| Challenge the Philosophy - Investigation 9 (10-12) |
In reply 2 in the dispute section of the "Challenge the Philosophy", you wrote:
"I would have to concede that if reason were our only
faculty we would be in a real mess.
However we also possess the knowledge of being which allows
objective observation, through our senses, of the world
around us. This world includes other people who also
observe the world and interact with us. Are we always
guided by reason in our daily lives? Has there
ever been a rational culture? It seems to me that the
knowledge of being, being a limited instance of being
itself, is the value referred to in A)6 which can be used
to moderate an apparently degenerative loop."
What is this "knowledge of being" you are referring to? How do you define it?
How can your "knowledge of being" be independent of reason when it is dependent on reason to have "objective observation"?
Since we can't get outside of our minds, all we can know is what we reason. So it appears that your "knowledge of being" is a fabricated faculty, or at least one, from our perspective, contingent on reason.
Is "I" absolute, or could it merely be a fabricated identity of who we are? (Can you prove that we don't invent the labels and meanings for our knowledge?)
We concede that who or what we are appears casually connected to our thoughts. Though it does not follow that what we think itself has "knowledge of being". A more plausible answer, in consideration of the challenge proposition, is that who we are is behind our thoughts, (ie. casually connected), but our thoughts themselves have no knowledge of being.
"I appreciate your preception of the key point of the challenge. In regards to Knowledge of Being I would like to approach this from a couple of different angles. Firstly I would reiterate that knowledge logically reduces to two fundamental types. Knowledge based on direct observation of the world, which I have termed (k)d and knowledge based in reason (k)i. Perhaps these distinctions are best demonstrated with a short fiction.
Say, for example, while driving in your car you come across an accident, where a car is wrecked and overturned. You pull over and perhaps if you have a cell phone, call the authorities. When you get out of your vehicle to help you notice smoke coming from the overturned car, and see the driver upside down, hanging by the seatbelt strap. Depending upon the type of person you are, you may either experience some momentary deliberation or you may run in to rescue the hapless driver.
Suffice to say that you do rush in and pull the man from the wreck. After dragging him some distance from the accident you see that he is conscious but unable to communicate and is in obvious pain.
You may ask "where does it hurt" but get no meaningful response. After a brief visual check you notice that his right leg is broken. Moments later you notice the lights of a police car that has stopped to help. Later, that evening you relate the story to family and friends, perhaps focusing on the fact that the car was smoking, or that the man was unable to communicate.
In the story we see examples of (k)d and (k)i working dependently and independently. Globally your relating the story to family and friends is clearly (k)i, since their only real experience is the event of you telling a story. More specifically the experience of pain, due to a broken leg, by the victim is an example of (k)d, in fact the reality of his broken leg did not exist for you until you discovered it for yourself. Now to the important point. When you saw the smoke, then the victim and realized the potentially fatal consequences to the driver, and perhaps to yourself, what realization drove you to rescue him? What were your thoughts concerning your own safety? And, more to the point, do you feel you could properly convey your internal experience, after the fact? This is one way to show Knowledge of Being in action.
From Reply 2 in the disputes:
C) 4.
Since (b) cannot be abstracted by (k)
we must conclude that:
All (b) that is (not(k)) is equally undefined and
therefore beyond our perspective.
Since (k) in (b) is not necessarily absolute, (k) can only be
considered an instance of (b).
As for (b) in (k), because of (b)'s undefined character,
only a limited set of (b) can be defined.
Klein bottle.
The reason I include the term Klein Bottle is to show the parallel between,
a finite but unbounded surface which cannot be extrapolated by any portion of itself,
and the nature of knowledge as a subset of being and hence beings potential for realization.
And from Reply 3:
A)6.
(b) in (k) is defined as the portion of (k) which
recognizes 'itself' and by extension, 'other'(b).
