| Challenge the Philosophy - Disputes 36-37 |
Dispute of the response to Entry 442
"While I understand and agree that "Competition 1 is centered around the challenge of more reasonably demonstrating complete knowledge of who we are", it leaves the question of "what is knowledge?" wide open. It thus has no epistemological "ground" to refer to - and hence either has an implicit epistemology, or is malformed (i.e. is based on an inconsistent or undefined epistemology).
I inferred, from your definitions, that you are relying on a scientific epistemology (in which knowledge is both reified and demonstrable): within that modality of thinking, it is (as I indicated) consistent for the Self[1] to demonstrably [transitively know] and [transitively be with] the (reified) Self[2], and hence your proposition is overcome.
However, your response indicates that you are in fact hoping that an answer given will (somehow) transcend your proposition's implicit scientific epistemology, thus providing a normative or sociological answer in terms of *intransitive knowledge*.
Unfortunately, scientific problems are only resolved by/into scientific predictions, sociological problems are only resolved by/into sociological explanations, and normative (evaluative) problems are only resolved by/into decisions & actions. [*] There is therefore a category error (arising from epistemic inconsistency) implicit in your question & definitions, which I assert cannot be overcome.
You challenge me to demonstrate how the Self[1] can know (and be) the Self[1] at the same time. In turn, I challenge you to define knowledge in a way such that it can stand in for both transitive (reified) and intransitive ("idealist" or direct) knowledge *at the same time*.
[*] This forms the central argument of the dissertation (on knowledge) I'm about to submit."
Nick Pelling October 23 2003
Your assertion that the Competition "has no epistemological ground" (i.e. "...leaves the question of ‘what is knowledge?’ wide open") overlooks that the Challenge Proposition refers explicitly to limited knowledge of who we are (e.g. from the response to Entry 249, "...non-absolute... from the apparent limits of what we know"), and through the nine main supporting arguments further refines limited knowledge to an invention of the human mind (or in your words, "a [limited] construct of the human mind"].1 However, we are left with the notion of true (or complete, unlimited) knowledge as a part of the Proposition which according to your position is inconsistent with the limited knowledge of the Challenge Proposition. According to you, this dual use of incomplete (or intransitive) and complete (or intransitive) knowledge is not only inconsistent, but cannot be overcome due to a "category error". Viz., the scientific epistemology of the Challenge Proposition itself cannot be transcended without creating an inconsistency in epistemology; or in your words, a scientific problem requires a scientific answer, just as a sociological problem requires a sociological answer.
We concede your fundamental point that the Challenge Proposition is asserted from a scientific epistemology, and yet internally refers to an unknown epistemology (i.e. complete or intransitive knowledge). However, it is unclear to us why more reasonably the epistemology of the Challenge Proposition itself has to be the same as any more reasonable antagonistic proposition? If that was the case and the epistemology of the Challenge Proposition took precedence, the Challenge Proposition could not within limits be overcome. Also, it should be pointed out that though the Challenge Proposition refers partly to complete (or intransitive) knowledge, it does so antagonistically from an incomplete, limited perspective. Therefore, the Challenge Proposition is not saying that intransitive knowledge exists; rather, it is saying that it is possible intransitive knowledge exists, and proposing that more reasonably intransitive knowledge does not exist. Hence, the Challenge Proposition does not contain an inconsistency in epistemology.
Another problem with your position is that it does not follow, in the context of the Competition, that scientific problems necessarily require a scientific answer, because the underlying determinate of the more reasonable position is the more sound and consistent reasons, irrespective of what branch of knowledge the reasons come from. In other words, no academic field is given more value than another, and all fields as mentioned have their basis in reason.
So in response to your challenge to us to define knowledge both transitively and intransitively and at the same time, we say pass, because the Challenge Proposition is proposed strictly from within the transitive framework (rather than a dual framework of transitive and intransitive as you suggest). (Note, if the Proposition was proposed from within a dual framework, we would concede your position that the Proposition is inherently inconsistent.)
