Challenge the Philosophy - Commemoration of Nicholas Covelli

Nicholas Covelli, a frequent participant of Challenge the Philosophy Competition 1, was tragically killed in February, 2003. (On a very cold early morning in February 2003, Nicholas was bloody, barefoot, dazed and confused, yelling for help to get to a hospital, after having been assaulted. A Kern County Sheriff's Department deputy in Frazier Park, CA arrived before the ambulance; he shot and killed Nicholas who was totally unarmed and injured. Anyone who has ANY information regarding this tragic incident, please contact help.)

Covelli's submissions (Entries 397, 399) to Challenge the Philosophy Competition 1 are as follows:

397. Entry:

Reply to the response to Entry 396

"Your proposition is in contradiction with itself...on one hand it is saying that truth known completely is less reasonable, on the other hand it says that truth must refer to something completely known...(context)

Here is my question, how is someone going to prove that we can truly know and be who we are 'with absolute truth-value' when it is less reasonable that truth is completely known?

nice fix..."

covelli December 11 2002

Response:

The proposition does not make a distinction between different types of truth (i.e. truth defined as complete knowledge, and truth defined as incomplete knowledge). Rather, the proposition only refers to knowledge which is known completely or in entirety, and which we label as "truly know".

Also, the proposition does not propose that truth "must" refer to something completely known. The proposition is merely focused on knowledge completely known.

Therefore, your claimed contradiction in the proposition, which is based on the less reasonableness of truth known completely, and the notion that truth must refer to something completely known, does not stand.

Regarding your question, you are overlooking that it is possible for something to be more reasonably completely known.

Note, your contention that truth defined by incomplete knowledge is more reasonable than truth defined by complete knowledge, which we have brought into question in our response to Entry 396, is relevant to the proposition only as support for it, because the proposition is focused on whether or not knowledge more reasonably can be completely known.

399. Entry:

Reply to the response to Entry 397

"'Merely focused'? The proposition would not stand if your definition of truth did not refer to something known in entirety...

Also, it is possible for something to be more reasonably completely known, however that possibility is less reasonable."

covelli December 12 2002

Response:

At this stage in the Competition, we agree that the proposition would not stand if our definition of truth did not refer to something known in entirety, or referred to something incompletely known. Viz., by the use of "we" in the proposition, or even the mere expression of the proposition, we are acknowledging at least that we have limited knowledge of who we are. However, it is possible that the proposition could stand if our definition of truth referred to something incompletely known.

Also, though we agree with your claim that the possibility of something being more reasonably completely known is less reasonable [at this stage in the Competition] than the possibility of something being more reasonably incompletely known, your claim supports the proposition or that it is more reasonable that we incompletely know who we are than completely know who we are. Moreover, your claim does not negate the possible more reasonableness of the possibility of something being more reasonably completely known.

Entries 386-396

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