Since "Be" refers to the state of living or existing,
everything beyond (k) which is alive or exists must have
the quality (b). Therefore (b) in (k) which exists is
limited to (k)'s assertion that it, (k) exists and, by
extension other undefined (b) exists.
As I have also shown the resolution to the paradox cited in the discussion can be found in the recognition of our inability to communicate direct knowledge ie. experience. In the communication of this knowledge we do indeed invent labels and derive meaning from those labels. However, although the word "I" is a label which communicates my identity as distinct from "you" it is based on the direct knowledge of myself and in fact can only be a pale representation of my being. After all "I" is just a story that I'm telling you. You don't necessarily have to believe it, but then, how do you feel about your own existence?
In regards to causality, any causally connected definition of us must necessarily be reduced to reason, which I think you'll agree is too limited for a complete definition. To reiterate:
for all "I" there exists (k)i+(k)d (self awareness)
for all (not)"I" there exists ["I"((k)d+(k)i)]=(not)"I"(k)i
Secondly, in regards to animals. It can be demonstrated that any animals ability
to solve problems using abstract reason is functionally related to their ability to use
language. In short, reason, as we recognize it is a function of communication or more
specifically recursive language. With this in mind we know that animals with little or no
reasoning ability can still aquire new knowledge. They may not have the ability to process
this knowledge into a systemic context the way higher brains can, but they, none the less
learn to interact positively with their specific enviroment. Since humans and higher
animals differ in this respect, only quantitatively, it would seem reasonable to infer
that our ability to reason and abstract symbols from our enviroment is a function of
our communication and recursive language. Since the systemic context of some of
our concepts is, several levels removed, from the concrete principals from which
they were derived, it would also be reasonable to infer that some of these concepts,
assumptions and conclusions could lead to dead end inexpressabilities."
Ken Bell January 8 2000
A) Regarding your short fiction, we have the following comments:
1. We claim that we, (ie. the individuals that make up humankind) can't get outside of our minds. So all we can know, from our perspective, is from within our minds, or what we reason. Since we invent the labels of our knowledge and their meanings, as you agree by stating that "we do indeed invent labels and derive meaning from those labels," it follows that when the person in the story discovers the accident, he does not perceive the accident directly as in "k(d)"; rather, he perceives it by applying his invented knowledge to what he thinks he perceives around him. In other words, he does not directly perceive the "wrecked car", "the driver upside down, hanging by his seatbelt strap", "the driver's right leg broken", or "the lights of a police car that has stopped". Instead, he has applied his invented knowledge to what he perceives around him, without really knowing what he perceives.
To illustrate, could a person with no conscious knowledge, perceive anything consciously around him? No. The conscious knowledge does not come directly from what is around him. It comes from his invented knowledge applied to what he perceives around him. His ability to distinguish things around him is not from whatever is around him, but from the application of his invented knowledge to what he perceives.
Moreover, when the person at the scene of the accident relates his story to family and friends, he is relying on what he perceived by applying his invented knowledge to it. We agree that since his family and friends were not at the accident, their knowledge of it is indirect in a limited sense, but in another, it is not indirect because it has come from the person's direct experience of the accident.
Also, we agree that when the person discovered the accident he made a decision, either instinctually or consciously, or both, about of how to respond to it. We agree that his decision and actions are a representation of him in that moment. However, it does not follow that his decisions were from "knowledge of being". It is clear that regardless of the situation, he would have to respond in some way. (ie. he exists) And it would seem equally clear that he could consider different choices about how to respond, and then act on one of them. So again in a limited sense, we agree that the person may have had "knowledge of being" by deciding from the choices in his mind. However, it does not follow that he really knew how he himself wanted to respond to the accident. All he did was choose from the choices of his invented knowledge. He did not have literal "knowledge of being". Also, he did not know that "this is who I really am, and I can express it in my thoughts themselves". No. He himself (ie. being) appears to be outside of his invented knowledge, and choosing from it.
