| Challenge the Philosophy - Dispute 9 (32-36) |
"We are not our thoughts, but we would not be who we are without them. We are not trapped within our minds, we are the cage and the bird. Is the song of the free bird any different from that of the caged bird?
From our cultural context, our perceptions of the world are formed, and within that context new perceptions are added, forever changing the context space. Within the creation of meaning we become truth.
Since we have dealt with the issues of containment (Reply 17 P1(c), Reply 29 P3), the knowledge that we claim remains unbounded within the dynamic. Therefore the notion of a thing which exists outside of ourselves seems more an intrinsic motive than an actual object. Further, the concept of intrinsic separation as a prerequisite to knowledge classifies the unknown as an object separate from self and therefore posits a paradox as it's basis. Simply put, if we can't get outside of our minds' then the intrinsic separation of (self/not self) is an illusion. It may perhaps be more reasonable to conclude that the simple notions of "inside" and "outside" cannot, in a global way, be applied to epistemology (not to mention the difficulties in handling self referential functions). To refer back to the analogy of the klein bottle, the location of any point on it's surface can be linked to any other point through a simple transformation, however the extrapolation of the entire closed surface through a subset of points remains undefined. In a similar way, reference to that which exists "outside" of ourselves is a misnomer. In other words, knowledge is based on transformation (or in linguistic terms context juxtaposition). The experience of newness can therefore be perceived as a function of a dynamic.
To bridge the apparent gap between perception and cognition, I have decided to take a bottom up approach and base extrapolation on consistent data. It is my belief that a psychological (or top down) approach should be able to derive, what we perceive as physical laws and therefore define a complete manifold.
I certainly don't mean to imply that any particular experience is pre ordinate. However experience itself, whether conscious or unconscious, to be examined reasonably, must be given a self consistent basis. Within the superposition model we exist as icebergs in a sea of experience. Both composed of water and yet separate from it. The only difference between us and our surroundings is that of form, not of substance."
Ken Bell May 15 2000
If we are not our thoughts, how can we be the bird in the cage?
We agree that the song of the free bird may not be any different from the song of the caged bird. Though there appears to be a profound difference between us existing as the free bird versus us existing through the caged bird. Both birds appear empty of who we are, except we exist through the empty song of the caged bird.
Why is it a paradox to assert that knowledge itself is intrinsically different from who we are, when we apparently cannot get outside of our minds, and we cannot know something (ie. knowledge) solely through itself? Further, if we are the creators of knowledge, and we cannot create who we are through who we are, how could there not be an intrinsic difference between who we are and knowledge?
Just because we cannot get outside of our minds, does not mean that the intrinsic separation between who we are and knowledge is an illusion. The concept of not getting outside of our minds refers to our knowledge, and since we ourselves are not our knowledge, or thoughts, we deduct that we ourselves are intrinsically different from knowledge.
We agree that the concepts of "inside" and "outside" have epistemic limits, and therefore may not be applicable to epistemology or self-referential functions. Though if we accept their inapplicability, to be consistent in our reasoning we would have to accept the inapplicability of all concepts including epistemology, klein bottle, and independent living systems.
From our perspective, as reasoning beings, we must accept all dichotomies and comparisons, including their epistemic limitations, and use our reason to decide amongst them, or detach from thought. In other words, we do not accept "oneness" as a valid epistemological argument, because it is self-contradictory.
If form is the only difference between us and our surroundings, how can we know anything?
We contend that thoughts themselves, being different in substance from us and our surroundings, give us a limited ability to know.
"Consider a diamond, a lump of coal, and a piece of graphite. Each of these objects is mainly composed of carbon atoms arranged in various ways. Each object has properties that are distinct from one another that may be equal to or greater than the comparative properties of differing substances. When we compare these three different forms to one another using our senses, they appear to be very different things. Yet we know, through conscious analysis, that all three objects are manifestations of a single basic substance.
