"Assuming that knowledge is in some way instantiated or realised in being, a change (e.g. increase) in knowledge will entail a change in being. This means that the truth of the proposition "I cannot know who I am and be who I am at the same time" can be shown by the method of reductio ad absurdum: for the truth of its negation, i.e. "I can know who I am and be who I am at the same time", leads to an infinite regress. In gaining self-knowledge the self is correspondingly altered and the knowledge thus ceases to be true. In order to know someone - on this model of knowing and being - one cannot be them.

However, an obvious counter point springs to mind which stems from a weakness in the arguments supporting the proposition, that weakness being there simplicity. They assume that the knowledge of oneself must be total, ignoring the possibility that certain propositions may continue to be true of one even as one is changed by the gaining of knowledge of them - e.g. general truths of the form that the being be extended in space or time. There is no reason why less incidental and even 'essential' truths may be known without the self altering sufficiently to render them false."

Alexander Fiske Harrison November 19 2000

Response:

We agree that it is possible that general truths of something dynamic may still be true regardless of the something being dynamic. In other words, change in something does not necessarily mean that a general truth about the something cannot capture, in its meaning, the change in the something.

However, in terms of being, it does not follow how we could know who we are (i.e. an "essential truth") and be who we are, because we would be without intrinsic separation from who we are and what we know. (i.e. our knowledge itself would be in oneness with who we are, thereby leave no space for us to know.)

Also, it does not make sense how something static like a general or essential truth can capture something dynamic, unless there is something static in essence about the something dynamic. Although, regardless if we are only dealing with a static and static, we again face the problem of how we can know without intrinsic separation from what we know.

136. Entry:

"You may consider this a note of support or a basic criticism. You are asking people to contradict a statement equivalent to "black is not white". Undoubtedly true, but hardly a paragon of reasoning n'est ce pas?

Here are my thoughts, I hope they make some sense to anyone other than me. This hinges on our old friends "be" and "know". To "be" implies undivided identity. You can't "be" something, and be separate from it.

To "know" something implies separation. This is endlessly elaborated in Hinduism and Buddhism and almost all mystical traditions. All "knowledge" is fundamentally relative to oneself as the "knower", and that sense of self is continuously reconstructed by the process of separation/knowing. Indeed the sense has no other existence except as the implied shadow to the separation implied by knowledge. As such it is described as "empty". Having no more or less substance than a windowspace or a shadow. This is a Buddhist-like definition of "ego" or "self".

Thus to know oneself and be oneself, one must simultaneously be separate from oneself as an observer, and yet not be unseparate. This is a simple semantic contradiction. It's significance to our own life is aesthetic. A whim. It can be of some personal value though :)."

Richard Henderson November 20 2000

Response:

We believe the challenge proposition cannot be overcome. Though this does not mean we think the proposition is "undoubtedly true". Due to the apparent self-referential nature of knowledge, all thought is defined by doubt, whether an individual wishes to acknowledge it or not. Hence, though we believe the proposition cannot be overcome, we are not entirely sure. In other words, we believe it is possible to overcome the proposition.

We find your analogy of the sense of self as an "implied shadow" of ‘whoever we are’ profound. Thank you for sharing it.

What is the substance of a windowspace or a shadow? Surely, these phenomenon are not completely empty; and how can you be sure that their substance corresponds to the substance of thought as form?

Why is the proposition "I cannot know who I am", only of significance to our individual lives as an aesthetic? Surely, the proposition has significance to the human species, which exists from knowledge? Also, how can we ignore the apparent fact that by existing from knowledge, which is empty of empty of who we are, we are diminuting us ourselves?

137. Entry:

"In essence all anybody really is, is a combination of energy and mass with consciousness. According to you own statement I cannot be myself since I know this. Am I now someone else? Obviously not. Therefore your statement is only right if you believe in sprits. Do you?"

Travis Hedglin November 21 2000

Response:

You are assuming that "all anybody really is, is a combination of energy and mass with consciousness". You do not really know, as illustrated by "energy" and "mass", as conscious labels with meaning, being part of consciousness. In other words, you think that the concepts of "energy" and "mass" are beyond your consciousness, and yet you can only express and know them from your consciousness.

Also, where does "energy" and "mass" come from? Is there anything behind or outside of them which allows them to exist?

