"There is a distinct difference between awareness and consciousness. Animals and all other living things have awareness because they react to danger, but they're not conscious of what they're doing. Humans react to danger in much the same way, but they have a memory of doing it and probably won't put themselves in that kind of situation again. Is that the primary difference? I think not. I have found through my experiments that the lowly snail actually has a memory of it's own reaction to danger, and in some ways is superior to humans in adapting to new situations.

I touched one of a snail's antenna feelers and the snail immediately drew it back inside its head. After a while, the feeler emerged to it's full length. I touched it again. This time it retracted half way. The third time I touched the snail's feeler it didn't move! Incredibly, the snail had come to the conclusion that I wasn't a threat, at least for the moment. Was it exhibiting its own form of consciousness? Can it be that in its own way the lowly snail has the capacity to know who it is and be who it is? If it could talk would it say? "All right buddy, you've had your fun. Now get lost."

What kind of response would you expect to get if you asked six unsuspecting adults of reasonable intelligence if they knew who they are?
Chances are you'd get blank stares until they digested your words, then they would get defensive. "What do you want to know for?" At that moment they are compelled to be who they are. Up until then, they had no reason to know who they were or be who they were. Their defensiveness will gradually abate until the next time they have to defend their prejudices.

Just who are we anyway? If I were asked who I am, my honest response (as opposed to dishonest response) would be: "I am a sentient being with manageable prejudices and the need for recognition whose worst fears are being bored and being found out." As you can see, I still have the same characteristics I had when I was a child. The difference is- -as a child I had awareness with limited comprehension and limited prejudices; as an adult I now have a limited comprehension of the awareness of my prejudices.

That is my concept of who I am, but if you asked my wife or friends they would have an entirely different opinion. For that matter, could we say that consciousness is our honest appraisal of who we are? So, who are we, really, our own prejudiced opinions of ourselves? An old Arab proverb says, "If one man says you are a horse, you laugh at him. If two men say you are a horse, you begin to wonder. If three men say that you are a horse, you buy yourself a saddle."

I guess the point I'm trying to make is that consciousness is not with us at all times. It only becomes manifest when we are put into a defensive position by people we associate with or things we see and/or read. That is also when our prejudices and preferences emerge. We either like it or don't like it for various reasons known only to ourselves, and we'll defend our prejudices to the death.

So the question remains: how can we know who we are when we don't know who we are???"

Richard Stover September 24 2000

Response:

You view the lowly snail from your perspective, so whatever you think about the lowly snail’s behavior, is from what you think the snail is doing, and why it is doing what you think it is doing.

We agree from your example that the snail demonstrates a form of memory, though that does not mean the snail consciously memorizes, through thoughts, as we do.
Could it be that the snail responds directly from its sensory through evolved instinctual responses directed by its brain and without the use of thoughts?

In another example, someone sits down beside a tidal pool containing small crabs and numerous snails. The crabs and snails immediately freeze, almost in unison, to the presence of the person, or predator. The person sits beside the crabs and snails and does not move, waiting about twenty minutes, when with him still sitting in the same spot, all the crabs and snails begin to move, with even some of the crabs, which had previously retreated from the person, now approaches him as if he was not there.
From our perspective, this example shows that the crabs and snails respond to movement of life-forms, and possibly not to the sight of life-forms. Moreover, do you think if the crabs and snails were conscious of the person sitting right next to them, that they would shortly later get on with their existence as if he were not there? We do not think so. If anything some of the crabs would have retreated the tidal pool to another, but none of them did.
Our tentative conclusion is that the crabs and snails responded instinctually rather than through self-awareness and thereby intellect.

Using the same reasoning, we question that the snail in your example actually came to the conclusion that you were not a threat, even though its actions from your perspective showed that it did. Rather, we contend that the snail instinctually responded to you touching its antenna, and unconsciously adjusted its response each time. However, if you do not accept our interpretation of the snail’s responses, we would like to know how the snail could be self-conscious and think, and what other evidence you have, other than your interpretation of its behavior, that it does.

