"The claim is that we can't know who we are. First, and leaving aside the peculiar definition of knowledge in terms of what can't be refuted(!), if knowledge is related to the refutation of propositions, "who we are" isn't a proposition -- thus, on Garvey's account of knowledge, it's at best difficult to see what knowing who we are is supposed to mean." Peter J. King November 20 1999

Response:

"Who we are" is a proposition in the sense that it is proposing that there is something behind us and who we are exists. Moreover, you can make your claim about who we are NOT being a proposition to ANY idea. It reflects the limitation of knowledge.

Reply 1:

"But then the question concerns knowing whether we are anything, not knowing who we are.

I don't follow this. How can my claim be applied to ideas (most ideas, at least, being propositional)? But, of course, I don't accept the definition of knowledge with which the challenge is working, so that it might be limited isn't really of much concern to me." Peter J. King November 21 1999

Response 1:

We don't think "knowing whether we are anything" is a concern because we have to be something, otherwise we would not exist.

"Who we are" is proposing that we exist, and that there is a basis behind us. These propositions are implicit in the way "who we are' is being used in the proposition "we can't know who we are and be who we are at the same time." In other words, if we felt that we did not exist or that there was no basis behind us, what would be the point in having the competition?

The definition of "we can't know" has been made clear. The revised definition reads:
"We can't know" refers to our ability to refute or prove a proposition, using reason, by only contradicting our use of reason. In other words, "we can know" refers to our ability to refute or prove a proposition, using reason, by not contradicting our use of reason.

2. Dispute:

"The definition of "who we are" is vague, to say the least, but at the same time it makes some dubious assumptions (that there's something "behind" us, for example)." Peter J. King November 20 1999

Response:

Yes, the definition of "who we are" makes the assumption that there is a basis behind us. In other words, we are NOT ends ourselves. Is this reasonable? Can you refute it? If you can, you have won the competition.

Reply 1:

"But the onus of proof is on the claimant, not on me. Why should I think that there's anything behind us? That we're not ends in ourselves? Again, this seems to rest on the peculiar definition of knowledge in terms of the refutation of ideas. (I know that I exist, I know that I'm not in pain; in neither case does this involve my ability to refute anything.)" Peter J. King November 21 1999

Response 1:

By stating that "the onus of proof is on the claimant, not us. Why should we think that there's anything behind us? That we're not ends in ourselves?" you imply that there is an absolute, fixed knowledge. What is this absolute knowledge? We'd like to know.

By stating that "I know that I exist, I know that I'm not in pain," you are ASSUMING that what we think through our senses is what is. (Same view as Bertrand Russell) However, this may not be the case. For instance, could you be applying INVENTED description to what you think you sense, though you really don't know, because you can never get outside your mind?!

3. Dispute:

"It's entirely unclear how we could ever be anything but who we are, even on the limited and vague account of 'who we are'". Peter J. King November 20 1999

Response:

The proposition in question isn't saying that we can't be who we are. It is saying that we can't know who we are.

Reply 1:

"But the challenge concerns the claim: 'we can't know who we are and be who we are at the same time' -- which surely implies that, if we know who we are, then we can't be who we are." Peter J. King November 21 1999

Response 1:

Yes, we agree with the last statement. In other words, if we don't know who we are, we can be who we are. However, the challenge concerns the claim that what we know itself is empty of who we are.

4. Dispute:

"Proposition 1 is Godel's Incompleteness theorem, and I take it as axiomatic. Where the claim falls apart is in proposition 2, "what we know is Empty of who we are." Common sense suggests that 'what we know' is a function of 'who we are'; the two propositions are inextricably related.

(To inject a note of rigor, you may say that 'what we know' ['Y'] is a subset of 'who we are' ['Z']. The subsequent propositions are all denials that Y is a subset of Z.)" David L Fitzsimmons December 1 1999

Response:

Proposition 1, 'we can't know who we are and be who we are at the same time,' which you call "axiomatic" contradicts the so-called "inextricable relationship" between 'what we know' and 'who we are.' Moreover, even if there is a relationship between them, it does not mean that they have the same bases. In other words, 'what we know' is not necessarily a subset of 'who we are,' and according to proposition 1, we know it is not.