We disagree that the statement "I cannot know who I am" is only right if we believe in spirits, because who I am refers to something labeled, "being" or "inexpressible" beyond or outside of our minds. We do not claim to know what who I am is. We claim that we exist, and that there is something beyond or outside of our consciousness which is the basis for our existence. (i.e. we are not nothing nor everything, nor are we our thoughts themselves.)

However, assuming that you are correct that we are a "combination of energy and mass with consciousness", how can we know we are energy and mass, and be energy and mass at the same time? In other words, how can we, energy and mass, know without intrinsic separation from what we know?

138. Entry:

"I would like to discuss a model of the brain and the self which I have come across which has been developed in recent years by some researchers within psychology.

The model goes something like this. The brain constructs the 'self' at around 18 months of age. The 'self' is you. It is entirely a construct of the brain. Apart from the brain, 'the self' does not exist, so it ceases to exist at death, when the brain ceases to function.

The self is given the illusion by the brain that it is in control. The self (you) however, is not in control. The brain not only constructs the self, but the information the brain receives from the senses are censored and transmitted to the self on a need-to-know basis only. If the brain determines that you don't need to know something, it will not tell you. Also, some of what the self receives as 'true' is distorted, if the brain determines that this is beneficial to you-the self. The arrangement is about security, if the brain receives something which it deems will upset the selfs' sense of well-being and security, it will suppress it, perhaps even entirely. Some 'belief systems' and/or some religions, amongst other things, are only able to operate in this arrangement according to the brains determination, and may be why people tend to ignore or irrationally re-interpret good evidence that is contrary to their internal beliefs. The brain simply tells them to, and, as in Platos Cave, it can be very difficult to break out of it. Some studies suggest that only about 50% of what people generally 'believe' is true, at least some of which can be attributed to the brains' censoring capacity with the self.

It follows from this that ones sense of 'free will', is, at least in part, an illusion. The brain controls the self (you), and in turn the brain is ultimately controlled by natural selection and genetics.

Now this model has some implications relevant to the proposition. The 'self' is an illusion constructed by a machine, and is entirely? controlled by that machine. Consequently, even if one can escape the brains 'censoring' tendancies and control, one cannot know "who you are" because "who you are"-"the self" is an illusion-it does not exist.

Are you the brain or the self? If the brain, you cannot know who you are because the brain does not come equipped to know itself, it only contructs the self and manages bodily functions. The hand for example, does not come equipped to "know itself" either-it is simply an organ controlled by the brain. If you are the "self" you cannot know yourself either because the self is an illusion.

But perhaps there is a loophole in this arrangement of the brain and the self. The brain constructs the self yes, but the self acts on instructions from the brain which produces actions, which in turn are relayed back to the brain which then in turn reconstructs the self, in a slightly modified form. In other words the arrangement may be a duality, like nature versus nurture and so on. The 'self', with time, is thus able to modify the brain’s construction of itself.

If the 'self' is partially able to affect the brains construction of it, then it follows that one can partially define who one is. But one still cannot "know oneself" because the self is still an illusion of the brain. The "fundamental level of being" also does not exist, it is an illusion of the brain.

But there is a peculiar alternative angle about this model which concerns "to know". Knowledge itself does not exist, it also is a construct of the brain, but like the self it can be given meaning by the brain if the brain decides to give it meaning. But if meaning can be given to something which does not exist, then "meaning" can also be given to something you can't do. This is difficult to explain. You can "know who you are" as an illusion, given to the self, with meaning, by the brain. In this context, "you can know who you are" and "you can't know who you are", are both correct, or incorrect, in the sense that both do not essentially have any meaning or existance, any "meaning" to either statement is constructed by the brain itself. Thus the proposition itself cannot be valid, because it itself is a non-existant construct given meaning by the illusion of the brain."

eif November 22 2000

Response:

We have a number of problems with your proposed model and the conclusions you draw from it:

1. You assume that the self and all thoughts created by the brain are illusions (i.e. the brain receives sensory and transmits, or constructs, them into conscious form or "meaning"), and that the illusions or meaning created by the brain "do not exist". You then conclude correctly that if meaning can be given to something that does not exist, it follows that meaning can be given to something we cannot do, thereby everything we know is canceled out by its opposite. In other words, if all thoughts are non-existent, then what we think including "I cannot know who I am", and "I can know who I am" are invalid. However, the problem with this position is that you are assuming that illusion equates with non-existence, when by the fact that illusion exists, it cannot be non-existent. (i.e. illusion must exist, otherwise we would not be aware of it.) Added to this point, it does not follow how the brain could "construct" something that is non-existent! Further, even if all thoughts are non-existent and this is invalid from our perspective as you conclude, we would have no way of knowing your conclusion with certainty, because everything we know, including our view of its invalidness, would be invalid. (i.e. we cannot show invalidness from invalidness.)