Finally, according to your theory of knowledge, k(i) is dependent on k(d), otherwise it could not exist. So in essence, there is really no difference between k(d) and k(i). They amount to simply k: invented labels and meanings formed by our reason and what we imagine we perceive around us, including ourselves. (K(i) can't be reasonably distinguished from k(d) because, for example, when we reflect to ourselves, it requires both invented knowledge and our imaginary perception of reflecting, which in our view, is only different from k(d) in that we are perceiving in our minds versus perceiving outside of them.
B). "Since (k) in (b) is not necessarily absolute", just as (not(k)) in (b) is not necessarily absolute as well, it does not follow why "(k) can only be considered an instance of (b)". (k) could be considered (not(b)) with only casual connection to (b). The problem with the Klein Bottle example is that it does not explain how we can know who we are and be who we are at the same time. Moreover, it does not follow how (k)itself could equal (b)itself, and yet they are part of the same thing. What is this thing they are part of? Also, it appears that (b)itself in (k)itself, whether a limited subset of (b) or not, does not even exist, because (b)itself and (k)itself are really part of something else. Is it reasonable to assert that (k) and (b) don't really exist, or that they only exist as an invented division of something else? From our perspective, we say no, it is not reasonable. If you mean that the something else is (b)itself as in ((b)itself in (k)itself) = (b)itself, then this does not make sense because it would have to equal a variable different from (b) and (k). Also, there would be no inherent difference between (b) and (k), and thereby there would be no way to distinguish the two of them.
B).1. You wrote that "since (b) cannot be abstracted by (k)", and then later that "as for (b) in (k), because of (b)'s undefined character, only a limited subset of (b) can be defined". The two statements contradict. Since we can't abstract (b) by (k), there would not be a subset of (b) that can be defined, without assuming what we cannot know.
C). The definition of "be" as used in the "Challenge the Philosophy" competition is defined as "the state of living or existing with who we are as the basis". So by proving that (k) exists, does not prove that (k) exists with who we are as its basis. It may exist as mere form through our thought process and invention of knowledge, or there may be something other than life behind it.
D). In terms of "I" being based on "direct knowledge of myself", we assert that your direct knowledge of yourself is invented labels and meanings applied to the perception of what you do not know, and in terms of you yourself, what you cannot express. The point is that you can't have direct knowledge of you yourself because you yourself would then be a mere invented label and invented meaning. Since "I" is just a "label which communicates your identity", it follows that "yourself" would be as well.
E). We agree with your point that reason alone is too limited to capture any casually
connected definition of us. However, we have shown that there is no inherent difference
between k(i) and k(d). So our definiton of a casually connected us would be as follows:
for all "I" there exists (k) + ((i)nexpressible of who we are) + ((u)nconscious sensory)
F). It appears unreasonable to assume that just because "the systemic context of some of our concepts is, several levels removed, from the concrete principals from which they were derived that some of these concepts, assumptions, and conclusions could be inexpressible. Inexpressible in the way you are using it implies that they can't be expressed, even though they are connected to concrete principles which can be expressed. A more reasonable position is to assert that they are unknown with the possibility of being expressed, without even considering whether the "concepts, assumptions, and conclusions" themselves are reasonable.
"Before we go too much further I think that we should clearly establish and define the nature of the challenge assertion. Since we agree (R5 A,2.) that we can be "nothing other our present existence", I believe that it would be prudent, in future to refer to the true problem. That is, "can we know ourselves"?