5. Dispute:

"You said, 'what we know itself is EMPTY of who we are.'

In what way is our knowledge empty? - epistemically, metaphysically or ontologically?" Cameron Thomson December 14 1999

Response:

What we know itself is empty of who we are in every conceivable way.

6. Dispute:

"You're statement that "we can't know who we are and be who we are at the same time" is not sufficiently self-contained, does not exhaust its own subject matter, is just too simply-put - to be overcome. I haven't the least idea what you mean by "we can't know... ect." - I don't know what I'm supposed to be overcoming." Cameron Thomson December 14 1999

Response:

"We can't know," refers to the process of using reason to know something like one plus one equals two. So what Garvey means by "not knowing" is the inability to use reason to know. And since as far we know, reason is the basis for knowing, we have no way of knowing something, if we can't use reason to know it. (Please note that as far as we are concerned using reason is not just a matter of defining the terms and setting the rules. It must maintain its sense).

In terms of "who we are," this refers to the basis for whatever we are, whether our life-force, essence, spirit, soul, ect.
So the proposition, "we can't know who we are and be who we are at the same time" means that we have no way of using reason to know the basis of who we are. So what we know is not it. We believe this proposition can't be overcome using reason, the basis for all thought. To overcome it, someone must show using reason that we can know who we are or that there is no who we are to know etc.

7. Dispute:

"What about Descartes'contention that he is a "thinking substance" - and that it follows indubitably from this fact that he exists? (Cogito ergo sum.) What about His contention that we CAN KNOW what we are (a thinking substance) and BE what we are (a thinking substance) at the same time? He may not have been right - but surely Descartes deserves our attention on this point. Does he "overcome" Garvey's thesis?" Cameron Thomson December 14 1999

Response:

We agree with Descartes that we exist, though for other reasons.
Also, we agree with Descartes' contention, "I think therefore I am," in a limited sense. By existing through our thoughts, our thoughts are a reflection of us. However, just because we are aware of thoughts in our minds, it does not follow that we ARE a "thinking substance." Our thoughts may be one aspect of our existence, and they may have nothing to do with us ourselves. In other words, just because we think, it does not necessarily follow that we are what we think. And thinking alone does not necessarily determine our existence. So Descartes contention itself does not really get us anywhere. In other words, it is LIMITED to the conscious realm.

Regarding his second contention, how can we know what we are and be who we are at the same time? According to reason, it is impossible. We can't know what we are without getting outside of what we are, and yet by doing so, we cease to be who we are. Even if we could get outside of what we are, we still wouldn't know what we are because to know anything, we must be who we are, and yet we are back in the dilemma of not being able to know who we are while being who we are. So Descartes contention is refuted.

8. Dispute:

"The problem is that the challenge assumes that something must involve getting a full hold of it. We know a lot we do not know in full -- our time of birth, the place where we were born, where World War II occurred, ect., ect. So knowing oneself just because not every element is captured is equally possible." AUBama1511 December 15 1999

Response:

To know anything about "oneself," what we know about it must be connected to who we are. Yet, we have proven through the challenge proposition that no connection exists.
Also, with who we are, whatever it is, behind our consciousness, we can know about us ourselves IN RELATION to our thoughts themselves, or that who we are is not part of our consciousness. Even then, we really don't know anything DIRECTLY about who we are. So the idea of "knowing oneself because not every element is captured is equally possible" does not stand. (And even if we did know many elements about oneself, it still would not amount to really knowing oneself).

If who we are is not part of our thoughts themselves, it follows that "our time of birth and place where we were born," are fabrications about the fabrication, "oneself".

Disputes 9(1-5) Disputes 10-13