2. You claim that in addition to the "self" being non-existent, the concept of "fundamental level of being" is as well, while leaving out your conception of brain and model about it, which according to your view, are also non-existent!

3. You claim that the "self", an illusion and non-existent, is able to modify the brain’s construction of itself, and yet, according to your model, the brain came before the self. (i.e. the brain created the self), and controls everything the self knows, and therefore, it follows that the self cannot modify the brain’s construction of itself.

4. Also, it does not make sense how the self, which is defined as illusion and non-existent, can become "upset" over its "sense of well-being and security".

5. What is behind the brain (i.e. "machine"), which allows it to construct the "self"? How does the brain "determine" what the self knows and does not know?

Other points:

If the brain is controlled by "natural selection" and "genetics", what controls "natural selection" and "genetics"? If all thoughts are illusory and non-existent, how can you know that the brain is ultimately controlled by natural selection and genetics?

How can 50% of what people generally believe be "true", when according to your model, our thoughts are illusions, thereby are not true? Even if they are not illusions, how can a truth be known? (i.e. how can something static be known, when our perception, and thereby what we know, is apparently in flux?)

139. Entry:

"Here's a technical challenge. My attack is based on the assertion that language cannot approach the absolute. If this is true, then any statement made by language can only be considered valid within it's sphere of action, which is the personal conscious experience.

Since the proposition is describing an extra-conscious entity of "being", it cannot be considered meaningful. Indeed we cannot know if it is correct or incorrect since "knowing" is essentially a conscious indirect process.

A logical proposition with a null result is generally considered invalid.

What's the prize?"

Richard November 25 2000

Response:

If your assertion that, "language cannot approach the absolute" because knowing is a "conscious indirect process", is correct, then your assertion itself cannot approach the absolute. We are left with your assertions, "language cannot approach the absolute" and "knowing is a conscious indirect process" being neither certain nor uncertain, which means that language may approach the absolute and knowledge may be a direct process, without us knowing that they are.

In other words, because of the self-referential nature of knowledge, we cannot know an absolute or "approach the absolute", but at the same time, we may know an absolute or "approach the absolute", without knowing that we do. Therefore, we disagree with your statement that "a logical proposition with a null result is generally considered invalid", because we cannot know the "result" of a logical proposition.

Though if we accepted your statement regarding a "null result", all thought, which have their basis in reason, would be invalid, making your statement contradictory because we would not be able to assert anything with validity, even your statement. (i.e. we cannot show invalidity from invalidity.) So as thinking beings, we accept that what we think is valid in terms of knowing, and we use reason, and reasonableness, to judge one thought from another.

In short, we disagree that the challenge proposition is meaningless, because it, like any other statements, may be meaningful or meaningless, without us knowing that it is, just as it may be correct or incorrect, without knowing us knowing that it is as well. The problem with your position is that you are using perceived absolutes, "language cannot approach the absolute" and "knowing is a conscious indirect process", to assert that there are no absolutes we can know.

The "Challenge the Philosophy" prize is publication of the winning entry, and with a detailed explanation, as a book. For further information, see the terms and conditions for the competition at Competition and Entry Form.

140. Entry:

In reply to the Response to Entry 138.

"I think you have raised some good points. I think also you have interpreted my position correctly. Both the proposition and its opposite are invalid in my view, because both exist as "truths" only in the minds of those who believe them, both of which are beliefs which are constructed by the brain. Apart from the brain they don't exist, and are therefore not true.

I will attempt to answer each of your points in turn.

1) Maybe you are correct, I may have confused illusion and non-existance.
Perhaps I should say the brain can construct illusion that does not exist outside of our own minds. I suppose you could therefore say illusion exists, and so do thoughts, but that they are invalid. Illusion and invalidness are therefore the same, but not illusion and non-existance, as you point out.

