|
|
inexpressible.com |
|
| Reasons Accepted | MessageBoard | Search inexpressible | Books | Contact Us | Home | | | |
| Challenge the Philosophy - Commemoration of Nicholas Covelli |
Nicholas Covelli, a frequent participant of Challenge the Philosophy Competition 1, was tragically killed in February, 2003. (On a very cold early morning in February 2003, Nicholas was bloody, barefoot, dazed and confused, yelling for help to get to a hospital, after having been assaulted. A Kern County Sheriff's Department deputy in Frazier Park, CA arrived before the ambulance; he shot and killed Nicholas who was totally unarmed and injured. Anyone who has ANY information regarding this tragic incident, please contact help.)
Covelli's submissions (Entries 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396) to Challenge the Philosophy Competition 1 are as follows:
Reply to the response to Entry 384
"Truth exists, therefore absolute truth-value exists because absolute truth is known from knowing the truth..."
covelli December 5 2002
Supplementary explanations as requested by the Inexpressible Committee (IC).
(IC) What is the ground(s) for your assertion that "truth exists"?
(covelli) "Truth exists because what we perceive we can only assess to be true..."
(IC) Why can we only assess what we perceive to be true?
(covelli) "Before my answer, could you tell me why I have to provide grounds for the existence of truth...isn't it more reasonable that it does exist?"
(IC) The Competition is centered around whether or not it is more reasonable that truth exists than truth does not exist.
Truth refers to knowledge with absolute truth-value. Viz., something known completely or in entirety.
(covelli) "Sorry...by ‘we can only assess to be true’ I meant if we are to perceive our surroundings with any validity, then we must assess what we perceive to be true...rephrased
Truth exists because what we perceive we must (for validity) assess to be true..."
It does not necessarily follow that perception of our surroundings with limited truth-value is invalid. 1 If we consider that more reasonably we can only know what we know, and what we know is based on limited, indirect perception, then it follows that our limited perception is necessarily valid, unless you claim that we ourselves are invalid, but that would self-defeat your argument by making it invalid. 2
Also, your position that our perception of our surroundings is true (in order to be valid) leads to contradictory perceptions being valid. For example, even though one critic perceives a painting to be original, and another critic perceives the same painting to be unoriginal, both perceptions according to your position would be true!! 3
_________________________
1. Valid refers to sound, defensible positions/arguments.
2. Our "limited, indirect perception" is supported by the apparent indirect connection between our sensory receptors and external stimuli, and the less reasonableness of direct realism versus indirect realism (See the response to Entry 152). Or as stated in the section, Defense of Proposition:
"Conscious knowledge is apparently based on interaction at sensorial, biochemical, and neurological levels, or any other levels, and therefore we can only know via representation. (i.e. we [more reasonably] do not know directly from the external world in a Aristotelian fashion, whereby external knowledge somehow enters directly into our minds. We [more reasonably] know through representation based on interaction, whether it be the interaction of neuron cells or the interaction of sensory receptors with external stimulus. One way around this position is to assert that some conscious knowledge is created ex nihilo ("out of nothing"). However, the concept of ex nihilo is less reasonable than something coming from something else ad infinitium (infinite causality), because we can only know by imputing infinite causality onto things.The representative nature of conscious knowledge is important, in the context of the competition, because it refutes the notion of true knowledge viz., representative knowledge cannot truly be what it represents, because then it would not be representational."
3. True refers to something known completely or in entirety.
Reply to the response to Entry 386
"Yes, what we perceive with limited truth value is somewhat valid... I never
claimed it was not...
Truth exists because what we perceive we must assess to be true...
The painting example does not disprove this point... perceiving a painting is not the same as perceiving our surroundings... for instance, if two people see a tree, both of them will recognize its existence... according to your position, one person's perception of the tree could be true, and the other could be false!!"
covelli December 6 2002
Supplementary explanations as requested by the Inexpressible Committee (IC).