In the story it's important to remember that there were two main characters, One whose memory of the incident was mostly based on generated knowledge (k)i, and one whose recollection would be a reflection of his experience (k)d. I'm certain that the experience of being in a rolling car, or the pain of a broken limb, would be recognized by any cognatitive being, as traumatic. Indeed, one could easly imagine, that if this had happened to a dog, that, an automobile fearing complex "autophobia if you will" could easily develop. This brings us to the distinction between (k)d and (k)i. These two type of knowledge can only be defined extrinsically of rational cognition or more simply put, as a function of their basis. When (k)d and (k)i become encapsulated by definition they become the same thing. Now as for the hero in the story. Whether by deliberation, or some form of instinct based tropism he became fully contiguous with the situation and also with the victim. In fact, as far as language permits, his differentiation between "I" and "you" became secondary to his perception of the reality of the situation. This, at least hints to, the possibility of all (b) being unbounded by "I". I would go further to conclude that the decision to pull the victim from the wreck could not have been made, based on reason (k)i, as this would have inevitably lead to degenerate recursion.
Again I feel it important to make perfectly clear that any information conveyed through language has it's basis in a consensus of abstractions, and that reason is based on that consensus. Therefore I agree that the global inexpressability of being exists, but this does not necessarily negate it's perception. Indeed, to "know ourselves" and to "be ourselves" are one in the same.
In regards to your observation in (R10, B2), I apologise for not making the point more clearly understood. The statement "(b) cannot be abstracted by (k)" should read "all(b) cannot be abstracted by (k)". As for the limited subset of (b) which can be defined by (k), I refer here to the portion of (b) which recognizes itself through the limited abstractions of (k)i.
On your definition of "be" within the context of the challenge ("the state of living or existing with who we are as the basis"), the word "be" becomes contained within the rational definition of "who we are". This is an example of what I earlier referred to a concept, removed by systemic context. Since "be" is already an abstraction, any further alienation of it's fundemental concept can only lead to confusion. Perhaps even to paradox.
The term "I" as communicated to "you" is only a symbol and does not convey my being. The concept "I" as communicated to myself is still, only an abstraction, after the fact. Any true self awareness can only exist in being.
In a sense, what we are doing here is analogous to trying to infer the taste of
a salad by examining the
chemical components of its constituent vegetables. If properly made and tossed,
each bite of the salad
is slightly different from the last but doesn't detract too much from the main
theme. One could examine
each bite and perhaps deduce the types and percentages of vegetables used, but the
experience of eating
the salad, and the recognition that, what one is eating is indeed a salad, need no
rational cognition".
Ken Bell January 10 2000
Yes, the competition problem is whether or not we can know us ourselves. (ie. who we are) However, the challenge proposition could be refuted in one of its premises. Though we don't think so.
The person who experienced the "rolling car" and a "broken limb" must apply his invented labels and invented meanings to those situations for him to know that he experienced those things. Hence, we disagree that k(d) and k(i) can be distinguished based on a "function of their bases". Their bases are the same, except for the experiencing in our minds versus the experiencing outside of them. (It seems that you are taking a "cake and no cake" position by asserting that k(d) and k(i) can be distinguished "extrinsically of rational cognition", and then admitting that they become the same thing when "encapsulated by definition".)
Regarding the claim that any cognitive being would feel "traumatic" about rolling in a car or from the pain of a broken leg does not get us anywhere, because most cognitive beings would agree that rolling in car or breaking a leg is traumatic if they reflected about it happening to them. So it appears that there is only insignificant difference between k(d) and k(i). (The dog example is not relevant because dogs are not cognitive beings. Though even if we apply the dog example, it actually shows that we don't need k(d) to have experience of being. We can do it unconsciously or instinctually like a non-cognitive being such as a dog.
We disagree that we can "perceive" the inexpressibility of being through our intellect. Perception through intellect implies the application of knowledge to what we sense around us, including ourselves. We can't perceive anything through intellect, without having knowledge of what we are perceiving. Therefore, it follows that inexpressibility of being does negate its perception through intellect. (ie. If its inexpressible, we certainly can't know it). However, we concede that it may be possible to instinctually sense the inexpressibility of being. So the decision to pull the victim out of the car appears to have been made by the rescuer instinctually sensing the victim as being.
