"Doesn't your "proof" make itself inadmissible by its own standards? You use your knowledge to prove that knowledge is an illusion. Wouldn't that make your claim and proof just an illusion?

Does knowing who we are really matter in the world? Our lives are so inconsequential that we could technically say that they amount to nothing in the end. Why know who we are?"

Marc Reside September 29 2000

Response:

Garvey’s proof would be inadmissible if there was some knowledge that is not illusory. But as the proof stands, all knowledge is illusory, so that we distinguish the reasonableness between illusions. It is here we make the step that reason is the anchor of illusions, including reason itself, which allows us to distinguish between them. Though our position is circular, all knowledge is susceptible to similar circularity, so we do not attach to it, and instead we use reasonableness as our means for comparing illusions.

You may respond that if all our knowledge is illusory, what does it matter what we think? We reply that the illusions of knowledge have limited connection to what is outside of us, and that we exist through illusions as a means to exist, and therefore, in terms of our preservation, it does matter what we think, even if we are only thinking through illusions.

Regarding your second question, the issue is not that we do not know who we are. The issue is the apparent fact that we cannot know who we are, and the implications from not being able to do so. For instance, from not being able to know who we are, it follows that what know itself, and the form of knowledge, is not who we are, and by existing through knowledge and its material extensions, we are existing through what is empty of who we are, and thereby gradually canceling who we are out.

127. Entry:

"P1: I know who I am.

P2: You cannot know who I am.

C: It is irrefutable that I know who I am."

Duane Salmon September 30 2000

Response:

Though you may know who you are, and someone other than yourself may not be able to refute that you know who you are, the competition is about explaining how we can know who we are, or in your case, how you can know who you are.

128. Entry:

Reply to the Response to Entry 126.

"For instance, from not being able to know who we are, it follows that what know itself, and the form of knowledge, is not who we are, and by existing through knowledge and its material extensions, we are existing through what is empty of who we are, and thereby gradually canceling who we are out." (Excerpt from the Response to Entry 126.)

This is interesting. Isn't "who we are" knowledge? That's not saying that "who we are" is knowledge exclusively, but that "who we are" is a piece of knowledge.

So it's just an illusion, right? There's nothing to know, because there IS nothing to know.

How can we NOT live through things that are empty of ourselves when "who we are" is empty?

Marc Reside September 30 2000

Response:

"Who we are" is a mere symbol for whatever or whoever we may be. So even though the symbol "who we are" appears empty, does not mean that we ourselves are empty. In fact, because "being is a necessity of reason" (Kant), we assert that us ourselves, the beings, are not empty or non-existent.

Garvey does not claim that who we are is literally a "piece" of knowledge. Rather, he asserts that there is a limited connection between who we are and knowledge, whereby knowledge is a creation of who we are. (Note: we apparently cannot create who we are through who we are.)

Just because our thoughts may be illusory, does not mean that there is nothing to know. As we stated in the Response to Entry 125, we give meaning to thoughts which they themselves apparently do not have, so that our thoughts have significance, because we give them significance.

129. Entry:

"The proposition can be "overcome" (or rather refuted) quite easily. The proposition really states nothing more than we cannot know who we are, since the who we are at the same time is an empty pleonasm that adds nothing to the first part of the proposition. But since we most certainly know a great many things about ourselves (e.g., our tastes, interests, our history, etc. etc.), this claim is obviously untrue. The only way to answer this objection is to claim that this knowledge of ourselves isn't "perfect" or "non- relational" or known "through itself." But if we adopt this approach to knowledge, than all knowledge becomes imaginary, not just knowledge about who we are. In the final analysis, the claim that we can't know who we are is self-contradictory, since the very claim is a claim about who we are. But if we can't know who we are than we can't know that we don't know."

Greg Nyquist October 17 2000

Response:

Just because we know a great many things about ourselves, like our tastes, interests, and history ect., does not mean that what we know about ourselves is really who we are. For instance, what we know about ourselves may be things stemming from a fabricated identity labeled self, and with limited connection to who we are and our sensory.

