the way we do (with words and ideas); it’s actually what makes us that which we think we are: individual human identities. If we were to somehow find a way to go outside of thinking in order to discover some true meaning for it, we’d discover that we’d no longer be who or what we truly are. We would in effect completely "undo" ourselves by the success of such an action. We cannot, in other words, truly "understand" our (thinking) selves (i.e. attach some kind of meaning to them), and "be" them at the same time. To truly understand our "self" would require that we somehow go outside of it, which means that we would no longer "be" it.

The self is of course an abstraction, composed of words only. It also consists of images, to be sure, but the use of words plays by far the more critical role in the creation of that dynamic which we think of as a "human" being. (Even animals think with images.) It is not like a tree, which is composed of atoms and molecules, and which would still exist as a tree whether or not the word "tree" ever existed. We can’t say the same of our selves, our personal identities. If words were to disappear, that which we call our "selves" would disappear along with them."

Wayne Holland January 17 2001

Response:

The question the competition is now centered on, is whether or not we can know who we are in the sense that who we are is an innate part of thoughts as form, so that we know who we are indirectly by the mere fact that we think. (direct realist position) There are a number of problems with this position listed in the conclusion of the response to Entry 152. For instance, it does not follow how we can know, if being/knowing are in intrinsic oneness. (i.e. there would be no intrinsic separation between being and knowing that would allow us to know. Or in other words, it does not follow how we can think who we are (i.e. who we are as part of the form of thoughts) if the basis for our thinking is who we are. In other words still, it does not follow how we can think who we are through who we are.)

154. Entry:

"As you have stated and I quote "I can only know knowledge itself in relation to who I am." You do not know who you are, therefore, you do not know or have knowledge, and since, and I quote "I cannot have language without knowledge, and knowledge without language." In your own limited reasoning skills you have stated that language doesn't exist since knowledge does not. Language is a wonderful tool I use too try to see myself from others point of view as well as my own. Inasmuch, I must have some innate sense of myself to act out my personality, and its related idiosyncrasies. Sense is stimuli, information to be processed through the brain, and can be stored for later retrospect. Storage is at least being able to conceive. Understanding is not knowledge, however, neither is the ability to conceive. Therefore it must be experience. We experience first-hand who we are every second of every day for the rest of our lives. What a truly pitiful experience. To be some thing we can never fully conceive or understand. However, it is not ignorance, Just a detestable experience."

Travis Hedglin January 18 2001

Response:

The statement, "I can only know knowledge itself in relation to who I am", means that I can only know knowledge itself in relation to the conception of "who I am" as non-label, non-conscious entity.) (Sorry for any misunderstanding. The statement in question, now edited for clarity, is from the Proof.)

Do you need an innate sense of yourself to act out your personality, or do you simply exist your personality?!

How do we experience who we are everyday and every second of our lives, and know that we do?

155. Entry:

"I agree that we are not our thoughts and have stated so ( Reply 23, Reply 32). It is an error to combine the two questions "Can we know anything other than ourselves? " and "Can we be anything other than ourselves? " into a single question that assumes being is derived from knowledge. Being cannot be abstracted by reason. The only shape reason can give to being is through negation.

Nor can being be separate from mind. Mind and Being are forever coupled in a dance of creation and destruction. Though, when examined through a subset of mind (reason), one may assert precedence of one over the other, the duality created by such an endeavour ultimately leads to the erroneous conclusion that we are "not who we are", (i.e. that knowledge of ourselves is somehow intrinsically separate from our being).

To assert that "who we are" is the basis of the "universe in action" is essentially cognocentric in that it presupposes nothing beyond perception. Just as the stream sinks into the earth only to emerge from the cliff face miles away, so we see seemingly discontinuous events as somehow relating to a whole. Certainly, one may investigate any set of data to reveal correlations and propose a hypothesis to explain them, but this doesn't form the basis of any direct statement of the phenomenon in question. With this in mind, it is understood that we must in some way actually experience a thing to have any direct knowledge of it. Since the nature of experience is unknowable (in that "newness" is the word we give to the "moment to moment" unfolding of reality), that which we consider "reasonable" must constantly be challenged by our perceptions.

As in the old aphorism "hindsight is 20/20" we can rationalize every bend and turn along a trodden path, but this doesn't tell us what’s ahead. Any path is the interplay of an organism’s movement and the relative non-movement of an environment. The path is not a function of the organism OR the environment, it is a function of the organism AND the environment, and as such represents a superposition of each. Further, since the path is likely to be referenced again, we may consider it (from the organism’s perspective) as part of the environment, and (from the environment’s perspective) as an extension of organisms. Therefore a degree of self-reference is required to come to a more complete understanding of what a path actually is.

Through this reasoning, its easy to see that the dichotomy between subject and object is in fact an illusion of causality, and no single perspective can give a complete description. We are not our thoughts, just as we are not our actions. I agree that in saying "we are the universe in action", I have taken a somewhat biased view, but after all, I'm only human."