(IC) You claim that what we perceive [for validity] we must assess to be true, and yet you concede that perception with limited truth-value is somewhat valid. So we want to know what is your ground for your contention that it is necessary that we assess our perception as true since the necessity cannot be validity? Unless you are claiming it is necessary for absolute validity we assess our perception as true? But if that is the case, why is it necessary to view our perception with absolute validity?
(covelli) "It is necessary to view what we perceive with absolute validity because what we perceive is true...
I guess I could have originally said...
Truth exists because what we perceive is true..."
(IC) How do you more reasonably know that what we perceive is true (or false)? Why is it necessary that what we perceive is true (or false)? Viz., why can't what we perceive be a gradation of limited truth-value?
(covelli) "We can more reasonably know that what we perceive is true (or false) because what we perceive is what we become aware of, what we know, what we observe...are you suggesting what we perceive is not true?
It is necessary that what we perceive is true (or false) so we can function sanely within our environment...
What we perceive can be a gradation of limited truth-value."
Just because what we perceive "is what we become aware of, what we know, and what we observe", it does not follow that what we become aware, what we know, and what we observe necessarily equates with knowledge with absolute truth-value.
To establish this necessity, you argue that what we perceive is knowledge with absolute truth-value in order for us (humanity) to function sanely within our environment. Yet it does not make sense why we cannot function sanely in our environment with knowledge with limited truth-value based on using reason to compare, and thereby distinguish, what we know. 1 In other words, it does not follow why a sensible, rational individual requires knowledge with absolute truth-value, when he or she has access to the faculty of reason. 2
_________________________
1. Sane refers to a sensible, rational human mind.
2. At this point, it appears to us that generally insanity has to do with malfunction of the faculty of reason, (and the brain’s mechanism(s) behind it), which may manifest itself in an individual believing his or her perception (including illusions) is knowledge with absolute truth-value.
Reply to the response to Entry 387
"This necessarily equates to knowledge with truth because what we perceive is true... Whether it is limited, or absolute, what we perceive is still true...
Because even knowledge with limited truth-value does perceive what is true or false...(as you have pointed out)."
covelli December 6 2002
We agree that knowledge with limited truth-value has a comparative aspect which manifests itself in perception defined, for instance, by true and false, good and evil, and more and less reasonable. However, the manifestation of the comparative aspect does not necessarily mean that our perception itself has absolute truth-value. Viz., we apparently do not need knowledge with absolute truth-value to compare, nor does the form of comparison, like true and false, necessarily mean that we have knowledge with absolute truth-value.
Reply to the response to Entry 388
"Whether it is limited, or absolute, what we perceive is still true... It may not be absolute, but it is still true..."
covelli December 6 2002
Supplementary explanations as requested by the Inexpressible Committee.
We request that you expand on "it is still true..."
"Meaning that what we perceive may not have absolute truth-value, but that does not mean what we perceive is not true..."
Since we apparently cannot get outside of our minds and know that we are, we can only perceive (in terms of intellect) the conscious meaning of what we think we perceive.
The conscious meaning as you concede may not have absolute truth-value, and we contend based, for instance, on the apparent indirect nature of conscious knowledge, conscious meaning more reasonably does not have absolute truth-value. 1
If you disagree, how do you more reasonably know what we perceive (in terms of intellect) is true? What is it that we actually perceive (in terms of intellect), other than the conscious meaning in our minds?
_________________________
1. You say in Entry 386 that "Truth exists, therefore absolute truth-value exists because absolute truth-value is known from knowing the truth..." So it follows if what we know or perceive (in terms of intellect and meaning) has limited truth-value, what we know or perceive is not true.
h4>390. Entry:
Reply to the response to Entry 389
"Yes, what we perceive does not have absolute truth value, but that still does not mean what we perceive is not true; truth does not refer to something known completely because knowledge with limited truth-value does perceive what is true (or false)."
covelli December 7 2002
Supplementary explanations as requested by the Inexpressible Committee (IC).