Regarding your example of people responding with blank stares to the question of whether or not they know who they are, we add that even though we apparently cannot know who we are, we cannot help from being who we are. So what does the challenge proposition matter? We exist through our thoughts. Also, just because we cannot help from being who we are, does not mean that we will always exist or be who we are. So we try to overcome a dilemma with our existence, namely that our existence through thoughts is apparently canceling out who we are.

The dynamic of consciousness through intellect, whereby sometimes we are conscious and sometimes we are not, shows that when we are not conscious, we may be no different, in terms of our instinctual responses, from the lowly snail.

121. Entry:

"I am who I am no other way, I have my thoughts my questions and my answers. I know who I am by the way I think and all the personal thoughts I have had. I constantly talk to myself in my head. Life and the way people are is all about mind states not every one sees the same thing in the same way. Levels, everything I mean absolutely everything has levels to it. I cannot agree that every one could possibly know "who they are" because there are so many people who are blind to so many things people walking aimlessly through life do what they think that they are expected to do. Doesn’t matter its pointless trying to explain this. I understand philosophy and I think that It should replace school, anyway it does not matter worrying about how people are because the frustration I receive from the thoughts I have about them are overwhelming. I learned to allow it to occur in my head. We are who we are at the same time in constant because there is nothing to compare us to so we are perfect."

Daniel Sadlon September 25 2000

Response:

If we know who we are and are who we are at the same time because there is nothing to compare us ourselves to, how can we know who we are and be who we are without comparison? We cannot. Comparison is a prerequisite to knowing. Could it be that we compare who we are, at least the conception of it, to other thoughts, so that the comparison lies in the differences in words and their meanings, and that beyond our thoughts, there is an intrinsic separation between who we are and our thoughts themselves, which allow us to know?

How do you know who you are through the way you think and all the personal thoughts you have? How are your personal thoughts who you are? Could it be that the way you think and all your personal thoughts are from who you are, without actually being who you are?

We agree that there appears to be levels of self-awareness, though that does not mean there is no level, whereby someone knows who they are.

122. Entry:

"I find it rather funny that this entry may be simple but not easy to see. Why is that? Don’t get me wrong, I don’t assume with certainty that the proposition "we cannot know who we are and be who we are at the same time" seems simple. But I open the opportunity to avoid criticism and say "its mutually exclusive" or it as uncertainty relation to a conceptual approach in Heisenberg Uncertainty principle. In this case the changes in one element of the equation makes a change inversely proportional to the other element greater than or equal to a constant, et cetera--- for philosophy in this case. In a nutshell, to be blunt, the epistemological truths expressed here must be expressed with certainty to make them certain. No I mean that literally. Really, I cannot be certain because I express it with uncertainty. If you don’t follow, good, then I have succeeded in one way or another to show that there are no concrete words to form the extent of meaning the mind's capacity withholds. But I leave you simply with a vague picture of the superficial concept, just as others do not completely comprehend the eyes behind the words, as the eyes are the window to the "soul". To be direct and forget the nonfigurative implications, we know who we are, that we are the concrete reality of intuition and our senses. anything beyond that is irrelevant to an extent. It is simple but without explanation. Perhaps this is why we can’t find answers. We can know who we are, and thus be who we know we are in a foundational and fundamental view. If we do not know who we are, which seems impossible, because without directing bull that throws false thought premises into the figurative picture it becomes far from so abstract, then we can still be who we are, that happens with birth. So foundationally, if being who are is inevitable and carved in titanium, than knowing what we are is irrelevant. Or perhaps we are incapable of knowing because of the limits the human perspective entails. Or maybe we manifest the limits?"

Sean Walker September 25 2000

Response:

We agree that epistemological truth, or any other truths, must be expressed with certainty to make them certain. However, certainty is an extension of perspective, not the truth(s) in question. So it is possible that an epistemological truth could be certain or absolute, without us knowing that it is.