Though the Competition’s challenge to you or any other participant does not ask for a dual use of transitive and intransitive knowledge, but a (more reasonable) transitive explanation of complete knowledge of who we are. You say this explanation is impossible, but you will need to more reasonably prove the explanation is impossible in light of the apparent incompleteness of what we know and precedence of possibility over impossibility (See the response to Entry 168).
In summary, what your challenge comes down to is whether or not the Competition’s challenge to use transitive knowledge to more reasonably demonstrate intransitive knowledge invalidates the Challenge Proposition. In our view, the (more reasonable) possibility of using transitive knowledge to more reasonably demonstrate intransitive knowledge negates any extension of invalidation to the Challenge Proposition. Also, the Challenge Proposition cannot be invalidated for the very reason behind it: our (apparent) more reasonable inability to intransitively know.
One way forward for your position is to attempt to refute the possibility of using transitive knowledge to more reasonably demonstrate intransitive knowledge. In our view, that refutation is a near impossible task considering the apparently comparative and thereby incomplete nature of human thought (i.e. incompleteness in the context of human consciousness equates to possibility). Another way forward for your position is to argue that the Competition is inconsistent because it is asking for something (i.e. a transitive (more reasonable) demonstration of intransitive) that is more reasonably contradictory, and yet the Competition is grounded on the notion of more reasonableness. Though the problem with this argument is that the Competition is not centered around more reasonableness itself (or the Competition in relation to antagonistic competitions), but the more reasonableness of the Challenge Proposition in relation to antagonistic propositions.
So we challenge you to more reasonably (and transitively) answer how you or anyone else can more reasonably completely (or intransitively) know who you are?
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1. The nine main supporting arguments (of the Challenge Proposition) can be viewed at: arguments.
Reply to the response to Entry 443
"My thesis argues that, before we try to build an inclusive epistemological
framework, we must take a position on the nature of time. McTaggart
influentially described two types of time series:
* A-series (‘tensed time’) - Past, Present, Future
* B-series (‘linear time’) - Earlier, (Simultaneously), Later
Practically, one can think of the A-series as St Augustine's ‘triple
present’, and the B-series as ‘space-time’.
I assert that, while we *exist* in linear time, we *think* in terms of tensed time. That is, our *actual needs, actions and reactions* exist in (B-series) linear time, but our *knowledge* is constructed upon (A-series) tensed time, which consists of multiple (possible) pasts, a single present, and multiple (possible) futures.
These correspond to past needs, present action(s), and future reactions,
each of which has a categorically different kinds of uncertainty (and hence
knowability):-
(1) uncertainty of past needs (sociology)
(2) uncertainty of present action (politics / free will)
(3) uncertainty of future reactions (science)
These correspond to three kinds of temporal problem (AKA ‘irritants,
stimulating knowledge production’):-
(1) Sociological (past-tense) problems (AKA Chomsky's ‘mystery’)
--> *symptoms* requiring *explanations* (i.e., what needs [probably] preceded
an action)
(2) Political (present-tense) problems [AKA ‘normative’/‘(e)valuative’]
--> *issues* requiring *decisions* (which action should [probably] best
balance predictions, needs, & explanations)
(3) Scientific (future-tense) problems
--> *scenarios* requiring *predictions* (what reactions would [probably]
follow action)
Here, scenarios, predictions, explanations, and symptoms are all different
kinds of knowledge. For symmetry, *models* (i.e., of behaviour) and
*principles* (i.e., of theory) should also be added (these claim to reduce
uncertainty by sidestepping the normative/judgmental stage). Issues, needs,
decisions and actions are the means by which the (A-series) domain of
knowledge and the (B-series) domain of existence interact.