What does it matter if from our perspective all knowledge is imaginary, in which we distinguish between imagines using imaginary reason? If knowledge is not imaginary through our creation of it, where does knowledge come from?

The claim that we cannot know who we are is not about who we are as you assert, but about who we are in a limited sense, whereby we are using the symbol and meaning of who we are to represent whatever we may be. Therefore, our claim of not knowing who we are is not self-contradictory.

We agree that if we cannot know who we are then we cannot know that we cannot know who we are in an absolute sense. Though as mentioned we are using a limited conception of who we are, so we can know that we cannot know who we are from our limited perspective, with the possibility that our limited claim may be absolutely true without us knowing that it is.

130. Entry:

"[Loss of autonoesis: we cannot know who we are and be who we are at the same time ] Prosopagnosia: inability to recognize familiar faces, including the self, is not explained by defective visual acuity or reduced consciousness or alertness. Prosopagnosia is presently difficult to overcome. When a similar condition occurs after REM sleep it can be overcome by waking up."

Ian Dengler October 21 2000

Response:

Just because individuals not suffering from prosopagnosia can recognize the self, does not mean that the self they recognize is really who they are. It may be a fabricated, conscious identity of whoever they may be. If the self is not a fabricated identity, how can individuals know who they really are?

Could it be that all human beings suffer from a form of prosopagnosia, whereby they cannot recognize, or know, who they really are?

131. Entry:

"We dictate our perception others by ourselves, therefore, we know who we are and we are being who we are at the same time. Furthermore, "Being" and "Knowing" are inextricably connected to each other meaning you have to know who you are on some distinct level to be the way you are. I have an ingrained knowledge of myself as a person by the way I am towards others, or who I am willing to be in a specific personalized setting as opposed to a wall I tend to put up in a social setting especially with strangers."

Travis Hedglin October 27 2000

Response:

The dictation of perception by ourselves does not necessarily mean that we know who we are, because the perception we are dictating may be fabricated, or have limited connection to who we are. Though we agree that in order to dictate our perception we need to know it at least in a limited sense.

We agree that being and knowing, in terms of the human species, appears to be inextricably connected to each other, so that in order to be we need to know, just as in order to know we need to be. Though it does not follow that we need to know who we are at a distinct level to be the way we are. In our view, what we know, including the way we are, needs to have at least a limited connection, or correspondence, to who we are and whatever is outside of us. Without this limited connection, it appears impossible for us to successfully exist through knowledge.

The ingrained knowledge of yourself, discovered through your interaction with other people, may be attained through a fabricated identity of yourself, but with limited and necessary connection to yourself. It is like existing through a mask, so that the mask, and other people’s reaction to it, is incorporated into your perception of yourself, even though the mask is not really who you are.

In short, we contend that you have not shown the necessity of an individual to really know himself in order to be. Though, as mentioned, we acknowledge that it appears to be a necessity that the knowledge of an individual have limited connection to himself and whatever is outside of him.

132. Entry:

"The proposition in itself is too broad to be defined in any manner of short essay (or long one for that matter). Who we are can be defined by so many different things. Who we are in terms of what we think and believe. Who we are in relation to other people. Who we are in terms of our eternal purpose or lack thereof. Who we are in terms of our role in society. etc. Beyond that, we are perceived to be different to every different person who sees us and every person has a different idea of who each person is and there is no way of deciding or knowing who has the "official correct answer" to the question "who are we." There is also the question of "can who we are change?" which in itself brings about a whole new set of questions such as "What defines the change from who we are to who we were?" and "If we change, do we truly cease to be the past person and if so what happens to that person in our minds and in our souls?" This is such a broad topic and really can't be proven much due to the fact that all reality is different depending on the mind of who is comprehending the reality with relation to their point of view and past knowledge and experience. There is no true definition of "who we are" to be found. Therefore we can't know it and we certainly can't cease to be who we are at any time whether we claim to know what that is or not and whether we are the same as we used to be or not."