Also, we agree that there are no concrete words from our perspective that form the extent of the mind’s capacity to withhold meaning. Though this assertion does not mean we cannot know the capacity of meaning the mind withholds, without knowing that we do.

Further, we agree that we are "the concrete reality of intuition and our senses", but that does not mean that what we know through intuition and our senses are who we are. What we know through them may be a limited extension of who we are.

We agree that we need at least a limited conception of who we are. Although we disagree that we need to really know who we are to distinguish or choose between thoughts. We distinguish and choose, and thereby avoid the "abstract", from who we are and through reason.

We disagree that because being who we are appears inevitable, that knowing who we are is irrelevant, because we as a species exist through thoughts, and being who we are always is not inevitable. (ie. we may cease to exist or be who we are.) So we investigate, in terms of our preservation, our means to exist, which primarily focuses on our existence through thoughts and their material extensions.

If the limits of our perspective, which includes not knowing who we are, are manifest in who we are, then our perspective is who we are, which does not make sense because the limits state that we cannot know who we are. Therefore, for the former statement to make sense, our perspective cannot be a manifestation in who we are. Rather, it must be a limited extension, or reality, of being who we are, in which our perspective, and the knowledge it contains, is only who we are in a limited, relational sense.

123. Entry:

"Your original proposition is stated as follows: "The basis for the treatise is the proposition that we can't know who we are and be who we are at the same time. It shows that what we think cannot be who we are, and thereby is empty of who we are. In other words, assuming who we are is equated with life, our attachment to thoughts as a means to exist is an attachment to what is empty of life."

This is a very interesting notion. I was attracted to respond in virtue of the fact that I happen to be writing my senior thesis on a related topic. At the base of your principle assumption is the modern era's understanding of what an idea is, I think, namely that ideas are things in themselves (this conception can be found in the writings of many moderns; I'm writing my thesis on its relation to Locke). If it were indeed the case that ideas were things in themselves, then in the same sense that the moderns criticize the verity of humanity's perceptions of the outside world, they are equally committed to criticizing the mind's perception of the ideas. Our "knowing who we are" in this schema would indeed be one of these ideas, and so even if that knowledge were actually of who we are, we would have no guarantee that we really knew that knowledge--that we properly perceived that idea, which is a thing in itself just like the outside world, and so could be mistaken. In that sense it could certainly be the case that we could not be who we are (which we must indeed always be) and also know who we are (as the correct perception of the idea of who we are is not guaranteed). Whether we might not by chance perceive the correct understanding of who we are is not an issue, as no one would be able to tell whether it was the correct understanding. In this sense your premise is unapproachably secure.

The solution, as I see it (and have been writing my thesis about), is to adjust our notion of what ideas are. The very notion that ideas could be things in themselves that the mind must perceive like our senses perceive the outside world is ludicrous, and gives rise to just such problems as you posit. A much more coherent option is to look at what ideas are like Aristotle understood them. Without explaining Aristotle's whole matter-form conception of the universe (and resultingly us, as we're a part of it), his understanding of ideas is relatively easy to understand. The human mind for Aristotle is not a spiritual substance, like Descartes posited, but rather simply a capacity of the human person. For Aristotle we are very much our bodies, and so the mind-body problem never needs to enter the picture. This is indeed much more coherent than there being two separate entities in one, mind and body, that must mysteriously interact somehow. The Aristotelian Nous or mind thinks its own ideas. The ideas just are the Nous--it would be as if the ideas are the form imparted to the Nous at any particular time.

This revolutionizes how one would look at the problem. For now there is no confused perception of what our understanding of ourselves is. And indeed when we have that understanding of ourselves in our minds, we understand ourselves that much further because that very understanding is a part of who we are as humans.