How can (b) recognize itself through the limited abstraction of k(i)? Are you saying that the invented label "I" is inherently the same as (b)itself, or are you saying that (b) can recognize that "I" is a label of it?
We are confused by your notion of "fundamental concept" in terms of "be". If we simply defined "be" as a state of living and existing, it would be too vague because it does not distinguish something living versus something merely existing as form, or something living versus something existing with something other than life as its basis.
We agree that the only true self-awareness can exist in being. However, we go further and assert that any true self-awareness can only exist unconsciously.
Your analogy is limited because it only considers knowledge to knowledge (ie. salad to piece of salad). [Salad itself is an invented label and invented meaning]. Whereas what we are doing in the competition is dealing with basis to basis (ie. who we are and our thoughts themselves). [Who we are is an invented label, but it really appears to exist in contrast to a salad].
In our opinion, the crux of your reply 11 comes down to identifying the inexpressibility of being through "some form of instinct based on tropism" and whether or not this includes perception of the intellect. It is clear that we don't need intellect to have instinct based on tropism. (ie. wild animals act instinctually without intellect). Though to be conscious of our instinct, we need intellect. However, for example, just because the rescuer can instinctually sense the being of the victim, it does not follow that the rescuer can really know the victim's being itself. There is no apparent link between instinctually sensing and consciously knowing. We concede that we can be consciously aware of our instinct, but that is only through invented labels and invented meanings. Surely, the victim's being itself, or any other life-form's being itself, is not an invented label with invented meaning.
I make no claim to the statement "we can "perceive" the inexpressibility of being through our intellect". It seems that our views on perception are different.
Since "I" is only a label or an abstraction of ones being it serves merely as a pointer.
In regards to the term "be", using the basis of "who we are"becomes an implicit containment which is not necessarily a function of "be". In fact "who we are" is what this discussion is all about, and using that premise to encapsulate a fundamental tool of discussion ie. "be" only serves to direct a conclusion.
I would agree that the perception of being through intellect (k)i, is at present beyond us.
Since we agree that self awareness exists in being and we agree that (k)i exists,
we're left with a couple of problems.
1) Does (k)d exist as independent in basis from (k)i?
2) Can true self awareness exist consciously?
To perceive a broken leg and to derive meaning from it are two different
things. Another anecdote if you
will? We've all heard the story about the brave soldier who, after loosing
his legs in battle, continues to
feel pain in them. Now please imagine that the man has not yet observed
the loss of his legs. In that moment
he exists in a unique state of being. Does he have legs or not? Of course,
until he actually see's his state
both answers are correct. Later, in the hospital the doctor informs him of
his loss. Now the poor man's
consciousness must shift, painfully, to a new state of awareness. With the
observation and realization
of his present condition, the superposition of (legs, no legs) collapses
to a "no legs" consensus.
The important point here is that, even after the realization, he may still
feel pain in his non-existent
legs. This discontinuity exists, and is unreconcilable with (k)i. He does
not need to invent a label for
the pain he feels to have knowledge of it's real existence. What he feels
is, in more than one way,
independent of (k)i and has no reasonable basis.
This extreme example shows that (k)d can exist in conjunction with (k)i
and need not be defined by it,
to have an independent basis . Further it shows that superposition of
cognitive states exists, and is collapsed by perception and consensus.