Ken Bell January 19 2001

Response:

The problem with your ‘interconnected’ position, "being and knowing cannot be divided into separate entities, because they are ‘coupled in a dance of creation and destruction’", is that you can take that position for any asserted division or separation, so that if we consistently follow your position through, we would not be able to know anything, including oneness and nothingness (or oneness and "negation") because they too cannot be separated according to the interconnected position. Moreover, if we examine the interconnected position itself, the position succumbs to inconsistency, by being dependent on the basis for interconnectedness and its negation. Therefore, we assert that our conclusion that ‘knowledge as form is intrinsically separate from who we are as non-label entity’ is a necessity of reason. (i.e. it is a necessity of reason for all thought to have conscious distinctions or separations.)

We agree that the conception of "who we are" as non-label entity is cognocentric, and yet similarly, your notion of experience as in direct knowledge is also cognocentric, unless you can more reasonably show how we can get outside of our minds through experience and know that we are, than not doing so. We do not think you or anyone can.

We agree that apparently no single perspective can give a complete description of reality. Though we contend that due to the self-referent nature of knowledge, it is possible that a single perspective could give a complete description.

It is our contention that to partially relieve the apparent incompleteness, imperfectness of knowledge, we must determine what is the most reasonable knowledge (Garvey, "The Critique of Reasonableness"), and as you say, continue to challenge what is the most reasonable through our new perspectives.

156. Entry:

Reply to the Response to Entry149.

Definition of a principal term in the Entry:

Subtle refers to something that is hard to detect and hence hard to describe. Mind, thoughts and the soul and also the air do not have shape, color or any of the physical criteria with which one can try to measure or see with the naked eye and describe their qualities. Hence, they are in subtle states.

Entry:

1) How can one reach the inner self and know that one has, while at the same time being the inner self? In other words, how can one know the inner self, while at the same time know through the inner self? (Excerpt from the Response to Entry 149)

"The process of knowing ends when one reaches the inner self. Because the knowledge, the object to be known and the subject who wants to know becomes one i.e. synonymous.

Let me explain this as follows:

There are two people 'A' and 'B'.

'A' wants to know about 'B'.

So 'A' puts the efforts to find means to reach 'B'.

'A' reaches 'B'.

'A' tries to get knowledge of 'B'.

'A' gets the knowledge of 'B'.

Here 'A' is different, 'B' is different and the knowledge of 'B' which 'A' has acquired is different.

But what happens if 'A' and 'B' are not different?

This is what exactly we are trying to find out.

The awareness of myself as an individual is related to the external world around me.

So far we are accustomed to observe an individual from its projection of self in the external world.

Thus initially I , who is aware of my individual existence am always projecting myself into the external world.

To know the inner self one has to reach inner self.

For this it is necessary to withdraw our self from external world.

Meditation helps us in this process.

Inside our body also we try to project our self towards different parts in our body.

This is evident from our awareness of different sensation we experience in our body during the initial process of meditation.

Hence slowly we have to train our self to withdraw from that too.

If one succeeds, one truly reaches the inner self.

As stated in the beginning, 'A' and 'B' in this case being the same., the knower, the knowledge and the knowable i.e. subject, object and the knowledge become one and the process of knowledge stops.

In our original proposition, when we say we cannot know "who we are?" means, we can not arrive at the knowledge of self. In this case we are going beyond that too.

Spiritual practice is the means to withdraw the self from projecting outwards and to concentrate upon the inner self.

In the example of water vapors, the vapors do exist and can be condensed if in a closed vessel. But what happens to water vapors in an open space? They merge in the air as moisture content and do not have limited space. Initially they originate from the liquid water kept in an open vessel. We can measure the volume, weight etc. Moisture content in the air is measured only as percentage of it in the air which is the relative measure. Anyway, the example of water vapors was only to show that the physical liquid comes into contact with air and vapories, the vapors then merge in air and travels along with the air. Similarly, though, thoughts arise from physical brain, being subtle and the soul being subtle travels with each other. The entire science of spiritual healing is based upon this. There are reports of spiritual surgery too. Spiritual person sits in meditation and lets the spirit travel to the place where the patient is lying down, enters the body of the patient and performs the surgery.

As for relation of thoughts and breathing, Paul Bronton has given detail reports of his findings in his book "The Quest of the Overself" first published in 1937. In this book he has also discussed the spiritual practice at great length. In the beginning only he writes, "when peace of mind and concentration of thought have been gained, then only will one be fit and ready to embark on the quest of Ultimate Truth."

Mrs. Bharathi Shanker January 21 2001

Response:

How does withdrawing ourselves from all external perception allow us to know the inner self or "soul"?

How can an individual withdraw completely from external perception, both directly and indirectly, and still have thoughts?

Just because thoughts and "soul", according to your definition, are in subtle states, it does not necessarily follow that "soul" is part of thoughts. Also, we contend that because we are conscious of thoughts, whether they are illusory or not, thoughts must have a physical entity, no matter how minuscule, in order for us to be conscious of them. However, in contrast, we are apparently not conscious of "soul" as non-label entity, and therefore, it follows that "soul" does have to be a physical entity. If "soul" is not a physical entity, and thoughts as form are, it means that "soul" is not part of thoughts as form.

More important, how can you claim, without reverting to blind faith, that the "soul", something apparently inexpressible, travels with our thought? Surely, there must be more to your claim than thoughts and "soul", according to your definition, are in subtle states. Yet how can you know anything directly about "soul" when it is apparently beyond your direct comprehension?!

Entries 148-151 Entries 157-160