The question remains whether we can come to a true understanding of who we are through reason. The simple answer is yes, and the complicated one is to understand a human person as a functional concept. Functional concepts are our understanding of what a particular thing does; a hair dryer is a functional concept, and so is a spoon. There's no question that these objects can be used for other things than drying hair and spooning, but in their capacity as hair dryers and spoons they have certain unchanging roles. In the same way, understanding humans as functional concepts gives rise to a whole system of life. You can read about it in Aristotle's Ethics and also in the Politics.

Aristotle faced the same question as you, as the Sophists were proclaiming that justice in different cities was different and that all were just at the same time. He needed to find a way in which justice had a universal application, and the easiest way to do it is to perceive humans as functional concepts. Aristotle has been criticized for this move, but I don't think it's very controversial. After all, we have a certain conception of a dog as a functional concept, and a bird; that we could conceive of abnormal dog or bird behaviour is proof of this (can you imagine a dog climbing trees, or a bird chewing a bone?). In the same way we think of humans as being functional concepts all the time: why else would we find various forms of base humour funny?

The solution to your difficulty, then, is precisely to alter our understanding of what ideas are into something more coherent and to recognize that humans are functional concepts. When humans understand themselves to be functional concepts, they are just knowing who they are being, as the ideas are them and their ideas match who they are essentially.

I hope this helps, or at least provokes some thought."

Nathaniel Hannan September 26 2000

Response:

Our perspective (ie. Garvey’s) on the nature of ideas may be the same as your own. We contend that knowledge itself, a product of who we are, sensory information, and thought process, is non-existent, while knowledge is an imaginary illusion created by us ourselves, and it has limited connection through sensory to whatever is outside of ourselves. So our reference to knowledge itself is merely for clarification, and perhaps in response to the prevailing notion that ideas are things in themselves.

Further, the difference between our views may come down to the nature of ideas as form. We claim that the form of ideas is, as mentioned, an imaginary illusion created by us ourselves giving meaning to things (ie. ideas), which themselves do not have, including giving meaning to meaning. In other words, the form of ideas is in our minds because we imagine that it is. It follows that the form is part of who we are in the sense that we are the creators of ideas. Though the form is not an intrinsic part of who we are, which creates in our view a necessary separation between mind and being to allow us to know.
Is this the position you are taking as well in regard to the nature of form? If not, please explain to us how we can know without intrinsic separation from what we know?

In terms of Aristotle’s notion of functional concepts, as true conceptions of what things and life-forms are, we reserve comment on it until you address the nature of form. Though, we will mention that functional concepts appear applicable to material extensions of thought, since we are the inventors of them, but not to life-forms due to the neither certainty nor uncertainty of the nature of being. Hence, if thought is empty of who we are, by using functional concepts to perceive ourselves and other life-forms, we may detach ourselves from who we are through our use of them, thereby dehumanize our existence.

Note: We agree that the challenge proposition is "unapproachably secure", as all propositions are, due to the neither certainty nor uncertainty of knowledge. However, in the realm of reason, no proposition is rationally secure, in terms of internal consistency and soundness in relation to antagonistic propositions. It is in that area in which the competition is directed.

124. Entry:

"Based upon the reactions to danger by animals, insects, and people, you could say that there isn't much difference between instinct and consciousness. Ants lose their initial purpose when you try to step on them and scatter in all directions, completely abandoning their assigned duties. The same is true with bees, spiders, and other insects. Somehow they seem to know that their existence is more important than their routines.

To a lesser degree dogs and cats seem to know when their masters are displeased. Many times when I come home I find my dog, Sam, lying on the couch when he knows he shouldn't. When I come into the room, Sam jumps off without being told to. Sam seems to know my wife was much more lax and on more than one occasion, I've seen Sam lie there defying her command to get down. The funny part is she swats him and pushes him, and I don't have to touch him or say a word. Somehow Sam knows I mean business and has nothing to fear from my wife. Is that instinct or conscious choice?"