Intrinsically the three forms remain undifferentiated and exist only in relation to the knowable. If we consider that "we" (as classifier through superposition, create differentiation of form, then an implied history, filtered through our awareness), define what is observed. The way that we define and process matter is in a fundamental way, no different from the way any life form or living system does. A tree for example makes a distinction between CO2 and H2O in that one is taken in primarily from the atmosphere and the other exclusively from the soil. The encoded information regarding the relative abundance, phase and circulation of the two substances is what we see when we observe a tree. Of course it doesn't stop there, the encoding of gravitational pull, relative sunlight, seasonal variation and all other factors within the tree phenotype and the defining functions of our phenotype are what makes the reality of a tree to us possible.
A primary difference between living and non-living forms is that living forms of matter possess phylogenic plasticity as an emergent property. Living matter can, within limits, change form in response to the environment and still retain basic properties such as reproduction, and variation. However, the genotype doesn't necessarily reflect the history of immediate predecessors. In non-living matter, every change in form is reflected in structure, or in other words non-living matter possesses low phylogenic plasticity. From a simple point of view complex systems are defined by their emergent properties and we can therefore posit a boundary space between living and non-living constrained by the level of complexity. Living systems increase algorithmic complexity by encoding (self/not self) superpositions within a dynamic structure. As complex systems settle on attractors, the degree of strangeness can be considered a measure of plasticity. Since energy pathways are fractal, changes in scale as well as form can take place.
Consider our symbolic interaction with the environment.
The actions of berry picking and clear cut foresting are in essence the same thing. Aside from the obvious difference in scale they both serve as a means, through which we maintain our bodies Of course, through symbolic interaction we imbue one form with the encoded information of another. In this way we can short circuit fractal enthalpic paths, and increase our "footprint" if you will. The cost is that symbolic interaction itself is a dynamic structure, whose attractor remains unbounded. From this view it can be seen that the relative information encoded in price structures has as one source the price structure itself. It certainly has no relation to what could be called, biological necessity, from our point of view. This property of self-reference has not been proven to exist in natural non-living systems. We may therefore conclude that symbolic interaction falls within the definition of a living system. If symbolic interaction or culture can in some respect be considered a living system, then the proportion of phylogenic plasticity, when considered from within the system will always be 100%. What this does for us is to provide an artificial fitness advantage through which symbolic interaction is maintained. In a very real way we become links in our own food web. Of course today, with system models we can see that this particular set of interactions is causing rapid change to the environment. To facilitate increased symbolic interaction (ie. trade, conquest, etc) various power structures have developed which position us within emergent environments The problem is that centralized (ideologically or otherwise) power structures can't in a robust way, interact with the natural environment. For example, the relative demand of a commodity such as aluminum is a product of the utility and the availability. If availability becomes so low as push the price beyond means then the utility will be redistributed to other commodities. This, fairly sudden change translates to adding noise to our symbolic interaction, in that a change of state becomes encoded within the system by modifying the price structure. As we can see in this instance, price structure creates a level of abstraction (aluminum based technology transferred to non-aluminum resources) which supersedes any barriers between phylogeny and ontogeny. So it would seem that this system exhibits living and non-living properties. Could it be perhaps, that (knowledge / language) also exhibits living and non-living properties? Perhaps a fundamental reexamination of the concept "tool" is in order."
Ken Bell July 28 2000
What do you mean by (self and non self) superpositions in terms of living systems?
How can an unconscious living system encode?
How can the system of abstraction via price structure not exhibit both living and non-living properties, when both we ourselves (living systems), and price and its structure (non-living systems) are behind the system? Moreover, since the non-living system (ie. price) is guiding the living system (us), it should not be surprising that the system is causing “rapid change to the environment”. (ie. collection of living systems) The same result can be derived from knowledge / language, the conscious basis for price system, which exhibits the living property of us ourselves (high plasticity relative to non-living system) the creators of knowledge / language, and knowledge / language itself being a non-living system.
Apparently the only living property of knowledge / language themselves is that they have existence in the form of appearances in our minds; though we can attribute this form to us ourselves exerting, and thereby creating, the existence of knowledge / language.
