

Table of Contents

Foreword	v
Glossary	vii
Critique of Democracy	1
Democracy	1
Collective Decision-Making	3
Aggregative Democracy	7
Act of Voting	7
Aggregative Rules	9
Application of Aggregative Rules	11
Inherent Problems with Populism	12
Inherent Problems with Aggregative Liberalism	18
Observations on Aggregative Systems	21
Evaluative Democracy	23
More Reasonable Rule (i.e. Non-Aggregative Liberalism) as Advancement on Majority Rule (i.e. Aggregative Liberalism and Populism)	23
Criticism of More Reasonable Rule as Advancement	24
More Reasonable Rule	31
The Philosophical Basis for More Reasonable Rule	31
Basic Political Framework of (Non-Aggregative) More Reasonable Rule	43
Theoretical Framework of More Reasonable Rule (In Contrast to Majority Rule)	43
Basic Operational Framework for More	

Reasonableness Rule	46
General Application of More Reasonable Rule	54
Criticism of More Reasonable Rule as a Political System	71
Theoretical	71
Practical	85
The Attainment of More Reasonable Rule within Aggregative Political Systems	97
Obstacles	97
Groundwork	100
More Reasonable Rule, More Reasonable Government, More Reasonable Society	107
Fundamental Purpose	107
Nature of Government	107
Shape of Society	108
Notes on Specific References	109
Bibliography	112

Foreword

The main objective of *Evaluative Democracy* is to theoretically establish a more reasonable and viable non-voting democratic alternative to voting democratic systems, with the hope that evaluative democracy will replace voting democratic systems.

I challenge the reader to evaluate the arguments presented in this book, for and against evaluative democracy, based on what argument is more sound and consistent, and allow in the context of society as a whole the “unforced force of the better [or more reasonable] argument” (Habermas) to prevail in one's mind. To settle for a weaker (or less reasonable) argument is to act inconsistent with one's reasons and allow the force of anarchy to prevail because if we cannot make decisions based on objective evaluation of our reasons, within limits, then anything goes.

Also, if the reader chooses to evaluate the arguments for and against evaluative democracy based solely on his or her individual interests, then the reader will likely ignore or overlook the interdependency and interconnection between individuals of democratic society, whereby the society is made up individuals working together (rather than existing disconnectedly in a “state of nature”). If the reader's individual interests are dominant, and they do not coincide with the collective interest, then the reader's evaluation will succumb to a weaker or less reasonable argument.

I should add that I realize that the implementation of evaluative democracy on a national and global scale is a difficult task because of the inevitable power struggle between those individuals and organizations empowered by the existing electoral democratic systems, and those individuals and organizations who are determined to replace the electoral democratic political system with

an evaluative democratic political system. It is my conviction as mentioned that the “unforced force of the better argument” ought to prevail, and if the human will for change and advancement is sufficient, the better argument will prevail.

I am confident that the arguments presented in this book in favor of evaluative democracy, and in consideration of antagonistic arguments, establish the ground (i.e. the better or more reasonable argument) for change and advancement. Though it is up to the reader and other individuals of societies to help implement the change and advancement.

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Glossary

Administrator: an individual who administers the political process of more reasonable rule.

Aggregative democracy: collective political decision-making based on the quantification of votes.

Aggregative rule: political decision-making based on the quantification of opinion whether in the form of votes or raised hands.

Basis for evaluation: a specified statement in a determination of more reasonableness which establishes the fundamental direction of a determination. (Level 1 from Statement 81 and Statement 117.3)

Categorical approach: a means in more reasonable rule to reduce the complexity of the evaluation process through the categorization of (evaluated) categories and their subsequent evaluation. (Statement 149)

Complete knowledge: knowledge that is known in entirety.

Concise: a submission in more reasonable rule stated in the least possible words to accurately and clearly express its main idea. (Length of submissions from Statement 118 and Statement 150)

Deliberative (democracy): a collective political decision-making process in which the emphasis is on constructive discussion.

Democracy: a political system in which citizens have a formal say in the formation of government.

Determination: a political result based on the evaluation of reasons according to the methodology of more reasonableness.

Enclosed absolute: from the theory of more reasonableness, situational information that an evaluator(s) views as fixed within a determination of more reasonableness. (Statement 84).

Epistemic populism: a populist school of thought that justifies and defends populism on grounds that though the collective position of society is attained imperfectly, the collective position is attained reliably on particular issues.

Evaluative democracy: collective political decision-making based on the evaluation of reasons for and against political candidates and according to the methodology of more reasonableness (i.e. more reasonable rule).