(IC) Since truth, according to you, does not refer to "something known completely", what does truth refer to? How does truth relate to what we know? What is truth?
(covelli) "You also claim that ‘truth’ is something only known completely or entirely, am I correct?
’Truth refers to knowledge with absolute truth-value. Viz., something known completely or in entirety.’ -Inexpressible Committee-"
(IC) Truth is knowledge that is known completely or in entirety.
Knowledge with absolute truth-value refers to truth.
Absolute truth-value refers to a state of completeness.
(covelli) "According to me?
This statement disproves that truth is only known completely... Can you refute
it?
Truth does not refer to something known completely because knowledge with limited truth-value does perceive what is true (or false)."
We agree that truth may not only refer to what is completely known, but in the context of the Competition, "truly know" refers to what is known in entirety.
Also, by agreeing that we can only perceive through knowledge with limited truth-value, and that our distinctions of true and false, or any other, are based on that limited truth-value, you are supporting the proposition that we cannot know who we are except in a limited sense.
Reply to the response to Entry 390
"[Truth] does not refer to what is completely known because knowledge with limited truth-value does perceive what is true (or false).
Again, you have not proved that it may not...
I never said that we can only perceive through knowledge with limited truth-value... In fact, we don’t know if what we perceive is limited, because truth does not refer to what is completely known...(absolute truth-value).
You say in the context of the competition truth refers to something completely known... In other words, is it all right if your proposition is based on a false claim?"
covelli December 7 2002
Your assertion that "we don’t know if what we perceive is limited" establishes the possibility that truth may refer to what is completely known.
Also, your claim that "truth does not refer to what is completely known" supports the proposition ("we cannot truly know"), and therefore whatever truth that does exist refers to what is not completely known (viz., our limited perspective). (Note, this position does not contradict the previous claim that it is possible truth may refer to what is completely known, because this position is from our limited perspective, and thereby leaves an opening for possibilities.)
Further, the proposition is not based on a "false claim" because it is saying we cannot truly know, so that truth can only refer to what we know from our limited perspective, but as mentioned the proposition does not rule out the possibility that truth may refer to what is completely known. For you to claim that the proposition is a completely known false statement, because truth does not refer to what is completely known, you would contradict your position by relying on an example of complete knowledge.
One approach you could take is that it is more reasonable that truth does not refer to what is completely known, but that would not rule out the possibility that truth does refer to what is completely known, and more important, your position would support the proposition which is saying we cannot know in terms of complete knowledge.
Reply to the response to Entry 391
"You are still claiming truth refers to what is completely known by stating that we have a limited perspective...
What we perceive is not limited because knowledge with so-called limited truth-value does perceive what is true (or false)."
covelli December 8 2002
Knowledge with so-called limited truth-value does not perceive what is true or false. We perceive what is true or false using knowledge with so-called limited truth-value. Viz., the truth or falsity we perceive is limited.
Are you denying that truth defined by complete knowledge is possible?
Are you claiming that what perceive is not limited, and thereby separate our perception from our knowledge with limited truth-value? If what we perceive is not limited as you contend, what is it? Unlimited? How can you separate what we know from what we perceive, since apparently we cannot get outside of our minds and know that we are?
Reply to the response to Entry 392
"You are still claiming truth refers to what is completely known by stating the truth or falsity we perceive is limited...
It is not more reasonable that truth refers to something completely known because knowledge with so-called limited truth value does perceive what is true (or false)...
Can you more reasonably refute this rather than establishing a possibility for its justification?"
covelli December 8 2002
We cannot more reasonably refute that truth does not refer to something completely known. However, the more reasonableness of truth not referring to something completely known, does not mean that it is impossible for truth to refer to something completely known.
Also, the more reasonableness of truth not referring to something completely known supports the proposition, because it implicitly shows the less reasonableness of truly knowing who we are (or completely knowing who we are in part or in whole).
Note, more or less reasonableness does not equate to what is valid or invalid. It equates to what is more or less valid.