Problem-solving is quite different for each of the three problem categories:-
(1) Sociological problem-solving processes are *behavioural* (transitive)
- these use (refer to) symptoms and principles, and abduct explanations
(diagnoses)
(2) Political problem-solving processes are *symbolic* (intransitive)
- to resolve needs, these generatively produce scenarios and symptoms
- these use (compare) explanations and predictions, and produce
decisions/actions
(3) Scientific problem-solving processes are *reified* (transitive)
- these use (refer to) models and scenarios, and deduct predictions
Finally: its should be noted that my thesis asserts not so much a theory of time, but rather a *foundational framework for time* (in the same way that an epistemological framework is a foundational framework for knowledge). Within this, beliefs about the Self can usefully be ‘framed’, or placed - so it also functions as a foundational framework for metaphysics.
Whether you see the Self as being a ghost in the (A-series) machine, as a set of (B-series) physical needs, as an agent of free will in a negotiated social world, or as an interactive process by which Divine Will and Human Reason collide (etc), this framework (for time) can hold it. However, its strong implication is that defining the locus of the Self defines epistemology's relationship with the world, not the other way round.
* * * * * *
What, then, is Competition 1's Proposition - that ‘we cannot [more reasonably] truly know who we are, in part or in whole, and be who we are at the same time’ - all about?
Categorically, this appears to be a *scenario* - that is, a generative attempt to convert a problem of (normative) evaluation into a problem of (scientific) causation - yet, like Descartes' ‘cogito ergo sum’, couched in defiantly present-tense language.
Superficially, this points to a hybrid scientific-idealist mindset, and (more specifically) to a linguistically-expressed desire to apply scientific (future-tense) thinking to a normative (present-tense) context, while bracketing both sociological thinking AND normative thinking. There is a strong argument that this juxtaposition of tenses indicates that this is in fact a ‘specious present’ (and hence, like counterfactuals, arguably not really knowledge). Discourse-wise, what's missing is the insight that ‘knowledge is uncertain (and so life is a risk)... but that's OK’.
Yet Competition 1 aspires to touch something greater, something deeper - in fact, I believe that it aspires to explore the relationship between (B-series) existence and (A-series) knowledge. Where in this framework, it wants to ask, is the Self, and (how) can we know it? Can we (reasonably) *prove or disprove* this? Though the details of the discourse are scientific, its aspiration is undoubtedly metaphysical.
You challenge me to answer how you or ‘anyone ... can more reasonably completely (or intransitively) know who [they] are?’ My response - only once you have decided what you believe is the locus of the Self can I tell you whether (and how) you can know it. Metaphysics defines epistemology, not the reverse - so the direction of the causal link you're seeking (however expressed) is incorrect."
Nick Pelling October 27 2003
Though it may appear that the metaphysics of who we are precedes the epistemology of human knowledge (on grounds that the locus of individuals is the defining element of human knowledge), it is (paradoxically) not the case. Based on the premise that we cannot (more reasonably) get outside of our minds and know that we are (i.e. mind in box), and the conclusion that we can only know what we know, it follows within the limits of what we know that the nature of human consciousness itself precedes (or defines) what we know. Hence, any metaphysical knowledge of who we are will be preceded by the apparent nature of human consciousness. Consequently, the fundamental challenge of the Competition is over the nature of human consciousness, which in the context of the Challenge Proposition we have defined as comparative and incomplete.
To put the precedence of human consciousness in perspective, you could for example metaphysically define who we are as an end-in-itself, and thereby establish a ground for complete knowledge, but you would have to (more reasonably) defend that definition through what you know, and ultimately the nature of your consciousness. Unless you can (more reasonably) overcome the apparent comparative and incomplete nature of human consciousness, any defense by you will fall short. (Viz., a complete conception of who we are will be contradicted by the primacy of your incomplete perspective.)
So we disagree with your claim that the direction of the Competition, which has laid an emphasis on epistemology including the nature of human consciousness, is "incorrect".
Supplementary comment:
Your assertion that the Competition is focused on scientific evaluation/investigation, ignores that it entails philosophic evaluation/investigation as well. Though as mentioned in the response to Entry 443, there are no restrictions on what field of knowledge is drawn upon, because the basis for evaluation is reason itself, which all fields are apparently defined by.