Evaluator: an individual in the political process of more reasonable rule who determines the more reasonable political candidates.

Expressive (democracy): a collective political decision-making process based on the expressed (collective) human will in terms of morality and ethics.

Incomplete knowledge: knowledge that is not known in entirety.

Influence: the act of one individual encouraging for neither his or her gain or non-gain (neutral position) an action(s) of another individual.

Liberalism: a main form of democracy based on the individual will.

Local submission centres: designated places in communities such as schools or churches, where reasoners make submissions.

Majority rule: a decision-making method based on the quantification of votes in which generally the higher number votes wins over the lower number of votes.

Manipulation: the act of one individual influencing to his or her perceived gain the actions of another individual. (Note, the greater the influence for one's perceived gain over the actions of another individual, the greater the manipulation.)

Methodology of more reasonableness: a decision-making process based on the evaluation of reasons themselves, for and against two or more positions, and according to comparative soundness and consistency (in the form of contradiction/non-contradiction, ambiguity/

non-ambiguity, and incompleteness/non-incompleteness).

More reasonable rule: a decision-making method based on the evaluation of reasons for and against positions and according to the methodology of more reasonableness or what reasons themselves are more sound, clear, and complete.

More reasonableness: the more sound, clear, and complete (or more possible) reason in comparison to antagonistic reasons.

Non-aggregative democracy: collective political decision-making based on the evaluation of reasons themselves.

Political manipulation: the conception of William Riker (1982 and 1986) which refers to three main manipulation devices, “agenda control”, “manipulation of dimensions”, and “strategic voting”, used in aggregative political systems to control how people vote, and thereby manipulate electoral outcomes.

Populism: a main form of democracy based on the existence and attainment of the collective will.

Reason itself: the comparative dynamic between two or more thoughts (or conscious meanings).

Reasonableness: the possibility of human thought. (Statement 69)

Reasoner: an individual in the political process of more reasonable rule who submits reasons for or against political candidates.

Reason: a concise argument in more reasonable rule for or against a political candidate.

Valid/relevant/verified reason: a concise argument in more reasonable rule that has met the criteria of validity, relevancy, and verification for formal inclusion in the evaluation process. (Statement 98).

Critique of Democracy

Democracy

1. With reference to William Riker and his review of major western political texts, and John Dahl, democracy refers to self-determination (self-governance), and the liberty and equality of individuals to pursue that determination, within limits, in a collective of individuals.¹
2. Liberty refers to the freedom of an individual, within limits, to make a political determination, whether the freedom to discuss with other individuals, or the freedom to access relevant information.
3. Equality refers to individuals having the same access to the (collective) determination process. It does not refer to individuals' views being weighed the same in the determination process. This point is crucial because it is a commonly held fallacy that individuals in a democracy ought to have their views (or votes) weighed the same in the determination process like 'one vote, one man'. If such is the case, democracy as a political decision-making process would be inconsistent, because the decision like the determination of a governing party would be centered on the quantification of opinion rather than on the actual reasons for the decision. To argue that the

¹ William H. Riker in *Democracy in the United States* (1960) uses five distinguished political documents, Pericles' *Funeral Oration* (Athens, circa 431 B.C.), *The Agreement of the People* (Putney (now in London), 1648), *The Declaration of Independence* (Philadelphia, 1776), *Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen* (Versailles, 1789), and *The Gettysburg Address* (Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, 1863) to define democracy as an ideal which comprises "liberty", "freedom", "rights", "equality", and "obedience to law". Also, in *Democracy and its Critics* (1989), Dahl argues that self-determination is an integral part of democracy.

self-determination (of the individual) precedes the (political) decision itself, overlooks that the decision rather than self-determination is the focal point of the decision-making process. Also, the self-determination argument overlooks that the political decision is not an individual decision, but a collective decision. To allow individuals to maintain their independence in terms of (political) opinion and equal weight of it relative to other individuals is to contradict the collective of the individuals.

4. It could be argued that the quantification of opinions, in the form of votes, is the reason for the (political) decision, and therefore quantification of opinion is not inconsistent in terms of the decision-making process. However, this position ignores the reasons for the opinions behind votes by putting the emphasis on the quantification of opinions, instead of the actual reasons for the opinions. This response could be countered by the argument that the reasons have been weighed by individuals prior to voting, but the political decision is a collective decision-making process rather than individual decision-making process.

5. The quantification of individual opinions, and indirectly the reasons for opinions, based on majority rule, does not equate to the collective opinion (or will), because the opinions are individual based. What if individuals came to their opinions based on reasons in terms of the collective rather than just themselves? The quantification of individual opinion is still inconsistent in terms of the collective and decision-making process because the reasons for the opinions have not been weighed or evaluated collectively.