In the example of the wreck, the heros actions and his present awareness are the important points to consider in the question of self awareness. Since any future reflection of his cognitive state necessairly degrades to (k)i, his self awareness is confined to the present. It appears that, in the present, from moment to moment we preceive the collapse of disparate and yet connected cognative states as our self awareness. The superposition of these states exists not only between individuals and everything outside of the sphere of self, but also within the self. Of course, most of us, most of the time have our consciousness splashed over an area of time which includes the immediate past and the immediate future and perhaps extensions of each. Since these states, through reflection, collapse to an apparent self awareness it's not difficult to see how algorithmic reason breaks down when trying to resolve the collapse product of these states. To this, compound the contiguity of (not self)/(self) superpositions and we really have a mess. What allows us to effectively function and derive meaning from (self)/(not self) or more aptly (b)eing is contiguity with each present moment ie. collapse product of superimposed states (self) / (not self) into each new state of being." Ken Bell January 12 2000
In terms of k(d) and k(i), we have shown in response 11 that there is no significant difference between them because they both involve indirect experience, except k(i) involves indirect experience in our minds, and k(d) involves indirect experience outside of our minds. We feel that that distinguishing k(d) from k(i) is redundant and unnecessarily complicated. Also, we feel it is more accurate to infer that (k) involves indirect experience rather than direct exprience, because there is always a step of applying our knowledge to what we unconsciously sense, whether we are sensing in our minds or outside of them.
Regarding the definition of "be", what else are we suppose to do: leave the definition in its so-called fundamental form, ie. "state of living or existing", and thereby have the definition so vague that all meaning would be lost? It seems we are in an imperfect situation. One way around it is to not consider the basis regarding "be". Is this acceptable with you? (Though we would prefer using the definition with who we are as "be"'s basis. Since we are dealing with who we are and thoughts themselves, and you accept that "who we are", within the confines of reason, is representative of us ourselves, surely it must be reasonable to define "be" with who we are as its basis. The "be" we are referring to belongs to us. What other basis could it have?
We can show that our inability to perceive being through intellect will always be beyond us, as long as we remain in a similar life-form. (By considering every basis for us, hypothetically, and no basis at all, we show that we can never know who we are, whatever it is).
To perceive a broken leg, excluding perception through intellect, and to derive meaning from it are two different things.
How is it that the legless man is in a "unique state of being", by being ignorant that he has lost both of his legs? How can both answers be correct (ie. legs or no legs), when we know full well that they are not? Even just considering the perspective of the legless man, both answers cannot be correct. Rather, one of them may be correct, and the other is a mistake. Hence, the superposition (legs, no legs), does not really exist, except in the fabricated thoughts of the legless man.
How can the legless man not need an invented label with invented meaning to have knowledge to describe the pain he feels for his legless situation? If you are referring to him unconsciously sensing, if so we agree. Though to make this step to conscious knowledge does not make sense, without invented labels.
Regarding your second anecdote, we are still left with the difference between being itself and what we know itself. The "contiguity" of each present moment does change this difference.
What allows us to function is not the "collapse of superimposed states (self) / (non-self) into each new state of being", but the ability of us to shift from one stream of thought to another. It is inexpressible whether our being itself changes or not. Though our ability to function is not contingent on it changing, nor is it contingent on our thoughts themselves changing, since we have contigious change in our thoughts and material being.
In regard to the first problem you proposed, we say that k(d) exists independent of k(i) only in that it involves indirect experience outside of our minds as opposed to indirect experience in our minds. This difference
between k(d) and k(i) does not change that we cannot percieve our being itself through intellect.
Regarding the second problem, it does not make sense how we can be consciously self-aware of ourselves through ourselves. There would be nothing to be self-aware of. In order to be consciously self-aware, we need distance between who we are and not who we are, and yet this is where and why we cannot be consciously self-aware. In other words, it can only be achieved through thoughts having a different basis from ourselves, and by them having a different basis, we can't really be consciously self-aware.
We propose that "true" self-awareness, not involving knowing, is done unconsciously through instinct, which we may apply our invented labels and invented meanings to.
Moreover, we challenge your earlier assertion from reply 2 that "if reason were our only faculty we would be in a real mess." Since as far we know our thoughts themselves are empty of who we are (as you conceded in reply 11 by stating that perception of being itself through intellect is at present beyond us), it follows, from our perspective, that regardless of what other faculties we may have besides reason, we are in a "degenerate recursion loop".
Dispute 9 (6-9)
Dispute 9 (13-15)