Could it be that by the human species using tools (ie. use of material extensions of thought to assist its means to exist), it is gradually diminuting itself and the environment, or "short circuiting entropy at the expense of [most] living systems", through accelerated abstraction and expansion of symbolic interaction?
"From our point of view, living systems can only be considered an extension of ourselves and therefore any definition of self or not self with regards to such systems must necessarily be a function of a rational projection or "model". With this in mind, (self and non self) superpositions in terms of living systems can only be defined retroactively (since we cannot predict the precise form,{or state space location} only the general shape of the orbit) in terms of a given set of measurable parameters. So, for example within a stable ecosystem(defined as one within which we can make fairly accurate predictions of population cycles, energy pathways, etc...) an introduced genotype will precipitate changes to all phenotypes(including itself) and thus perminately encode the superposition as a function of complexity (often with the effect of increasing the total system entropy for a period of time, until the system settles to an area of state space of lower intrinsic potential energy). The key to understanding how algorithmic complexity can increase is by measuring system response (time) in terms of energy differentials. Plainly put, we can't rush things. Also, in terms of the universe, there are no unitary phenomenon, only unitary perceptions.(A tree is not a tree. It is only a tree because we say that it is.).
Consciousness is not prerequisite to encode, however it seems that it "is" to decode. In this way matter speaks, and we listen. On the other hand, since we have no clear definition of consciousness(and thus unconsciousness), your question extends an undefined attribute to a category.
In regards to your last question, I regret that I must begin by asking:
Do you believe that there is a definable boundary between a living thing and a non living thing?
If so, can you demonstrate (living/non living) interactions in terms of absolutes?
If you would be so kind, please indulge me in a small demonstration. After reading this sentence, please pick up the nearest non living object and consider what has just happened, in terms of a single event. Put aside notions of causality and time for a moment. We, that is, you and I are separated by almost two thousand miles and several hours and yet in terms of this small system a measurable change of energy has occurred.
Once again, it seems, we're led to a reexamination of what a "tool" actually is.
Could it be perhaps that our ability to make tools far exceeds our ability to use them wisely? Perhaps the simple awareness of this recursive cycle will be enough to reverse some of the suffering that we've inflicted upon the environment and ourselves."
Ken Bell September 18 2000
In terms of your living system, it does not follow that it is necessary that the living system contain (self and non self) superpositions. By asserting this point, we do not question the notion of self and non self; rather, we question the notion of superposition which is scientifically unverifiable, and it can only be theorized within a self-contained system of thought, rather than in the open realm of reason. We would like to know why superposition is a necessary feature of your notion of a living system.
Could it be that your notion of a living system, and not living system itself, is dependent on superposition?
Also, it is unclear why you do not incorporate being or "ourselves" directly into your notion of a living system, instead of using energy as the central component.
If consciousness is not a prerequisite to encode, it follows that there are other forms of knowledge that are beyond consciousness. Though could it be that there is no other encoding than through consciousness, so that a life-form’s sensory unconsciously gives birth to unconscious information? In other words, could it not be that sensory does not encode information from outside of it, since its information is in relation to itself and whatever is outside of it, but that sensory is information?
No, we do not believe that there is a definable boundary between a living thing and a non-existent thing. Though our assertion does not mean that a living thing is the same as a non-existent thing. It means that there is a connection between a living thing and non-existent thing, which prevents us from making a concrete boundary between them. In other words, any boundary we define between a living thing and a non-existent thing will be overshadowed by a connection between the living thing and non-existent thing. (ie. apparently, there is no non-existent thing without a living thing. Hence, if there is any definable boundary that could reasonably be set, it is that a non-existent thing is dependent on a living thing; whereas, a living thing, depending on the case, is not dependent on a non-existent thing. For example, non-thinking animals apparently exist without a need for a non-existent thing like thought. (We have left out consideration of the definable boundary between a living thing and non-living thing, because they appear dependent on each other, like a life-form needing to feed off a dead life-form, and a dead life-form needing prior living existence in order to be a dead life-form.))