Paul Dawkins October 29 2000

Response:

We disagree that "who we are" is too broad to be defined in any manner of short essay or long essay for that matter, because we are using the term not to represent our conscious identities, but to represent we ourselves, whatever we may be and in a limited sense, by merely claiming that the we ourselves exist. (You appear to agree with this perspective by referring to "soul" and stating that "…we certainty can’t cease to be who we are…")

In other words, we contend that "who we are" is not too broad to be defined, but as you agree, "who we are" is apparently truly undefinable. Though we also contend that as rational beings, we must accept that who we are, in terms of our fundamental level of being, exists. (i.e. we are not nothing nor are we everything.)

Hence, the competition is directed to the question of whether or not we can truly know who we are. (i.e. are our thoughts themselves the same as who we are? If so, how?)

133. Entry:

"We cannot know who we are and be who we are at the same time."

"We" stands for the individuals of humanity, so the statement means that given any human being, that human can not know who he is and be who he is at the same time. This implies that Mr. Garvey cannot know who he is and be who he is at the same time. Therefore, he might as well have written, "I cannot know who I am and be who I am at the same time, and my fellow human beings cannot know who they are and be who they are at the same time."

"I just want to focus on the first part of his statement. If I asked Mr. Garvey who he is, he would probably reply by telling me his name. Doesn't this show that he knows who he is? I really think he does know who he is, but he might argue still that he doesn't. In this case, I just want to know whom he is talking about in his statement. I just want to know then, who is the statement about? So, let's assume that he does know who he is. Since he cannot know who he is and be who he is at the same time, he cannot be who he is! I don't know what to say.

Another approach one can take to this problem is to say that we do know who we are. Mr. Garvey defined that word as the individuals of humanity. We can obviously be who we are, so the statement is false."

Jesse Crawford October 31 2000

Response:

Yes, Garvey could have written the challenge proposition as "I cannot know who I am and be who I am at the same time, and my fellow human beings cannot know who they are and be who they are at the same time."

You are also correct that Garvey knows who he is, but he apparently only knows who he is in a limited sense. (i.e. what he knows himself as is only conscious representation for whatever he may be. The important consideration, in our view, is that Garvey asserts that there is a fundamental level of being behind the individuals who make up humanity, without knowing what the fundamental level of being is, except through limited conscious representation.)

If Garvey can know who he is, and he cannot know who he is and be who he is at the same time, and he cannot help from being who he is as long as he is alive, it follows that what he knows himself as is not really who he is.

If the individuals of humanity cannot know who they are, it does not follow how individuals can know who they are as a collective. In other words, if individuals cannot know who they are, and who they are, whatever it is, by necessity is part of a collective of individuals, it does not follow how individuals can know who they are through a collective.

We contend that there is only conscious identity for a collective of individuals, because it is individuals who make up a collective, rather than a single life-form.

134. Entry:

"The proposition cannot be overcome because it is an example of ostentatious thought hoping to be taken seriously more for it's cryptic nature than for its clarity, which is obscure. It is a perfect example of contortion as philosophy and exhibits a love of painting oneself into an epistemological corner as evidence of deep thought. It's not worth trying to overcome."

Bruce Newman November 16 2000

Response:

We disagree that the proposition is obscure. The terms have been defined, and some of them have been explained in further detail. Also, even though "who I am" is ambiguous because it is a label for whatever we are, so that we do not really know who we are, the important consideration is that we are claiming that we ourselves exist.

The competition is directed to the question of how we can know who we are and be who we are, or whether or not we ourselves exist. What is obscure?

Further, your assertion that the proposition is contorted does not stand, because the proposition is merely stating in two parts, "know who I am" and "be who I am at the same time", the claim that I cannot know who I am, while showing the nature of the problem. (i.e. between being and knowing).

In terms of your notion of "deep thought" as though the proposition is a shallow thought, does not make sense, because in our view, so-called deep thoughts are relative to other thoughts, rather than being deep thoughts themselves.

Entries 120-125 Entries 135-141