6. The “general will” (or collective will) a Rousseau concept is crude because it is simply contingent on determining the average of public opinion, and yet it does not necessarily follow that the average of public opinion equates to the so-called “general will”. Viz., it is unclear what it is about the average of public opinion itself that equates to the general will. Also, even if the average of public opinion did equate to the general will, the average would still be inconsistent in terms of the collective decision-making process because the emphasis would be on quantification in terms of

average instead of the actual reasons for the decision. The same problem applies to the majority of public opinion or any other quantification because the emphasis remains on quantification of opinions rather than on the evaluation of opinions. Hence, if democracy in a theoretical sense is to be internally consistent it must put the central focus on the collective evaluation of reasons (for and against candidates) rather than on the individual evaluation of reasons (for and against candidates) and the quantification of opinions.

Collective Decision-Making

7. The main problem with the traditional view of democracy (e.g. John Locke) is its emphasis on self-determination (or self-governance) when democracy comes down to a collective decision-making process. Hence, the emphasis should be on collective-determination rather than on self-(or individual) determination.

8. The main purpose of democracy is to attain a fair collective (political) decision(s) in which citizens of a state have the liberty to participate and equal access to the process. However, as mentioned in Statement 3, citizens ought not have equal say in terms of the collective decision, because what matters are the reasons for the (political) decision in terms of the collective. To weigh what citizens say equally by for instance quantifying their votes equally, is to erroneously put the emphasis on individual determination rather than on the reasons for the collective decision itself.

9. Collective decision-making is no different from individual decision-making, except in the former case there is more than one individual involved in the decision-making.


10. Any decision whether an individual or collective entails determining the more sound and consistent choice, or similar criteria, through the more sound and consistent reasons, and in relation to a basis for the decision like the well-being of an individual or the preservation of a collective of individuals.

10.1. A decision entails a conscious process based on the comparison of different ideas (or options/choices) in terms of conscious meanings (like the coherence, completeness, soundness, consistency etc. of the ideas), and in relation to a basis for the comparison.

11. A collective decision can entail other forms than the comparison of reasons like the quantification of opinion through votes, but the quantitative forms, as mentioned in Statement 6 are inconsistent with decision-making process.

12. Based on the theoretical need to compare (or evaluate) reasons on a collective level, democracy ought to entail an evaluation of reasons in order to attain the more reasonable (i.e. the more sound, clear, and complete) collective decision and in which citizens submit reasons in favor or against different alternatives/choices.

Basic forms of (democratic) collective decision-making:



13. The two fundamental forms of democratic decision-making are populism and liberalism.² Liberalism, which is associated with John Locke, emphasizes individual interest within an aggregative framework of majority rule. Populism, which is associated with Jean-Jacques Rousseau and his Social Contract Theory, emphasizes the “general” or collective will (or collective or “common” interest) within also an aggregative framework of majority rule. Note, as mentioned in Statement 6, Rousseau argues for an average of public opinion, which is another form of majority rule. From *The Social Contract* (1968), he writes “... the pluses and minuses (of individual wills in the form of opinion) which cancel each other out, which remains is the general will.” (p. 73)

13.1. Both populism and liberalism in the Rousseau and Locke senses are **aggregative** decision-making processes because they rely on quantifying the majority. In the liberalism case, aggregation is used to identify the majority (the highest, rightful Lockean authority), in order to make the political decision, and in the populism case, aggregation is used to identify the “general” will (the highest, rightful Rousseauan authority next to God) through identifying the “common interest” of the majority and in order to make the political decision.

14. My proposed alternative to Rousseau and Locke's aggregative systems is the non-aggregative system called evaluative democracy. In contrast to Locke's liberalism, it is collective-interest based (rather than individual-interest based), deliberative and evaluative (rather than just deliberative), and based on more reasonable rule (i.e. the more sound, clear, complete reasons determine the political decision) (rather than on majority rule). And in contrast to Rousseau's populism, evaluative democracy is collective-interest based (rather than collective-will based), deliberative and evaluative (rather than deliberative and expressive), and based on more reasonable rule (rather than on majority rule).

² William H. Riker in *Populism against Liberalism* (1982) identifies populism and liberalism as the two main forms of democracy.

14.1. Though both evaluative democracy and Rousseau's populism rely on the common or collective interest, Rousseau's common interest is rooted in the general will; whereas, evaluative democracy's collective interest is rooted in the more reasonable reasons for political decisions.