Richard Stover September 27 2000

Response:

Are insects knowingly changing their routines in the face of danger, or are they responding unconsciously through sensory and instinct? Similarly, does your dog, Sam know that he has nothing to fear from your wife, or is he responding unconsciously through sensory and instinct, which makes it seem to you that he knows?

To begin answering this question, we ask does Sam talk to you or your wife (ie. does Sam use language with conscious meaning attached to it; does he consciously invent things; does he have conscious self-awareness? (ie. does Sam know that he is Sam, or he is simply responding instinctually to a repetitive call directed at him like a clap or whistle, and with conditioned reward waiting for him if he does?)

Further, we agree with your initial statement that there does not appear to be much difference between instinct and consciousness in terms of responding to sensory. Though there does appear to be a profound difference when we compare instinct to consciousness in terms of the nature of knowledge itself. (ie. existing from and through who we are versus existing through thought or what is apparently empty of who we are. The former appears to be a sanctification of who we are, and the latter a rejection of who we are by gradually canceling who we are out.)

Note: Whether life-forms other than ourselves reason or not, does not answer the question of knowing who we are, nor does it necessarily validate reason or non-reason as a means to exist. What we are after is reasonably challenging the assertion that knowledge itself is intrinsically separate from being; and if we take the position that being is intrinsically part of knowing, we need to reasonably show how we can know without intrinsic separation from what we know.

125. Entry:

Reply to the Response to Entry 123.

"I'm going to use a few logical notations to try to make explicit the claims that you make. Content notation will be {} and operator notation will be <>. I take "We contend that knowledge itself, a product of who we are, sensory information, and thought process, is non-existent" to mean that

1. {knowledge} {human being} {sensory information, thought process}

and that

2. {knowledge}

Claim 2 makes claim 1 trivial. I could say, for example, that I produce a fleagle every 2.593 minutes. This is a trivial statement if fleagles don't exist. Indeed, if I were to say that I produce fleagles using wood and steel, it would be clear that I was lying; however, if I said that I produced fleagles from speds and kronks then the statement would be similarly trivially true. In other words, by saying that knowledge doesn't exist, you also imply that sensory information and thought process don't exist either, as they're the wood and steel of knowledge according to (1).

The next phrase of your reply, that "knowledge is an imaginary illusion created by us ourselves, and it has limited connection through sensory to whatever is outside of ourselves" seems to restate these two claims in different words:

3. {knowledge} {human being}

4. {knowledge} {illusion}

Where and are synonymous terms. You would be far better off logically speaking if you changed your claim that knowledge is an illusion, as in (2) your claim is that knowledge doesn't have any kind of being, where in (4) knowledge does seem to have some ontological status, though the ontological status of "illusion" is unclear.

I take "We claim that the form of ideas is, as mentioned, an imaginary illusion created by us ourselves giving meaning to things (ie. ideas), which themselves do not have, including giving meaning to meaning" to be properly translated as follows:

5. {form of ideas} {illusion} 6. {form of ideas} {by human beings}
7. {form of ideas} {meaning} {ideas}
8. {form of ideas} {meaning} {meaning}

The logical consequence of (4) and (5) is that

9. {form of ideas} {knowledge} (4,5) 10. {knowledge} {meaning} {meaning} (8,9)
11. {knowledge} {meaning} {ideas} (7,9)

I take "In other words, the form of ideas is in our minds because we imagine that it is. It follows that the form is part of who we are in the sense that we are the creators of ideas" to be translated:

12. {form of ideas} {human minds} 13. {form of ideas} {human beings}
14. {ideas} {human beings}
15. {form of ideas} {human beings}

I take "Though the form is not an intrinsic part of who we are, which creates in our view a necessary separation between mind and being to allow us to know" to be (where "joined to" is the opposite of "separated from"):

16. {form of ideas} {human beings}
17. {human being} {human minds}

Using 1-17 as premises, I posit:
18. {illusion} {human beings} (4,9,15)
19 {knowledge} {human beings} (9, 13)
20. {knowledge} {human minds} (9,12)

Your views are thus incoherent. (2) implies with 11, 12,19, 20, that ideas can't really have meaning because the knowledge that would give them meaning doesn't exist; that there's no form of ideas in human minds, and without the form of ideas no ideas in human minds either (no form of ideas because the form of ideas and knowledge are interchangeable and knowledge doesn't really exist), and knowledge is imagined by human beings but not in human minds because it doesn't exist (also entailing an internal contradiction in your thought).