We agree that things, living and non-living, are influenced by changes in energy. Though it appears that a non-existent thing does not measure energy, and through for instance our use of thought, a non-existent thing can help bring about changes in energy in living and non-living things.
We agree with your point that by being aware of our ability to make tools exceeds our ability to use them wisely, we may be able to reverse some of the suffering that we have inflicted on the environment and ourselves. But we need to answer in what ways do we use tools unwisely? Could it be that the use of tools themselves, or material extensions of thought, is inherently unreasonable in terms of our preservation? What are the effects of using tools on us ourselves? What is the nature of ourselves and the nature of tools themselves? What is the nature of us ourselves and the nature of thoughts themselves? Could Garvey be right that beneath the benefits of using tools, the human species is gradually diminuting itself and most other life-forms through its use of tools?
Reply to Entry 146 and its response.
Explanation of the concept, "2 are parts of One" from the Reply:
One and Two
Within the set of positive integers there exists a member (1) whose value is considered indivisible, that is it has no real factors. As such, 1 represents the fundamental integer(ness) of all members of the set. In this way 1 stands as a concept in the same way that an apple’s appleness, represents a general class composed of sensory data and associative functions. Though these generalizations, when examined through their components (in the case of "apple", shape, color, texture etc.) would necessitate further divisions into subclasses (macintosh, sparta, granny smith....) and further, our rule of thumb is to limit the definition to the context and extend properties to similar things. In this way we create a oneness to which we can apply logical operators.
I wish to point out the disconnect, between the reality of the apple (or any other single thing) to our senses, and the operators by which we manipulate the unitary models.
A simple example may clarify.
Suppose, walking through the autumn forest you suddenly find yourself surrounded by a grove of beech trees. You see a few large trees surrounded by a number of younger trees. You may notice that this particular grove is denser than the surrounding forest and seems composed of only beech trees. Looking down you also notice a number of small scruffy looking shrubs devoid of any leaves. Taking the time to investigate you may notice a pattern in the densities of larger and smaller trees. You will also see that if you dig under the leaf litter and into the soil, an extensive network of large roots connects all of the trees. In fact what seemed like a grove of trees and shrubs is in fact, a single organism. Now, you could count all of the trees, but that number would be restricted to your previous assumption and you would have to relabel trees as trunks. This definition will hold only as long as you don't investigate the nature of "trunks".
Within the single parameter space of integers, 1+1=2 only when viewed as an alienated construct, as a logical reality that exists independently. If however, we include our own perceptions of oneness, we find a fundamental bifurcation of the unitary "integer" into components that satisfy integer(ness). Viewed as a whole the equation 1+1=2 can be redefined as a system whose elements are unitary.
Reply:
"What do we really know?
After all information is just a word we use to describe the change of state of a system from A to B. Certainly this conforms to our definition of entropy. Can knowledge, or more precisely the "state of knowing", be restricted to our information/entropy consensus? Within the Aristotelian world 1+1=2 is always true. However it can also be concluded that 2 are parts of One if we include our own perception in the equation.
The idea of "who we are" is nothing more that a unitary concept and therefore falls within the limits of perception. By this definition, one could say that we are as we perceive ourselves to be. Since our perception exists only as a superposition of our present internal state and the state of our sensory environment (self/not self), self awareness can only exist in flux. The monolithic "Who We Are" can only be replaced by a more subtle and dynamic present awareness. We are the universe in action. There can be no other.
Models we create can add greatly to our understanding of the workings of the universe, but they cannot provide us with that which we desperately seek. They are tools, creations, and have no knowledge of themselves. We provide the basis of implementation and it is Us ourselves that provide the reason behind their creation. It is also Us ourselves that provide meaning to that which we discover.
Is it reasonable to posit a goal within the unknown?