2) Your "fundamental level of being" must equate with the self, and therefore be an illusion. The brain and self model however exists and is not invalid, because it exists outside of the self.

3) The self may be able to modify the brain and therefore itself only with the passage of time. It is reasonable to assume that the brain can be affected by it's own illusion, since it is also able to construct it. E.g. the brain hallucinates, and gets fearful-here the brain is afraid of, and reacts to, something it invented.

4) The self, if defined as illusion, but existant, can become upset, in the same way as an existant illusory thought can be contradicted.

5) I don't know what you mean by "behind". This seems to me illusory. Machines don't need to be behind anything to function (sorry, tongue in cheek). A computer will function according to its programming, and the brain will function according to the programming in the genome. The human genome and the computer programme appear to be very similar in operational function. I don't see any "behind" concept being necessary. The brain determines what the self knows according to its programming, which was written by natural selection over about 4.6 billion years.

6) Natural selection and genetics are controlled by the physical and chemical laws of the universe.

7) All thoughts are illusory yes, but as corrected earlier, illusory is not the same as non-existant. The laws of the universe operate irrespective of the self, and are therefore not illusory. I guess to answer the second part of the question, "how can you know that the brain is ultimately controlled by natural selection and genetics? I don't know, but since this has little to do with self, it seems valid.

8) I refer to 50% of what people believe its actually related to the information coming in to the senses, and not distorted. I guess I should say only 50% of what people believe actually relates to what information the brain receives. A point here is that the brain can construct thoughts which are either true or untrue, as it relates to the information received by the senses, but this does not make the information outside of the brain "untrue". Just because something is an illusion, and a construction, doesn't mean it is untrue, it just means that it exists in the minds of those who believe them, and may be true or untrue as it relates to the world outside. As for "knowing", I guess I have to concede that the more something relates to the self, the more unlikely it is to be true, the more it relates to things external to the self and security, the more likely it is true.

My model has weaknesses. But so does yours, methinks. But my main argument with your proposition is that of "the fundamental level of being". I don't see how this could be anything other than an illusion. I don't see/reason any evidence for whatever it is, other than perhaps the self itself-which by definition can't be trusted, and only exists as an illusory construction of the brain."

eif November 27 2000

Response:

If the challenge proposition and its opposite are invalid because they only exist in the mind of those who believe in them, and through their brains’ construction of the proposition and its opposite, it follows that your model of the brain and the brain itself is invalid for the same reason. Also, your assertion that the proposition and its opposite are invalid does not stand because you cannot show invalidity from invalidity.

Yes, we agree that conscious illusion does not directly exist outside of our minds. Though we would add that they appear to exist indirectly outside of our minds in the form of material extensions.

How can illusions and invalidness be the same, when illusions themselves are valid by the fact that they exist, and that they are valid in terms of us existing from them? It appears that you are confusing invalidness with subjectivity or finity. However, even if illusions are invalid, your model of the brain and self, an illusory phenomenon, would be invalid as well.

Yes, the "fundamental level of being" is an illusion, but we have been careful to point out that it only represents something behind or outside of us. (i.e. fundamental level of being is only a label.)

How can your brain and self model exist literally outside of the self and your mind?
We contend that your model is an illusion, which you use to represent something beyond your mind, in the same way, we use "being" to represent something beyond our mind. If you disagree, please tell us how you can know something which is devoid of self and illusion, or in other words, something beyond the brain’s construction?

We disagree that machines do not need anything beyond them to function. For instance, machines need an energy input and inventor. Similarly, the human brain needs an energy input for it to function, and yet unlike machines, it as a self-functioning entity, thereby needs something behind the energy source, which we label "being".

How can the "laws of the universe", conscious, illusory phenomenons, not be illusory? How can you express something that is not illusory, when all you can know is illusory? Again like your brain and self model, and our notion of "being", you are projecting something beyond your mind, which you label "laws of the universe". Yet, like the projections of being and brain, it does not follow how you can project these laws and yet actually know these laws?!