Reply to the response to Entry 393
"So, then your proposition is based on a possibility rather than more reasonableness?"
covelli December 9 2002
The proposition is based on the more reasonableness of not being able to truly know (i.e. completely know) who we are in part or in whole. The less reasonableness of truth defined by complete knowledge only applies to the proposition in the sense that it supports the more reasonableness of the proposition. Viz., the proposition is proposing the less reasonableness of complete knowledge (of who we are); it is not proposing the less reasonableness of truth (paradoxically) defined by knowledge with limited truth-value.
Reply to the response to Entry 394
"If it is more reasonable that truth does not refer to what is completely known, then that would mean we can truly know and be who we are because truth more reasonably does not refer to what is completely known..."
covelli December 9 2002
We agree that more reasonably we can truly know and be who we are, when truly know is defined as knowledge with limited truth-value. However, in the context of the Competition, truly know is defined as complete knowledge. Therefore, the proposition stands: we cannot [more reasonably] truly know who we are and be who we are at the same time.
For you to argue that the definition of truly know as complete knowledge is less reasonable, and therefore the proposition is less reasonable, overlooks that the proposition is saying that truly know defined as complete knowledge is less reasonable.
Also, for you to argue that you have overcome the proposition because you have more reasonably established that we can truly know and be who we are, overlooks that you have done so by changing the definition of truly know, which is central to the proposition. To counter that your definition of truly know is more reasonable than our definition of truly know, does not more reasonably establish the invalidness of our definition or the impossibility of it, and your position on truly know supports the proposition (i.e. we cannot more reasonably know in terms complete knowledge).
Further, for you to argue that your proposition is more reasonable than our proposition because your proposition is more direct, overlooks that your proposition is focused on knowledge with limited truth-value (incomplete knowledge) and our proposition is focused on knowledge with absolute truth-value (complete knowledge). In other words, the different focus of the propositions does not appear to be a sufficient ground to say one of the propositions is more reasonable than the other, especially when they are implicitly saying the same thing. (I.e. we can more reasonably only know who we are with limited truth-value, whether what we know is called truth, non-truth, or more reasonable idea.)
Reply to the response to Entry 395
"All right, then what is our truth-value limited to?"
covelli December 10 2002
Supplementary information:
Inexpressible Committee (IC) The truth-value of knowledge is determined by what we more reasonably know about the truth-value of knowledge.
We would not say "our truth-value is limited to", but that our truth-value appears more reasonably limited based on what we know. (I.e. causal perspective, indirect nature of knowledge (interaction based existence, separation between observer and observed etc.), human origin of human knowledge etc.)
(covelli) "Yes, but in what way is our truth-value limited?"
(IC) The truth-value of our knowledge is limited in terms of our perception (based on intellect) of it.
(covelli) "So, even though it is less reasonable that truth refers to something completely known, you insist on keeping it as the definition for truth?"
We now question whether truth defined by complete knowledge is less reasonable than truth defined by incomplete knowledge. 1
Nonetheless, the Competition is centered around whether or not we can completely know who we are in part or in whole. To focus on the label truth itself is off target.
_________________________
1. If truth has limited truth-value, as you contend, what does non-truth have? No truth-value? That would not make sense from our limited perspective, in which all thoughts are defined by possibility. So we are left with all thoughts being true with only a gradation of limited truth-value with no endpoints separating them. In essence, no thought would be false; all thought would be true at some level. Is this way of thinking more reasonable than perceiving truth as simply complete knowledge? We think a more reasonable case can be made for truth defined as complete knowledge partly on grounds that the notion of false would have no place when truth is defined as incomplete knowledge. Also, the definition of truth as complete knowledge is more consistent with the standard definition of truth, which refers to truth as what really is (viz., "the real thing, as distinguished from a representation or imitation." Source: New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary)
Entries 188-384 Entries 397-399
| Reasons Accepted | MessageBoard | Search inexpressible | Books | Contact Us | Home | | |