It seems to me that knowledge of ourselves would more aptly be described as a process. In this sense self knowledge is inherently irrational. Further, since we have demonstrated the non locality of mind (as a function of context domains ; see Reply 29-30) that, which "we perceive ourselves to be" can only exist as a member of some set of larger contexts. I suggest that the term "being" in the context of our discussion represents a metonymy of something inexpressible yet comprehensible.
To reverse the question I ask :
"Can we know anything other than ourselves? Can we be anything other than ourselves?".
Ken Bell January 11 2001
Just as it can be reasoned that the equation, (1+1=2) is an interconnected whole made up of "logical operators", it can be reasoned that (1+1) does not equal 2, because in terms of time and space, there is no such thing as identical things (e.g. 1 and 1), so (1+1) must be either less or more than 2, with never the same result.
More interesting is that Aristotle justifies the equation (1+1=2) as always true, on the grounds that reason equates to "soul" or who we are, and yet in your example and in our own, we are using reason, which means that if we accept Aristotle’s concept of reason as "soul", we face the task of determining which of three of assertions about (1+1=2) is more reasonable, instead of just accepting Aristotle’s claim (1+1=2) is always true.
Further, and more important, the notion of reason as "soul" is antagonistic to the challenge proposition, which says that reason is not "soul" or who we are, and in fact is empty of "soul". (Aristotle’s claim that reason equates to "soul" stems from his belief that the "soul" is made up of irrational or unconscious side and a rational or conscious side, so that being and knowing are in oneness. ("Ethics", I, xiii, 8) Several problems with his perspective of "soul" will be addressed in the conclusion of this response.)
Yes, the notion of "who we are" falls within the limits of our perception, and yet the notion as used in the competition refers to a reasoned entity beyond our perception.
Can "who we are" as non-label entity be replaced by "we are the universe in action" as you contend? What is behind the universe and its action? What is the origin of the universe? We contend that "who we are" could be the basis behind the "universe in action".
We agree that "being" represents a "metonymy of something inexpressible yet comprehensible", just as the notion of who we are does. (Note, we equate "metonymy of something inexpressible yet comprehensible" to our limited perspective of things we reason to be beyond or outside of our minds.) Hence, in terms of the competition, we are not positing a goal within the unknown, but the positing a goal within the known by trying to determine a more reasonable perspective than the apparent intrinsic separation between being and knowing. (However, we contend that even if we posited competition’s goal within the unknown, it would still be reasonable due to the self-referent nature of knowledge, and yet less reasonable than positing the goal within the known as we have done.)
We disagree that self-knowledge, or any knowledge, is "inherently irrational", because of the self-referent nature of knowledge, whereby we cannot be fully certain of anything we know or believe. For instance, you cannot be absolutely certain that your premise, "knowledge of ourselves is a process", and your conclusion, "self-knowledge is inherently irrational", no matter how reasonable they may appear to you. So the assertion itself, "self-knowledge is inherently rational", is reasonable. (i.e. the assertion itself is reasonably possible.)
Can we know anything other than ourselves?
We contend that it is possible that we could know something other than ourselves. Though the more reasonable response is that we cannot, because we cannot get outside of our minds and know that we are, so everything we know is our individual perspective, and yet the content of our perspective derives partly from sensory of whatever is outside of us and may also be from the minds of other people (past and present), which takes us to the notion that self-knowledge appears limited.
Can we be anything other than ourselves?
To rephrase your question, can we be anything other than the knowledge of ourselves? We contend that the question’s premise that we are the knowledge of ourselves (Aristotle’s position of the oneness of being and knowing) is incorrect for the following reasons:
1. In order to know, we need intrinsic separation from what we know and ourselves, otherwise we would be in oneness with what we know.
2. We are apparently the creators of our knowledge. So it does not follow how we can create who we are through who we are.
3. If our thoughts are who we are, it does not follow how we can still be who we are, when we are not thinking, and yet some how when we do think, our thoughts are who we are? (i.e. since we are who we are when we are not thinking, how can our thoughts be who we are when we are thinking? What is the connection between our being and our thoughts, when they are apparently not the same? For instance, an individual acts without thinking, and yet when he thinks, he is using thoughts he already knows, so where is the connection between his being and his thoughts? The answer to this question is that no perspective or thought is identical. It is not that thoughts as form are not the same, but our perspective of thoughts change. Though the form or basis of thoughts could change with our being. How? We create thoughts, and yet they as form some how change on their own??)