How can something be true as it relates to the outer world, when the information the brain receives through sensory is from the perspective of sensory, so that from our perspective there is no "truth" outside of sensory? (i.e. all we can know stems from the unconscious, perspective of sensory.)
We contend that truth and non-truth is a matter of perspective, like that of sensory or brain, and that from our sensory and brain’s perspectives, there is no absolute truth outside of them. (i.e. conscious and unconscious information are constructions rather than what really is.) Hence, we disagree that the constructions of brain or sensory can reasonably be absolute truth.

The evidence for the "fundamental level of being" is that in order for us to be aware of thoughts, we must exist, and by existing, we contend that we ourselves cannot be nothing, everything, or thoughts themselves, because we could not reasonably be aware of thoughts. Hence, we contend that there must be something behind or outside of us in order for us to exist and be aware of thoughts, and which we label "fundamental level of being".

Other points:

How can the self, an illusion, modify the brain with the passage of time, when according to your model, the brain constructs everything the self knows, including hallucinations?

Also, how can the self have emotions like getting "upset" when the self is illusory? Does a thought get upset when it is contradicted?!
We contend that according to your model, that the self can become "upset" through the constructions of the brain, but the self itself, a mere illusion, cannot become upset. So it appears that your notion of the "brain" as something behind or outside of self is similar to our notion of being as something behind or outside of self. The only difference is that you appear to be equating being with brain, whereas we have not made that step. Though we agree that the brain appears to act as a converter of sensory information into conscious information.

141. Entry:

"I'd say your conundrum question requires much more than an exercise in logic. Shortly: it addresses issues of selfhood, knowledge & time. I wouldn't attack the question itself, but will only point to different approaches:

-these questions can be analyzed within the framework of materialist epiphenomenalism (consciousness studies & cognitive theory-Churchland et al). Succinctly- "I" is firing off of neurons in a regular pattern, knowledge is a set bio-chemical processes whereby "I" simultaneously absorbs & transforms energy (from within & without the body) and in the process re-creates & re-invents itself. So- there is no static "I", nor knowledge, and the question is wrong. Self is a mutable pseudo-entity, as is the self-knowledge. You start from one point of mutable pseudo-entity & land on another link of selfhood's chain, the "knower" being changed in the process. So- you can know yourself, but neither knowledge nor self/"I" are permanent, even for a fracture of time (and we don't know whether time is continuous or possibly granular ).

-in various "spiritual" traditions there is no consensus communis re. the "essential self". Some schools hold that "self" is illusory ( Advaita Vedanta and Theravada Buddhism); on the other hand, you got doctrines ( Tantricism, Aurobindo, Gerda Walther) which/who assert the supramundane existence of indestructible, but mutable "I" (mutable in non-temporal dimensions). Evidently, such schools deny the accepted definition of 4-dimensional spatio-temporal reality as *the* reference point, and their position would be:
yes, you can know yourself, but- you are not your empirical "self", and "knowledge" is a trans-physical process whereby "being" and "knowing" fuse into one another and time ceases to be. But- that's mysticism, not something one can dissect along logical propositions."

Arvan Harvat November 28 2000

Response:

How can the challenge proposition require "much more than an exercise in logic", when any challenge to the proposition, or to any other proposition, must have its basis in reason?!
However, we agree that challenging the proposition may require knowledge of different systems of thought or as you say, "issues of selfhood, knowledge, and time".

In regard to the different approaches you shared, we respond with the following:

1. It is unclear in the materialist epiphenomenonalism approach, what is behind "I" or the "firing off of neurons in a regular pattern"? (i.e. what is causing the firing off of neurons?) Also, how can you know knowledge is a "set bio-chemical processes" when apparently all you can know is what you know, and you cannot know knowledge solely from itself?
Further, if there is no "static", it does not follow how you can know "I" is a "firing off of neurons", and "absorbs and transforms energy". Therefore, it follows that the challenge proposition is not "wrong", but the conclusion that "there is no static "I" or knowledge", does not follow from its static premises, "'I' is a firing off of neurons", which "absorbs and transforms energy", and knowledge is a "set of bio-chemical processes".

2. If knowledge and self/"I" are impermanent, it does not follow how you can know anything, including the statement that "knowledge and self/I" are impermanent". Hence, the statement of impermanence is invalid from inconsistency, because you cannot use knowledge as static, and yet assert that knowledge, including the knowledge or statement you are using, is dynamic or impermanent.

Entries 126-134 Entries 142-145