(10) is simply incoherent. Knowledge doesn't exist, and meaning isn't even defined.

So what we really have here are a bunch of people walking around with no minds because they're not really attached, and nothing in those minds anyway because knowledge doesn't really exist and the forms of ideas are imaginary and the ideas that we supposedly create also don't exist.

Easy refutation, even though your thoughts are internally contradictory and so no refutation is really needed, is that I'm writing this to you; even if I didn't really exist, you'd still have the idea of this letter and by having even the form of that idea in your mind your argument would be refuted as there can't be any such thing."

Nathaniel Hannan September 28 2000

Response:

Based on your interpretation of our position, we agree with your criticism of it. However, your interpretation does not fully reflect our position:

Though we assert that knowledge itself is non-existent, we assert also that knowledge as form exists as an imaginary illusion from our perspective. In other words, knowledge exists in our minds because we imagine it does, and even though knowledge itself does not exist. Our assertion does not mean that sensory information or thought process does not exist; rather, it means that we ourselves use sensory information and thought process to help form knowledge as imaginary illusion. Moreover, according to your Premise 1, sensory information and thought process are not the "wood and steel" of knowledge, but are merely means to facilitate imagination, or knowledge, with who we are as the fundamental basis for knowledge, which has no wood and steel due to its imaginary state.

Our initial position was that knowledge itself, including knowledge as form, is empty of being or who we are. However, due to the following premises:

1. we cannot get outside of our minds and know that we are.

2. we cannot know knowledge solely through itself.

3. we know through what we know.

4. what we know cannot be knowledge itself which does not make sense.

We conclude that knowledge must be an empty form, whereby knowledge itself is non-existent and knowledge as form is an imaginary illusion created by us ourselves giving meaning to what does not have it. (Meaning refers to something consciously defined.)

Your Premise 7 and 8 are incorrect, because we assert that "being is a necessity of reason" (Kant), therefore though being, or who we are, is a form of knowledge, we are using it to refer to us ourselves, so that who we are, and not the form of ideas, gives meaning to ideas.

Also, Premise 16 is ambiguous, because form of ideas are an essential part of human beings, in the sense that they have become a necessary part of our preservation, while they are not an essential part of human beings in the sense that being is the essential part of human beings.

Similarly Premise 17 is ambiguous, because it is not that human beings are not joined to human minds, but that they are not joined to them intrinsically. Yet, human beings and human minds are joined from creation of minds through human beings, and human beings' use of minds as a means to exist, so that the preservation of human beings through human minds is also the preservation of human minds.

Finally, your claim that because "knowledge is imagined by human beings but not in human minds because they do not exist" is contradictory does not stand, because we stated that knowledge as form exists as an imaginary illusion, including human minds, so that knowledge as imaginary illusion exists as imaginary illusion. This assertion is not internally inconsistent, but represents the circularity of knowledge. In other words, because we cannot know knowledge solely through itself, and all we can know is knowledge, all system of thoughts face circularity when trying to define a system outside of knowledge. Hence, we concede that mind is a crude term, but in our view it is a necessary term because it defines knowledge as a whole in relation to who we are. Also, if we accepted your criticism of circular reasoning, we would be obligated to apply to it all systems of thought, and thereby be left with the position of either rejecting all thought based on internal contradiction, or accepting the apparent limit of knowledge. At this point, we choose the latter alternative, thus determine the reasonableness of thoughts not based on their limits, but based on their reasonableness in relation to each other.

Entries 114-119 Entries 126-134