4. If thoughts as form are who we are, there is no separation between thoughts and who we are, and yet there is when we are not thinking and we are thinking.
"I agree that we are not our thoughts and have stated so ( Reply 23, Reply 32 above). It is an error to combine the two questions "Can we know anything other than ourselves? " and "Can we be anything other than ourselves? " into a single question that assumes being is derived from knowledge. Being cannot be abstracted by reason. The only shape reason can give to being is through negation.
Nor can being be separate from mind. Mind and Being are forever coupled in a dance of creation and destruction. Though, when examined through a subset of mind (reason), one may assert precedence of one over the other, the duality created by such an endeavour ultimately leads to the erroneous conclusion that we are "not who we are", (i.e. that knowledge of ourselves is somehow intrinsically separate from our being).
To assert that "who we are" is the basis of the "universe in action" is essentially cognocentric in that it presupposes nothing beyond perception. Just as the stream sinks into the earth only to emerge from the cliff face miles away, so we see seemingly discontinuous events as somehow relating to a whole. Certainly, one may investigate any set of data to reveal correlations and propose a hypothesis to explain them, but this doesn't form the basis of any direct statement of the phenomenon in question. With this in mind, it is understood that we must in some way actually experience a thing to have any direct knowledge of it. Since the nature of experience is unknowable (in that "newness" is the word we give to the "moment to moment" unfolding of reality), that which we consider "reasonable" must constantly be challenged by our perceptions.
As in the old aphorism "hindsight is 20/20" we can rationalize every bend and turn along a trodden path, but this doesn't tell us what’s ahead. Any path is the interplay of an organism’s movement and the relative non-movement of an environment. The path is not a function of the organism OR the environment, it is a function of the organism AND the environment, and as such represents a superposition of each. Further, since the path is likely to be referenced again, we may consider it (from the organism’s perspective) as part of the environment, and (from the environment’s perspective) as an extension of organisms. Therefore a degree of self-reference is required to come to a more complete understanding of what a path actually is.
Through this reasoning, its easy to see that the dichotomy between subject and object is in fact an illusion of causality, and no single perspective can give a complete description. We are not our thoughts, just as we are not our actions. I agree that in saying "we are the universe in action", I have taken a somewhat biased view, but after all, I'm only human."
Ken Bell January 19 2001
The problem with your ‘interconnected’ position, "being and knowing cannot be divided into separate entities, because they are ‘coupled in a dance of creation and destruction’", is that you can take that position for any asserted division or separation, so that if we consistently follow your position through, we would not be able to know anything, including oneness and nothingness (or "negation") because they too cannot be separated according to the interconnected position. Moreover, if we examine the interconnected position itself, the position succumbs to inconsistency, by being dependent on the basis for interconnectedness and its negation. Therefore, we assert that our conclusion that ‘knowledge as form is intrinsically separate from who we are as non-label entity’ is a necessity of reason. (i.e. it is a necessity of reason for all thought to have conscious distinctions or separations.)
We agree that the conception of "who we are" as non-label entity is cognocentric, and yet similarly, your notion of experience as in direct knowledge is also cognocentric, unless you can more reasonably show how we can get outside of our minds through experience and know that we are, than not doing so. We do not think you or anyone can.
We agree that apparently no single perspective can give a complete description of reality. Though we contend that due to the self-referent nature of knowledge, it is possible that a single perspective could give a complete description.
It is our contention that to partially relieve the apparent incompleteness, imperfectness of knowledge, we must determine what is the most reasonable knowledge (Garvey, "The Critique of Reasonableness"), and as you say, continue to challenge what is the most reasonable through our new perspectives.
Dispute 9 (29-31) Dispute 9 (37-)